Beliefs
Religious Conversion across Countries
Robert Barro & Rachel McCleary
NBER Working Paper, January 2024
Abstract:
In a rational-choice approach to religious conversion, the conversion rate depends on a person’s costs of switching religions and costs of having one’s religion deviate from the type viewed as ideal. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves for 1991, 1998, 2008, and 2018 allow for calculations of country-wide conversion rates based on religion adherence at the time of each survey and a retrospective question that gauges adherence when the respondent was raised. The analysis applies to 8 types of religion for 58 countries (125 total observations). The rate of conversion depends positively on measures of religious pluralism, negatively on official restrictions that inhibit conversion, negatively on a history of Communism, negatively on real per capita GDP, and positively on years of schooling. These empirical findings accord with predictions from the theoretical framework.
Church Closings Were Associated with Higher COVID-19 Infection Rates: Implications for Community Health Equity
Yusuf Ransome et al.
Journal of Urban Health, December 2023, Pages 1258-1263
Abstract:
This study investigates the changes in physical church closings years 2013 to 2019 in New York City (NYC), Philadelphia, and Baltimore and the association with COVID-19 infection rates. We applied Bayesian spatial binomial models to analyze confirmed cases of COVID-19 as of February 28, 2022, in each city at the zip code-level. A one unit increase in the number of churches closed corresponded to a 5% higher COVID-19 infection rate, in NYC (rate ratio = 1.05, 95% credible interval = 1.02–1.08%), where the association was significant. Church closings appears to be an important indicator of neighborhood social vulnerability. Church closings should be routinely monitored as a structural determinant of community health and to advance health equity.
Understanding Competition in Social Space: Religious Congregations in Manhattan, 1949 to 1999
Casey Homan
American Sociological Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Competition between social units has long been central to sociological theories of change. Understanding it has become particularly important in the sociology of religion with the theory of religious economies, a market model of religious change. Existing empirical tests of the theory are limited by (1) ambiguity regarding which religious groups are expected to compete with which other groups, and/or (2) a neglect of the local level (competition among congregations). Using an original compilation of the life histories of religious congregations in Manhattan from 1949 to 1999, I conduct event-history analyses that avoid those limitations. The chief results are the following: (1) the more congregations there were near a given congregation that were theologically dissimilar to that congregation, the less likely that congregation was to advertise; (2) when there was an increase over time in the number of nearby congregations that were theologically similar to the focal congregation, that congregation became more likely to advertise; and (3) when there was an increase over time in the number of nearby congregations that were theologically dissimilar to the focal congregation, that congregation became less likely to advertise. Implications for the study of religion include modifications of religious-economies theory; broader implications speak to understanding the social units that compete and what drives competition.
Islamic religious behaviors and civic engagement in Europe and North America
Aubrey Westfall
Politics and Religion, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper analyzes relationships between Islamic religious behaviors and civic engagement in Europe and North America. Using data from an original survey of Muslims in Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States, it finds that Muslim religious behaviors relate to civic behaviors in varied ways. The conventional distinction between public and private religious behaviors does not graft perfectly on to Islamic religious behaviors, but the way Islamic religious behaviors straddle the public-private divide help explain their relationships with civic behaviors. Mosque attendance, an example of public religious behavior, is positively associated with secular organizational membership and mainstream political behaviors, and negatively associated with protest activity. Private, or quasi-private, religious behaviors are more commonly associated with protest activities. There are some national-level differences in patterns of civic engagement after controlling for other determinants, but not many, suggesting similar mechanisms mobilize and facilitate Muslim civic incorporation across national contexts. The results suggest that Islamic religious behaviors create diverse opportunities for Muslims to engage as civic citizens.
Value Conflicts Revisited: Muslims, Gender Equality, and Gestures of Respect
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten et al.
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
This is a study on the inclusion of Muslims in liberal democracies in the presence of value conflict. We focus on handshaking controversies that appear to pit gender equality against religious freedom. The possible outcomes seem mutually exclusive: either conservative Muslim minorities must conform to the norms of the majority culture, or non-Muslim majorities must acquiesce to the legitimacy of conservative Muslim ideas. Using a trio of experiments to replicate our results, we demonstrate the efficacy of introducing alternative gestures of respect. Presented with a substitute gesture of respect -- placing the ‘hand on heart’ -- non-Muslim demands for Muslim conformity drop dramatically. The results of the handshaking experiments call out a general lesson. Thanks to the ingenuity and versatility of cultural customs to signal respect, value conflicts can be open to resolution in everyday encounters without minorities or majorities having to forsake their convictions.
Ruled by the Demons? Exploring the Relationship Between Belief in Demons and Public Attitudes Toward Donald Trump and Joe Biden
Fanhao Nie
Social Currents, forthcoming
Abstract:
Beliefs in supernatural evils are prevalent among many religions. Prior research has shown that beliefs in supernatural evils were tied to various social and health outcomes. However, much less is known about the political implications of beliefs in supernatural evils. To fill this research void, a national survey of 1,092 adults with oversamples of respondents of Asian or Hispanic heritage was conducted in March 2023. The findings suggest that a stronger belief in demons or evil spirits was associated with more negative views toward President Joe Biden. This demonic effect was robust even after controlling for a variety of religious and sociodemographic variables. Besides being robust, the demonic effect was the strongest among all religiosity measures. In contrast, a main relationship between a stronger belief in demons and greater support for Donald Trump was found. However, this demonic effect was explained by Christian nationalism. Finally, these demonic effects vary based on one’s political party identity.