Director, Officer, and a Gentleman
The Case For Intervening in Bankers' Pay
John Thanassoulis
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper studies the default risk of banks generated by investment and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. Competition for bankers generates a negative externality driving up market levels of banker remuneration and so rival banks' default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured limit on the proportion of the balance sheet used for bonuses. However, stringent bonus caps are value destroying, default risk enhancing and cannot be optimal for regulators who control only a small number of banks.
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Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite's Small World and the Effectiveness of Boards of Directors
Bang Dang Nguyen
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper investigates the impact of social ties on the effectiveness of boards of directors. When the chief executive officer (CEO) and a number of directors belong to the same social networks, the CEO is less likely to be dismissed for poor performance. The results are robust to different measures of performance and networks, and consistent after controlling for CEO ability and connected boards' superior information. Although being ousted is costly for all CEOs - who must then devote time to finding new employment and only succeed in 62% of cases - socially connected CEOs are more likely to find new and better employment after a forced departure. Evidence from this paper suggests that close social ties between board members and CEOs impact the workings of the board of directors.
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CEO Preferences and Acquisitions
Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen
NBER Working Paper, December 2011
Abstract:
This paper explores the impact of target CEOs' retirement preferences on the incidence, the pricing, and the outcomes of takeover bids. Mergers frequently force target CEOs to retire early, and CEOs' private merger costs are the forgone benefits of staying employed until the planned retirement date. Using retirement age as an instrument for CEOs' private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEO preferences affect merger patterns. The likelihood of receiving a takeover bid increases sharply when target CEOs reach age 65. The probability of a bid is close to 4% per year for target CEOs below age 65 but increases to 6% for the retirement-age group, a 50% increase in the odds of receiving a bid. This increase in takeover activity appears discretely at the age-65 threshold, with no gradual increase as CEOs approach retirement age. Moreover, observed takeover premiums and target announcement returns are significantly lower when target CEOs are older than 65, reinforcing the conclusion that retirement-age CEOs are more willing to accept takeover offers. These results suggest that the preferences of target CEOs have first-order effects on both bidder and target behavior.
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Alwyn Lim & Kiyoteru Tsutsui
American Sociological Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article examines why global corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks have gained popularity in the past decade, despite their uncertain costs and benefits, and how they affect adherents' behavior. We focus on the two largest global frameworks - the United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative - to examine patterns of CSR adoption by governments and corporations. Drawing on institutional and political-economy theories, we develop a new analytic framework that focuses on four key environmental factors - global institutional pressure, local receptivity, foreign economic penetration, and national economic system. We propose two arguments about the relationship between stated commitment and subsequent action: decoupling due to lack of capacity and organized hypocrisy due to lack of will. Our cross-national time-series analyses show that global institutional pressure through nongovernmental linkages encourages CSR adoption, but this pressure leads to ceremonial commitment in developed countries and to substantive commitment in developing countries. Moreover, in developed countries, liberal economic policies increase ceremonial commitment, suggesting a pattern of organized hypocrisy whereby corporations in developed countries make discursive commitments without subsequent action. We also find that in developing countries, short-term trade relations exert greater influence on corporate CSR behavior than do long-term investment transactions.
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Golfing Alone? Corporations, Elites, and Nonprofit Growth in 100 American Communities
Christopher Marquis, Gerald Davis & Mary Ann Glynn
Organization Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine the link between corporations and community by showing how corporate density interacts with the local social and cultural infrastructure to affect the growth and decline of the number of local nonprofits between 1987 and 2002. We focus on two subpopulations of nonprofits in 100 American cities: (1) elite-oriented cultural and educational institutions and (2) social welfare-oriented organizations. We find that corporate density enhances the growth of both types of nonprofits, as does location in the northeast United States and a long-established business community, but corporate density is especially potent for the growth of elite-oriented nonprofits - but not social welfare nonprofits - when local networks and cultural norms support elite mobilization. We conclude that despite globalizing trends, the local geographic community continues to be an important unit of analysis for unpacking multisector organizational processes among corporations and nonprofits.
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Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating
Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study whether outside directors are held accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties to directors of firms involved in the option backdating (BD) scandal of 2006-2007. We find that, at firms involved in BD, significant penalties accrued to compensation committee members (particularly those who served during the BD period) both in terms of votes withheld when up for election and in terms of turnover, especially in more severe cases of BD. However, directors of BD firms did not suffer similar penalties at non-BD firms, raising the question of whether reputation penalties for poor oversight of executive pay are large enough to affect the ex ante incentives of directors.
