Bubbles
Political rule (vs. opposition) predicts whether ideological prejudice is stronger in U.S. conservatives or progressives
Johanna Woitzel & Alex Koch
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
People see societal groups as less moral, warm, and likable if their ideology is more dissimilar to the ideology of the self (i.e., ideological prejudice). We contribute to the debate on whether ideological prejudice in the United States is stronger in conservatives, progressives, or neither. Investigating the American National Election Studies, we found that between 1972 and 2021, ideological prejudice was stronger in conservatives. However, investigating studies conducted to develop the agency–beliefs–communion model, we found that between 2016 and 2021, ideological prejudice was stronger in progressives. We report various analyses of both research programs and two new studies that rule out several explanations for this contradiction. Additional analytic and experimental evidence suggests that political rule (vs. opposition) may explain the robust heterogeneity in asymmetric ideological prejudice. Ideological prejudice shifted toward being stronger in conservatives when the United States was governed by Democrats and toward being stronger in progressives when the United States was governed by Republicans.
Latent Polarization
Klaus Desmet, Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & Romain Wacziarg
University of California Working Paper, May 2024
Abstract:
We develop a new method to endogenously partition society into groups based on homophily in values. The between-group differentiation that results from this partition provides a novel measure of latent polarization in society. For the last forty years, the degree of latent polarization of the U.S. public has been high and relatively stable. In contrast, the degree of partisan polarization between voters of the two main political parties steadily increased since the 1990s, and is now converging toward that of underlying values-based clusters. Growing partisan polarization in the U.S. is a reflection of partisan views becoming increasingly aligned with the main values-based clusters in society.
Anchoring of political attitudes
Courtney Broscious, Brianna Halladay & Rachel Landsman
Economics Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper studies the malleability of individuals’ political attitudes to simple anchors. Using an online survey experiment, we provide participants with the policy preference of one anonymous previous survey respondent. We exogenously vary whether participants are shown a Republican-aligned or Democrat-aligned response. We demonstrate that anchoring has a significant effect on an individual’s stated political attitudes even with this minimal anchor. Our results support the susceptibility of individuals to be easily persuaded through strategic anchoring.
Responsive rhetoric: Evidence from congressional redistricting
Jaclyn Kaslovsky & Michael Kistner
Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do representatives change their messaging to match the partisanship of their district? Prior studies of Congressional communication reveal a correspondence between district and member partisanship, but rely on cross-sectional comparisons that do not distinguish between the role of electoral selection versus re-election incentives. In this paper, we address this gap using decennial redistricting, examining how the partisan extremity of members' social media posts changes when they are redistricted into more partisan or more moderate districts. We find clear evidence of rhetorical responsiveness to the new constituency. Additional analyses show that rhetorical responsiveness complements roll call responsiveness, but is greater in magnitude. We argue that rhetorical responsiveness is normatively complex, potentially aiding representational processes but also possibly contributing to affective polarization. An examination of changes in specific word usage following redistricting supports the latter concern.
A Bulwark against Tyranny? Fear of the Government and Fear-based Gun Purchasing in Recent Years
Christopher Seto
Social Problems, forthcoming
Abstract:
Guns are a central aspect of violence in the United States. A growing body of research seeks to understand social and psychological factors motivating gun ownership, with the concept of fear occupying an important place in this literature. Relying on multiple waves of recent, nationally representative survey data (2015–2021; N=4,767), I argue that fear of the government (e.g., fear of government corruption, overreach, and surveillance) is a primary motivator of gun acquisition and ownership in the United States. Multivariable regression analyses showed that fear of the government has a strong, positive association with purchasing a gun because of one’s fears, controlling for fear of crime, fear of societal instability, and a host of political and sociodemographic characteristics. This association was not contingent on other types of fear, suggesting that fear of the government itself represents a unique, perceived threat among fear-motivated gun owners – one which is distinct from simply lacking confidence in government protection against external threats. Analyses that explored changes over time showed that rising fear of the government among the U.S. public may underlie a substantial portion of increased fear-based gun purchases in recent years. Implications and opportunities for future research are discussed.
Her Lips Are Sealed: Effects of Negative Feedback on Women’s Participation in Online Political Discussions
Zhaodi Chen & Junghun Han
Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, August 2024
Abstract:
Research shows that women engage less in online political discussions than men, but it remains unclear under what conditions this gender difference intensifies. Using a unique survey experiment with a demographically representative sample of 1,032 individuals, the authors examine how negative feedback mechanisms, a critical aspect of the online environment, affect men’s and women’s intention to participate in these discussions. The authors focus on two feedback mechanisms: dislike and deletion. The findings suggest that dislike does not discourage women from participating in online political discussions. However, women show significantly lower participation intentions when their posts risk deletion. In contrast, men’s participation intentions are not deterred by either feedback mechanism. These findings suggest that context-specific feedback mechanisms are important in understanding the gender gap in online political participation, emphasizing women’s sensitivity to online environments where their contributions might be erased.
