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On gender

JAMES Q. WILSON

Nature has played a cruel trick on humankind. It has made males essential for reproduction but next to useless for nurturance. Yet if children are to do more than survive, they must be part of a community. For such a complex social organization to develop, men must be induced to provide resources and act cooperatively. Living in a community requires of them sympathy, prudence, and above all, commitment.

Unfortunately, when men are born they are on average much less amenable to socialization than women. Compared to their sisters, men are born less advanced neurologically: They are four to six weeks less well-developed and, thus, more in need of care. They are more likely to be hyperactive, autistic, color-blind, and lefthanded, and are more prone to learning disorders. If they are born prematurely, boys will suffer more harm and display more conduct problems than premature girls. If the mother used alcohol or drugs, a male infant is more likely to be adversely affected than a female one. If raised in a discordant or broken family, boys suffer more adverse consequences than do girls.
Men are more aggressive than women. Though child-rearing practices may intensify or moderate this difference, the difference will persist and almost surely rests on biological factors. In every known society, men are more likely than women to play roughly, drive recklessly, fight physically, and assault ruthlessly, and these differences appear early in life. Some people with a romanticized notion of primitive cultures imagine that before men were corrupted by civilization they lived in harmony with one another, but this was scarcely the case. One review of the archaeological evidence suggests that in the state of nature, about one-quarter of all human males died in fights,1 a rate of violent death that is about the same as the anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon found among Yanonamo men now living in the Amazon basin.

The neurochemical basis of the greater aggressiveness of human males is not well understood, but a growing body of evidence implicates hormones (such as testosterone), enzymes (such as monoamine oxidase), and neurotransmitters (such as serotonin). As men grow up, they are much more likely than women to cause trouble in school, to be alcoholics or drug addicts, and to commit crimes. Though some aspects of the human personality change as people grow up, aggression in males is least likely to change, at least through adolescence.

The maternal instinct

It is not hard to explain why women care for their infants; without the female breast the child would perish. If there ever existed women who lacked the inclination to nourish their offspring, those offspring would have died. To the extent that that inclination is genetic, nature would have selected for women who cared for their children. But men have been less important for the survival of the child. Though it would have been helpful had they gathered food while the mothers nursed, females living where fruits, nuts, and vegetables were naturally available could often collect enough food on their own to meet at least their minimal requirements. Among many primates this continues to be the case.

No woman needs to be reminded of the fact that men are less likely than women to get up when the baby cries, feed it, or fret

over its moods and needs. Infidelity is more common among men than women. (Men also have more premarital sexual intercourse and with a greater variety of partners than do women.) Single-parent households, a large, growing, and worrisome feature of modern life, are, in the vast majority of cases, female-headed households. In this regard the human male is very much like most other male primates. Among most mammals, the male contributes little to offspring development beyond his sperm and, in some cases, defense against rivals and predators. Since human infants require a long period of care after birth, a central problem for women living anywhere but in the most nurturant environments is to find ways of inducing the male to supply the resources necessary to make this care possible.

Because resources are scarce, it is to the mother’s advantage for the father to supply her and her alone. In this regard mankind does not manage to do as well as many species of birds. Monogamous pair bonding is common to quail and uncommon to mankind. Among human societies monogamy is the rule in only a minority of cases (roughly 17 percent): polygyny—that is, one husband taking more than one wife—is far more common. And even in monogamous societies, infidelity is widespread. By contrast, polyandry—that is, a wife taking more than one husband—is vanishingly rare. (Of course, even in polygynous societies, most men will invest in child care to some degree.) The high rates of divorce and separation with which we are all too familiar provide ample evidence that humans have not yet figured out how to solve a problem that quail and wolves have solved without reading a single book.

**Man troubles**

It seems clear that Mother Nature would much prefer to produce only girls, because she does such a poor job of producing boys. Her preferences are quite clear in this regard: All fetuses begin as females; only in the third month of gestation does masculinization begin. And when it does begin, it sometimes is a process prone to error, leading to all manner of deficiencies and abnormalities. Not only do men have a shorter life expectancy than women, a fact that might be explained by their more violent tendencies, but the higher mortality rate appears almost from the beginning: Male fetuses are more likely than female ones to die
in utero, and male infants have a higher death rate than female infants. The higher death rate of males is probably a consequence, at every age, of the presence of the male sex hormone. Castrated male cats, for example, live much longer than intact ones, and not simply because they fight less. Among humans, eunuchs outlive intact males.

Having invented the male, Mother Nature doesn't quite know what to do with him. It is as if she had suddenly realized, too late, what every student of biology now knows: Asexual reproduction is far more efficient than sexual reproduction. But now we are stuck with men who are likely to be both troublesome and vulnerable.

At one time the traits that we judge to be troublesome may have been useful, and those that we take to be vulnerabilities may have been irrelevant. When prehistoric man hunted for wild animals, aggressiveness and even hyperactivity were adaptive. Even after man had settled into sedentary communities, aggression and physical activity were useful if, as was often the case, his community was threatened by enemies. That he might be color-blind, have a speech defect, or be dyslexic was of little importance. Evolution has selected for traits in males that have aided them in hunting and in competition with other males for access to females, but at the price of reduced longevity.

Even though evolution has equipped men with traits that make them good hunters but not necessarily good fathers, most men who father children will aid in their care. In this respect, the human male is more like a bird, wolf, or butterfly than he is like many other primates. Most male baboons do not invest much in caring for their offspring; male humans invest substantially. As a consequence, family life among humans is not only possible but even commonplace.

Why? Why should a man, who can in a few moments conceive a fetus that will grow in the mother's belly and be dependent on the mother for food for many months after its birth, stick around to care for it? And why should he even forsake other women, along with the sexual opportunities they offer, to cling to the mother alone? If the principle of evolution is reproductive fitness—that is, selection for creatures that maximize the number of genes they reproduce in the next generation—then evolution ought to select for the genes of those males who produce the largest number of
offspring. That would mean selecting for the most promiscuous males, and under those circumstances, family life would be next to impossible.

**Sexual selection**

The chief answer to this puzzle is female choice. Females who nurture their young for extended periods will, on the average, prefer to mate with males who are likely to aid in that nurture for a long period of time. In species that do not require extended infant care, the female will pair with the male that makes the most impressive display of size, strength, plumage, coloration, or territorial defense. In these cases the female is selecting mates whose vigor creates the best prospects for the survival of offspring even when the female alone must provide the care after birth. Selection for these traits, however, does not make possible an elaborate social life. But in other species, and notably among humans, females will select mates that seem not only vigorous but inclined to make long-term investments in child care.

Just why the human female, unlike many primate females, should have begun to select for dependability is unclear. But having done so, males biologically disposed to share in nurturance began to have a reproductive advantage. The result of female choice is evident in what we observe in males today. Despite the difficulty in socializing young ones, adult males usually respond warmly to infants. Many if not most men find fathering, and not just inseminating, to be a rewarding activity; they respond instinctively and with compassion to the sight, sounds, and touch of their offspring.

Though as a group men invest far more heavily in child care than do, for example, male rhesus monkeys, individual men vary greatly in this disposition. As a result, the choice of mate made by (or for) women will be based on a careful evaluation of the suitability of various men. When the choice is left to the women, it typically occurs after a long period of courtship in which men are tested in various ways for loyalty and affection; sometimes sexual favors are granted or withheld on the basis of evidence that the man will be a good father—that is, will be dependable, caring, and monogamous. When the choice is made by the bride's family, much the same evaluation occurs, though with less emphasis on affection and more on reputation, wealth, and status.
Courtship is a way of testing commitment. If the woman is sexually easy, the value of the test will be lessened, as the man will have less of an incentive to produce evidence of commitment in order to acquire sexual access. If the man is deceitful, he may be able to fool a woman into thinking that commitment is assured when in fact it is not. Since individuals differ in these respects, the process is imperfect. Its imperfection has supplied the themes of thousands of years of songs, plays, and stories that give expression to the continuing differences between the sexes.

The songs and stories portray women who want commitment coping with men who want action. In modern times the signal of commitment is romantic love: If the man is sensitive to the woman's feelings and caring of her needs and responses, his expression of those feelings is taken to be a sign of an enduring emotional investment. But romance can be feigned or be a short-lived prelude to sex. Love is the currency; women hope it is an asset that will be invested, but men may treat it merely as the price of consumption. Female choice—in Darwin's terms, sexual selection—has shaped the evolutionary development of men, but without making men the same as women. As a result, one would expect the moral development of men and women to differ.

**Gender and culture**

Some of that difference will be shaped by the way in which a society's culture and economic system make certain traits more adaptive than others. Mary Maxwell West and Melvin J. Konner illustrate this by sketching the differences in styles of fathering in five non-industrial cultures. Hunter-gatherers, such as the !Kung San bushmen of Africa, and fishermen, such as the Lesu of Melanesia, can feed themselves without constant labor and do not depend on possessing capital stocks (such as cattle) that must be defended against rival tribes. Women supply some of the food by their own foraging or gardening. Neither finding food supplies nor protecting land or cattle are full-time preoccupations, freeing men to spend time with their families. Family life in these places tends to be monogamous, and the men are deeply involved in child care. They often hold and fondle their children, who are indulged by both parents.

By contrast, the Bedouins of the Arabian desert raise cattle, and the Thonga in South Africa practice both farming and herd-
ing. They have both cattle and land to protect, as well as the cash income that these stocks generate. Fighting is commonplace, both within the group and among rival groups. In this warrior culture, fierceness and bravery are highly valued, leading to a strong emphasis on male authority and heavy discipline. Men remain aloof from their children and often mistreat their wives. Subsistence living based on scarce capital assets, it would appear, reduces male involvement in child care and rewards male aggressiveness.

This explanation of the warrior culture also appears in Robert Edgerton's comparison of four East African tribes, the members of which were divided between areas where the economy rested on either farming or herding. Both groups had capital stocks to protect, but the pastoralists were most at risk from raids by rival tribes endeavoring to steal their cattle. Accordingly, the pastoralists were more militaristic, more given to direct expressions of aggression, and more inclined to respect central authority than were the farmers, who tended instead to secrecy, caution, indirect action, mutual suspicion, and jealousy. Such evidence as Edgerton gathered on male dominance and aloofness showed that both traits were more prevalent among the pastoralists than among the farmers. In one tribe, the Kamba of Kenya, the antagonism between men and women was especially acute. A male Kamba herder stressed the need to show that men were "always superior" to women and that he was entitled to "come and go as he pleases" and to buy, sell, and beat his wife. The women described their husbands as "never affectionate" and not involved in rearing children. Though the women professed to accept this as a natural state of affairs, many revealed a smoldering antagonism that they expressed indirectly by means of witchcraft directed against the men.

Modern society presents an especially complex challenge to the task of socializing males. Industrialization and the division of labor improve the standard of living while moving production out of the household. As the standard of living rises, improvements in diet reduce the age at which women can conceive and thus the age at which they first give birth. Contraception separates sexuality from procreation. The father's role in child care is reduced because he spends more time away from home. For most men aggression is no longer adaptive, because capital stocks are now conserved and managed by bureaucratic processes that require conformity and technical competence more than boldness and
physical prowess. But while they are no longer adaptive, aggressive impulses are still present. The rise of large cities weakens kinship controls on such aggression, brings groups with different standards of conduct into close contact, and multiplies opportunities for violent exchanges.

These circumstances require society to invent and enforce rules to regulate aggression among men and to ensure that they care for the children they beget and the wives they take. Legal codes take on great importance but are rarely sufficient. In Anglo-Saxon countries, the control of male behavior since at least the eighteenth century has required the preachings of the church, the discipline of the factory, and the supervision of the temperance society.

During the nineteenth century, these informal methods of control reached their greatest strength; we in the United States and Great Britain refer to these teachings as "Victorian morality." As applied to male behavior, that morality was, in essence, the code of the gentleman. The invention of the "gentleman" constituted the emergence of a society-wide definition of proper behavior to replace the premodern definitions enforced by kinship groupings and the feudal definitions enforced by the aristocracy.

The requirements of gentlemanly behavior included everything from table manners and the obligation to play games fairly to one's responsibilities toward ladies and one's duty to country. So successful were these moral exhortations and codes of gentility that, so far as we can tell, both alcohol abuse and crime rates declined in England and America during a period—the second half of the nineteenth century—characterized by rapid urbanization, massive immigration, and the beginnings of industrialization. Though not without its oft-remarked hypocrisies and its heavy reliance on a double standard governing male and female conduct, the code of the gentleman was the most successful extralegal mechanism ever devised for adapting male behavior to the requirements of modern life.

