Blood and treasure
Hannah Farber
Journal of the Early Republic, Summer 2014, Pages 187-217
Abstract:
In September 1795, the United States of America agreed to pay a large sum of money to the independent Ottoman regency of Algiers so that Algiers would not interfere with its trade in and around the Mediterranean. This trade was of great importance for American farmers and merchants, who hoped to meet warring European armies’ increased demand for grain, as well as for the American commercial fleet, which sought to increase its share of the Mediterranean carrying trade. For the next thirteen months, however, the United States struggled to make the payment, and the Dey of Algiers repeatedly threatened to cancel the treaty. American historians usually describe this series of events as a diplomatic crisis and national disgrace, during which the United States was forced to pay protection money to safeguard its ships from the Algerian corsair fleets mistakenly termed “pirates.” This article argues, however, that the American payment to Algiers benefited the United States by establishing American commercial credit and political credibility overseas. As the treaty payment left the Bank of the United States in Philadelphia, entered the London financial markets, and passed through the hands of merchant houses in Cadiz and Livorno, a diverse group of international creditors became invested in American success. When the payment at last arrived as specie in Algiers, government leaders, diplomats, merchants and insurers around Europe and the Mediterranean had new reason to believe that the credit of the new republic was good.
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Leonardo Bursztyn et al.
NBER Working Paper, May 2014
Abstract:
We develop an indirect, revealed preference method of eliciting attitudes and apply it in an experiment in Pakistan designed to understand the expression of anti-American views. Following the completion of a personality survey, we offer subjects a bonus payment for completing the survey. We find that around one-quarter of subjects forgo a 100 Rupee payment (roughly one-fifth of a day's wage) to avoid anonymously checking a box indicating gratitude toward the United States government for providing funds. We experimentally vary the identity of the funder, the payment size, and subjects' expectations of privacy, and find that rejection of the payment is responsive to all of these treatments. Rejection of the U.S. government bonus payment is an indirect measure of anti-American attitudes. This approach mitigates concerns with experimenter demand, social desirability, and other biases, which can distort reported attitudes. We discuss and present suggestive evidence of the advantages of our methodology.
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Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls
Raphael Cohen
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought.
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Civil War and U.S. Foreign Influence
Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk
Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study how foreign interventions affect civil war around the world. In an infinitely repeated game we combine a gambling for resurrection mechanism for the influencing country with the canonical bargaining model of war in the influenced country to micro-found sudden shifts in power among the domestic bargaining partners, which are known to lead to war due to commitment problems. We test two of our model predictions that allow us to identify the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence : (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates. These results withstand several robustness checks and, overall, suggest that foreign influence is a sizable driver of domestic conflict.
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US Food Aid and Civil Conflict
Nathan Nunn & Nancy Qian
American Economic Review, June 2014, Pages 1630-1666
Abstract:
We study the effect of U.S. food aid on conflict in recipient countries. Our analysis exploits time variation in food aid shipments due to changes in U.S. wheat production and cross-sectional variation in a country's tendency to receive any U.S. food aid. According to our estimates, an increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence and duration of civil conflicts, but has no robust effect on inter-state conflicts or the onset of civil conflicts. We also provide suggestive evidence that the effects are most pronounced in countries with a recent history of civil conflict.
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Moran Yarchi
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
The study examines the effect of female suicide attacks on foreign media framing of conflicts. Examining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 2,731 articles were sampled that covered terrorist events (American, British, and Indian press); 625 appeared in the week following a female's suicide attack, 97 reported an attack by a female perpetrator. The findings suggest that foreign media discourse around female suicide bombers promotes more messages about the society within which the terrorists are embedded. Since the coverage of female terrorists tends to provide more detailed information about the perpetrator, it focuses more on the terror organizations’ side of the conflict's story.
