Assets under Management
Status, Marriage, and Managers' Attitudes To Risk
Nikolai Roussanov & Pavel Savor
NBER Working Paper, March 2012
Abstract:
Relative wealth concerns can affect risk-taking behavior, as the payoff to a marginal dollar of wealth depends on the wealth of others. We develop a model where status concerns arise endogenously due to competition in the marriage market and lead to greater risk-taking for unmarried individuals. We evaluate empirically the importance of this effect in a high-stakes setting by studying corporate CEOs. We find that single CEOs, who are more likely to exhibit status concerns, are associated with firms that exhibit higher stock return volatility and pursue more aggressive investment policies. This effect is weaker for older CEOs. Our results hold both when we estimate the impact of marital status directly and when we use variation in divorce laws across U.S. states to instrument for CEO marital status.
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Intrepid, imprudent, or impetuous?: The effects of gender threats on men's financial decisions
Jonathan Weaver, Joseph Vandello & Jennifer Bosson
Psychology of Men & Masculinity, forthcoming
Abstract:
Among the conjectured causes of the recent U.S. financial crisis is the hyper-masculine culture of Wall Street that promotes extreme risk-taking. In two experiments, we found that threats to their manhood motivated men to take greater financial risks and favor immediate (vs. delayed) fiscal rewards. In Experiment 1, men placed larger bets during a gambling game after a gender threat as compared to men in an affirmation condition. In Experiment 2, after a gender threat, men pursued an immediate financial payoff rather than waiting for interest to accrue, but only if they believed their decision was public. When the decision was private, gender-threatened men did not show the same desire for immediate reward. These results suggest that gender threats may shift men's financial decisions toward more risky and short-sighted public choices.
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Journalists and the Stock Market
Casey Dougal et al.
Review of Financial Studies, March 2012, Pages 639-679
Abstract:
We use exogenous scheduling of Wall Street Journal columnists to identify a causal relation between financial reporting and stock market performance. To measure the media's unconditional effect, we add columnist fixed effects to a daily regression of excess Dow Jones Industrial Average returns. Relative to standard control variables, these fixed effects increase the R2 by about 35%, indicating each columnist's average persistent "bullishness" or "bearishness." To measure the media's conditional effect, we interact columnist fixed effects with lagged returns. This increases explanatory power by yet another one-third, and identifies amplification or attenuation of prevailing sentiment as a tool used by financial journalists.
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Insider trading in takeover targets
Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser
Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine open market stock trades by registered insiders in about 3,700 targets of takeovers announced during 1988-2006 and in a control sample of non-targets, both during an ‘informed' and a control period. Using difference-in-differences regressions of several insider trading measures, we find no evidence that insiders increase their purchases before takeover announcements; instead, they decrease them. But while insiders reduce their purchases below normal levels, they reduce their sales even more, thus increasing their net purchases. This ‘passive' insider trading holds for each of the five insider groups we examine, for all three measures of net purchases, and is more pronounced in certain sub-samples with less uncertainty about takeover completion, such as friendly deals, and deals with a single bidder, domestic acquirer, or less regulated target. The magnitude of the increase in the dollar value of net purchases is quite substantial, about 50% relative to their usual levels, for targets' officers and directors in the six-month pre-announcement period. Our finding of widespread profitable passive trading by target insiders during takeover negotiations points to the limits of insider trading regulation. Finally, our finding that registered insiders of target firms largely refrain from profitable active trading before takeover announcements contrasts with prior findings that insiders engage in such trading before announcements of other important corporate events, and points to the effectiveness of private over public enforcement of insider trading regulations.
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Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?
Robert Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven Kaplan
NBER Working Paper, February 2012
Abstract:
We present evidence on the performance of nearly 1400 U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds using a new research-quality dataset from Burgiss, sourced from over 200 institutional investors. Using detailed cash-flow data, we compare buyout and venture capital returns to the returns produced by public markets. We also compare the evidence from Burgiss to that derived from other commercial datasets - Venture Economics, Preqin and Cambridge Associates - as well as recent research. We find better buyout fund performance than has previously been documented. This in part reflects recently discovered problems with data provided by Venture Economics, upon which several previous studies had relied. Average U.S. buyout fund performance has exceeded that of public markets for most vintages for a long period of time. The outperformance versus the S&P 500 averages 20% to 27% over the life of the fund and more than 3% per year. Average U.S. venture capital funds, on the other hand, outperformed public equities in the 1990s, but have underperformed public equities in the 2000s. Using individual fund data, we explore the relationship between absolute measures of performance - internal rates of return (IRRs) and multiples of invested capital - and performance relative to public markets. Within a given vintage year, performance relative to public markets can be predicted well by a fund's multiple of invested capital and IRR, so we are able to estimate the performance relative to public markets that would have been derived from the other commercial datasets, had the required cash-flow data been available. Private equity performance in the other commercial sources - other than Venture Economics - is qualitatively similar to that we find using the Burgiss data.