In those places where the moral code was weak, the legal system impotent, and bureaucratic structures absent, a warrior culture often emerged. If large numbers of unmarried young men were thrown together outside of the control mechanisms of the conventional economic system, they would reduce their investment in family life or child care in favor of using their physical prowess to acquire and defend free-floating forms of wealth.
One example is the discovery of gold in remote areas. There were two American gold rushes in the mid-nineteenth century, the famous one in California and a lesser-known one in Appalachia. The former attracted single males whose life, devoted to acquisition and defense in an area beyond the reach of the law, came close to that in the Hobbesian state of nature: solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Sixteen thousand people died in the California mining camps, victims of disease, murder, and insanity. Such family life as existed was male-dominated, with little paternal investment in child care. The Appalachia gold rush, by contrast, attracted Cornish miners who arrived with their families and soon became part of well-organized mining companies. Owing, it would seem, to the combined effect of familial bonds and bureaucratic constraints, the North Carolina gold rush produced relatively little violence.

Marauding male gangs have excited fear for as long as man has lived in cities. From time to time we forget that young men in groups are always a potential challenge to social order, and so we are surprised when they reappear in places that we think of as tranquil and civilized. We are astonished to learn of football (in American terminology, soccer) gangs tearing apart trains, pubs, and athletic grounds in stately, sedate England. England? Supposedly, people there are utterly civil, with violent crime scarcely a problem and daily life moving in the orderly, class-ridden, but polite tempos of Masterpiece Theatre. What terrible thing—poverty? alienation? despair?—could produce football riots in England?

This idealized view of England can only be sustained if one forgets that in every society, a certain small fraction of young males will have an inordinate taste for violence and a low degree of self-control. What is striking about England and other civilized places is not that there are young thugs, but that in some places they organize themselves into gangs. England, contrary to popular belief, has a rate of burglary and robbery not much different from that of the United States. But whereas American gangs are found chiefly among the inner-city poor and are territorially based, British gangs are found chiefly among football supporters and are not territorial. They go to every game, traveling by bus, rail, or plane, trashng these conveyances along the way and spoiling for a good fight. Bill Buford’s horrifying account of these gangs—or “firms,” as they call themselves—does not depict unemployed, disenfran-
chised youth searching for meaning; it depicts young men of the sort always found overrepresented among the criminal classes—thrill seekers with a predisposition to alcoholism and violence, young toughs who enjoy the fight. What is surprising is not that they exist, but that they manage to sustain a modicum of organization, with captains and lieutenants. That these gangs are intensely patriotic, singing “Rule Britannia” while destroying property and assaulting women, is not at all surprising; men in groups define sharply, however implausibly, the boundaries by which someone is either in or out.

Lionel Tiger’s well-known book Men in Groups suggests the evolutionary origins and social functions of such behavior: It derives from the need for males to hunt, defend, and attack. Much of the history of civilization can be thought of as an effort to adapt these male dispositions to contemporary needs by restricting aggression or channeling it into appropriate areas. That adaptation has often required extraordinary measures, such as hunting rituals, rites of passage, athletic contests, military discipline, guild apprenticeships, or industrial authority. (By contrast, one almost never reads of equivalent rituals, authority systems, or fraternal rules employed to socialize women, in part because they have often been confined to a subordinate status and in part because the realities of childbirth and child care provide an automatic process of socialization.) Modern society, with its rapid technological change, intense division of labor, and ambiguous allocation of social roles, frequently leaves some men out, with their aggressive predispositions either uncontrolled or undirected. Gangs are one result.

Matters get worse when the gangs can earn profits from illegal alcohol and drug distribution systems. Prohibiting the sale of such commodities provides economic opportunities in which young males have a competitive advantage, and this in turn leads to the emergence of a warrior culture that underinvests in family life. Economic activity is separated from family maintenance and organized around capital that can be seized by predation. In these warrior societies, today as in the past, status among males is largely determined by physical combat and sexual conquest. Women can no longer control male behavior by requiring monogamous commitment in exchange for sexual access. Moreover, since women can control
their reproductive rate through contraception or abortion, what once was a moral obligation gives way to a utilitarian calculation. The obligation was: "She is going to have a kid, and so I must marry her." The utilitarian calculation is: "If she wants to have the kid when she doesn't have to, then raising it is her problem." As a result, the children are raised apart from their fathers.

Among male animals generally, and perhaps among male humans as well, the more a male engages in promiscuous sexuality and intraspecies fighting, the less he invests in caring for his offspring. But the reverse is also true: The less he invests in caring for his offspring, the more he is disposed to compete, violently if need be, with others for sexual access to a large number of women. A culture that does not succeed in inducing its males to care for their offspring not only produces children that lack adequate care, but also creates an environment that rewards predatory sexuality.

**Gender and family**

Although men and women come together out of natural attraction, it is not clear why a household—that is, an enduring and cohesive family—should be the result. If the household is, as Aristotle put it, "the partnership constituted by nature for [the needs of] daily life," what is there in nature that produces not simply sex but partnership? We know why men and women come together, but what keeps them together? Unless we can explain that, we cannot explain the social unit that forms human character. Moral life begins not with sexual congress but with emotional commitment—the formation and maintenance of the family.

The needs of the woman may lead her to try to select males who will invest in child care, but this preference is not strong enough to produce families unless it is powerfully reinforced by cultural expectations and social sanctions. As Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox have argued, the chief function of human kinship systems is to "protect the mother-infant bond from the relative fragility and volatility of the male-female bond." The weakening of the family in many Western societies is familiar evidence that these kinship systems and their cultural and legal supports are far more fragile than one would have guessed even forty years ago.

So fragile, indeed, that one can now say that the conditions of child-rearing have changed fundamentally for many youngsters. In
the 1950s, the typical American child lived in a two-parent family with a stay-at-home mother, a working father, and several siblings. By the 1990s, the typical child spent at least some time (among black children, most of the time) with a single mother and had only one sibling. The public believes that the consequences of this have been harmful, and the scholarly evidence bears them out. Compared to children who are raised by both biological parents, those raised by unmarried mothers, whether black or white, are more likely to be poor, to acquire less schooling, to be expelled or suspended from school, to experience emotional or behavioral problems, to display antisocial behavior, to have trouble getting along with their peers, and to start their own single-parent families. Both girls and boys are afflicted, but boys show more adverse effects.

The better off the parent, the less likely it is that the child will have to live in a one-parent household. But one should not infer from this that the problem of single-parent children can be solved simply by raising parental incomes. Consider black children. At every income level, they are more likely to live with a single parent than are white children at those income levels. And for all children, there was a sharp decline in their likelihood of having a two-parent family during the very period—the 1960s and 1970s—when family incomes were rising.

This is not a peculiarly American phenomenon. David Poppenoe, a sociologist, has studied families in Sweden, where he found a similar increase in single-parent households. By 1980, 18 percent of all Swedish households with children had but one parent (the figure in the United States for that year was 21.5 percent, though by 1984 it had become 26 percent). There remain industrial societies in which the overwhelming majority of children grow up in families with fathers—Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland are three of them. But these three countries may be standing (for how long?) against a powerful tide.

**Single-parent problems**

The consequences of mother-only families for the socialization of the male child seem bleak. I say "seem" because it is not easy to prove that a single-parent family, independently of other factors, produces undersocialized males. One reason is that mother-only households often suffer from so many problems, such as pov-
erty, that isolating the effect of parenting on children is difficult. Another is that women who bear children without marrying may differ temperamentally from those who do marry. And finally, mother-child relations occupy a much more prominent place in academic studies than do father-child relations, in part because, as Martin Hoffman has noted, “mothers are the main moral socializers of children of both sexes” in virtually every culture.

The main, but not the only socializers. In one of the few studies to follow similarly situated children over many years and observe the relationship between their behavior and the role of their fathers, Sheppard Kellam and his co-workers studied several hundred poor, black first-graders living in a depressed neighborhood near the University of Chicago. Each lived in one of eighty-six different family types, defined by the number and type of adults present. Of the 1,391 families, about one-third had a mother as the only adult present; another third consisted of a mother and a father. Only a tiny fraction was headed by a father with no mother present. The remainder was made up of various combinations of mothers, grandparents, uncles, aunts, adult brothers and sisters, and various unrelated adults. By the time the children entered the third grade, those who lived with their mothers alone were the worst off in terms of their socialization. After ten years, the boys who had grown up in mother-only families (which by then made up about half the total) reported more delinquencies, regardless of family income, than those who had grown up in families with multiple adults, especially a father. Comparable findings have come from studies in Detroit. The most common and most plausible interpretation of these studies is that the presence of a decent father helps a male child learn to control aggression; his absence impedes it.

Not only does it appear that two-parent families do a better job of developing the moral senses of male children, but they also seem to have a beneficial effect on the husbands themselves. Of all of the institutions through which men may pass—schools, factories, the military—marriage has the largest effect. For every race and at every age, married males live longer than unmarried ones, having lower rates of homicide, suicide, accidents, and mental illness. Crime rates are lower for married than unmarried males, and incomes are higher. Drug dealers are less likely to be married than young males who are not dealers. Infant mortality rates
are higher for unmarried than for married women, whether black or white, and these differences cannot be explained by differences in income or availability of medical care.

Though some of these differences can be explained by female selectivity in choosing mates, I doubt that all can. While marriage involves screening people for their capacity for self-control, it also provides inducements—the need to support a mate, care for a child, and maintain a home—that increase that capacity.

When the mother in a mother-only family is a teenager, or at least a teenager living in urban America, the consequences for the child are even grimmer. The most authoritative survey of what we know about the offspring of adolescent mothers concluded that the children suffer more serious problems in cognitive development and display a greater degree of hyperactivity, hostility, and poorly controlled aggression than is true of children born to older mothers of the same race. This is especially true of boys.

**Gender, temperament, and moral senses**

These findings support the view that males and females differ in temperament (especially with respect to aggression), that boys are harder to socialize than girls, and that female choice does not guarantee the selection of dependable mates. Given these differences in temperament, socialization, and reproductive success, one should not be surprised to find evidence that men and women differ in their moral orientation.

An awareness of these differences has led many people in the past (and some today) to argue that morality is more natural to women than to men and to justify differences in the roles and rights of the two sexes. They claim that women, being purer, finer, and more emotional than men, are properly confined to the home, where their more delicate sensibilities suit them for rearing children and sustaining a refuge from the cruelties and competition of the outside world. The argument is not only self-serving (for males), it is also incorrect. Both males and females learn moral behavior in the family; were that not the case, human communities would be impossible. Neither sex is “more” or “less” moral than the other. But they do seem to differ.

Early childhood experiences may lead to greater emphasis on one or the other of the several moral senses. One person may be more inclined to emphasize justice, fairness, and duty, another to
stress sympathy, care, and helping. If Harvard's Carol Gilligan and her colleagues are correct, the former emphasis is more characteristic of men, the latter of women. For example, when people are asked to describe moral dilemmas that they have faced or that they encounter in Aesop's fables, boys overwhelmingly do so in terms of justice (honoring contracts, making a fair division, or respecting rights), while girls are more likely to do so in terms of care (helping people in need, resolving conflict). It must be stressed that these are differences in what people say about a story, not in what they will do in a real-life situation. Yet they are consistent with many obvious facts of life. Women are more likely than men to dislike violence in motion pictures, less likely to enjoy sports that emphasize violence, and far less likely to commit crimes of violence. This is exactly what one would expect of people who say that they keenly experience the pain and sympathize with the plight of others.

**Equality versus fairness**

A clearer test of gender differences comes from the many experiments conducted to see how people will divide rewards after performing some task. Brenda Major and Kay Deaux summarize these findings this way: Under experimental conditions, women take less of the reward for themselves than do men, and they do so regardless of whether the partners with whom they are sharing are male or female. This does not mean that women are less greedy than men, but rather that they seem to apply somewhat different principles to the allocation process.

When a woman has performed better than her partner in some common task, she tends to split the reward equally; when a man has performed better than his partner, he divides the reward equitably (that is, in proportion to the value of each person's contributions). Men also give more to female partners than they do to male ones, whereas women do not allow the sex of their partner to influence their allocation decisions.

These findings hold true under one important condition: The participants expect to have further interactions with their partners. When they don't—when they perform a task with somebody they never expect to meet again—men and women allocate rewards in the same way. It is the prospect of future involvement that leads women to reduce the share they give
themselves even when they are entitled to more. The clear implication is that women assign a higher value to ongoing relationships than do men. Brenda Major is not quite certain how to explain this difference and suggests that it probably has a variety of causes. But it is striking how consistent this is with the Gilligan theory. (Major published her work before Gilligan's appeared.)