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Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs
Alexander Montgomery & Adam Mount
Intelligence and National Security, May/June 2014, Pages 357-386
Abstract:
Various policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons, yet all rely on sound intelligence about the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States' record of estimating foreign weapons programs has been uneven, overestimating the progress made by some proliferators while underestimating others. This paper seeks to catalogue and evaluate the intelligence work surrounding 16 of the 25 states that are thought to have pursued nuclear weapons and to provide a framework for evaluating the causes of distorted intelligence estimates of nuclear proliferation. In particular, we identify 12 specific hypotheses related to politics, culture, bureaucracy and organizational culture, then explore how they play out in practice through two case studies (North Korea and Israel). We find that the US has overestimated nuclear programs much more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated them.
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Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade
Matthew Jackson & Stephen Nei
Stanford Working Paper, May 2014
Abstract:
We investigate the role of networks of military alliances in preventing or encouraging wars between groups of countries. A country is vulnerable to attack if some allied group of countries can defeat the defending country and its (remaining) allies based on their collective military strengths. We show that there do not exist any networks which contain no vulnerable countries and that are stable against the pairwise addition of a new alliance as well as against the unilateral deletion of any existing alliance. We then show that economic benefits from international trade provide incentives to form alliances in ways that restore stability and prevent wars, both by increasing the density of alliances so that countries are less vulnerable and by removing the incentives of countries to attack their allies. In closing, we examine historical data on interstate wars and trade, noting that a dramatic (more than ten-fold) drop in the rate of interstate wars since 1950 is paralleled by the advent of nuclear weapons and an unprecedented growth in trade over the same period, matched with a similar densification and stabilization of alliances, consistent with the model.
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International Cooperation, Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism
Justin Conrad & James Igoe Walsh
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: non-state groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and non-cooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism.
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Scott Kemp
International Security, Spring 2014, Pages 39-78
Abstract:
Technology has been long understood to play a central role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Evolving nuclear technology, increased access to information, and systematic improvements in design and manufacturing tools, however, should in time ease the proliferation challenge. Eventually, even developing countries could possess a sufficient technical ability. There is evidence that this transition has already occurred. The basic uranium-enrichment gas centrifuge, developed in the 1960s, has technical characteristics that are within reach of nearly all states, without foreign assistance or access to export-controllable materials. The history of centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective, as do previously secret studies carried out by the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. Complicating matters, centrifuges also have properties that make the detection of a clandestine program enormously difficult. If conditions for the clandestine and indigenous production of weapons have emerged, then nonproliferation institutions focused on technology will be inadequate. Although it would represent a near-foundational shift in nuclear security policy, the changed technology landscape may now necessitate a return to institutions focused instead on motivations.
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Matthew Morehouse
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, July 2014, Pages 541-566
Abstract:
While the use of targeted killings by the United States and Israel has received the most press coverage, Colombia has also utilized targeted killings in its conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Utilizing an original dataset, this study quantitatively gauges the effectiveness of Colombia's targeted killing program, by examining the influence of FARC leadership deaths upon the number and severity of FARC attacks during the years 2004 to 2011. The results suggest that the Colombian government's killing of FARC leaders has been effective in decreasing the number of attacks, but not the severity of attacks.
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Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism
David Benson
Security Studies, Spring 2014, Pages 293-328
Abstract:
Policymakers and scholars fear that the Internet has increased the ability of transnational terrorists, like al Qaeda, to attack targets in the West, even in the face of increased policing and military efforts. Although access to the Internet has increased across the globe, there has been no corresponding increase in completed transnational terrorist attacks. This analysis examines the causal logics — which have led to the conventional wisdom — and demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the Internet is not a force multiplier for transnational terrorist organizations. Far from being at a disadvantage on the Internet, state security organs actually gain at least as much utility from the Internet as terrorist groups do, meaning that at worst the Internet leaves the state in the same position vis-à-vis terrorist campaigns as it was prior to the Internet.
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The domestic sources of China’s more assertive foreign policy
Jian Zhang
International Politics, May 2014, Pages 390–397
Abstract:
China’s more assertive policy in the East and South East Asia region since 2008 has been explained either in terms of its rising power, a belief that the United States is in decline, or even the complexities of the Chinese state’s bureaucratic political structures. This article suggests another explanation – namely that China’s more assertive strategy is an attempt to shore up legitimacy at home at a time of increasing domestic stress.
