Findings

By design

Kevin Lewis

May 12, 2015

The divided mind of a disbeliever: Intuitive beliefs about nature as purposefully created among different groups of non-religious adults

Elisa Järnefelt, Caitlin Canfield & Deborah Kelemen
Cognition, July 2015, Pages 72–88

Abstract:
Do non-religious adults – despite their explicit disavowal of religious beliefs – have a tacit tendency to view nature as purposefully created by some being? This question was explored in three online studies using a speeded judgment procedure, which assessed disbelievers in two different Western cultures (United States and Finland). Despite strong performance on control trials, across all three studies non-religious individuals displayed a default bias to increasingly judge pictures of natural phenomena as “purposefully made by some being” under processing constraints. Personal beliefs in the supernatural agency of nature (“Gaia beliefs”) consistently predicted this tendency. However, beliefs in nature as purposefully made by some being persisted even when such secular agency beliefs were controlled. These results suggest that the tendency to view nature as designed is rooted in evolved cognitive biases as well as cultural socialization.

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What If They’re Right About the Afterlife? Evidence of the Role of Existential Threat on Anti-Atheist Prejudice

Corey Cook, Florette Cohen & Sheldon Solomon
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming

Abstract:
Terror management theory posits that the uniquely human awareness of death gives rise to potentially paralyzing terror that is assuaged by embracing cultural worldviews that provide a sense that one is a valuable participant in a meaningful universe. We propose that pervasive and pronounced anti-atheist prejudices stem, in part, from the existential threat posed by conflicting worldview beliefs. Two studies were conducted to establish that existential concerns contribute to anti-atheist sentiments. Experiment 1 found that a subtle reminder of death increased disparagement, social distancing, and distrust of atheists. Experiment 2 found that asking people to think about atheism increased the accessibility of implicit death thoughts. These studies provide the first empirical link between existential concerns and anti-atheist prejudices.

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Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni
NBER Working Paper, April 2015

Abstract:
We analyze the joint dynamics of religious beliefs, scientific progress and coalitional politics along both religious and economic lines. History offers many examples of the recurring tensions between science and organized religion, but as part of the paper's motivating evidence we also uncover a new fact: in both international and cross-state U.S. data, there is a significant and robust negative relationship between religiosity and patents per capita. The political-economy model we develop has three main features: (i) the recurrent arrival of scientific discoveries that generate productivity gains but sometimes erode religious beliefs; (ii) a government, endogenously in power, that can allow such innovations to spread or instead censor them; (iii) a religious organization or sector that may invest in adapting the doctrine to new knowledge. Three long-term outcomes emerge. First, a "Secularization" or "Western-European" regime with declining religiosity, unimpeded science, a passive Church and high levels of taxes and transfers. Second, a "Theocratic" regime with knowledge stagnation, extreme religiosity with no modernization effort, and high public spending on religious public goods. In-between is a third, "American" regime that generally (not always) combines scientific progress and stable religiosity within a range where religious institutions engage in doctrinal adaptation. It features low overall taxes, together with fiscal advantages or societal laws benefiting religious citizens. Rising income inequality can, however, lead some of the rich to form a successful Religious-Right alliance with the religious poor and start blocking belief-eroding discoveries and ideas.

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Perceived Openness to Experience Accounts for Religious Homogamy

Joshua Jackson et al.
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming

Abstract:
Two studies tested the hypothesis that religious homogamy — assortative mating on the basis of religion — can be partly explained by inferences about religious individuals’ openness to experience, rather than attitudes toward religion per se. Results of Study 1 indicated that non-religious participants perceived non-religious targets to be higher in openness and more appealing as romantic partners, with the first effect statistically accounting for the second. Study 2, which manipulated “religious” and “open” behaviors independently, showed that openness guided dating judgments for both non-religious and religious participants, albeit in opposite directions. Thus, regardless of their own religious beliefs, individuals appear to infer the same kind of behaviors from others’ religiosity, behaviors that are seen positively by religious individuals, but negatively by non-religious individuals. These inferences, in turn, partially explain all individuals’ preferences for partners of the same religious orientation.