When Jean Piaget observed boys and girls at play, he noticed that boys were more concerned with rules, and girls with relationships. When a dispute arose, the boys were more likely to argue about the rules and search for fair procedures for applying them, while the girls were more inclined to manage conflict by making exceptions to the rules or ignoring them entirely. Piaget suggested that girls regarded a rule as "good as long as the game repaid it." Many years later Janet Lever came to the same conclusion after observing fifth-grade children playing at school. Compared to the girls' games, the boys' games were more competitive, more complex, involved more players, often split close friends between different teams, and lasted longer. The greater length reflected both the complexity of the game and the fact that disputes over what constituted fair play were resolved by boys through the application of rules or the decision to repeat the play. Girls, by contrast, were more likely to play short, simple, turn-taking games and to react to a dispute by ending the game. To the girls, maintaining their relationships was more important than continuing the game. Judy Dunn, watching young children at home, was struck by the fact that at as early as two years of age, girls conversed more about their feelings than did boys. Similarly, the aggressiveness of males is commonly expressed by direct physical confrontation, whereas the aggressive impulses of females more often take the form of organized social ostracism.

Though some students of child development suggest that individuals move through various stages of moral reasoning, with the highest stage being the one at which the individual applies universal principles of justice to moral dilemmas, this claim, in my view, assigns too much importance to how a person formulates justifications for his moral inclinations and too little to the inclinations themselves. (I also am a bit suspicious of any theory that says that the highest moral stage is one
in which people talk like college professors.) Ranking moral stages from low to high does not capture the reality of many moral problems, which often involve choosing which of several moral sentiments ought to govern one’s action. For these reasons, the theory that men and women differ in the kinds of moral sentiments they emphasize cannot be tested by measuring which stage each gender is in; much less can the worth of a man’s moral sentiments be compared to that of a woman’s by noting where each stands in the presumed hierarchy of moral stages. To say that the two sexes differ is not the same thing as saying that morality defined as justice and fairness is superior to morality defined as benevolence and caring. Everyone applies various combinations of principles and feelings to the management of moral problems. Sometimes they diverge; and then, if we are calm and self-aware, we struggle to reconcile the competing dispositions.

It is difficult to say exactly how these gender differences, to the extent that they exist, emerge. Nature and nurture interact in ways that are complex and hard to disentangle. Boys are more aggressive than girls (nature at work), but over many millennia their aggressiveness has been moderated by female selection of mates (nature modified by human choices that affect reproductive success) and continues to be moderated or exacerbated by child-rearing practices (nurture) that reflect both infant temperament (nature) and parental attitudes (nurture).

**Gender and social roles**

However complex the origin of the more fundamental gender differences, they are remarkably resistant to planned change. The most impressive demonstration of that resistance—impressive both because of the quality of the research and the initial suppositions of the authors—comes from the studies by Melford E. and Audrey Spiro of a kibbutz, one of the Israeli collective farms. When the Spiros first studied it in 1951, the kibbutz was already thirty years old; when they returned in 1975, it had been in existence for nearly sixty years. It represented, thus, a mature example of a bold experiment: to achieve on a farm a wholly egalitarian society based on collective ownership, cooperative enterprise, a classless society, and the group rearing of children in an atmosphere that accorded no significance to differences in gender. Within a week
after birth, infants were brought to a communal nursery; at one year of age, they moved into a Toddlers' House; at five years of age, they entered kindergarten; and so on through grammar school and high school, living always with other children and never with their parents, except for brief daily visits. Although there were slight differences in dress, in general male and female children were treated in exactly the same way: They dressed together, bathed together, played together, and slept together; they were given the same toys and the same chores. Though men and women married and lived together, the family as a parent-child unit and sex-differentiated roles within the family were abolished, not only in the assignment of rights, duties, and opportunities, but even in dress. Communal facilities—the kitchen, laundry, dining room, nursery, and school—were to be staffed without regard to gender. Women—who wore pants, avoided cosmetics, and retained their maiden names—were encouraged to work the fields alongside the men.

The communal nursery was successful in discouraging clear sex-role identifications among the children. In their fantasy play, boys rarely assumed adult male roles. Some boys chose to wear ribbons and dresses during their games, and boys and girls played together and not in same-sex groups. But from the first some gender differences in behavior appeared despite efforts to discourage them. Just as in conventional families, boys played more strenuous games than girls. Boys were more likely to pretend they were driving machines, while girls were more likely to play with dolls and baby buggies; girls engaged in more artistic games and boys in more mechanical ones. As they got older, the formal sexual equality of life continued: Boys and girls lived together, took showers together, and could indulge their sexual curiosity without adult interference or guidance. But the signs of sexual identification continued to appear. At parties girls spontaneously sang, danced, and initiated activity; boys increasingly sat on the sidelines and watched. Girls began assisting the nurses, boys the farmers. Teachers began to remark that the girls were socially more sensitive, the boys more egotistical.

As they entered high school, the behavior of the kibbutz adolescents was still different in many ways from that of conventional teenagers. In the kibbutz there was virtually no dating and no intense or morbid curiosity about sex. But evidence of shame and
embarrassment had begun to appear. The girls protested against taking showers with boys, began undressing in the dark, and took to wearing nightclothes in bed, all to avoid male eyes. Teachers reported that the girls kept themselves and their living areas cleaner than did the boys, whereas the boys were more aggressive in classroom discussions. The physics class attracted boys, the psychology class girls.

But the biggest changes occurred among the adults who had been born and raised on the kibbutz. The family reasserted itself. Women sought renewed contact with their children, though not at the expense of abandoning collective education; the children's living quarters were increasingly staffed by women; and the men began to do most of the major agricultural jobs and to dominate the leadership roles and discussion in the communal meetings. Women returned to feminine styles in clothing and opened a beauty parlor. This is not to say that there was now sexual inequality in the kibbutz, only that there was sexual diversity—in roles, preferences, styles, and modes of thought—within a structure of legal and formal equality.

The link between Gilligan's studies of gender differences in moral dispositions and the Spiros' observations of gender differences in roles may be this: The moral roles played by women in the kibbutz tended to be expressive while those played by men tended to be instrumental. When conflict arose in children's houses, the girls tended to handle it by supplying assistance, sharing, and cooperation, while the boys more often relied on initiating activities, applying rules, or issuing directives. Predictably, the most aggressive children were boys. Both boys and girls would attempt to control the aggression, but only the girls would console the victims of it.

It is hard to imagine that a free society will ever make a more determined effort to eliminate gender differences in social roles than did the Israeli kibbutzim. It is also hard to imagine that such an effort would be studied by anyone more sympathetic to its goals than Melford and Audrey Spiro. As the former put it in 1979:

As a cultural determinist, my aim in studying personality development in Kiryat Yedidim [the pseudonym of the kibbutz] was to observe the influence of culture on human nature or, more accurately, to discover how a new culture produces a new human nature. In 1975 I found
(against my own intentions) that I was observing the influence of human nature on culture.

The effect on the author's thinking was, as he put it, a "kind of Copernican revolution." His conclusions are supported by another large-scale study of a kibbutz, this by Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepher. These findings help explain the absence of matriarchal societies. Despite recurring claims to the contrary, some by scholars as distinguished as Lewis Henry Morgan and by polemicists as skilled as Friedrich Engels, no credible historical evidence has been adduced to show that a society ruled by women has ever existed. Joan Bamberger, a feminist scholar, has shown that the case for matriarchy has rested on two errors: confounding myth with history (as with the myths of the Amazon women) and confusing matrilineal descent (the inheritance through the female line of property and family name) with matriarchal authority (the enduring rule of women over men).

**Gender and power**

This argument about matriarchy is a bit misplaced, for it proceeds on the assumption that the only authority that counts is that which is wielded publicly and officially or is embodied in offices and rules. Everyday experience should remind us of the countless ways in which men and women alike wield influence without controlling offices. Peggy Reeves Sanday, an anthropologist, has explored in great detail the many and subtle ways in which women exercise informal power, especially in those cultures in which human survival is not threatened by invasion or deprivation. Without the prospect of war or want, a culture tends to evolve a well-understood sexual division of labor, which often leads to the creation of spheres of relatively autonomous action for females and males alike.

That matriarchy has never existed says nothing, of course, about the moral worth or legal rights of men or women. But viewed in light of the evidence from the kibbutzim, it does suggest that the explanation of male domination of political structures may involve more than merely male oppression. While the greater physical strength of men has no doubt been an important factor in maintaining male authority, especially in preindustrial societies, and
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while cultural conventions no doubt continue to sustain many aspects of male advantage, the differing orientations of men and women of the sort suggested by Gilligan and Spiro may also help account for this pattern.

I offer this conjecture: The innately greater aggressiveness of males reflects not only a combative nature, but also the legacy of selection for domination. That tendency may be moderated or exaggerated by parental training. As young boys begin to take pleasure in childhood games, they discover through spontaneous interaction that some principle for controlling aggression and allocating roles must be maintained if the game, and thus its pleasures, are to continue. When each person is, in varying degrees, asserting a desire to dominate, only two principles for moderating conflict are available: the authority of the most powerful or skillful participant, or the authority of norms that allocate roles either equally (for example, taking turns) or equitably (for example, awarding positions in the game on the basis of skill or effort). Whichever principle of authority is accepted, each tends toward the creation of rule-based systems organized around roles, claims, and rights. Prolonged experience in rule-based systems, whether they rest on the authority of a dominant figure or on the legitimacy of the rules themselves, contributes to the acquisition of both a moral orientation that emphasizes justice or fairness and a hierarchical orientation toward the management of conflict and the organization of common undertakings. To borrow the phrase of Louis Dumont, males tend to become homo hierarchicus.

By contrast, to the extent that young girls are innately disposed to avoid physical aggression or, as a result of natural selection, to partake of a nurturant predisposition (of course, individual girls, like individual boys, will differ greatly in these inclinations), they will find that their childhood will generate fewer competing demands for domination requiring rule-based management. Their play, as Piaget, Lever, and others have observed, will be less in need of, and less receptive to, formal principles of authority; the maintenance of personal relationships will take precedence over the allocation of rights and roles. Through prolonged involvement in play where sustaining relationships is more important than managing dominance, girls tend to acquire both a moral orientation that emphasizes caring and harmony and a nonhierarchical orientation toward the organization of common undertakings. Insofar
as power relationships are hierarchical (as they almost always are), women will tend to be excluded, or, if included, confined (in part by fiat, in part by choice) to less authoritative roles.

**Gender and language**

Deborah Tannen finds abundant evidence of these differences in social orientation in the everyday language of men and women, especially in the ways in which the two sexes seem to misunderstand one another (the title of her best-selling book was *You Just Don't Understand*). Men speak in order to report, women to establish rapport; men give directions, women make suggestions; male discourse suggests that independence is important, female discourse that intimacy is crucial. Men are more likely to make decisions "on the merits," women to feel that consultation is as important as decisiveness. When an emotional problem arises, men are inclined to suggest a solution, women to extend sympathy, often by describing similar difficulties of their own. The complaints men and women make about each other's behavior are so well known as scarcely to bear repeating; many grow out of these linguistic—actually, personality—differences: "He is so aloof," "She is so moody"; "He doesn't listen," "She is insecure"; "He never talks to me," "She never stops talking."

Tannen's sociolinguistic analysis, taken together with Gilligan's and Major's psychological inquiries, suggests how gender may affect at least two of the moral senses. Take the sense of fairness: It is a human sentiment, common to both sexes. But fairness, as we have seen, requires a judgment about proportionality: If people ought to get what they deserve or reciprocate what they receive, then the person evaluating the situation must decide how equal or unequal are the contributions of each party. If a person greatly values intimacy, community, and mutual esteem, then that person will tend to value the inputs—the work, effort, time, or manner—of each party in the group equally. Several scholars have noted that in girls' play groups there is a stress on connection and similarity, reflecting a fear of rejection.

From one perspective this appears to be simply an adolescent preoccupation with popularity and conformity, but seen more deeply it reveals an egalitarian ethos that is maintained by striving to see all inputs to some common endeavor as relatively equal,
so that the allocation of rewards will also be roughly the same. Boys also value popularity and certainly are in some sense conformists, but their relationships are substantially more competitive—in athletic achievements, material acquisition, and displays of masculine toughness. Like most male primates, boys participate from an early age in dominance hierarchies. This means that when contributions to joint activities are assessed, males will emphasize the differences in inputs to a greater degree than will females. It does not mean that one gender is more or less fair in its outlook than the other, only that specific application of the norm of fairness or reciprocity will reflect a different assessment of inputs. To oversimplify, men will be more likely to value equity, women equality.

