Come on over
Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in US Schools after World War I
Vasiliki Fouka
Stanford Working Paper, July 2015
Abstract:
Can forced assimilation policies successfully integrate immigrant groups? As cross-border migration surges, more countries must grapple with this question. A rich theoretical literature argues that forced integration can either succeed or create a powerful backlash, heightening the sense of cultural identity among the minority. This paper examines how a specific integration policy — namely language restrictions in elementary school — affects integration and identification with the host country later in life. I focus on the case of Germans in the United States during and after World War I. In the period 1917–1923, several US states barred foreign languages from their schools, often targeting German explicitly. Yet rather than facilitating the assimilation of immigrant children, that policy instigated a backlash. In particular, individuals who had two German parents and were affected by these language laws were less likely to volunteer in WWII; they were also more likely to marry within their ethnic group and to choose decidedly German names for their offspring. These observed effects were greater in locations where the initial sense of German identity, as proxied by Lutheran church influence, was stronger. These findings are compatible with a model of cultural transmission of identity, in which parental investment overcompensates for the direct effects of assimilation policies.
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The Causal Effect of Place: Evidence from Japanese-American Internment
Daniel Shoag & Nicholas Carollo
Harvard Working Paper, June 2016
Abstract:
Recent research has stressed the importance of long-run place effects on income and economic mobility, but the literature has struggled to isolate the causal impact of location. This paper provides new evidence on these effects using administrative data on over 100,000 Japanese-Americans who were interned during World War II. Internees were conditionally randomly assigned to camps in seven different states and held for several years. Restitution payments paid in the early 1990s to the universe of surviving internees allow us to measure their locations and outcomes nearly half a century after the camp assignments. Using this unique natural experiment we find, first, that camp assignment had a lasting effect on individuals’ long-term locations. Next, using this variation, we find large place effects on individual economic outcomes like income, education, socioeconomic status, house prices, and housing quality. People assigned to richer locations do better on all measures. Random location assignment affected intergenerational economic outcomes as well, with families assigned to more socially mobile areas (as designated by Chetty et al., 2014) displaying lower cross-generational correlation in outcomes. Finally, we provide evidence that assignment to richer places impacted people’s values and political views, a new and intriguing mechanism through which place effects operate. Together, this new causal evidence on location effects has broad implications for urban economics, as well as potential policy implications for policymakers struggling to resettle and integrate large refugee or immigrant populations.
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Cultural Assimilation during the Age of Mass Migration
Ran Abramitzky, Leah Platt Boustan & Katherine Eriksson
NBER Working Paper, July 2016
Abstract:
Using two million census records, we document cultural assimilation during the Age of Mass Migration, a formative period in US history. Immigrants chose less foreign names for children as they spent more time in the US, eventually closing half of the gap with natives. Many immigrants also intermarried and learned English. Name-based assimilation was similar by literacy status, and faster for immigrants who were more culturally distant from natives. Cultural assimilation affected the next generation. Within households, brothers with more foreign names completed fewer years of schooling, faced higher unemployment, earned less and were more likely to marry foreign-born spouses.
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The Muted Consequences of Correct Information About Immigration
Daniel Hopkins, John Sides & Jack Citrin
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, June 2016
Abstract:
Previous research shows that people commonly exaggerate the size of minority populations. Moreover, as theories of inter-group threat would predict, the larger people perceive minority groups to be, the less favorably they feel toward these groups. Here, we investigate whether correcting Americans' misperceptions of one such population -- immigrants -- affects attitudes toward this group. We confirm that non-Hispanic Americans over-estimate the percentage of the population that is foreign-born or that is in the U.S. without authorization. However, in four separate survey experiments, we find that providing accurate information does little to affect attitudes toward immigration. This is true even when people's misperceptions are explicitly corrected. These results call into question a potential cognitive mechanism that could underpin inter-group threat theory. Misperceptions of the size of minority groups may be a consequence, rather than cause, of attitudes toward those groups.
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Inequality, Labor Market Segmentation, and Preferences for Redistribution
James Alt & Torben Iversen
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We formalize and examine two overlapping models that show how rising inequality combined with ethnic and racial heterogeneity can explain why many advanced industrial countries have experienced a drop in support for redistribution as inequality has risen. One model, based on altruism and homophily, focuses on the effect of increasing “social distance” between the poor and the middle class, especially when minorities are increasingly overrepresented among the very poor. The other, based on self-interest, combines an “insurance” model of preferences for redistribution with increasingly segmented labor markets, in which immigration of workers without recognized skills leaves most native workers better off but intensifies competition for low-end jobs. Empirically, when we estimate parameters from the two models using data from multiple waves of ISSP surveys, we find that labor market segmentation, previously omitted in this literature, has more consistent effects than social distance.
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Immigration Enforcement and Childhood Poverty in the United States
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Esther Arenas-Arroyo & Almudena Sevilla
San Diego State University Working Paper, June 2016
Abstract:
Over the past two decades immigration enforcement has grown exponentially in the United States. We exploit the geographical and temporal variation in a novel index of the intensity of immigration enforcement between 2005 and 2011 to show how the average yearly increase in interior immigration enforcement over that time period raised the likelihood of living in poverty of households with U.S. citizen children by 4 percent. The effect is robust to a number of identification tests accounting for the potential endogeneity of enforcement policies, and is primarily driven by police-based immigration enforcement measures adopted at the local level such as 287(g) agreements.