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Financial Expertise as an Arms Race
Vincent Glode, Richard Green & Richard Lowery
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise, and that these investments can be destabilizing. Financial expertise in our model improves firms' ability to estimate value when trading a security. It creates adverse selection, which under normal circumstances works to the advantage of the expert. It deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties. That advantage is neutralized in equilibrium, however, by offsetting investments competitors make. Moreover, when volatility rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity, destroying gains to trade and thus the benefits that firms hope to gain through high levels of expertise.
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Wal-Mart's Impact on Supplier Profits
Qingyi Huang et al.
Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous academic research on the expansion of dominant retailers such as Wal-Mart has examined implications for incumbent retailers, consumers, and the local community. Little is known, however, about Wal-Mart's influence on suppliers' performance. Manufacturers suggest that Wal-Mart uses its power to squeeze their profits. In this article, the authors study the validity of this claim. They investigate the underlying mechanisms that may cause changes in manufacturer profits following Wal-Mart market entry. The data contain information on supplier interactions with retail stores, including Wal-Mart, for a period of five years. They find that postentry supplier profits increased by 18% on average, whereas profits derived from incumbent retailers decreased only marginally. Their results show that wholesale prices are not the main driver of postentry supplier profit changes; market expansion is. They observe a significant increase in shipments to 50% of markets studied. Furthermore, their analyses demonstrate that supplier shipment and profit increases are highest for markets in which incumbents offer a wide variety of products and carry items that Wal-Mart does not sell.
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The Valuation Effects of Geographic Diversification: Evidence from U.S. Banks
Martin Goetz, Luc Laeven & Ross Levine
NBER Working Paper, December 2011
Abstract:
This paper assesses the impact of the geographic diversification of bank holding company (BHC) assets across the United States on their market valuations. Using two novel identification strategies based on the dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation, we find that exogenous increases in geographic diversity reduce BHC valuations. These findings are consistent with the view that geographic diversity makes it more difficult for shareholders and creditors to monitor firm executives, allowing corporate insiders to extract larger private benefits from firms.
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Advertising's Unintended Consequence: Economic Growth
Dennis Kopf, Ivonne Torres & Carl Enomoto
Journal of Advertising, Winter 2011, Pages 5-18
Abstract:
The purpose of our study is to explore what relationship, if any, exists between advertising and economic growth. Endogenous growth theory (Romer 1990) is proposed as a possible solution to this 50-year debate. Using endogenous growth theory, we develop a model that links advertising to incentives for business innovation and for overall levels of information and knowledge in society. Results indicate that advertising expenditures offer significant explanatory power for long-term economic growth for a panel of 64 countries. This study contributes to the debate in two major ways: (1) by empirically showing that on a macrolevel, advertising expenditures and economic growth are related; and (2) by developing a theoretical economic growth model that demonstrates that not only are advertising expenditures related to economic growth, but that they can bring about economic growth. Finally, by providing a refinement of how marketing actions may positively affect the economy, the study contributes to the broader debate of advertising's role in society.
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John Coates et al.
Law & Social Inquiry, Fall 2011, Pages 999-1031
Abstract:
How are relationships between corporate clients and law firms evolving? Drawing on interview and survey data from 166 chief legal officers of S&P 500 companies from 2006-2007, we find that - contrary to standard depictions of corporate client-provider relationships - (1) large companies have relationships with ten to twenty preferred providers; (2) these relationships continue to be enduring; and (3) clients focus not only on law firm platforms and lead partners, but also on teams and departments within preferred providers, allocating work to these subunits at rival firms over time and following "star" lawyers, especially if they move as part of a team. The combination of long-term relationships and subunit rivalry provides law firms with steady work flows and allows companies to keep cost pressure on firms while preserving relationship-specific capital, quality assurance, and soft forms of legal capacity insurance. Our findings have implications for law firms, corporate departments, and law schools.
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Depth to Bedrock and the Formation of the Manhattan Skyline, 1890-1915
Jason Barr, Troy Tassier & Rossen Trendafilov
Journal of Economic History, December 2011, Pages 1060-1077
Abstract:
New York City historiography holds that Manhattan developed two business centers - downtown and midtown - because the bedrock is close to the surface at these locations, with a bedrock "valley" in between. This article is the first effort to measure the effect of depth to bedrock on construction costs and the location of skyscrapers. We find that while depth to bedrock had a modest effect on costs (up to 7 percent), it had relatively little influence on the location of skyscrapers.