Credible Threats
Delegating Destruction: Coercive Threats and Automated Nuclear Systems
Joshua Schwartz & Michael Horowitz
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercion, and, if so, what factors increase the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear threats? While prominent scholars like Thomas Schelling argue that nuclear brinkmanship, or the manipulation of nuclear risk, can effectively coerce adversaries, others contend nuclear weapons are not effective tools of coercion, especially when designed to achieve offensive and revisionist objectives. Simultaneously, there is broad debate about the incorporation of automation via artificial intelligence into military systems, especially nuclear command and control. We develop a theoretical argument that nuclear threats implemented with automated nuclear launch systems are more credible compared to those implemented via non-automated means. By reducing human control over nuclear use, leaders can more effectively tie their hands and thus signal resolve, even if doing so increases the risk of nuclear war and thus is extremely dangerous. Preregistered survey experiments on an elite sample of United Kingdom Members of Parliament and two public samples of UK citizens provide support for these expectations, showing that in a crisis scenario involving a Russian invasion of Estonia, automated nuclear threats can increase credibility and willingness to back down. From a policy perspective, this paper highlights the dangers of countries adopting automated nuclear systems for malign purposes, and contributes to the literatures on coercive bargaining, weapons of mass destruction, and emerging technology.
Shadow Wars in the Shadow of the Bomb: The Link Between Nuclear Weapons and Indirect Conflict
Kyle Atwell & David Logan
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do nuclear weapons affect interstate conflict? Empirical studies on this question have returned mixed results. We argue that these results are due to overlooking indirect conflicts, a distinct and prominent form of limited conflict. Expanding current datasets to account for both conflict intensity and directness provides new insights about interstate conflict. We investigate the relationship between nuclear weapons and conflict through a large-n analysis that includes a new indicator for indirect conflict. We find that state dyads which possess nuclear weapons are significantly more likely to engage in indirect conflict. The results suggest the importance of including measures of indirect conflict in future scholarship and the need for policymakers to prepare for increased instances of indirect conflict between major powers possessing nuclear weapons.
Foreign Policy Failures and Global Attitudes Towards Great Powers: Evidence from the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan
Rachel Myrick & William Marble
British Journal of Political Science, January 2026
Abstract:
Do perceived foreign policy failures shape assessments of a country's leadership in the eyes of international observers? We explore the consequences of foreign policy failures using global reactions to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some argue that a poorly executed withdrawal heightened concerns about America's soft power and image abroad. Others believe that the negative consequences of the withdrawal were exaggerated. To adjudicate between these claims, we compile public opinion surveys across 24 countries containing over 17,000 respondents. Analyzing perceptions of US leadership before and after the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, we find that the Afghanistan withdrawal had a substantive negative impact on global perceptions of US leadership. However, we observe no corresponding evidence that the attractiveness of great powers is 'zero-sum': decreases in favorability towards the United States were not paralleled by increases in the perceived attractiveness of alternatives to US leadership like Russia and China.
The Ford Foundation and the development of international relations in China
Shuhong Huo, Inderjeet Parmar & Ferran Perez Mena
Review of International Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Current explanations of Sino-American relations are dominated by realist and liberal understandings of world politics, neglecting crucial transnational actors that complexify Sino-American relations. In contrast and drawing from internationally informed Gramscian hegemony theory, and on extensive archival work, we offer an alternative complex multidimensional transnational account. By researching the Ford Foundation's activities in China and the United States, specifically its contribution to the development of the international relations (IR) discipline in China, we break new ground and show that Ford was key in profoundly shaping Sino-American relations, especially by developing transnational knowledge networks. These transnational elite networks simultaneously integrated China into the LIO and had unintended consequences, particularly in encouraging Chinese counter-hegemonic dynamics that challenge the LIO from within. Our approach indicates a richer complexity of Sino-US relations than extant theories, suggesting that the future trajectories of this strategic relationship are uncertain and do not fall neatly into an inevitable war or peaceful interdependence binary.
Authoritarian Reforms and External Legitimacy
Calvert Jones
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
A growing body of work suggests that authoritarian regimes can enhance their external legitimacy by undertaking reform -- from democratic or "pseudodemocratic" institutional changes at the domestic level to participation in international efforts to mitigate climate change. Yet the shared theoretical logic underlying this work has received surprisingly little empirical attention. This research contributes by offering findings from an iterative series of original survey experiments conducted over nationally representative samples of US citizens. Study 1 tested the foundational hypothesis -- that reforms build external legitimacy -- by adopting a simple independent groups design. Studies 2 and 3 subjected that hypothesis to harder tests via conjoint designs, and also evaluated extension hypotheses about when and in what sense "legitimacy" is gained. Across studies, the results consistently demonstrate that reforms (of a variety of types) do generate external legitimacy, offering both positive benefits as well as shielding benefits in keeping with theoretical arguments. The results also provide support for several new and previously undocumented findings concerning the role of reform type, type of legitimacy-derived gain, and the conditions under which such gains are more or less likely to accrue.