A parallel difference in emphasis can be imagined with respect to sympathy. One can respond to the plight of another by expressions of care or by offers of solutions. In the first instance, empathy is the goal ("let's share our feelings"), in the latter it is simply a motive ("I can help you fix that"). Women may be more likely to take the first view: When an acquaintance suffers a reversal, sympathy requires that one display one's feelings and thereby draw tighter the bonds of friendship. Men may be more likely to take the latter view: The adversity of a friend is an occasion to supply help but not, except within narrow limits, emotion. Help is "what friends are for"; emotion, extravagantly displayed, is simply and wrongly a loss of self-control that helps neither and embarrasses both. These differences may mean, not necessarily that one sex has a greater or lesser capacity for sympathy, but that people, equally affected by the plight of another, may choose to make either an expressive or an instrumental reaction to it.

**Culture versus gender**

These observations about gender differences in moral sentiments are based on evidence that is fragmentary, in some cases controversial, and limited to Western sources. Despite these shortcomings, I advance them because they are consistent with my experiences. But my experiences are, of course, rather parochial. I was reminded of this when Grace Goodell, an anthropologist who has devoted years to studying the cultures of the industrialized nations of the Pacific Rim, suggested to me that in some respects
the moral thinking of successful East Asian businessmen seems to resemble that of eleven-year-old Western girls.

For example, East Asian businessmen often manage their commercial relationships with one another in ways that are designed to maintain those relationships more than to assert legal claims, just as Western girls manage their games in ways that keep the game going even at some cost to the rules. In the Asian business world, anyone who emphasizes contractual obligations, legal rights, or formal rules is guilty of a grave breach of etiquette. These executives are competitive, often fiercely so, but the competition is constrained by a moral sense that neither party should embarrass the other, even at some cost in money. Fairness, abstractly conceived, is less important than comity.

These dispositions may grow out of the interaction between temperamental endowments and child-rearing practices of the sort already mentioned, practices that (at least in Japan) stress emotional interdependency and control behavior by the threat of social isolation. Self-control, sincerity, and collective decisionmaking are greatly esteemed. Pre-school education continues this emphasis. When teachers, parents, and child-development specialists in China, Japan, and the United States were asked to state the most important things that children ought to learn in preschool, the first choice in Japan was sympathy and a concern for others, followed by cooperation. In the United States, the most common response was self-reliance (followed by cooperation); sympathy was rarely mentioned. But in the Japanese preschool, exactly the same gender differences in behavior were observed as one would see in an American preschool or an Israeli kibbutz: The boys acted like warriors, the girls like healers and peacemakers. How gender differences, which seem universal, interact with culture to affect moral sentiments is a subject about which almost everything remains to be learned.

Whether the gender differences in moral sentiments that Gilligan observes in the United States will be found in East Asian (or other) cultures remains to be seen. But the problem of male socialization is, I think, the same everywhere; cultures differ not in whether they must cope with it, but how and with what success.
A human capital policy for the cities

NATHAN GLAZER

A NEW NATIONAL administration has taken office, one of whose defining characteristics is its commitment to human capital investment, which it sees as crucial for the restoration of vigor to the American economy, the increase of good jobs for American workers, the effective competitiveness of the American economy in a world in which international competition and the openness of all markets to penetration from abroad is a new and somewhat frightening reality. In the view of the administration, and many others, investment in young people in school, in those who leave school prematurely, in those who even with high-school diplomas flounder from one inadequate job to another, in mature workers who lose jobs in an increasingly turbulent and volatile economy, has become a key task for American society. Human capital investment—better education at all levels, better training for new jobs in businesses taking advantage of new technology and new ideas of leaner organization—is seen by the leaders of the new administration as critical.

Thus a more activist phase in American national government, inspired by a new vision, opens, succeeding a series of Republi-
can administrations with quite a different vision. For twelve years, national administration has been committed to the free market, and its expectations were that the signals the market provided would suffice to guide people and firms, seeking their own interests, to the training necessary for a changing economy. Under such an outlook, the cities, which had seen in the 1960s and 1970s a huge increase in federal funds for education and training, summer jobs and public service jobs, and other needs that they defined as crucial as their populations became poorer and the proportion of minorities and new immigrants in them rose, felt ignored. The best the cities could hope for was that the rising economic tide would lift all boats, including the cities among them. But the condition of cities overall has not improved in the last dozen years—or in the two decades that preceded them, for that matter. They have become poorer, compared with their suburbs and compared with the nation as a whole. They have become increasingly the place where minorities and new immigrants live, with their additional burdens on social services. They have lost great numbers of manufacturing jobs, to suburbs, to the South, to Mexico or Puerto Rico, to foreign competitors. The "urban crisis," which has been with us for thirty years or more, is still with us. By almost all measures, cities, that is large central cities, poorly off in the 1960s when the poverty program and other initiatives designed to assist them were launched, are worse off today.

A new administration often comes with a defining book, or text. When it comes to the key role of human capital investment, the defining book for this administration is Robert Reich's *The Work of Nations* (Knopf, 1991), and the defining text is the report, *America's Choice: High Skills or Low Wages* (1990). Robert Reich has become secretary of labor, and Ira Magaziner, who was chairman of the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce that produced the report *America's Choice*, and has like Reich been a close advisor to the president, also has an important place in the new administration. We can find further elaboration of the defining vision in the report of the William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work, Family and Citizenship, *The Forgotten Half* (1988), addressing itself to that half of America's youth who don't go to college, a commission on which Hillary Rodham Clinton sat, and in books such as *Thinking for a Living*, by Ray Marshall and Marc Tucker (Basic Books, 1992), *Made in America: Regaining the Competitive Edge*, by Michael Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester
and Robert Solow (MIT Press, 1989)—Solow was the witness who opened the president-elect’s post-election economic summit, in Turbulence in the American Workplace, by Peter Doeringer and others for the Committee on New American Realities of the National Planning Association (Oxford, 1991), and in other books and reports.

We here spell out the vision briefly. It argues that an American economy that was dominant for twenty-five years after the end of World War II is dominant no longer, and will not be again unless it undergoes some radical changes—and they are not to be effected by cutting tax rates and leaving it up to business and individuals to respond by increasing savings and investment and seizing economic opportunities. That dominant economy, these various analysts tell us, was based on mass production, in which the United States had pioneered, and on Taylorism (radical critics call it Fordism), which scientifically analyzed jobs and reduced them to a tiny compass which an unskilled or hardly skilled worker could fill. Powerful industrial trade unions could guarantee such workers good jobs because the United States provided a huge market and foreign competition could not easily penetrate it. National economies, for various reasons, were more self-contained than they are today.

All this has changed. In addition to the buffeting of technological change and its demands, we have more effective international competition. Manufacturing and other industries must become much more flexible, responding rapidly to the varied markets of an open and increasingly affluent world economy. Workers must become more flexible and resourceful. The jobs of unskilled or hardly skilled workers, which trade unions could protect in the former economy, and which provided high wages and benefits, are rapidly shrinking in number—as the troubles of General Motors, or the former U.S. Steel, and many other pillars of American industry demonstrate.

One can present many reasons why foreign competition has become such a powerful threat: higher savings rates in Japan and Germany, greater investment there in new capital, managements more attuned to the needs of production and less to those of the financial markets, and so on, but the analysts I have referred to place great weight on human capital, on the inferior capacities of American workers.

The argument is not foreclosed: American workers are still the
most productive in the world, overall, but their advantage over competitors such as Germany and Japan keeps on shrinking, they are no longer the most highly reimbursed workers in the world, and many comparisons, both of school children and young adults ready to enter the work force, show they are far from the best educated. That too has been disputed—as has been the overall argument that a key element in the greater competitiveness of foreign manufactured goods is the better education and training of workers. But we are not going to dispute here the basic grounds of the analysis. Rather, taking the analysis as a given, what follows? In the more benign environment for programs of education and training promised by this analysis, what policy can cities follow to improve their circumstances?

Why it’s worse in the cities

The analysis we have given as the defining vision of the new administration is a general one applying to the nation. Inevitably, it must apply even more forcefully to the cities. If the country has lost manufacturing jobs, the cities have lost more. If its industry has been based on unskilled and scarcely skilled workers, that certainly defines one aspect of traditional city prosperity, built on the backs of and with the hands of immigrants and migrants, generally with limited skills, whether Irish and Italian and Jewish in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, or black from the South in this century up until the 1960s, or immigrants from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia since the 1970s. (In this latest stage, we also have had an immigration of the more highly educated, particularly from Asia, which only strengthens the analysis: Asians, despite the fact they are recent immigrants and not white, have on the whole done well.) If the task is better education and training, the cities are more in need of it than the nation as a whole.

The cities have in general become poorer than their surrounding suburban belts, and the gap continues to widen. They have become areas of high concentrations of blacks and Hispanics, of high concentrations of new immigrants, and the combination of more poverty among their population, more of minority status, more with language difficulties, inevitably means greater burdens on educational systems. These, if they have more resources than
are found in rural areas and small towns, generally have fewer resources than are available to suburbs, and state formulas to compensate cities, despite decades of litigation and many reforms, have not done much to redress the imbalance.

The large city school districts, organized in the Council for the Great City Schools, have recently issued baseline indicators as to where they stand in the effort to reach six educational goals set by the president and the governors in 1990. These large-city school systems enroll 13.1 percent of all public school children, but they enroll 37.1 percent of all Afro-American children, 31.8 percent of all Hispanic children, 36.1 percent of all children of Limited English Proficiency, 24.5 percent of all children entitled to free or reduced lunches. The aggregate enrollment of these large city districts is 42.1 percent Afro-American, 26.5 percent Hispanic, 5.9 percent Asian American, and 25 percent non-Hispanic white. There are 5.4 million students in the public schools of these city systems—54.8 percent of them are eligible for free or reduced lunch. It comes as no surprise that on the whole they do worse, and the Afro-American or Hispanic do worse among them. Thus, one-third or less of the Afro-American and Hispanic students score above the median in tests of reading (the median is the national average), and less than 50 percent of the non-Hispanic white students score above the median. Only 36.1 percent of the tenth graders in the city school systems had completed first-year algebra—fewer than this of the Afro-Americans and Hispanics, more of the non-Hispanic whites, but still not 50 percent (the Asians did best).

One group of statistics in this compendium is particularly revealing. The number of graduates from these systems—high school graduates—is surprisingly small. Only half of the cohort of entering high-school students become graduates in four years. Thus, consider New York City. It counts 955,514 students in its system, but graduates only 34,290 a year. The four-year dropout rate is given as 17.2 percent, and it is explained as follows: The cohort of high school entrants on the basis of which this was calculated was 70,510. "After 4 years of high school, 17.2 percent had dropped out, 38.9 percent had graduated, 16.0 percent discharged to other school systems, and 27.8 percent were still enrolled. Based on studies of previous cohorts, the dropout rate of individuals by age 21 is expected to be between 25.0 percent and 30.0 percent."
Half of the graduates enroll in four-year colleges, a fifth in two-year community colleges, and only small percentages go into vocational programs (2.5 percent) and military service (2.0 percent). Eight percent are employed full-time, 15.8 percent are "undetermined." In some respects, the system is working. When one considers the numbers who are not on track to employment or higher education, they do not seem overwhelming, even for New York City. We cannot be speaking of more than 20,000 youths a year in need of some help. In an educational system that spends $8 billion dollars a year, in a local economy with 3 million jobs, one would think that a problem of these dimensions could be handled.

There are other features of central cities which make this process of human capital improvement through social and public means more difficult, and more crucial. The percentage of families that are female-headed is greater; the number of young people connected to stable workers who can help them to a job in the typical way in which the non-college do get a job, through family and friends, is fewer; the initial jobs that help orient adolescents and non-college goers to the culture and requirements of the workplace are fewer, as manufacturing and other business leaves the inner city. This situation has been most dramatically described by William Julius Wilson in *The Truly Disadvantaged*. As it is put in a quotation in *The Forgotten Half* by Loic J.D. Wacquant and Wilson:

> Increased joblessness, poverty and receipt of welfare do not simply result mechanically from having large numbers of poor together in the same areas. They signal ... not merely a quantitative concentration of poverty but a transformation of the social and institutional structure of the inner city which, given profound economic changes, puts their residents in a radically more constraining situation than their counterparts of earlier times or the poor of other neighborhoods.

**The "forgotten half" problem**

A human capital approach for the cities means in the large two things, two thrusts. One is attention to education. And that has not been neglected, at least as far as attention is concerned, even in the last two administrations, with their distance from the city and urban problems. The report of the National Commission on
Excellence in Education in 1983, *A Nation at Risk*, appeared while many reform initiatives were stirring in the states, but had an enormous impact in spurring yet further measures. In 1989, George Bush called an unparalleled education summit of all the governors, who set education goals for the year 2000. One cannot possibly summarize all the initiatives that have been started with the general objective of improving levels of achievement in American education.