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SEC enforcement: Does forthright disclosure and cooperation really matter?
Rebecca Files
Journal of Accounting and Economics, February-April 2012, Pages 353-374
Abstract:
This study examines the conditions under which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises enforcement leniency following a restatement. I explore whether cooperation with SEC staff and forthright disclosure of a restatement (e.g., disclosures reported in a timely and visible manner) reduce the likelihood of an SEC sanction or SEC monetary penalties. After controlling for restatement severity, I find that cooperation increases the likelihood of being sanctioned, perhaps because it improves the SEC's ability to build a successful case against the firm. However, cooperation and forthright disclosures are rewarded by the SEC through lower monetary penalties.
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Detecting Deceptive Discussions in Conference Calls
David Larcker & Anastasia Zakolyukina
Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
We estimate linguistic-based classification models of deceptive discussions during quarterly earnings conference calls. Using data on subsequent financial restatements and a set of criteria to identify severity of accounting problems, we label each call as "truthful" or "deceptive". Prediction models are then developed with the word categories that have been shown by previous psychological and linguistic research to be related to deception. We find that the out-of-sample performance of models based on chief executive officer (CEO) and/or chief financial officer (CFO) narratives is significantly better than a random guess by 6%-16% and is at least equivalent to models based on financial and accounting variables. The language of deceptive executives exhibits more references to general knowledge, fewer non-extreme positive emotions, and fewer references to shareholder value. In addition, deceptive CEOs use significantly more extreme positive emotion and fewer anxiety words. Finally, a portfolio formed from firms with the highest deception scores from CFO narratives produces an annualized alpha of between -4% and -11%.
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Public Opinion and Executive Compensation
Camelia Kuhnen & Alexandra Niessen
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992-2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion.
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Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge
Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian
NBER Working Paper, February 2012
Abstract:
We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional ownership in particular, lost value on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly announced that it would delay implementation of the Rule in response to the Business Roundtable challenge. We also examine intra-day returns and find that the value loss occurred just after the SEC's announcement on October 4. We find similar results on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business Roundtable. These findings are consistent with the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC's 2010 Rule.
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David Erkens, Mingyi Hung & Pedro Matos
Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007-2008 crisis.
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Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of "Independent" Directors
Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, microlevel data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the boards of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also poor relative performers. The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed recommendations are strong buy/buy recommendations, compared with 56.9% for all other analyst recommendations. We also show that appointed analysts' optimism is stronger at precisely those times when firms' benefits are larger. Last, we find that appointing firms are more likely to have management on the board nominating committee, appear to be poorly governed, and increase earnings management and chief executive officer compensation following these board appointments.
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Rick Johnston et al.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, February-April 2012, Pages 271-289
Abstract:
Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods so that each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one or two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added every fifth or sixth year and, consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of predictable forecast errors and stock returns in 14-week quarters, suggesting that analysts and investors do not, on average, adjust their expectations for the extra week. The ease with which 14-week quarters can be predicted, and expectations adjusted, suggests a surprising lack of effort on the part of analysts and investors.
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Voting Rights, Share Concentration, and Leverage at Nineteenth-Century US Banks
Howard Bodenhorn
NBER Working Paper, February 2012
Abstract:
Studies of corporate governance are concerned with two features of modern shareholding: diffuse ownership and the resulting separation of ownership and control, which potentially leads to managerial self-dealing; and, majority shareholding, which potentially mitigates some managerial self-dealing but opens the door for the expropriation of minority shareholders. This paper provides a study of the second issue for nineteenth-century US corporations. It investigates two related questions. First, did voting rules that limited the control rights of large shareholders encourage diffuse ownership? It did. Second, did diffuse ownership systematically alter bank risk taking? It did. Banks with less concentrated ownership followed policies that reduced liquidity and bankruptcy risk.