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Racial Threat and the Influence of Latino Turnout on State Immigration Policy
James Avery, Jeffrey Fine & Timothy Márquez
Social Science Quarterly, forthcoming
Method: Using state-level data from 2009 through 2012, we examine the influence of Latino constituency size and Latino electoral strength on the number of restrictive immigration laws enacted by U.S. state legislatures.
Results: We find that states with larger Latino populations pass more restrictive laws, but greater Latino electoral strength leads states to pass fewer restrictive policies. This relationship is interactive such that increases in Latino turnout act to mitigate the positive effect of Latino population size on restrictive policies. Finally, we show that the positive effect of Latino mobilization is indirect, meditated by their electoral influence on the partisan and ethnic composition of state legislatures.
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From Refuge to Riches? An Analysis of Refugees' Wage Assimilation in the United States
Animesh Giri
International Migration Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Given that refugees may be fleeing from political, social, racial, ethnic, or religious persecution, they are not expected to be economically independent upon arrival to the United States. Considerable state and federal resources are specifically aimed at the economic assimilation of refugees in the United States. In this article, I examine the extent to which average refugee wages have assimilated toward those of their native counterparts in the United States. Among synthetic cohorts from 1990 to 2000, most recent young refugees increase average refugee wages by approximately 17 percent within a decade. Similarly, in the period between 2000 and 2010, the gains for young and recent refugees increase average refugee wages by approximately 22 percent. In contrast, across both decades, duration effects for the oldest refugee cohorts — irrespective of their length of stay in the United States — exert a considerable downward push on average refugee wages. The contrasts in wage contributions for the oldest and youngest cohorts are less extreme for non-refugee immigrants. These findings underscore the importance of age at entry into the United States for wage assimilation, especially in the case of refugees.
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Occupations, National Identity, and Immigrant Integration
Rahsaan Maxwell
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article examines strategies for immigrants to improve integration by exploring the relationship between occupational choice and assimilation. I ask whether immigrant-origin individuals will be viewed as better representatives of the nation when employed in occupations that reflect national identity. I examine this question with data from original surveys in France, Germany, and the United States. Results suggest that native and immigrant-origin individuals in occupations that reflect national identity are more likely to be seen as ideal representatives of the nation. Yet, the benefits of an occupation that reflects national identity are fairly minor for immigrant-origin individuals in France and Germany and roughly one third the size of the benefit for native-origin individuals. In comparison, native and immigrant-origin individuals in the United States have the same increase in likelihood of being seen as ideal representatives of the nation. These findings have implications for our understanding of immigrant integration and national identity.
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James McCann et al.
The Forum, July 2016, Pages 169–190
Abstract:
Drawing from several original longitudinal surveys of the Mexican immigrant population in Texas and Indiana, we examine the course of the immigrant rights movement in the wake of the historic mobilization in the spring of 2006. We find that from 2007 to 2015, the number of participants in demonstrations, rallies, and marches to support immigrant rights dropped substantially, though protesting remains a fairly prevalent activity. The Mexicans taking part in protest events today, however, have higher levels of education and are older compared to 8 years ago, and they are not primarily driven by personal grievances. This change in the activist base suggests that the immigrant rights movement is following a trajectory that is common among protest movements across many democratic systems. What began as an expression of profound discontent has become a somewhat more conventional mode of involvement.
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Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?
Emmanuelle Auriol & Alice Mesnard
Economica, forthcoming
Abstract:
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful in eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits, but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we show that legalization through selling visas in combination with repression can be used to weaken human smuggling while controlling migration flows. Our results highlight the complementarities between repression and selling visas, and call into question current policies.
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Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration
Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe & Gabriel Romero
European Journal of Political Economy, September 2016, Pages 159–178
Abstract:
We study a model where individuals choose both the level of provision of a public good and the quota of low-skilled immigrants that are allowed into the country. Individuals can supplement the public good in the private market. Immigrants affect natives through three channels: (i) the labor market; (ii) tax collection; (iii) the quality of the public good. We find that the higher the political weight of the rich (highly skilled) is, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward immigration and the more demanding they are toward increasing public spending. The rich are the most favorable to immigration. As they have more weight, the political outcome is closer to their preferences and further from the preferences of the other groups. We use data from the European Social Survey to test the implications of our model.
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Do restrictive asylum and visa policies increase irregular migration into Europe?
Mathias Czaika & Mogens Hobolth
European Union Politics, September 2016, Pages 345-365
Abstract:
This article investigates the extent to which restrictive asylum and visa policies trigger an unintended behavioural response of potential and rejected asylum seekers. Based on our analysis of bilateral asylum and visa policies on migrant flows to 29 European states in the 2000s, we find evidence of a significant deflection into irregularity at work. Our estimates suggest that a 10% increase in asylum rejections raises the number of irregular migrants by on average 2% to 4%, and similarly, a 10% increase in short-stay visa rejections leads to a 4% to 7% increase in irregular border entries. We identify significant nuances in the impact of restrictive asylum and visa policies on the number of apprehensions ‘at the border’ versus ‘on territory’.