Group-based reputational incentives can blunt sensitivity to societal harms and benefits
Charles Dorison & Nour Kteily
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
People’s concern with maintaining their individual reputation powerfully drives judgment and decision making. But humans also identify strongly with groups. Concerns about group-based reputation may similarly shape people’s psychology, perhaps especially in contexts where shifts in group reputation can have strategic consequences. Do individuals allow their concern with their group’s reputation to shape their reactions to even large-scale societal suffering versus benefits? Examining both affective responses and financially incentivized behavior of partisans in the United States, five preregistered experiments (N = 7,534) demonstrate that group-based reputational incentives can weaken -- and sometimes nearly eliminate -- affective differentiation between present-term societal harms and benefits. This can occur even when these societal harms and benefits are substantial—including economic devastation and national security threats -- and when the consequences impact ingroup members. Individuals’ sensitivity to group-based reputation can even cause them to divert resources from more effective to less effective charities. We provide evidence that partisans care about group-based reputation in part because it holds strategic value, positioning their group to improve its standing vis-a-vis the outgroup. By allowing group-based reputational incentives to reduce their sensitivity to societal outcomes, partisans may play into the other side’s cynical narratives about their disregard for human suffering, damaging bridges to cooperation.
Partisan collaboration in policy adoption: An experimental study with local government officials
Yixin Liu
Policy Studies Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
Partisanship plays a central role in the policy process, but its impact on the adoption of collaborative strategy by policymakers remains unknown. To fill this gap, I conducted a conjoint experiment involving municipal officials across the United States, examining the effect of co-partisanship on policy collaboration and its moderating impact on collaborative attributes such as resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and policy outcome. The findings reveal that a collaborating partner's co-partisanship status increases the likelihood of local policymakers adopting a program by 12.75 percentage points. Moreover, co-partisan program proposals generally enhance the favorability of collaborative attributes. Finally, the consistency of the co-partisanship effect across ideologies and various subgroups demonstrates that party identity is rooted in in-group loyalty and fundamentally affects the collaborative process.
A generation divided: The politics of Generation X
Patrick Fisher
Politics & Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Generation X often receives less attention in generational analysis due to its perceived lack of distinctiveness compared to preceding and succeeding generations in the contemporary United States. Politically, there is little justification for distinguishing Generation X as it is commonly defined, yet it harbors significant political divergence between its older and younger cohorts. In terms of partisanship, ideology, and public policy preferences, Generation X is markedly divided, essentially comprising two distinct political generations. Generation X can thus be viewed as the in-between generation representing the political dividing line between young and old. The dividing point is the birth year of 1973. Due to the considerable differences in the political climate during their formative years, those Gen Xers born before 1973 lean considerably more conservative and Republican than those born in 1973 and afterward.
The Role of State and National Institutional Evaluations in Fostering Collective Accountability Across the U.S. States
Carlos Algara & Alexander Specht
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Theories of collective accountability in American elections center on the ability, and willingness, of voters to hold legislators accountable for the job performance of the president and his party in Congress. While this work finds that legislators pay an electoral penalty for low institutional approval ratings under their party’s control, little is known whether this form of collective accountability translates to the state legislative context. We argue that collective accountability in state legislative elections follows a two-tiered approach, with state legislators being held accountable for national and state policymaking institutions. Using new state-level measures of institutional approval for national and state institutions, along with voter-level data from the 2007–2020 Cooperative Election Study, we find that presidential approval is the principal growing motivator of state legislative partisan choice with other policymaking institutions playing a minimal role, at best. These findings suggest that the electoral fortune of state legislative candidates, and state parties, are largely and increasingly determined by national forces outside of the purview of state-level policymaking institutions.
Understanding the Impact of Military Service on Support for Insurrection in the United States
Robert Pape et al.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do some individuals with military experience support the insurrection of January 6? With US military veterans playing a central role in the assault on the US Capitol, answering this question is of immediate scholarly and policy concern. To better understand the impact of military service, we conducted the first nationally representative survey of support for pro-Trump anti-democratic violence (“insurrectionist sentiments”) among US military veterans and a demographically matched sample of non-veterans. Our analysis finds veterans nearly twice as likely to hold high insurrectionist sentiments than non-veterans, and that military service increases support for restoring Trump to the presidency by force by 15 percent. Further, we find the effect of veterancy is not fully explained by veterans being more likely to hold pro-Trump or conspiracy beliefs but is associated with negative military and post-service-related experiences. These findings are robust to significant unobserved confounding. We conclude with implications for future research on political violence and the role of the military in American democracy.