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The Madoff Paradox: American Jewish Sage, Savior, and Thief
Michael Berkowitz
Journal of American Studies, February 2012, Pages 189-202
Abstract:
Bernie Madoff perpetrated a Ponzi scheme on a scale that was gargantuan even compared with the outrageously destructive Enron and Worldcom debacles. A major aspect of the Madoff story is his rise as a specifically American Jewish type, who self-consciously exploited stereotypes to inspire trust and confidence in his counsel. Styling himself as a benefactor and protector of Jews as individuals and institutional Jewish interests, and possibly in the guise of the Jewish historical trope of shtadlan (intercessor), he was willing to threaten the well-being of all those enmeshed in his empire. The license granted to Madoff stemmed in part from the extent to which he appeared to diverge from earlier Jewish financial titans, such as Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, in that he epitomized an absolute "insider" - as opposed to an "outsider" or marginal figure. In reality he had none of the supposedly humane virtues attributed to Jewish crooks, at least in the realm of popular culture.
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Matthew Cain & Steven Davidoff
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, March 2012, Pages 92-128
Abstract:
Despite its dominance of the market for public company corporate charters, Delaware has come under increasing fire for losing ground to other states in the competition to retain corporate litigation. To test this criticism, we evaluate the selection of governing law and forum clauses in 1,020 merger agreements between public firms from 2004-2008. This sample provides a clean test of the real-time attractiveness of states' judiciary during the sample period. In contrast to prior research, we find that Delaware's attractiveness to merging parties has increased in recent years. Parties appear to respond to exogenous events, evidenced by the fact that top-tier legal advisors, foreign acquirers, transactions surrounded by greater financial uncertainty, and larger transactions tend to select Delaware's forum over other venues. We conclude that during our sample period, Delaware was increasingly valued by the corporate actors who influence incorporation choices, and competed strongly for legal products beyond its primary one, the public company charter. This is important because a failure to retain corporate litigation can possibly lead to an erosion in Delaware's prominence in the public company chartering market.
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Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study
Utpal Bhattacharya et al.
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Working with one of the largest brokerages in Germany, we record what happens when unbiased investment advice is offered to a random set of approximately 8,000 active retail customers out of the brokerage's several hundred thousand retail customers. We find that investors who most need the financial advice are least likely to obtain it. The investors who do obtain the advice (about 5%), however, hardly follow the advice and do not improve their portfolio efficiency by much. Overall, our results imply that the mere availability of unbiased financial advice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for benefiting retail investors.
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Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting
Catherine Schrand & Sarah Zechman
Journal of Accounting and Economics, February-April 2012, Pages 311-329
Abstract:
A detailed analysis of 49 firms subject to AAERs suggests that approximately one-quarter of the misstatements meet the legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional. Because of the bias, however, in subsequent periods these firms are more likely to be in a position in which they are compelled to intentionally misstate earnings. Overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements. Evidence from a high-tech sample and a larger and more general sample support the overconfidence explanation for this path to misstatements and AAERs.
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Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests
Peter Demerjian, Baruch Lev & Sarah McVay
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We propose a measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures. We find that our measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and that the stock price reactions to chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers are positive (negative) when we assess the outgoing CEO as low (high) ability. We also find that replacing CEOs with more (less) able CEOs is associated with improvements (declines) in subsequent firm performance. We conclude with a demonstration of the potential of the measure. We find that the negative relation between equity financing and future abnormal returns documented in prior research is mitigated by managerial ability. Specifically, more able managers appear to utilize equity issuance proceeds more effectively, illustrating that our more precise measure of managerial ability will allow researchers to pursue studies that were previously difficult to conduct.
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Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan & Qiang Wu
Review of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study examines the impact of corporate boards on firm performance during the current financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the crisis to measure firm performance, we find that board independence, as traditionally defined, does not significantly affect firm performance. However, when we re-define independent directors as outside directors who are less connected with current CEOs, a measure we call strong independence, there is a positive and significant relationship between this measure and firm performance. Second, outside financial experts are important for firm performance. We find that the positive impact of outside financial experts on firm performance is more significant than that of strong independence. Overall, our results suggest that firm performance during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate boards.
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Option Prices Leading Equity Prices: Do Option Traders Have an Information Advantage?
