Deep States
Costly Concealment: Secret Foreign Policymaking, Transparency, and Credible Reassurance
Brandon Yoder & William Spaniel
International Organization, Fall 2022, Pages 868-900
Abstract:
This article presents a formal model that shows how states can credibly reassure each other simply by maintaining a cooperative outward narrative. The reassurance literature to date has focused largely on costly signaling, whereby benign states must distinguish themselves by taking specific actions that hostile types would not. The mere lack of overtly expressed hostility without costly signals has been considered “cheap talk,” on the assumption that this behavior is costless for hostile states and thus uninformative. In contrast, this paper argues that maintaining a cooperative façade while secretly formulating and executing exploitative policies carries inherent trade-offs, and thus constitutes a credible reassurance signal. Foreign policy planning and implementation requires communication among various individuals, groups, and organizations, which has some probability of being observed and punished by outside actors. Yet efforts to conceal the policymaking process and reduce this probability are costly -- they require investments in internal monitoring and restrictions on internal communication that can substantially degrade policy outcomes. Thus, to the extent that a state's foreign policymaking process is transparent -- that is, that concealing internal communications is difficult -- the absence of positive signals of hostility is a credible signal of its benign intentions. The argument is illustrated with a case study of German reassurance signals during the July Crisis preceding World War I.
One if by Land, and Two if by Sea: Cross-Domain Contests and the Escalation of International Crises
Andrés Gannon
International Studies Quarterly, December 2022
Abstract:
New domains of military conflict, such as space and cyber, arguably increase opportunities for conflict across, as well as within, domains. Cross-domain conflict is thus seen by many as an emerging source of international instability. Yet, existing systematic empirical research has little to say about how domains interact. This study introduces a new dataset of the domains in which nations took military action during 412 international crises between 1918 and 2015. Analysis of these data yields several surprises. Far from being rare, cross-domain interactions are the modal form of conflict in crises during this period. Nor is cross-domain conflict “new”: crises that play out in more than one domain were about as frequent (proportionately) in decades past as they are today. Cross-domain crises are also less violent and of no greater duration than crises between belligerents using similar means. This study thus presents evidence that fears about cross-domain escalation are empirically unsubstantiated.
Obstacles to harnessing analytic innovations in foreign policy analysis: A case study of crowdsourcing in the U.S. intelligence community
Laura Resnick Samotin, Jeffrey Friedman & Michael Horowitz
Intelligence and National Security, forthcoming
Abstract:
We interviewed national security professionals to understand why the U.S. Intelligence Community has not systematically incorporated prediction markets or prediction polls into its intelligence reporting. This behavior is surprising since crowdsourcing platforms often generate more accurate predictions than traditional forms of intelligence analysis. Our interviews suggest that three principal barriers to adopting these platforms involved (i) bureaucratic politics, (ii) decision-makers lacking interest in probability estimates, and (iii) lack of knowledge about these platforms’ capabilities. Interviewees offered many actionable suggestions for addressing these challenges in future efforts to incorporate crowdsourcing platforms or other algorithmic tools into intelligence tradecraft.
A Silver Lining to Russia's Sanctions-Busting Clause?
Michael Bradley et al.
University of Virginia Working Paper, October 2022
Abstract:
In 2018, Russia began inserting an unusual clause into euro and dollar sovereign bonds, seemingly designed to circumvent future Western sanctions. The clause worked by letting the government pay in roubles if sanctions cut off access to dollar and euro payment systems. The clause received little scrutiny at the time, perhaps because Russia used a state-owned bank, rather than a global investment bank, as underwriter. But with the invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the United States and other governments, the relevance of the clause has become clear. This Essay examines how the market reacted to the clause before and after the invasion. Our expectation was that the market would charge a premium for bonds with the clause. Investors bought euro and dollar bonds, after all, because they did not want to be paid in roubles. Yet contrary to expectations, investors seemed to prefer bonds that allowed for payment in roubles over bonds that did not. This surprising finding has considerable implications for other countries, which may lose access to foreign currency for reasons that are more benign than Russia’s war of aggression. Despite its sordid provenance, Russia’s sanctions-busting clause might turn out to be a positive innovation that could benefit countries facing unexpected crises. Indeed, had Ukraine included such a clause in its bonds, the benefit would have been enormous.