The Soviet Legacy and the Global South's Reactions to Russian Invasion of Ukraine in the UN General Assembly
Qingjie Zeng
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted multiple resolutions condemning the aggression and calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces. While some Global South countries supported these measures, many refrained from taking a critical stance toward Moscow, despite clear violations of international law. What accounts for this divided response? Departing from existing explanations that focus on contemporary geopolitical or economic interests, this paper traces Global South countries' positions to the Soviet Union's extensive Cold War-era interventions in the developing world. We argue that states that received greater volumes of Soviet aid are significantly more likely to align with Russia today, driven by both material dependencies and ideational legacies. Empirically, we demonstrate that the observed association withstands extensive robustness tests and is substantiated by evidence for both material and ideational mechanisms. These findings underscore the importance of a historical-institutional approach to understanding international alignment in the Global South and call for moving beyond the Liberal International Order framework when analyzing global responses to contemporary conflicts.
Geopolitics in the Evaluation of International Scientific Collaboration
Alexander Furnas et al.
NBER Working Paper, February 2026
Abstract:
This study provides evidence that geopolitical considerations systematically shape funding evaluations of international collaboration proposals. We examine this dynamic in the consequential context of U.S.-China collaboration. Across two large-scale randomized experiments with U.S. policymakers and U.S.-based scientists, we find substantial and consistent penalties for proposals involving China-based collaborators. Policymakers express much greater unconditional support for proposals with Germany-based collaborators than for otherwise identical proposals with China-based collaborators (68% vs. 28%). Crucially, this penalty is not confined to policymakers: scientists themselves exhibit a sizeable 18 percentage-point gap (48% vs. 30%), despite professional expectations of merit-based evaluation. Much of the difference reflects a shift from unconditional to conditional approval rather than outright rejection. These penalties are remarkably consistent across scientific fields and respondent characteristics, with little evidence of heterogeneity, indicating that they reflect geopolitical rather than domain-specific concerns. Overall, the findings suggest that geopolitics influences gatekeeping judgments in government funding, with broad implications for peer review, scientific norms, and the future of international collaboration in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.
Explaining Command Style
Charles Miller
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Command style is crucial to military effectiveness. In modern warfare, a key component of command style is decentralization. The military effectiveness literature generally agrees that decentralization is a desirable trait. Why then would a military not adopt decentralization? I argue that the degree of centralization is primarily a function of prewar state decisions to build up trained manpower, and wartime losses. The larger the gap between the state's trained manpower at the beginning of the war and its ultimate land force needs, the more likely it is that the army will be compelled to embark on rapid mobilization. Since decentralization depends on sufficient trained manpower, this will imply more centralization. However early war differences will fade as losses mount. I illustrate this theory with respect to two combatants in World War II: Germany and the United Kingdom.
Coca's Return and the American Overdose Fallout
Xinming Du et al.
NBER Working Paper, February 2026
Abstract:
Colombian coca cultivation fell dramatically between 2000 and 2015, a period that saw intense U.S.-backed eradication and interdiction efforts. That progress reversed in 2015, when peace talks and legal rulings in Colombia opened enforcement gaps. Coca plantation has since increased to record levels, which coincided with a sharp rise in cocaine-related overdose deaths in the U.S. We estimate how much of that rise can be causally attributed to Colombia's new coca boom. Leveraging the unforeseen coca supply shock and cross-county differences in pre-shock cocaine exposure, we find that the surge in supply caused an immediate rise in overdose mortality in the U.S. Our analysis estimates on the order of 1,000-1,500 additional U.S. deaths per year in the late 2010s can be attributed to Colombia's cocaine boom. Implicit annual loss in American statistical life values about $48,000 per hectare of cultivation in Colombia. If left untamed, the current level of coca cultivation (over 230,000 ha in 2022) may impose on the order of $10 billion per year in costs via overdose fatalities.
Claimability in International Relations: Oil Discoveries, Territorial Claims, and Interstate Conflicts
Kyosuke Kikuta
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Interstate conflict is rare not primarily because states settle disputes peacefully but largely because they have no serious dispute. To address this simple but oft-neglected reality, I provide a comprehensive measurement of states' claimable areas. Focusing on three international norms that emerged after the world wars (territorial integrity, minority protection, and maritime sovereignty), I code geographical extents of states' claimable areas for 1946-2024. I illustrate the usefulness of this dataset by applying it to oil and conflict. By leveraging the records of over 600,000 wildcat drills, natural experiments, and difference-in-differences, I demonstrate that fuel resources increased interstate conflicts only when discovered in areas claimable to multiple states. The extensive analyses of validity, heterogeneity, and mechanisms, as well as the "most-similar" case study, provide further evidence. These findings expand the emerging literature on territorial norms by providing comprehensive, rigorous, and contemporary evidence for claimability in international relations.