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Religion and Innovation

Roland Bénabou, Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni
NBER Working Paper, March 2015

Abstract:
In earlier work (Bénabou, Ticchi and Vindigni 2013) we uncovered a robust negative association between religiosity and patents per capita, holding across countries as well as US states, with and without controls. In this paper we turn to the individual level, examining the relationship between religiosity and a broad set of pro- or anti-innovation attitudes in all five waves of the World Values Survey (1980 to 2005). We thus relate eleven indicators of individual openness to innovation, broadly defined (e.g., attitudes toward science and technology, new versus old ideas, change, risk taking, personal agency, imagination and independence in children) to five different measures of religiosity, including beliefs and attendance. We control for all standard socio-demographics as well as country, year and denomination fixed effects. Across the fifty-two estimated specifications, greater religiosity is almost uniformly and very significantly associated to less favorable views of innovation.

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A re-examination of religious fundamentalism: Positive implications for coping

Russell Phillips & Gene Ano
Mental Health, Religion & Culture, forthcoming

Abstract:
The majority of the research on religious fundamentalism explores its negative implications. Religious coping theory provides an opportunity to examine both positive and negative implications of fundamentalism. The present study incorporated various advanced methodologies utilised in the religious coping literature (mediation analyses, hierarchical regression procedures, and longitudinal design) to assess the relationship between religious fundamentalism and religious coping in 723 American college students. Religious fundamentalism was associated with a number of religious coping strategies that have positive implications and inversely related to religious coping with negative associations. Fundamentalism predicted religious coping over and above right-wing authoritarianism and religious orthodoxy. The religious coping methods mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and adjustment to stress both concurrently and over time. Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research are offered.

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Nonreligious Group Factors Versus Religious Belief in the Prediction of Prosociality

Luke Galen, Michael Sharp & Alison McNulty
Social Indicators Research, June 2015, Pages 411-432

Abstract:
Previous research has suggested that religious belief is associated with a range of prosocial behaviors such as social embeddedness and generosity. However, this literature has often conflated belief in God with group involvement and failed to control for demographic and social network effects. Rather than assessing prosociality by comparing religious group members with the unaffiliated, the present study also includes secular/nonreligious group members. Multiple regression analyses controlling for confounds diminishes many of the apparent differences between religious and nonreligious individuals. Belief in God itself accounts for approximately 1–2 % of the variance in social embeddedness domains and <1 % of the variance in the domains of outside-group charity and community volunteering. Belief in God is associated with homophily and parochial behavior such as within-group charitable donations and constrained contact with different others. These findings indicate that prosocial benefits are more related to general group membership equally available to religious and secular group members alike than they are to specifically religious content. Religious beliefs are related to within-group prosociality as well as homophily and parochialism directed to those outside the group.

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Explanations of changes in church attendance between 1970 and 2009

Erik van Ingen & Nienke Moor
Social Science Research, July 2015, Pages 558–569

Abstract:
We deduce hypotheses from theories on religious change to explain changes in church attendance rates. Using a new dataset with 51 countries across a long period we apply panel regression models, which enable us to test well-known theories in a more strict and dynamic fashion than do cross-sectional studies. Our results provide new evidence for a few old ideas, but also show striking lack of evidence for ideas that appear well-accepted. Tertiary education proved to be a strong predictor of changes in church attendance. Theories about individualization were also supported. The evidence of existential insecurity as a cause of change was ambiguous: economic development and life expectancy showed significant effects but income inequality did not. We found no support for theories on social globalization and social benefit policy. Finally, we found that income inequality and urbanization were driving forces of change during the 70s and 80s, but not since 1990.

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Examining the psychological separation of church and state: The American–Christian effect

David Butz & Jayson Carvalho
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, May 2015, Pages 109-119

Abstract:
Although religious diversity is increasing in the United States, there is strong evidence that many Americans perceive America to be a Christian nation. The present work provides insight into the extent to which American–Christian associations are deeply embedded in the American psyche by exploring implicit and explicit associations between the American identity and Christianity. Additionally, the present work examines the implications of American–Christian associations for behavioral intentions concerning Christian and non-Christian religious groups. In support of strong American–Christian associations, in Study 1 participants from across the United States (N = 100) associated Christian groups with the American identity more strongly than non-Christian groups. In Study 2 (N = 95), a modified Implicit Association Test (IAT) revealed strong implicit American–Christian associations, particularly among self-identified Christian participants. Moreover, strong explicit American–Christian associations were associated with allocating greater resources to Christian groups and fewer resources to non-Christian groups. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding the intersection of national and religious identities and furthering research on American–Christian associations.