We will have little to say in this article about the "unforgotten half," those who do go on to college, whether directly or through the route of community college. Whatever the failures of college education in the United States, college graduates do well enough. Indeed, a crucial initiating datum for the analysis of Robert Reich and the *America's Choice* report was the fact that the college graduate, and even the non-graduate college goer (one-half of the unforgotten half), does better than the high-school graduate and the high-school dropout.

One of the most surprising developments of the last fifteen years has been the growing gap between the wages of high-school dropouts and high-school graduates and college goers and college graduates. Even as perceptive an analyst as Richard Freeman, in his 1975 book, *The Overeducated American*, did not foresee this phenomenon—he felt that we were already educating to college standards more people than the jobs available for the college-educated. Many foresaw a future of college graduates driving taxicabs and selling shoes. Of course many did, many still do, but we are still very far from the educated unemployment of developing countries, or our own depression.

The statistics are unmistakable. The gap between the college-educated and the high-school dropout and high-school graduate has widened. As *America's Choice* summarizes it: Between 1979 and 1987, the earnings of men 24-34 who had less than four years of high school dropped 12 percent, of high school graduates 9 percent, of those with 2-3 years of college 5 percent; while the income of college graduates rose 8 percent, of those with more than four years of college rose 10 percent (we should recall at ages 24-34 such men are only at the beginning of their careers). Women did better, all along the line. The college graduate, in the prevailing analysis, does well enough, whether prepared for a specialized occupation or profession, or simply as a "symbolic analyst," pre-
pared to use words, understand concepts, write memoranda, and the like. It is the "forgotten half" on whom we must focus.

It is primarily for them that the second major prong of human capital investment policy, the employment and training system, has been devised. This varied enterprise, built on the assumption the schools have provided a basic education, but very often taking on the task of making up for the defects of a basic education, prepares people for work in all its aspects. One-half or more of high school graduates continue to prepare for work by going to community college or college. Whatever the strength of a liberal arts tradition in American colleges, it is clear to all who go on to college that this is a means of preparing for productive work. Many of the specific courses for which students enroll and the degrees for which they study are already directly work-related—engineering, business degrees, education. Those who are in fields not directly work-related are very often on course to further education that is directly work-related—law, medicine, other professions. It is work training for the others, "the forgotten half," that has been the focus of our efforts in employment and training for the past thirty years. A human capital approach must place as much weight on this system—whether remedial, or specialized to teach specific skills—as on education more narrowly understood, the work of the public schools.

Of course the two are connected: The compulsory education system, lasting for most a full twelve years, is the necessary base for further training for work. Its failures also set the agenda for much of the employment and training system.

**Japan and Germany as models?**

When it comes to employment and training, the prevailing analysis of our problems focuses on our successful international competitors, in particular Japan and Germany, and asks, can we do as well? For in those countries we see remarkably coherent systems of training for work, systems which do not leave so many thousands out in the cold floundering without skills and without leads to jobs that will provide a decent income and basic benefits.

Japan and Germany fascinate us: We do not see aimless groups of youth populating the poorer parts of the city, without jobs, apparently without the education or motivation or will to get jobs, forming a threat not only to the effectiveness of the economy be-
cause their labor is not available or used but also to the social peace of the city. Indeed, this latter threat, so evident in the American city—the threat of crime—plays a large role in the flight of business and industry from the city, either to find safer precincts, or to avoid the burden of the costs of crime, or of higher taxation to fight crime and social problems that have their sources in poor education and inadequacy to perform in the labor market.

I am summarizing the prevailing understanding: I think it is true. Others would ask, but are there good jobs for these people, even if better educated and better qualified? And are they not poorly educated and underqualified simply because they know there are no such jobs out there, and thus their motivation to perform is weak? However we resolve this problem, and it is a real one, the city as an actor cannot help but adopt the first posture, that better education and training are essential: The city cannot create the national economic policies that might produce a buoyant economy, it cannot deal with the problems of international competition the way the national state can, even though cities keep on sending their mayors off to Japan and Europe to seek investment. It is clear that the city’s first responsibility, acting on the hope that it is the quality of its young people and labor force that is a determinant factor, is to improve education and training for employment through those branches of educational and social policy that are within its reach. And indeed if it does, and reduces the costs of crime and welfare and social problems, it will become more attractive to business, as the quality of the available labor improves, as the social environment improves, as taxes decline.

In any case, we are bemused by Japan and Germany, and Sweden and Denmark, and other countries which seem to have a much more effective and systematic approach to preparing youth for productive work than we do.

One problem with this bemusement is that they do it in such different ways. In Japan, schools have nothing to do with preparing young people for work directly. Japanese schools are strictly academic. As Paul Osterman puts it (Employment Futures, Oxford, 1988):

"After World War II, Japan faced a shortage of skilled labor. It had this in common with much of Europe. Yet whereas European nations developed extensive vocational training in the context of public edu-"
cation and created a large postschool training system, the Japanese solution involved very little provision of training, either in schools or job-training programs. In 1976, Japan spent .04 percent of its GDP on government-provided adult job-training programs, whereas Sweden, at the other extreme, spent .72 percent of its GDP and the United States .26 percent. The picture isn’t very different with regard to vocational education in the schools.... Furthermore, Japanese public education has a very anti-vocational orientation....

In other words, we already in 1976 spent proportionately more than six times as much as Japan, if only one-third as much as Sweden.

So how does Japan get such a highly qualified work force? One reason is that the quality of its public education is so good, and its students do so much better than ours, in those areas of education which are common enough to be tested and compared (mathematics, science). But another reason is that Japanese business and industry invest a great deal in training workers, and look only for academic qualifications among those they select and train.

The Germans do it very differently, as many recent articles describing the German system have pointed out. At school leaving, after ten years of education, those not going on to university will take up an apprenticeship. That is something like 70 percent of all young Germans. The apprenticeship lasts two or three years, during which the apprentice gets training wages. During that period, he or she will attend a state school one day a week providing a related vocational-academic program. The apprentice will be trained in one of 380 occupations for which examinations exist. The examinations, passed after training, permit the apprentice to work at the trade for which he or she was trained. Apprentices very often graduate to work with the business or firm in which they have trained. State and local governments spend $5.5 billion on vocational education, the federal government adds $4.5 billion, the costs to business and industry are also large. One estimate is that it costs $8,400 for each apprentice a year—far more than we spend in almost any work-training program. The system is administered by the Federal Labor Agency which employs 96,000 people.

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The program is huge: In 1992, 595,000 entered an apprenticeship program, some 1.6 million are currently enrolled in apprenticeships, 6.5 percent of the labor force. This flurry of articles on German apprenticeship appeared in part because of President Clinton's expressed commitment to more effective and wide-reaching apprenticeship programs.

Not everyone is happy with even the admirable German program. In the New York Times, Stephen Kinzer quotes the Frankfurter Rundschau:

Do we really need apprentices in every bakery, art studio, hotel, travel agency and gas station? [And what, one wonders, can they possibly learn that requires two or three years of apprenticeship?] The usual answer is, Of course we do, because otherwise what would happen to our business and industries? How would we keep training the typical German high-tech workers who are the envy of the world from Japan to Detroit? What would become of our social and economic stability?

It is worth spending so much time on the German system because it seems to be more the kind of model we can in part follow than the Japanese, which seems so different from anything we do. We already emphasize placing attention on preparation for work in the educational system through its links with business, and have developed these connections substantially in the last ten years. The German model has had more influence on the proposals of the report America's Choice than the Japanese and other systems.

Us and them

But how do we get from here to there, can we get there, and should we get there? We do have real apprenticeship programs in the United States, but they enroll at best 200,000 or 300,000 young Americans, they are concentrated in the building trades, and they have a reputation for discriminating against blacks. (A recent New York Times report by Ronald Sullivan tells us: “Construction unions in New York City that have long been criticized for excluding members of racial minority groups have agreed to recruit 25 percent of their new apprentices from the overwhelmingly black and Hispanic graduating classes of the city’s vocational high schools.” Twenty-five percent seems rather paltry in a city that is one-half black and Hispanic, and whose vocational schools are “overwhelmingly” black and Hispanic. This is an old and still unresolved problem.)
Aside from our very small apprenticeship programs, based, just as the far more extensive German system, on old guild traditions, we have created over thirty years a very substantial but disorderly work and training system. We have been down this road before, that is, the creation of programs to prepare youth for work (and older workers for new work). The poverty program and its varied successors created a huge network of providers of some kind of human-capital improvement aimed at the poor and minorities. Most of this enterprise was maintained during the Nixon administration. It saw a burst of expansion in the Carter administration, with its substantial investments in employment and training programs. Much of it has survived even the dry years of recent Republican administrations.

There was an explosion of community organizations during the poverty program years that provided assistance to those whose capacity for work was limited—anti-dropout programs, intensive residential job training, labor market preparation programs, temporary jobs for in-school, or out-of-school youths, special intensive programs for welfare mothers and ex-offenders, for girls at risk of becoming pregnant or already mothers, and so on. Indeed, the number of programs, with their varied acronyms, boggles the mind. They had their bad periods and their good, went out of existence and came into existence as funds flowed or were cut off, but more of them survived the federal drought than seemed likely, and many imaginatively found new sources of funds (foundations, city government, state programs) as federal programs waned, or managed to connect in some ways with whatever federal initiative still persisted. But the result of all this has been thin indeed.

What the studies show

One key aspect of American social policy for the past thirty years that has been distinctive is that instead of launching vast new enterprises with confidence, it tries to first cautiously test effectiveness through demonstration, evaluation, and research. We may not be very good at establishing permanent institutions on a national scale that deal with the problems of improving human capital, as Germany and Sweden have, but we are quite good at testing whatever enterprises we launch. The results on the whole have been disheartening. One of the major initiatives of the Carter years was the expansion of such programs. One can read the re-

Both of these major evaluations ended up with rather similar conclusions. American efforts at employment and training, despite the energy and intelligence and large sums that were invested, suffered from a number of consistent faults. The YEDPA evaluation points out that the legislation created a program that combined too short a time schedule with too many different program elements and objectives. Quite typically, the aim in these programs was not only to provide employment and/or training, but to target dropouts, or minorities, or the hard-core unemployed, or young women, and success was predicated on reaching various groups. We were solving social as well as employment problems. The legislation setting up these programs and their accompanying evaluations generally gave them too little time in which to show results and too little time to make their case before further reauthorizations. There were of course also great changes from one administration to the next, and also substantial changes in program definitions from one fiscal year to the next. Funding was never assured. The various agencies created to carry out the programs had no assurance of continuity, had no professionalized and experienced staff, were better suited to exerting political pressure to get funds than to carrying out the program objectives of training or dropout prevention or basic education or placement in jobs or whatever the specific objectives of the program might be.

The conclusion of the YEDPA evaluation is striking but typical. It describes a fundamental dilemma of the system of employment and training in the United States:

The employment and training system is trying to do what the education system should be doing.... Yet the employment and training system has not attained stability of funding, professionalization of staff, and delineation of authority, in short, institutionalization, of the sort that has given the educational system its accepted place in the mainstream of American life. As a result, in most communities, organizations involved in training are considered marginal.
But the evaluators caution:

The educational system, on the other hand, should not be taken as an exact model for the institutionalization of the employment and training system, since it has not yet found an effective way to prepare a substantial part of the youth population for later employment.

Robert Taggart, looking at the entire employment and training enterprise in the Carter administration and before, came to conclusions consistent with these. He was unhappy in addition with the fact that many of these programs provided stipends, and thus many enrolled in them more for the stipends than for the training, and that programs did not discipline those who exploited them. His conclusions, to my reading, were that, surprisingly, these programs should be in some respects more like school—longer, graduated from the simpler to the more complex, people should not be paid for attending, and individuals should have to show clear evidence of success. Short-term programs, of the kind that were typical in the work-training world, could not deal with the severe problems many brought.

Paul Osterman, in an informed and penetrating recent review of American programs for employment and training, concludes that they achieve little (as do the evaluations of Taggart and Betsey), and his analysis of their failings is similar:

We must conclude that employment and training programs are marginal to the operation of the labor market. Whatever process generates the low earnings of the system's clients is only glancingly affected by the existence of the programs. The system is also marginal in other ways. The changing federal legislation has so frequently shifted the respective roles of federal, state, and city governments that consistent governance has become difficult. However, it is at the point of program delivery that the true nature of the programs is apparent. Regardless of the particular federal legislation ... the actual service deliverers have always been a collection of community action groups and social service agencies, national community-based organizations, and city agencies. The chief characteristic of many of these "program operators" has been their instability and lack of a consistent internal structure. In sharp contrast to the most analogous institution—the school system—these agencies come in and out of existence, there are no accepted certification or training requirements for staff, curriculum varies over space and time, and career lines for staff are virtually non-existent. Indeed, some estimates for the CETA period are that turnover rates of professional staff were between 25 and 50 percent per year!... The system can be interpreted as an in-
ner-city patronage operation that succeeds in its latent function of channeling resources to community groups.