What Do Think Tanks Think? Proximity to Power and Foreign Policy Preferences
Richard Hanania & Max Abrahms
Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
Through the use of survey methods, the study presents the first systematic comparison of America-based international relations professors to think tank employees (TTEs) in terms of their preferred conduct of the United States in international affairs. The difference between the two groups in their support for military intervention is stark. TTEs are 0.47 standard deviations more hawkish than professors based on a standard measure of militant internationalism (MI). Controlling for self-described ideology mitigates this effect although it remains statistically significant. Beyond quantifying their relative foreign policy preferences, this study helps to resolve why TTEs tend to assume more hawkish policies. The authors find evidence that hawkishness is associated with proximity to power. Professors who have worked for the federal government score higher on MI, as do TTEs based at institutions located closer to Capitol Hill. In general, the results point to a self-selection mechanism whereby those who favor interventionist policies are more likely to pursue positions to increase their policy influence, perhaps because they know that powerful institutions are more likely to hire hawks. Alternative explanations for differences, such as levels or kinds of foreign policy expertise, have weaker empirical support.
When does public diplomacy work? Evidence from China's “wolf warrior” diplomats
Daniel Mattingly & James Sundquist
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
How does public diplomacy shape global public opinion? In this note, we theorize that positive public diplomacy that emphasizes aid and friendship works, while negative messages that criticize international rivals are ineffective. We conduct an experiment, to our knowledge the first of its kind, that randomly exposes Indian citizens to real Twitter messages from Chinese diplomats. We find that positive messages emphasizing aid and friendship improve perceptions of China, even in times of escalating violent conflict. However, messages from so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomats that harshly criticize the United States are ineffective and can backfire in times of crisis. We argue public diplomacy can be a useful tool for global powers, but that domestic political pressures have pushed some diplomats, like China's Wolf Warriors, toward nationalist messages that do not appeal to foreign audiences.
Algorithms and Influence: Artificial Intelligence and Crisis Decision-Making
Michael Horowitz & Erik Lin-Greenberg
International Studies Quarterly, December 2022
Abstract:
Countries around the world are increasingly investing in artificial intelligence (AI) to automate military tasks that traditionally required human involvement. Despite growing interest in AI-enabled systems, relatively little research explores whether and how AI affects military decision-making. Yet, national security practitioners may perceive the judgments of and actions taken by algorithms differently than those of humans. This variation may subsequently affect decisions on the use of force. Using two original survey experiments fielded on a sample of US national security experts, we find that AI use by both friendly and rival forces affects decision-making during interstate crises. National security experts are less likely to take military action when AI is used to analyze intelligence than when humans conduct the analysis. Experts also viewed an accident involving a rival's AI-enabled weapon that kills American troops as more deserving of retaliation than an accident involving only human operators, suggesting that national security practitioners are less forgiving of errant AI systems than of similarly erring humans. Our findings suggest emerging technologies such as AI can affect decisionmakers’ perceptions in ways that shape political outcomes. Even in a world of algorithms, human decisions will still have important consequences for international security.
Competitors in Aid: How International Rivalry Affects Public Support for Aid Under Various Frames
Eunbin Chung, Anna Pechenkina & Kiron Skinner
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
International rivals often employ foreign aid to shape international institutions and alliances. This paper asks whether Americans are more supportive of allocating aid to Latin America when they learn about China’s aid programs in the region. Since the average citizen lacks detailed knowledge about foreign policy, communication frames could influence citizens’ support for aid. We, therefore, examine how various framing devices (national pride, humanitarian value, and instrumental value) affect public support for aid. Drawing on social psychology’s model of self-identifying with a group, we argue that one’s awareness of donor competition should boost support for aid. We innovate by using two dependent variables: support for giving US aid and the willingness to donate one’s own resources. A survey experiment with a high-quality sample of 2700 respondents reveals that rivalry has a different effect on these dependent variables: informing respondents of donor rivalry increases support for US aid but has no effect on respondents’ willingness to donate their own reward. Additionally, exposing subjects to the combination of rivalry and all three frames boosts approval for using tax dollars as aid; however, only national pride and humanitarian value appeals strengthen the respondents’ willingness to donate their own earnings.
