Bad vibes
The interpersonal costs of dishonesty: How dishonest behavior reduces individuals' ability to read others' emotions
Julia Lee et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this research, we examine the unintended consequences of dishonest behavior for one's interpersonal abilities and subsequent ethical behavior. Specifically, we unpack how dishonest conduct can reduce one's generalized empathic accuracy - the ability to accurately read other people's emotional states. In the process, we distinguish these 2 constructs from one another and demonstrate a causal relationship. The effects of dishonesty on empathic accuracy that we found were significant, but modest in size. Across 8 studies (n = 2,588), we find support for (a) a correlational and causal account of dishonest behavior reducing empathic accuracy; (b) an underlying mechanism of reduced relational self-construal (i.e., the tendency to define the self in terms of close relationships); (c) negative downstream consequences of impaired empathic accuracy, in terms of dehumanization and subsequent dishonesty; and (d) a physiological trait (i.e., vagal reactivity) that serves as a boundary condition for the relationship between dishonest behavior and empathic accuracy.
Animals Are People Too: Explaining Variation in Respect for Animal Rights
Yon Soo Park & Benjamin Valentino
Human Rights Quarterly, February 2019, Pages 39-65
Abstract:
In this article, we empirically test explanations for variation in support for animal rights at the individual level and across the United States. We draw on a combination of national public opinion surveys and cross-sectional data on animal rights laws from the fifty US states. We find a strong connection between recognition of human rights and animal rights both at the individual attitude level and at the US state policy level. Our results demonstrate that support for animal rights strongly links to support for disadvantaged or marginalized human populations, including LGBT groups, racial minorities, undocumented immigrants, and the poor.
Veil-of-Ignorance Reasoning Favors the Greater Good
Karen Huang, Joshua Greene & Max Bazerman
Harvard Working Paper, July 2019
Abstract:
The "veil of ignorance" is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by denying decision-makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across six experiments (N = 5,785), three pre-registered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by a simple anchoring account, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective-taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision-makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.
Do happy people care about society's problems?
Kostadin Kushlev et al.
Journal of Positive Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Since ancient times, scholars, individuals, and societies have been preoccupied with the pursuit of happiness. But might individual happiness actually be bad for society and the world? A common concern - which we refer to as the Pollyanna hypothesis - is that happy people might be too happy to care enough about important current issues, thus being less likely to act on improving society and the world. In three studies, however, we found that feeling good predicted more, not less, action on current issues. We saw this pattern in the context of the 2017 far right rallies in Charlottesville, VA (Study 1), a wide range of social, political, and environmental issues chosen by participants (Study 2), and environmental action within a nationally representative sample (Study 3). These correlational findings speak against the Pollyanna hypothesis: Happiness does not seem to preclude caring about local and global issues.
I don't feel ya: How narcissism shapes empathy
Pascal Burgmer, Alexa Weiss & Katharina Ohmann
Self and Identity, forthcoming
Abstract:
Those who tend towards a self-absorbed personality are less likely to "feel others." Indeed, subclinical narcissism has been linked to decreased empathy: Individuals high in narcissism seem to neglect what other people are thinking and feeling and are less likely to emotionally share others' mental states. Three studies (N = 1,008) extend the literature on narcissism and empathy in some important ways. We suggest that the empathy deficit among narcissists does not make an exception for close friends, that it manifests not only in less, but also in discordant affect, and that it is mainly driven by the antagonistic dimension of narcissism (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, employing an experimental manipulation, the present findings offer a novel way of attenuating this empathy deficit among narcissists: the experience of trust (Study 2). Finally, a pre-registered laboratory study documents a "bright" consequence of narcissists' empathy deficit with respect to parochial altruism (Study 3). Hence, as unfortunate as narcissists' empathy deficit might be, it is not set in stone. Additionally, a narcissistic spotlight that shines exclusively on the self can reduce some of the parochialism that empathy for specific, often close others entails.
Equity Concerns are Narrowly Framed
Christine Exley & Judd Kessler
Harvard Working Paper, June 2019
Abstract:
We show that individuals narrowly bracket their equity concerns. Across six experiments including 2,360 subjects, individuals equalize components of payoffs rather than overall payoffs. When earnings are comprised of "small tokens" worth 1 cent and "large tokens" worth 2 cents, subjects frequently equalize the distribution of small (or large) tokens rather than equalizing total earnings. When payoffs are comprised of time and money, subjects similarly equalize the distribution of time (or money) rather than total payoffs. In addition, subjects are more likely to equalize time than money. These findings can help explain a variety of behavioral phenomena including the structure of social insurance programs, patterns of public good provision, and why transactions that turn money into time are often deemed repugnant.
Individual Differences in Theory of Mind Predict Inequity Aversion in Children
Lily Tsoi & Katherine McAuliffe
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Early in human development, children react negatively to receiving less than others, and only later do they show a similar aversion to receiving more. We tested whether theory of mind (ToM) can account for this developmental shift we see in middle childhood. We conducted a face-to-face fairness task that involved a ToM manipulation, measured individual differences in ToM, and collected parent-ratings of children's empathy, a construct related to ToM. We find that greater ToM capacities lead to more rejections of unequal offers, regardless of the direction of inequality, demonstrating that children with greater ToM are more likely to engage in costly compliance with fairness norms. Moreover, drawing attention to mental states sufficiently elicits aversion to advantageous inequity in younger children. These findings contribute to our growing understanding that people's concerns for fairness rely not just on their own thoughts and beliefs but on the thoughts, beliefs, and expectations of others.
Exogenous testosterone increases sensitivity to moral norms in moral dilemma judgements
Skylar Brannon et al.
Nature Human Behaviour, August 2019, Pages 856-866
Abstract:
Moral dilemma judgements frequently involve decisions where moral norms and the greater good are in conflict. The current preregistered study tested the effect of the steroid hormone testosterone on moral dilemma judgements using a double-blind administration of testosterone or placebo. Counter to predictions, testosterone administration led to increased inaction in moral dilemmas where harmful actions prohibited by moral norms increase overall well-being. Using a mathematical model to disentangle sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms and general preference for inaction versus action, analyses further revealed that testosterone administration influenced judgements by increasing sensitivity to moral norms. Exploratory analyses suggested the opposite pattern for endogenous testosterone measured at baseline, in that higher levels of endogenous testosterone were associated with lower sensitivity to moral norms. The results indicate that the role of testosterone in moral judgements is more complex than suggested by previous findings.
Perceived momentum influences responsibility judgments
Jeffrey Parker, Iman Paul & Nicholas Reinholtz
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
This work examined how people judge the responsibility of sequential events (e.g., correct/incorrect guesses) for overall outcomes (e.g., winning/losing a trivia game). People are found to perceive momentum, even in contexts where it cannot exist (i.e., sequences of independent events), which leads them to expect streaks to continue. Events that break those streaks (e.g., an incorrect guess after a series of correct guesses) are more unexpected and, thus, held more responsible for overall outcomes. How these findings contribute to the contemporary understanding of responsibility judgments is discussed.