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Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes
Jenna Jordan
International Security, Spring 2014, Pages 7-38
Abstract:
Leadership targeting has become a key feature of counterterrorism policy. Both academics and policymakers have argued that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in combating terrorism. Leadership decapitation is not always successful, however, and existing empirical work does not account for this variability. A theory of organizational resilience explains why decapitation results in the decline of some terrorist organizations and the survival of others. Organizational resilience is dependent on two variables: bureaucratization and communal support. Older and larger organizations tend to develop bureaucratic features, facilitating a clear succession process and increasing their stability and ability to withstand attacks on their leadership. Communal support plays an important role in providing the resources necessary for terrorist groups to function and survive. Religious and separatist groups typically enjoy a high degree of support from the communities in which they operate, and thus access to critical resources. Application of this theoretical model to the case of al-Qaida reveals that Osama bin Laden’s death and the subsequent targeting of other high-level al-Qaida operatives are unlikely to produce significant organizational decline.
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Technology and the Era of the Mass Army
Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato, Kenneth Scheve & David Stasavage
Journal of Economic History, June 2014, Pages 449-481
Abstract:
We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century, the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century, further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find support for our technological account using a new data set covering thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000. We find little evidence that the French Revolution was a watershed in terms of levels of mobilization.
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Allison Redlich, Christopher Kelly & Jeaneé Miller
Applied Cognitive Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
A great deal of research in the past two decades has been devoted to interrogation and interviewing techniques. This study contributes to the existing literature using an online survey to examine the frequency of use and perceived effectiveness of interrogation methods for up to 152 military and federal-level interrogators from the USA. We focus on the who (objective and subjective interrogator characteristics), the what (situational and detainee characteristics), and the why (intended goal of interrogation). Results indicate that rapport and relationship-building techniques were employed most often and perceived as the most effective regardless of context and intended outcome, particularly in comparison to confrontational techniques. In addition, context was found to be important in that depending on the situational and detainee characteristics and goal, interrogation methods were viewed as more or less effective.
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First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa
Daniel Aldrich
Terrorism and Political Violence, Summer 2014, Pages 523-546
Abstract:
The United States government has adopted new approaches to counter violent extremist organizations around the world. “Soft security” and development programs include focused educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities. This article evaluates the effectiveness of one set of these multi-vectored, community-level programs through data from 200 respondents in two similar, neighboring towns in northern Mali, Africa. The data show that residents in Timbuktu who were exposed to the programming for up to five years displayed measurably altered civic behavior and listening patterns in comparison with their counterparts in the control town of Diré, which had no programming (controlling for potential covariates including age, ethnicity, and political and socioeconomic conditions). However, there was little measurable difference between the groups in terms of their cultural identities and attitudes towards the West. While this study is unable to definitively prove a causal connection between programming and behavioral outcomes, it nonetheless strongly suggests that the process of “winning hearts and minds” can be effective at certain levels but may require extended time and dedicated resources to generate higher-level results.
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The Changing Nonlinear Relationship between Income and Terrorism
Walter Enders, Gary Hoover & Todd Sandler
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article reinvestigates the relationship between real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and terrorism. We devise a terrorism Lorenz curve to show that domestic and transnational terrorist attacks are each more concentrated in middle-income countries, thereby suggesting a nonlinear income–terrorism relationship. Moreover, this point of concentration shifted to lower income countries after the rising influence of the religious fundamentalist and nationalist/separatist terrorists in the early 1990s. For transnational terrorist attacks, this shift characterized not only the attack venue but also the perpetrators’ nationality. The article then uses nonlinear smooth transition regressions to establish the relationship between real per capita GDP and terrorism for eight alternative terrorism samples, accounting for venue, perpetrators’ nationality, terrorism type, and the period. Our nonlinear estimates are shown to be favored over estimates using linear or quadratic income determinants of terrorism. These nonlinear estimates are robust to additional controls.