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Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration Sentiment

Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, Gizem Arikan & Marie Courtemanche
American Political Science Review, May 2015, Pages 203-221

Abstract:
Somewhat paradoxically, numerous scholars in various disciplines have found that religion induces negative attitudes towards immigrants, while others find that it fuels feelings of compassion. We offer a framework that accounts for this discrepancy. Using two priming experiments conducted among American Catholics, Turkish Muslims, and Israeli Jews, we disentangle the role of religious social identity and religious belief, and differentiate among types of immigrants based on their ethnic and religious similarity to, or difference from, members of the host society. We find that religious social identity increases opposition to immigrants who are dissimilar to in-group members in religion or ethnicity, while religious belief engenders welcoming attitudes toward immigrants of the same religion and ethnicity, particularly among the less conservative devout. These results suggest that different elements of the religious experience exert distinct and even contrasting effects on immigration attitudes, manifested in both the citizenry's considerations of beliefs and identity and its sensitivity to cues regarding the religion of the target group.

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Stereotypes and Madrassas: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

Adeline Delavande & Basit Zafar
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming

Abstract:
Little is known about the behavior of Madrassa (Islamic religious seminaries) students, and how other groups in their communities interact with them. To investigate this, we use data from economic decision-making experiments embedded in a survey that we collected from students pursuing bachelors-equivalent degrees in Madrassas and other educational institutions of distinct religious tendencies and socioeconomic background in Pakistan. First, we do not find that Madrassa students are less trusting of others; in fact, they exhibit the highest level of other-regarding behavior, and expect others to be the most trustworthy. Second, there is a high level of trust among all groups. Third, within each institution group, we fail to find evidence of in-group bias or systematic out-group bias either in trust or tastes. Fourth, we find that students from certain backgrounds under-estimate the trustworthiness of Madrassa students.

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Dogmatism and Mental Health: A Comparison of the Religious and Secular

Jon Moore & Mark Leach
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, forthcoming

Abstract:
Religiousness has frequently been found to be associated with higher reported mental health levels than those found in individuals lower in reported religiousness. These results have often been inferred by scholars to mean that secular groups have poorer levels of mental health despite the fact that secular populations have rarely been included in studies. In this study, an ideologically diverse sample of 4,667 respondents was included to determine the relationships among general dogmatism levels, existential dogmatism, religiousness, and 5 indicators of mental health. The sample mainly comprised agnostic, atheist, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and spiritual nonreligious participants. Statistical analyses indicated that atheistic and theistic groups showed no significant differences on 4 of the 5 mental health indicators. Existential dogmatism and religiousness had similar positive relationships with mental health, but each had weak predictive strengths. The implications of the current study are that secular and religious adherents have similar levels of mental health, which is contrary to expectations based on the previous literature.

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When Heterodoxy Becomes Heresy: Using Bourdieu's Concept of Doxa to Describe State-Sanctioned Exclusion in Pakistan

Ali Qadir
Sociology of Religion, forthcoming

Abstract:
This paper employs and adapts Bourdieu's concept of doxa to describe the declaration of heresy against the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. The Ahmadiyya, avowedly Muslim, were declared heretics by constitutional amendment in 1974, leading to their widespread persecution and bans on their use of Islamic symbols. Most analyses of this event — from a statehood and authority/“Othering” perspective — tend to overlook why the Ahmadi were singled out for this unusual exclusion and why emphasis was placed on symbolic violence. It discursively analyzes the recently declassified transcript of parliamentary proceedings to reveal three interlinked theological and political elements of Ahmadi heterodoxy that challenged the sociopolitical order. The analysis also shows how orthodoxy emerged and was institutionalized in a dialectical relationship with that heterodoxy. Further, the discussion focuses on the continuity of symbolic capital inherent in institutionalization and the implications of this for Ahmadis and other religious “heretics” in Pakistan. By exploring how heterodoxy becomes heresy, this case highlights the utility of Bourdieu's schema and proposes some adjustments to it to better understand modern religious heresy and then export lessons into other analytical domains.


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