Equally indicative of its marginal character, and more damning of the possibility of success, is the tenuous relationship of the employment and training system to the private economy. American business takes training seriously and expends considerable resources to accomplish it. One might expect that firms would eagerly turn to a public system that was prepared to underwrite some of the costs. Yet this has not proved true. Employment and training programs have found it very difficult. The Bureau of National Affairs found that only 9 percent (in a recent survey of firms concerning training programs) had any involvement at all with the Job Training Partnership Act.

The federally funded and locally and community-managed employment and training system has become stigmatized as a form of welfare, programs for losers. This was not necessarily so when the federal government first became involved, with the Manpower and Development Training Act of 1962, which was predicated on the assumption that workers losing jobs because of technological and economic change could be assisted by retraining. But with the wave of programs of the War on Poverty, employment and training became identified with those who were hard to train and hard to employ.

Our employment and training programs seem to suffer from the faults of other programs for the poorest, such as public housing and welfare. They are not general entitlements for all workers, but are targeted to the most needy. Whether because they have never been funded adequately or because they are in such large measure programs for minorities or because they are targeted on the most difficult cases, they are not effective. Osterman gives the example of a test of one program, in which the government provides a subsidy to employers who hire a targeted group of work-seekers drawn from the hard-to-employ. Similar applicants, with subsidies available, and without, were matched; employers preferred the applicants without subsidy.

So we are far from the German situation, in which no stigma attaches to those in the apprenticeship programs (after all, 70 percent of the work force passes through them), or the Swedish situation, in which so much is spent on the retraining of workers throughout the occupational system. We have created a separate, poorly organized, complexly administered set of programs, based on variably competent community groups, with no great record of
success. The Job Corps is regularly listed as the great success in this system. When one looks at the measures by which it is considered successful—a few weeks more employment a year, a few hundred dollars more a year in earnings—it is enough to make us think, if this is success, how much more poorly do all the others do?

To all this must be added the inordinate complexity imposed on these systems at the state as well as the federal level. As America's Choice describes:

The network of public training activities in this country has been created as a result of unrelated educational, social, and economic development goals rather than from any overall vision of human resource development.... These various and often unintended origins of our adult training and employment 'system' have created a bewildering array of services, programs and providers.

In Michigan, for example, $800 million in combined annual state and federal funds are scattered across 70 separate training and education funding programs, administered by nine different departments of state government, and offered by innumerable local providers. In New York, 19 different units of state government distribute $725 million in job training services through more than 85 different programs. At the local labor market level, where people seek training and employers seek workers, the picture is blurred. Lack of information on provision, price and quality continually frustrate the efforts of employers, agency officials, and customers.

**Promising paths**

If the evaluations have been so uniformly bleak, what can be different now? How can we improve on the course of the past, with at least four years of a new and sympathetic administration, and informed by a better understanding of our human capital problems and how they affect the nation and the cities?

Whether or not we can define new programs that are more effective than those of the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s is unclear, but certainly something new has been added in the 1990s: and that is the chill sense that these programs must not only lift up urban youth, but also contribute to America's international competitiveness. Perhaps this additional task will concentrate the mind.

But whether or not it concentrates the mind, one must recognize regretfully it cannot concentrate the energy of our politically elected leaders and politically appointed officials to the point where
anything like the German system or any great increase in order and systematic organization can be expected. These energetic and able people will have at most a few years in which to make an impact: They will not spend it in trying to make the current system more orderly, or in trying to make one new big system to replace it. Rather, more money will be put into old programs that look good or have sufficient political clout, and into new ideas that look good. Americans are rather more fertile in thinking up new ideas (and trying to get credit for them) than they are in creating new, stable institutions. That is why we have so many student-lending programs, and indeed other programs in whatever area one can think of.

Our constitutional system, with its fifty states, encourages this diversity. Our system of local government, with its great variations from state to state, also encourages this diversity. The very diversity of our people, in race and religion and national origins, and the scale of the country, inevitably make for this diversity. Our traditions of civil service, which give no great honor or credit to long service in established bureaucracies, also encourage this diversity. Every new secretary of labor, or governor, or mayor, or superintendent of schools, and go down the line as far as you wish, will want to make his or her mark, and it will rarely be made by creating order where there was disorder, German efficiency where there was blooming, blazing American confusion. I do not celebrate this; I simply think one must accept it as reality.

Thus there was more wisdom than President Bush (or his speechwriter) knew in the phrase "a thousand points of light." It is my guess that we will progress, if we do, to the degree it is possible for us to multiply programs and initiatives which relate school and education and training to skills and work more effectively. In fact, we already see the institutions, in all their nascent forms, which do some of this.

In the books and reports I have referred to, all of which tend to dream of and hope for a national and uniform system—if not Germany and Sweden, coming close to them—we are given examples of success. To some extent these are replicable and presented to us because they are replicable. Yet in each case, if one knows more, one sees distinctive features for each city, perhaps to be found in some others, perhaps not. Here there is an energetic and effective mayor, there a school superintendent, here an
effective local community organization, there a coherent body of concerned businessmen. Here one person or group takes the lead, there another. It is hard to see how it can be very different. We must build on what exists. What exists is various, indeed multifarious. It would be impossible to summarize the various programs which try to bring greater work skills into the schools, or provide better work skills for those who leave school, with the help of local business, business organizations, community groups, foundations, mentors, volunteers, philanthropists, ethnic organizations, and so on and so on. But we can describe some of these promising initiatives.

The case of Boston

The Boston Compact is a particular favorite of these efforts to exhort us to develop a more effective educational system linked to higher skills and rewarding work. It plays a role in almost all the books and reports we have referred to. Begun in 1982, through the efforts of a very energetic school superintendent and a particularly coherent and enlightened business leadership, it exchanged the promise of business assistance to the schools, and of jobs for its graduates, for promises of increased school performance and reduced numbers of dropouts. This was the crude bargain, but to do anything effective, beyond public relations, was far more complex.

Even for this one program for one city the eyes would glaze over if one listed all the elements involved and projects launched to reduce dropouts, improve performance, get students who could into college, and those who couldn't or didn't want to into employment. Undoubtedly the Compact was also assisted by the "Massachusetts Miracle" of the later 1980s—as it was harmed by the very rapid collapse of the Massachusetts Miracle, with the crisis in the computer industry and the decline in defense contracts in the early 1990s.

More students did go on to higher postsecondary education. Of 2,700 graduates in 1987, 36 percent went on to full time postsecondary education, 20 percent were working and studying (these make up the "unforgotten half"), 1,000 got jobs at an average wage of $6.18, 3,000 students were put in summer jobs in 669 companies at an average wage of $5.39. But all this was rather low-tech. The dropouts—as numerous possibly as the graduates—were not
affected much, and the graduates did not do that well. The details of the company-school connection show how chary the companies were of being able to find really adequate full-time employees from the Boston schools. The number of dropouts did not fall, which was a sticking point with the business side of the Compact. As was the fact that the achievement scores and general reputation of the Boston schools did not rise.

In a rather more detailed study of this business-school connection by Eleanor Farrar and Anthony Cipollone, we are told by a “career experience” teacher (especially assigned to tell students about jobs, counsel them):

The combination of putting kids in a work situation with counseling and school-work had a great effect. It has increased attendance....

For students, the Compact shows the longitudinal picture, that there is a connection between school and work. Seeing this in real life does more to put pressure on the kids than anything teachers can say. It has made discipline problems less.

But that is not very much. As this study goes on to say, “But simply clocking hours in school will not overcome many youngsters’ very real academic deficiencies.” One active participant is quoted: “The biggest problem is still in the area of basic skills. If there’s any weakness in the Compact, it’s ... in its ability to tackle this problem.” Another: “The greatest storm cloud is around the basic skills that kids enter ninth grade with and the relative inability of the high schools so far to change that.” The authors write, “the school system must deliver on its side of the business/education compact.” It was easy enough in a period of low unemployment to provide the jobs. It seemed inordinately difficult for the school system to raise basic skills substantially or reduce drop-outs.

There were already in 1985 shadows:

The Compact’s independence from the rest of the system bothered the School Committee and the Teachers’ Union. John O’Bryant [a member of the School Committee] described the compact as a “semi-autonomous unit” and said that “the School Committee is going to have trouble with that. We want all the people who are working in the schools to be certified....” He and Ed Doherty [of the Teachers’ Union] noted that the staff the Compact assigned to the schools are not paid salaries comparable to those of other school staff. Yet, according to Doherty, they’re doing guidance work.
The superintendent who helped start it all left and the new one had his own ideas about how to improve the schools:

In 1986 [the Compact] was merged with the school-based management and school improvement programs and then merged once more with the Department's staff development function. Officially part of the Office for School Assistance, the Compact was settled in the middle of the bureaucracy. Its staff was three layers removed from the Superintendent and reported to some of the curriculum and instruction staff they used to fight with.

Various key figures had left for other jobs.

The Compact persists, but it has not transformed the Boston schools, or much raised the capacity of the forgotten half on whom Boston's economy is in large part dependent.

City Year and Project ProTech

Other enterprises flourish in Boston. Much attention has been given to Boston's City Year as one model for the national service program to which the new president is committed, and Clinton's aides visited it during the transition. Privately funded (as is in large measure the Boston Compact), it mixes youth from various classes, "Andover and Exeter graduates along with knife-scarred gang members," for a year of useful work. It has now received a $7 million grant from the federal Commission on National and Community Service to double its numbers to 550. (Last year it chose 240 from 800 applicants.) They earn $100 a week, and at the end of nine months, if they have shown up on time and not missed work, a $5,000 bonus. They must also, before the end of the year, "register to vote, obtain a library card, produce a resume, complete a workshop in tax preparation and, if they are not high school graduates, get a GED." It is considered the most successful urban corps program in America. There are many others. The youths work at many things, and the article by Mary Jordan of the Washington Post from which this description is drawn describes them cleaning up a historic cemetery.

This is not very hi-tech. Yet another snapshot from Boston, by Jason DeParle of the New York Times, describes a program closer to the admired German model. It focuses on two high school girls in an innovative project. They are bored in their physics class:

But in the afternoon they are cheerful exemplars of the job-training approach that economists, in unusual numbers, are endorsing as a
A HUMAN CAPITAL POLICY FOR THE CITIES

A tonic for the nation's ailing economy. As members of a youth apprenticeship program here, called Project ProTech, they spend part of their high school days cultivating a marketable skill, in their case as hospital technicians.

Traveling each day to one of the nation's premier teaching hospitals, they turn tissue samples into medical slides....

Program officials warn that it takes considerable amounts of time and money to coordinate the three-way relationship among the schools, hospitals and the Private Industry Council, the business group that runs ProTech. Even with a $970,000 Federal grant, the program is able to serve only 120 of the city's 15,000 high school students.

For the two apprentice hospital technicians,

the program does seem to be having a clear, positive effect. But it is not necessarily the one intended. The students, their families and their supervisors say the program has raised their confidence and drive, but neither student is sure she wants to be a histology technician. Both are applying to four-year colleges, something they did not plan to do before entering the program....

The hospital's vice-president for human resources said its decision to join the program was born of both altruism and self-interest. "We've got a lot of jobs to fill, and we need highly technical people," he said, explaining that he sometimes recruits trained technicians from as far away as Ireland. Taking on 10 high school students who earn $6 an hour gives him the chance to train and screen potential future employees.

But he warns that letting high school students loose in hospital laboratories involves 'an enormous commitment of time and resources.' The students' salaries alone will cost the hospital $74,000 this year, and Mr. Manheimer estimates the program consumes another $20,000 worth of supervisors' salaries.

One of the two students applying to four-year colleges, we are told, has a combined score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test of 730.

The story illustrates the difficulties of introducing something like the German system. The training is expensive. Will the businesses or firms or nonprofit organizations that pay for it get the benefit of the training in which they have invested, if, as is so likely, the trainees decide to take their new skills down the road, or to another city or region, or to go on to postsecondary education, which offers so many opportunities, even to the barely skilled and qualified with a 730 SAT? The United States is a highly mobile and open country, with strong traditions of moving on, with many opportunities for a second, and a third, and even further
chances. That certainly limits the enthusiasm of the employer for high-cost investment in workers who may not stay. We read in the accounts from Germany of similar problems there, as the postsecondary system expands and becomes more attractive to those who formerly could not have made it into the university system.

