Department of duh
A Sharp Test of the Portability of Expertise
Etan Green, Justin Rao & David Rothschild
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
To what extent does expertise depend on context? We observe professionals perform a task that is logically isomorphic to — but contextually distinct from — a familiar task in which they are skilled. We find that performance plummets when contextual cues disappear, suggesting that the expertise we observe on the familiar task is more heuristic than conceptual and does not travel far.
The Revision Bias
Ximena Garcia-Rada et al.
Harvard Working Paper, February 2019
Abstract:
Things change. Things also get changed — often. Why? The obvious reason is that revising things makes them better. In the current research, we document a less obvious reason: Revising things makes people think they are better, absent objective improvement. We refer to this phenomenon as the revision bias. Nine studies document this effect and provide insight into its psychological underpinnings. In Study 1, MBA students perceived their revised resumes to be of higher quality the more they differed from their original versions, but this perception was not justified: observers judged originals (inaccurately) labeled as revisions to be superior to revisions (inaccurately) labeled as originals. Study 2 pinpoints the direction of the effect: revisions are appealing, as opposed to originals being unappealing. Moreover, the revision bias holds in a variety of settings in which the revision is devoid of objective improvement: when revisions are trivial (Study 3A), incidental (Study 3B), non-existent (Study 3C), and even objectively worse than the original (Study 3D). Study 4 directly tests the self-fulfilling nature of the revision bias, testing whether mere revision framing leads people to become less critical of the experience — in this study, less sensitive to possible bugs while playing an otherwise identical “revised” video game — and whether this mediates the effect of revision framing on positive evaluations. Studies 5A and 5B offer further support by testing whether the revision bias is accentuated when people engage in a holistic processing style, whether measured as an individual difference (Study 5A) or experimentally induced (Study 5B).
Does thinking about Einstein make people entity theorists? Examining the malleability of creative mindsets
Maciej Karwowski et al.
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, forthcoming
Abstract:
People differ in how they define creativity. Some people see it as malleable and possible to be developed (so-called growth mindset). Others view creativity as a stable and largely unchangeable characteristic (fixed mindset). In this article, we explore whether and to what extent creative mindsets change when everyday (little-c) or eminent (Big-C) creativity categories are experimentally activated by having participants (N = 501) read short descriptions of everyday and eminent creativity. Consistent with our predictions, thinking about renowned creators (the Big-C condition) led participants to exhibit stronger fixed beliefs compared to when they read descriptions of less prominent, little-c creativity. A reversed pattern was observed in the case of growth mindsets. Specifically, growth mindsets increased when little-c creativity was activated but decreased in the Big-C condition. We discuss implications of our findings for theory, research, and practice.
How breathing can help you make better decisions: Two studies on the effects of breathing patterns on heart rate variability and decision-making in business cases
Marijke De Couck et al.
International Journal of Psychophysiology, May 2019, Pages 1-9
Abstract:
Deep slow breathing can increase vagal nerve activity, indexed by heart rate variability (HRV). HRV is also associated with better decision-making. This research examined the effects of two breathing patterns on HRV (Study 1) and on stress and decision-making performance (Study 2). In Study 1, 30 healthy people performed either a symmetric breathing pattern (equal ratio of inhaling/exhalation timing), a skewed pattern (exhalation longer than inhalation), or watched an emotionally neutral film (sham), following a baseline period. Both types of breathing patterns significantly increased time and frequency domain HRV parameters, while viewing the film did not. In Study 2, 56 students were randomized to perform 2 min of the skewed vagal breathing (experimental group) or to wait for 2 min (controls), before performing a 30-minute business challenging decision-making task with multiple choice answers. Stress levels were self-reported before and after the task. While controls reported elevations in stress levels, those in the experimental group did not. Importantly, participants in the experimental group provided a significantly higher percentage of correct answers than controls. These studies show that brief vagal breathing patterns reliably increase HRV and improve decision-making. Limitations, possible mechanisms and implications for business decision-making are discussed.
Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment
Jennifer Logg, Julia Minson & Don Moore
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, March 2019, Pages 90-103
Abstract:
Even though computational algorithms often outperform human judgment, received wisdom suggests that people may be skeptical of relying on them (Dawes, 1979). Counter to this notion, results from six experiments show that lay people adhere more to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than from a person. People showed this effect, what we call algorithm appreciation, when making numeric estimates about a visual stimulus (Experiment 1A) and forecasts about the popularity of songs and romantic attraction (Experiments 1B and 1C). Yet, researchers predicted the opposite result (Experiment 1D). Algorithm appreciation persisted when advice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2). However, algorithm appreciation waned when: people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and they had expertise in forecasting (Experiment 4). Paradoxically, experienced professionals, who make forecasts on a regular basis, relied less on algorithmic advice than lay people did, which hurt their accuracy. These results shed light on the important question of when people rely on algorithmic advice over advice from people and have implications for the use of “big data” and algorithmic advice it generates.
Perspective taking failures in the valuation of mind and body
Matthew Jordan, Theresa Gebert & Christine Looser
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, March 2019, Pages 407-420
Abstract:
Accurately inferring the values and preferences of others is crucial for successful social interactions. Nevertheless, without direct access to others’ minds, perspective taking errors are common. Across 5 studies, we demonstrate a systematic perspective taking failure: People believe they value their minds more than others do and often believe they value their bodies less than others do. The bias manifests across a variety of domains and measures, from judgments about the severity of injuries to preferences for new abilities to assessments of how much one is defined by their mind and body. This perspective taking failure was diminished — but still present — when participants thought of a close other. Finally, we assess and find evidence for the notion that this perspective taking failure is a function of the fact that others’ minds are less salient than others’ bodies. It appears to be the case that people believe the most salient cue from a target is also the best indicator of their values and preferences. This bias has implications for the ways in which we create social policy, judge others’ actions, make choices on behalf of others, and allocate resources to the physically and mentally ill.