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Jerrold Post, Cody McGinnis & Kristen Moody
Behavioral Sciences & the Law, May/June 2014, Pages 306–334
Abstract:
There are no psychological characteristics or psychopathology separating terrorists from the general population. Rather, it is group dynamics, with a particular emphasis on collective identity, that helps to explain terrorist psychology. Just as there is a diverse spectrum of kinds of terrorism, so too is there a spectrum of terrorist psychologies. Some terrorists, those in nationalist-separatist groups, such as Fatah and the IRA, are continuing with the mission of their parents who are dissident to the regime. The opposite generational provenance is seen among social-revolutionary terrorists, such as the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction in Germany, who are rebelling against their parents’ generation, which is loyal to the regime. Four waves of terrorism can be distinguished: the “anarchist wave”; the “anti-colonial wave” (nationalist-separatist), with minority groups seeking to be liberated from their colonial masters or from the majority in their country; the “new left” wave (social-revolutionary); and now the “religious” wave. With the communications revolution, a new phenomenon is emerging which may presage a fifth wave: lone wolf terrorists who through the Internet are radicalized and feel they belong to the virtual community of hatred. A typology of lone wolf terrorism is proposed.
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Jesse Paul Lehrke & Rahel Schomaker
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article seeks to determine the mechanism(s) behind the convergence of domestic counter-terrorism regulations that has been noted across many OECD countries. Four hypotheses are developed and tested through regression analyses. These hypotheses examine (1) US influence, operationalized though a unique US footprint indictor; (2) national characteristics; (3) the extent to which states’ domestic structures match; and (4) international networks. We find little support that US influence matters. The international influence that does exist seems to operate through networks promoting learning, especially following a rise in the general global threat level. National characteristics as a driver also find some support.
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Institutional Opposition, Regime Accountability, and International Conflict
Daina Chiba & Songying Fang
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can international organizations constrain a leader’s behavior during a military crisis? Existing studies have shown that joint membership in international organizations reduces the likelihood of dispute initiation; however, whether institutional opposition can prevent an ongoing conflict from escalating has yet to be investigated. We develop and test a theory of how domestic politics provides a mechanism through which international organizations can reverse the course of a military crisis. The argument leads to the hypothesis that more accountable regimes are less likely to escalate military crises when an international organization opposes their actions. We test the hypothesis with an analysis of territorial disputes from 1946 to 1995. We find that while neither institutional opposition nor the degree of regime accountability independently reduces the tendency for a country to escalate a conflict, the joint effect of the two does.
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Women as Policy Makers and Donors: Female Legislators and Foreign Aid
Daniel Hicks, Joan Hamory Hicks & Beatriz Maldonado
University of Oklahoma Working Paper, May 2014
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the gender composition of national legislatures in donor countries impacts the level, composition, and pattern of foreign aid. We provide causal evidence that the election of female legislators leads countries to increase aid both in total and as a percentage of GDP. Our estimates suggest that, consistent with the existing evidence for domestic expenditures, the empowerment of women in national legislatures leads to higher levels of aid for specific projects such as education and health. These increased flows occur predominately through bilateral aid and reflect a redistribution of aid towards developing countries and for humanitarian purposes in particular.
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Leader Turnover, Institutions, and Voting at the UN General Assembly
Alastair Smith
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using evidence from voting in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), this article shows that leader turnover, especially in small coalition, nondemocratic systems, increases the likelihood of policy realignment. Autocrats who are beholden to only a small proportion of the population represent the foreign policy interests of their small number of supporters. When leader turnover occurs, the interests represented often shift too and this results in an increased volatility and regression toward a neutral position of a nation’s alignment at the United Nations vis-à-vis the United States. While such realignments can offer an opportunity to reduce enmity between states, they can also signal growing differences between friends. The impact of leaders change in large coalitions produces more moderate shifts in alignments.