But would we want it otherwise? There are many examples of truly high-tech training to bring workers to the high level of skill that is common in Japan and Germany and essential for the United States—after all, United States industry is still very far from down the tubes. These programs, in the examples that I have seen reported, are run by companies, with no government assistance, out of strict self-interest. But so many of the accounts that describe efforts to upgrade the American labor force concentrate on the enormous waste and cost of trying to instill, in the workplace, the minimal skills of reading and writing that should be the task of the public schools.

"A thousand points of light"

So what is the defining vision for a city program in employment and training, in the more benign environment in which new national programs will be launched? There will undoubtedly be a national service program, its dimensions and character undefined, but perhaps something like Boston's City Year, or perhaps something like the Peace Corps and its equivalents, and more closely linked to the need to provide funds for college education. There will be an expanded apprenticeship program, trying to reach beyond the building trades.

For the cities, the aim must simply be more of the same. It is not possible to build in a country with our federal and political and social traditions an all-embracing system such as the ones that exist in Germany or Sweden. What we can do is encourage and press for the kind of activities at which we are best—new and varied ideas, introduced by voluntary organizations, foundations, community groups, funded from various sources. The advice from past experience that seems best is to spend less time on reorganization—bursts of reorganization leave matters very much as they were before—more time seeking out and supporting new ideas, and perhaps most important, recognizing in all this the need for more—more time, more money, more experienced staff. This is the advice of those who studied the programs of the Carter years
and it still makes sense. Literacy programs take more time and effort than we thought, changing behavior to adapt to the needs of the workplace takes more time and money than we thought, learning some skills, for youth with weak education, weak motivation, takes longer. Programs if possible should build on each other, as Taggart suggested, in effect becoming a school beyond school. Successful programs require, for those with the most difficulty, steady support, even after, or particularly after, the first job has been gotten. All this seems like more paternalistic (or maternalistic) babying than should be necessary, but a substantial part of our urban youth needs it.

It would be tempting to depend on a rising economy to solve all these problems. But the experience of Boston and eastern Massachusetts in the few years of very low unemployment and easy availability of jobs in the late 1980s shows it does not. It would be tempting to depend on the family, that great educational agency which once provided the work habits and motivation necessary for effective participation in the labor force, to do it, but many families today cannot. In the inner-city schools, one-parent families are often the norm; after the crack epidemic, we are becoming familiar with the no-parent family. Of course we should strengthen the economy, and if we can learn how, strengthen the family. But the work-training system, the remedial function, will still be essential. Half the graduates are ready and able to go on to college, much of the “forgotten half” has the support of the family and work traditions and does not need the remedial system. Our remedial system is still necessary for those worst off, and I do not see how we can get out of that situation.
Mr. Jefferson comes to town

GEORGE F. WILL

ON MARCH 4, 1809, in the newly completed hall of the House of Representatives, Thomas Jefferson attended the presidential inauguration of his friend and fellow Virginian, James Madison. Observers noted—they could hardly fail to, such were Jefferson’s high spirits—that he was elated to be leaving public office. One week later, on March 11, Jefferson left Washington. He would never return. Indeed, in the remaining seventeen busy years of his life, he would never leave Virginia, or even venture far from Monticello.

Today, two and a half centuries after Jefferson’s birth, I would like to consider this question: Is Jefferson still instructive to us? Or has he become a glittering anachronism, with little to say that is pertinent to our nation’s current discontents?

These discontents are, essentially, of two kinds, and they are related. One is physical, the other is cultural and moral. But, then, it was an aspect of Jefferson’s genius that he knew that the

These remarks were delivered at the University of Virginia in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of Thomas Jefferson.
elemental physical facts of social life have cultural, and hence moral, consequences. Our physical discontent is that we feel crowded together. Our cultural discontent is that this crowding gives rise to an uncomfortable sense of dependency.

Put plainly, we have become a nation of cities, and we are uneasy about this. We are uneasy not just because our cities are dismaying in so many ways. We also are uneasy because there echo in our national memory Jefferson’s forebodings about urbanization. Jefferson inveighed against cities at a time when the largest city in the nation, Philadelphia, had a population of 54,391 (about the size of Rapid City, South Dakota today). Jefferson’s dislike of urban life was not merely an aesthetic recoil, although it was certainly that, too. His dislike flowed from his political philosophy, and reflected the radicalism of American political thought—the sharpness of our break from ancient patterns of political philosophizing.

Rural virtues

Jefferson is sometimes caricatured as a person who was optimistic to the point of simplemindedness. He did, indeed, have the innate confidence of a natural aristocrat, and the expansive intellectual expectation of progress that characterized the eighteenth century Enlightenment of which he was a conspicuous exemplar. But look at what he actually said about the problems of governance, and about the myriad lurking threats to the goodness of America. Democracy, he said, depends on the nurturing of certain virtues in its citizens. But those virtues, and the strength of character that we recognize as true independence in individuals, depend, Jefferson warned, on a certain kind of social order. They depend, he said, on a rural society. Hence he warned against “piling up” people in cities. Cities are, he said, inherently and everywhere “pestilential.” He exhorted Americans to let Europe have the cities—and, hence, the workshops, as well.

Jefferson was hardly unacquainted with metropolitan living. He lived with his customary flair and zest in the Paris of the 1780s—Paris fermenting with cultural and political upheaval. And having seen urban crowds abroad and at home, Jefferson still said “I am not among those who fear the people.”

But let us not flinch from this fact. Cut the people off from connection with the land, from a life of rural husbandry, and
Jefferson's trust became as attenuated as he said the people's virtue must then become.

Jefferson believed that human nature presented political problems. But he believed that those problems could be ameliorated by nature itself—by the education in hardihood, independence, and various other virtues that comes from a life engaged in labor on the land.

**Ancients and moderns**

The contrast between Jefferson's political philosophy and the philosophies of the ancients is stark. The words civic, citizen, and city have a common root and classical political philosophy taught that man could only become civilized—literally made suitable for life in the city, and for citizenship—by the close proximity to and involvement with other people that is required by the life of a polity compact enough to be walked across in a day. Compactness was a necessary condition for the flourishing of a political community—or so said most political philosophers prior to America's Founders.

Jefferson's, and America's, break with that classical tradition was complete. Jefferson wanted space not only between the citizen and the government, but also between citizens. Hence the alacrity with which he leapt at the opportunity to make the Louisiana Purchase for our suddenly very "extensive Republic." So from the beginning, American virtue was linked with space, meaning room enough for Americans to develop the virtues that undergird personal independence.

Classical political philosophy taught that the fulfillment of human life depended on active engagement in the civil, the political life of the country. Jefferson lived such a life. But he did not live it contentedly, or even happily, and he did not recommend it. To him, political engagement was a duty to be done, but not a career to be sought, still less a pleasure to be relished.

Again, remember the undisguised pleasure Jefferson took from shaking the dust of Washington from his shoes. Government, he knew, should not be at the center of American life, or at the center of the life of any American who could honorably avoid it. Serving in government can be a duty; but distrust anyone who does it for pleasure. In 1813, speaking after what he called "an intimacy of forty years with the public councils and characters,"
he said: “An honest man can feel no pleasure in the exercise of power over his fellow citizens.”

A distinguished historian, John P. Diggins, rightly says that American political thought, both liberal and conservative, has emphasized *homo faber*—man as a creature fulfilled in, and improved by, work. American political thought has not emphasized *homo politicus*—man as the classical philosophers understood him, as a creature fulfilled and improved through participation in politics. In American political thought, and especially in Jefferson’s thought, it is work, which takes place in the private sphere of life, and not politics in the public sphere, that is the primary source of American dignity.

In this regard, Lincoln was squarely in the Jeffersonian tradition. Lincoln came (in the words of his campaign song) “out of the wilderness, out in Illinois.” Back then, people still spoke of “the Illinois frontier.” Lincoln came from where people were grappling with nature, subduing it, fulfilling their (and the nation’s) manifest destiny in work.

As Diggins notes, American literature reflects—and reinforces—this national yearning for private space in which to work out one’s personal destiny. James Fenimore Cooper in the forest, Herman Melville at sea, Mark Twain on the Mississippi, Thoreau by his pond, all expressed an American—a Jeffersonian—faith in virtue developed without dependence on political engagement, or even on “society.”

Few people in contemporary America have even an inkling of what that cowboy from Manhattan, Teddy Roosevelt, called “the iron desolation” of the Great Plains. What Willa Cather of Red Cloud, the novelist from Nebraska, called “the inconceivable silence of the plains,” is indeed, inconceivable to most modern Americans who are enveloped by the cacophony of metropolitan living. Time was when an American leatherstocking could—and would—pack up and head west when he could hear the sound of his nearest neighbor’s ax. No more. Now we need to work on our neighborliness, and come to terms with living in close proximity to one another.

The continent that our continental republic spans is certainly not densely populated by Old World standards. But, then, those

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have never been our standards. And because so many Americans now live in close contact—social and economic—with other Americans, there seems to be a kind of national claustrophobia. It is making people increasingly irritable. Intellectually and emotionally we are all Jefferson’s children, and we are feeling cramped. We are throwing elbows, figuratively speaking, and speaking the aggressive language of rights, asserting myriad rights against one another in a jostle for social space.

We are now much in need of a translation of Jeffersonian philosophy for our urban situation. We need a new vernacular, not only, or even primarily, of politics, but also of civil society. That is, of all those intermediary and voluntary associations that leaven life and mediate between the individual and the state. A Jeffersonianism for our times would speak to the problem of defining, and valuing, and attaining personal independence “down town,” in the city, far from the frontier and farms where the original idea of the independent American was defined.

**Death of the frontier**

It is serendipitous that the 250th anniversary of Jefferson’s birth is also the 100th anniversary of the most seminal essay ever written on American historiography. Delivered in 1893 at the American Historical Association, it was Frederick Jackson Turner’s “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.”

Three years earlier the Bureau of the Census had declared the frontier closed. Turner considered that declaration momentous, and potentially ominous. He believed that American democratic values—nothing less than what was best in the nation’s character—had been shaped by the availability of western lands. So what would become of us now, our saving spaces being exhausted?

Turner said, “In the spirit of a pioneer’s ‘house raising’”—voluntary cooperation in the private realm—“lives the salvation of the Republic.” What would become of an America in which pioneering was a thing of the past?

Prior to the American Founding, the pedigree of republican institutions had been traced back to ancient ideas. But Turner, drawing on and deepening the Jeffersonian tradition, was intimating a new declaration of independence from the Old World; he was attempting to ground American republicanism quite literally on the ground, in the vastness of the American land.
Turner's "geographical" understanding of American history was squarely in the Jeffersonian tradition. But his paper was delivered in a distinctly un-Jeffersonian setting, one that would have given Jefferson an anxiety attack, if not vertigo.

When Turner addressed the American Historical Association, the meeting was in Chicago, drawn there by the great Columbian Exposition. That exposition had opened in October 1892, to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the coming of Columbus, and to celebrate in its exhibitions of technological and industrial marvels, the triumph of the will of man over the resistant material of nature in the New World.

It was at the Chicago Exposition, in the Gallery of Machines, that Henry Adams said he felt himself knocked prostrate, "his historical neck broken by the sudden eruption of forces totally new." It was because of new forces surging through society that, early in the twentieth century, many thoughtful Americans (Herbert Croley for one; Walter Lippmann for another) thought Jeffersonian individualism was no longer an answer to American problems, but rather had become the problem.

The problem, they thought, had two facets. One facet was the weakness of government. The challenge was to strengthen the state so that it could tame the surging energies of industrialism. The other facet of the problem was to temper American individualism so that a spirit of community could flourish. For these ends, the state has been expanding through most of this century.

The twentieth century has been the century of the state. Government has grown everywhere. However, as this weary century wends to a close, there is a fresh receptivity to the core conviction of Jeffersonianism, a fresh appreciation of the primacy of the private sphere of life.

Jefferson focuses our attention on the task of building a society that nurtures individuals to self-sufficiency, including independence of politics. Now more than ever we need to be focused on that task of nurturing, because the related forces of urbanization and statism are exerting a powerful pull toward an enervating dependency. It is a dependency on large economic entities, and on government, for security. Ultimately, it is dependency on—an addiction to—security as the highest aim of life. This addiction produces, over time, a timid, fearful, debased people, erecting barriers against a competitive world, and expressing an entitlement mentality, insisting that they are entitled to govern-
ment protection from uncertainty. That is an entitlement with a steep moral cost. Government that acknowledges that entitlement becomes a bland Leviathan, a soft, kindly meant but ultimately corrupting statism, a statism of benighted benevolence.

**A new path**

The Washington that Jefferson fled has, in our time, become an agency of dependency. So a sensible first step would be to restore the wrecked equilibrium of our federal system. From Jefferson’s era until well into this century, political debate in Washington about what Washington should do about this or that began with examination of the question of whether Washington should do anything—whether the federal government was constitutionally entitled to act.