Rationality of weather predictions and insurance purchases: Testing the gambler’s and hot hand fallacies
Mary Doidge, Hongli Feng & David Hennessy
Applied Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Deviations from the rational behaviour assumed in many economic models have been found in a variety of settings. Two such deviations, the gambler’s and hot hand fallacies have been found in lab settings, as well as in consequential real-world decisions. Previous economic experiments have shown that the behaviour of professionals can differ from that of the general population. In this paper, we use data from two experiments conducted with a particular group of professionals who make yearly high-stakes decisions in the face of uncertain weather and market conditions: agricultural producers. In the experiments, participants were asked to make predictions about the coming year’s weather and market conditions and make decisions in a familiar decision context. Results indicate evidence of the gambler’s fallacy, such that participants were less likely to predict a good outcome if the previous outcome(s) were good. We also observed that participants were more likely to gamble if a previous gamble was successful, but find no impact on two successful gambles. These combined results indicate that even professionals with many years of experience can exhibit behaviours that deviate from those assumed by classical models.
Oh, the things you don’t know: Awe promotes awareness of knowledge gaps and science interest
Jonathon McPhetres
Cognition and Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Awe is described as an a “epistemic emotion” because it is hypothesised to make gaps in one’s knowledge salient. However, no empirical evidence for this yet exists. Awe is also hypothesised to be an antecedent to interest in science because science is one way to fill those knowledge gaps. Results from four pre-registered studies (N = 1518) indicate that manipulating awe through online (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c) and virtual reality (Study 2) videos, led to greater awareness of knowledge gaps. Awareness of knowledge gaps was consistently associated with greater science interest and to choosing tickets to a science museum over tickets to an art museum (Study 1b). These effects were not consistently observed on, nor moderated by, other measures related to cognition, religion, and spirituality. However, exploratory analyses showed that science interest was better predicted by positive emotions than by awe. Still, these results provide the first empirical evidence of awe as an “epistemic emotion” by demonstrating its effects on awareness of knowledge gaps. These findings are also extended to the effects of awe on science interest as one possible outcome of awareness of knowledge gaps.
Taking the good with the bad: The impact of forecasting timing and valence on idea evaluation and creativity
Tristan McIntosh, Tyler Mulhearn & Michael Mumford
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, forthcoming
Abstract:
Forecasting is an integral component to idea evaluation and has been shown to positively impact creative performance. However, less is known about what set of conditions, namely forecasting timing and valence, maximizes the impact that forecasting has on creative performance. Along related lines, much is unknown about how quality and originality standards applied in idea evaluation interact with forecasting approaches to impact forecasting performance, idea evaluation, and creativity. In the present study, undergraduates were asked to take on the role of a restaurant development consultant and to develop a plan for a new restaurant concept. Participant forecast quality and extensiveness, idea evaluation quality, depth and range, and final plan quality, originality, and elegance were evaluated. Before formulating final plans, participants were asked to forecast either positive, negative, or both positive and negative outcomes of their generated ideas either as each individual idea was generated or after the final list of potential ideas had been generated. Then, participants evaluated each of their ideas with respect to quality or originality standards. It was found that forecasting both positive and negative outcomes during idea generation improves forecasting performance, idea evaluation, and plan elegance. The implications of these findings for understanding forecasting and creative problem solving are discussed.
Extracting the Wisdom of Crowds When Information Is Shared
Asa Palley & Jack Soll
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using the wisdom of crowds — combining many individual judgments to obtain an aggregate estimate — can be an effective technique for improving judgment accuracy. In practice, however, accuracy is limited by the presence of correlated judgment errors, which often emerge because information is shared. To address this problem, we propose an elicitation procedure in which respondents are asked to provide both their own best judgment and an estimate of the average judgment that will be given by all other respondents. We develop an aggregation method, called pivoting, which separates individual judgments into shared and private information and then recombines these results in the optimal manner. In several studies, we investigate the method and examine the accuracy of the aggregate estimates. Overall, the empirical data suggest that the pivoting method provides an effective judgment aggregation procedure that can significantly outperform the simple crowd average.
Is there hindsight bias without real hindsight? Conjectures are sufficient to elicit hindsight bias
Ina von der Beck, Ulrike Cress & Aileen Oeberst
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, March 2019, Pages 88-99
Abstract:
After learning about an event, people often mistakenly believe to have predicted what happened all along (hindsight bias). However, what if what has happened is not known, but subject to conjecture? Could conjectures, in the absence of knowledge about the event, elicit the same bias and make people believe they “conjectured it all along”, too? We examined this question in 2 studies. Immediately after the disappearance of flight MH370 in March, 2014, we asked N = 432 individuals about the likelihood of a number of possible events. One year later, N = 100 of these individuals participated again and were randomly assigned to 2 experimental conditions. Participants in the current conjecture group answered the same questions from their current perspective, participants in the reproduced conjecture group were asked to reproduce their earlier estimates. Results show that conjectures had changed over time and affected participants’ reproductions of their earlier estimates. We replicated this finding in a controlled lab experiment (N = 94) and found a comparable magnitude of conjecture-based and knowledge-based hindsight bias. These findings demonstrate hindsight distortions in the absence of definite knowledge and extend theoretical assumptions about the prerequisites of hindsight bias in the context of events.