Wen Jin, Joshua Livnat & Yuan Zhang
Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent evidence shows that option volatility skews and volatility spreads between call and put options predict equity returns. This study investigates whether such predictive ability is driven by option traders' information advantage. We examine the predictive ability of volatility skews and volatility spreads around significant information events including earnings announcements, other firm-specific information events, and events that trigger significant market reactions. Consistent with option traders having an information advantage relative to equity traders before information events, we find that the option measures immediately before these events have higher predictive ability for short-term event returns than they do in a more dated window or before a randomly selected pseudo-event. We also find that option measures have predictive ability after information events. However, this predictive ability holds only for unscheduled corporate announcements, which suggests that, relative to equity traders, option traders have superior ability to process less anticipated information.
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A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage: Safeguard or speculation?
George Aragon & Spencer Martin
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999-2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.
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Who, if anyone, reacts to accrual information?
Robert Battalio et al.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, February-April 2012, Pages 205-224
Abstract:
We show that the vast majority of investors ignore value-relevant accruals information when it is first released, but that investors who initiate trades of at least 5,000 shares tend to transact in the proper direction. These investors trade on accruals information only when the previously-announced earnings signal is non-negative. Unconditionally, those investors initiating the smallest trades appear to respond to accruals in the wrong direction, but further investigation suggests this behavior is explained by their attraction to attention-grabbing stocks. Finally, we find that those who trade on accruals information have insufficient market power to mitigate the accruals anomaly.
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Edward Bishop Smith
Administrative Science Quarterly, March 2011, Pages 61-94
Abstract:
This study calls into question the completeness of the argument that economic actors who fail to conform to certain identity-based logics - such as the categorical structure of markets - garner less attention and perform poorly, beginning with the observation that some nonconforming actors seem to elicit considerable attention and thrive. By reconceptualizing organizational identity as not just a signal of organizational legitimacy but also a lens used by evaluating audiences to make sense of emerging information, I explore the micro, decision-making foundations on which both conformist and nonconformist organizations may come to be favored. Analyzing the association between organizational conformity and return on investment and capital flows in the global hedge fund industry, 1994-2008, I find that investors allocate capital more readily to nonconforming hedge funds following periods of short-term positive performance. Contrary to prediction, nonconforming funds are also less severely penalized for recent poor performance. Both "amplification" and "buffering" effects persist for funds with nonconformist identities despite steady-state normative pressure toward conformity. I explore the asymmetry of this outcome, and what it means for theories related to organizational identity and legitimacy, in the discussion section.
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Investor Information Demand: Evidence from Google Searches around Earnings Announcements
Michael Drake, Darren Roulstone & Jacob Thornock
Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
The objective of this study is to investigate factors that influence investor information demand around earnings announcements and to provide insights into how variation in information demand impacts the capital market response to earnings. The internet is one channel through which public information is disseminated to investors and we propose that one way that investors express their demand for public information is via Google searches. We find that abnormal Google search increases about two weeks prior to the earnings announcement, spikes markedly at the announcement, and continues at high levels for a period after the announcement. This finding suggests that information diffusion is not instantaneous with the release of the earnings information, but rather is spread over a period surrounding the announcement. We also find that information demand is positively associated with media attention and news, and is negatively associated with investor distraction. When investors search for more information in the days just prior to the announcement, pre-announcement price and volume changes reflect more of the upcoming earnings news and there is less of a price and volume response when the news is announced. This result suggests that when investors demand more information about a firm, the information content of the earnings announcement is partially preempted.
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Does Chatter Really Matter? Dynamics of User-Generated Content and Stock Performance
Seshadri Tirunillai & Gerard Tellis
Marketing Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study examines whether user-generated content (UGC) is related to stock market performance, which metric of UGC has the strongest relationship, and what the dynamics of the relationship are. We aggregate UGC from multiple websites over a four-year period across 6 markets and 15 firms. We derive multiple metrics of UGC and use multivariate time-series models to assess the relationship between UGC and stock market performance. Volume of chatter significantly leads abnormal returns by a few days (supported by Granger causality tests). Of all the metrics of UGC, volume of chatter has the strongest positive effect on abnormal returns and trading volume. The effect of negative and positive metrics of UGC on abnormal returns is asymmetric. Whereas negative UGC has a significant negative effect on abnormal returns with a short "wear-in" and long "wear-out," positive UGC has no significant effect on these metrics. The volume of chatter and negative chatter have a significant positive effect on trading volume. Idiosyncratic risk increases significantly with negative information in UGC. Positive information does not have much influence on the risk of the firm. An increase in off-line advertising significantly increases the volume of chatter and decreases negative chatter. These results have important implications for managers and investors.