How foreign information campaigns shape US public pronouncements about civil wars
Benjamin Jones & Eleonora Mattiacci
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Governments involved in civil wars often seek to shape foreign perceptions of the conflict and of the government’s role in the conflict. To this end, for example, many such governments have engaged in public diplomacy campaigns (PDCs) in the United States since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, these governments have hired US public relations (PR) and lobbying firms to present favorable narratives of themselves and their role in the conflict. Through PDCs, governments seek to shape US public pronouncements about the governments and the conflict itself. Are PDCs effective tools to reach this goal? We argue that the effect of PDCs is divergent. PDCs help mobilize both supporters and opponents of the sponsoring governments. In so doing, PDCs increase both positive and negative public statements from US officials toward the civil war government. We compile data on PDCs in the United States since the end of the Cold War. Our results have implications for research on foreign influence in foreign policy, combatants’ moral hazard, and international norms about combatant behavior. Moreover, in order to gauge the influence of foreign actors on domestic narratives of civil wars, it is crucial to consider how such foreign actors can indirectly shape the discourse around conflict by mobilizing domestic factions.
Why Territorial Disputes Escalate: The Causes of Conquest Attempts since 1945
Dan Altman & Melissa Lee
International Studies Quarterly, December 2022
Abstract:
Although attempts to conquer entire states became rare after 1945, attempts to conquer small pieces of territory persisted. Why do states so often seize — and even fight wars over — remarkably small areas? We argue that traditional explanations predicated on the material or ethnic value of disputed territories largely cannot explain the escalation of territorial disputes since 1945. Instead, actors more often seize territory to be seen seizing it. We theorize that the roots of these conquest attempts often lie in careerist incentives within militaries. Military officers seize small pieces of disputed territory in pursuit of promotions or political office, especially in states where the military wields greater political power. We test this theory with a statistical analysis of conquest attempts in territorial disputes (1965–2000) using new geospatial and conquest data along with a medium-n process analysis of all conquest attempts since 1945. Our results suggest that careerist self-aggrandizement plays an important role in contemporary territorial conflict.
Awe for strategic effect: Hardly worth the trouble
Samuel Zilincik
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can strategists reduce the adversary’s capability or will to fight through militarily inspired awe? While strategic and emotion theories suggest an affirmative answer, evidence from strategic history indicates awe does not work well in practice. Historically, military power has only inspired awe on a limited scale, unreliably, disparately and not repeatedly. Furthermore, the emotion does not translate into favourable strategic effects because of the fluid emotional landscape which characterizes combat and politics. These findings question the wisdom of relying on awe in strategic practice but also hold implications for the extant and future strategic thought, particularly the emotion centric one.
Identifying the Effects of Sanctions on the Iranian Economy using Newspaper Coverage
Dario Laudati & Hashem Pesaran
Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the identification and quantitative estimation of sanctions on the Iranian economy over the period 1989–2019. It provides a new time series approach and proposes a novel measure of sanctions intensity based on daily newspaper coverage. In absence of sanctions, Iran’s average annual growth could have been around 4-5 per cent, as compared to the 3 per cent realized. Estimates of the proposed sanctions-augmented structural VAR show that sanctions significantly decrease oil export revenues, result in substantial depreciation of Iranian rial, followed by subsequent increases in inflation and falls in output growth. Keeping other shocks fixed, two years of sanctions can explain up to 60 per cent of output growth forecast error variance, although a single quarter sanction shock proves to have quantitatively small effects.