Some people will say that the constitutional question is firmly closed. They will say that the “living document” has “evolved,” and for many decades now has been consistently construed to emancipate the federal government from any serious restraint on its latitude for action. That is, alas, true. By construing the Constitution in a way that enables the federal government to act everywhere, we have taught Americans to think that it is natural and right for the federal government to take custody of every problem, to organize the provision of every need, and to satisfy every want.

I know an accomplished fact when I see one; I can face facts of constitutional construction even when I regret them. But what I am recommending is not a constitutional but a prudential inhibition on the central government. After all, it is not as though the federal government today has excess resources of energy, intelligence, and money. It is not as though the federal government is conspicuously successful at all its undertakings.

So, it would be an act of fidelity to Jeffersonianism to revive the idea of states’ rights—and states’ responsibilities.

Now, I know some people wince when they hear the phrase “states’ rights.” I understand. Let me tell a story.

Shelby Foote, in the second volume of his magisterial three-volume history of the Civil War, recounts a story concerning a Virginian, General George Thomas, who served in the Union Army.² Immediately after the bloody assault on Missionary Ridge

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in the Battle of Chattanooga, General Thomas discerned an attractive spot for a military cemetery, and put a detail to work on the project. The chaplain in charge asked Thomas if the dead were to be buried in plots assigned to the states their units represented, as was done at Gettysburg, where Lincoln had briefly spoken at a cemetery dedication a few weeks earlier. General Thomas lowered his head in thought, then shook it decisively. Making a tumbling gesture with both hands, he said, "No, no; mix 'em up. I'm tired of states' rights."

Today Americans old enough to remember America's great domestic conflicts over race relations in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s may well say, as Thomas did, that they want to hear no more about states' rights. But it is well to remember that an idea should not be discredited merely by the fact that it has been put to ignoble uses. (The history of Christianity, and other great religions, is instructive in this regard.)

It is also well to remember that in 1800, when our country still had not spilled westward over the Alleghenies, Jefferson wrote: "Our country is too large to have all its affairs directed by a single government." So let us send more political power back to where Jefferson thought it belonged, to the state and local—very local—levels. Even more important, let us get politics to the periphery of American life, where Jefferson wanted it.

To do so we will have to resist and reverse powerful tendencies in modern history, tendencies that tend to recur. Indeed, the mind of the West has long been haunted by the fear that history is, or tends to be—and will be if we are not careful—cyclical. The fear is that powerful forces, even the very logic of social development, propel societies into cycles of decay and—if society is resourceful—regeneration. But decay is more probable than regeneration.

Contradictions cultural and political

Although America's Founders were firm believers that history could be linear—that progress is possible—they knew that progress was not inevitable. And some of them had anxieties that have an astonishingly modern ring to them.

In December 1819, John Adams, an old adversary who had become a friendly correspondent, wrote the following to Jefferson:
"Will you tell me how to prevent riches from being the effects of temperance and industry? Will you tell me how to prevent riches from producing luxury? Will you tell me how to prevent luxury from producing effeminacy, intoxication, extravagance, vice and folly?"

What was worrying Adams, and Jefferson too, has come to be known in our day as the "cultural contradiction of capitalism." The worry is that capitalism, by its very success, by its prodigious productivity, undermines the social and moral prerequisites for its continued success. The worry is that capitalism requires thrift, discipline, industriousness, and deferral of gratifications; but capitalism by its prodigal success in making Americans a people of plenty, may be subverting those very virtues, making us soft and self-indulgent.

Just as there can be a "cultural contradiction of capitalism," so, too, there can be a political contradiction of democracy. It is this: The very responsiveness of democratic government to the popular will can corrupt the popular will. The more that government tries to satisfy the appetites of particular groups, the more appetites are inflamed, and the more groups organize to make their demands felt. So the very virtues that democracy presupposes—individualism, self-restraint, and self-reliance—are subverted, over time, by the very solicitousness of democratic government. That subversion is in a very advanced stage today in the city Jefferson left for good 184 years ago.

We have not been properly mindful of Jefferson's warnings about the tendency of government to swell; and the tendency of the central government in a federal system to absorb other governments' responsibilities and rights; and the tendency of politics to permeate life, constricting the private sphere of life. But these tendencies are only that—only tendencies, not inevitabilities. So let us resolve to honor Jefferson by resisting the increasing dependencies in our urban society, dependencies on government and politics. We Americans are a relentlessly forward-looking people, but let us learn to live looking back over our shoulders, back to Jefferson for guidance.

**Fitzgerald's lament**

Among the most moving passages in American literature is one, familiar to all, that echoes with what can be called Jeffersonian melancholy. It is the ending of F. Scott Fitzgerald's
The Great Gatsby. The narrator, Nick Carraway, is standing at night on a lawn on the Long Island shore. He says:

And as the moon rose higher the inessential houses began to melt away until gradually I became aware of the old island here that flowered once for Dutch sailors’ eyes—a fresh green breast of the new world. Its vanished trees, the trees that had made way for Gatsby’s house, had once pandered in whispers to the last and greatest of all human dreams; for a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his breath in the presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in history with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder.

I call this melancholy Jeffersonianism. It is Jeffersonian because it recalls the immense promise implicit in America’s space. It is melancholy because it suggests that the great dream, that of being worthy of the promise, was transitory, and has passed. But it need not be so.

Jefferson’s generation came many generations after the Dutch sailors’ eyes first fell on our continent, but Jefferson’s generation, too, held its breath, fully feeling it was face to face with a responsibility as large as the continent. In our time the sense of freshness is gone. The houses and the cities—these human handprints on the land—are not insubstantial and will not melt away. But we should not want them to. These most un-Jeffersonian things—our cities—can be made more civilized if we rededicate ourselves to the most Jeffersonian of values, personal independence, beginning with education and finding fruition in work. The Jeffersonian legacy can live downtown.

For just one more moment let us rejoin Nick Carraway on Gatsby’s lawn by the Long Island shore. His mind is on what he calls “the vast obscurity beyond the city, where the vast fields of the republic rolled on under the night.” Fitzgerald’s masterpiece concludes with these words: “And so we beat on. boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.”

The past has us in its grip. But that is our good fortune because Thomas Jefferson is a large component of our useable past. So let us beat against the current, the modern current of statism and dependency that, if unresisted, will bear us farther and farther away from Jefferson’s still vital vision of our Republic.
Homosexuality, the Bible, and us—a Jewish perspective

DENNIS PRAGER

Of all the issues that tear at our society, few provoke as much emotion, or seem as complex, as the question of homosexuality.

Most homosexuals and their heterosexual supporters argue that homosexuality is an inborn condition, and one, moreover, that is no less valid than heterosexuality. They maintain that to discriminate in any way against a person because of his or her sexual orientation is the moral equivalent of discrimination against a person on the basis of color or religion; that is to say, bigotry plain and simple.

On the other hand there are those who feel, no less passionately, that homosexuality is wrong, that society must cultivate the heterosexual marital ideal, or society's very foundations will be threatened.

In the middle are many who are torn between these two claims. I have been one of them. Generally speaking, I do not concern myself with the actions of consenting adults in the privacy of their homes, and I certainly oppose government involve-
ment with what consenting adults do in private. In addition, both lesbians and homosexual men have been part of my life as friends and relatives.

At the same time, I am a Jew who reveres Judaism. And my religion not only prohibits homosexuality, it unequivocally, unambiguously, and in the strongest language at its disposal, condemns it. Judaism—and Christianity—hold that marital sex must be the ideal to which society aspires. Thus my instinct to tolerate all non-coercive behavior runs counter to the deepest moral claims of my source of values.

This is not all. Adding to the seeming complexity are the questions of choice and psychopathology. Current homosexual doctrine holds that homosexuals are born homosexual, and that homosexuality is in no way a psychological or emotional deviation. Are these claims true? And if they are, what are we to do with Western society's (i.e., Judaism's and Christianity's) opposition to homosexuality? What are we to do with our gut instinct that men and women should make love and marry each other, not their own sex? Have Judaism and Christianity been wrong? Is our instinctive reaction no more than a heterosexual bias? And what about those of us who have two gut instincts—one that favors heterosexual love, and one that believes "live and let live"? These two feelings seem irreconcilable, and they have caused me and millions of others anguish and confusion.

After prolonged immersion in the subject, I continue to have anguish about the subject of homosexuality, but, to my great surprise, much less confusion. I hope that the reader will undergo a similar process, and it is to this end that I devote this article.

The nature of sex

Man's nature, undisciplined by values, will allow sex to dominate his life and the life of society. When Judaism first demanded that all sexual activity be channeled into marriage, it changed the world. It is not overstated to say that the Hebrew Bible's prohibition of non-marital sex made the creation of Western civilization possible. Societies that did not place boundaries around sexuality were stymied in their development. The subsequent dominance of the Western world can, to a significant extent, be
attributed to the sexual revolution, initiated by Judaism and later carried forward by Christianity.

This revolution consisted of forcing the sexual genie into the marital bottle. It ensured that sex no longer dominated society, it heightened male-female love and sexuality (and thereby almost alone created the possibility of love and eroticism within marriage), and it began the arduous task of elevating the status of women.

It is probably impossible for us who live thousands of years after Judaism began this process to perceive the extent to which sex can dominate, and has dominated, life. Throughout the ancient world, and up to the recent past in many parts of the world, sexuality infused virtually all of society.

Human sexuality, especially male sexuality, is polymorphous, or utterly wild (far more so than animal sexuality). Men have had sex with women and with men; with little girls and young boys; with a single partner and in large groups; with immediate family members; and with a variety of domesticated animals. They have achieved orgasm with inanimate objects such as leather, shoes, and other pieces of clothing; through urinating and defecating on each other (interested readers can see a photograph of the former at select art museums in America exhibiting the works of the gay photographer Robert Mapplethorpe); by dressing in women's garments; by watching other human beings being tortured; by fondling children of either sex; by listening to a man or woman's disembodied voice (e.g., phone sex); and, of course, by looking at pictures of bodies, or parts of bodies. There is little, animate or inanimate, that has not excited some men to orgasm.

Of course, not all of these practices have been condoned by societies—parent-child incest and seducing another man's wife have rarely been countenanced—but many have, and all illustrate what the unchanneled, or in Freudian terms, the "un-sublimated," sex drive can lead to.

Desexualizing God and religion

Among the consequences of the unchanneled sex drive is the sexualization of everything—including religion. Unless the sex drive is appropriately harnessed (not squelched, which leads to its own consequences), higher religion cannot develop.
Thus, the first thing the Hebrew Bible did was to desexualize God: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth"—by His will, not through any sexual behavior. This was an utterly radical break with all religion, and it alone changed human history. The gods of virtually all civilizations engaged in sexual relations. The gods of Babylon, Canaan, Egypt, Greece, and Rome were, in fact, extremely promiscuous, both with other gods and with mortals.

Given the sexual activity of the gods, it is not surprising that the religions themselves were replete with all forms of sexual activity. In the ancient Near East and elsewhere, virgins were deflowered by priests before marriage, and sacred or ritual prostitution was almost universal.

The Hebrew Bible was the first to place controls on sexual activity. It could no longer dominate religion and social life. It was to be sanctified—which in Hebrew means “separated”—from the world and placed in the home, in the bed of husband and wife. The restriction of sexual behavior by Judaism (and later Christianity) was one of the essential elements that enabled society to progress.

**The ubiquity of homosexuality**

The new restrictions were nowhere more radical, more challenging to the prevailing assumptions of mankind, than with regard to homosexuality. Indeed, for all intents and purposes, Judaism may be said to have invented the notion of homosexuality, for in the ancient world sexuality was not divided between heterosexuality and homosexuality. That division was the Bible’s doing. Before the Bible, the world divided sexuality between penetrator (active partner) and penetrated (passive partner).

As Martha Nussbaum, professor of philosophy at Brown University, has written, the ancients were no more concerned with people’s gender preference than people today are with others’ eating preferences:

Ancient categories of sexual experience differed considerably from our own.... The central distinction in sexual morality was the distinction between active and passive roles. *The gender of the object ... is not in itself morally problematic*. Boys and women are very often treated interchangeably as objects of [male] desire. What is socially important is to penetrate rather than to be penetrated. Sex
is understood fundamentally not as an interaction, but as a doing of something to someone...."1 [emphasis added]

Judaism changed this. It rendered the "gender of the object" very "morally problematic"; it declared that no one is "interchangeable" sexually; and, as a result, it ensured that sex would in fact be "fundamentally interaction" and not simply "a doing of something to someone." The Hebrew Bible condemned homosexuality in the most powerful and unambiguous language it could: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it is an abomination."

To appreciate the extent of the revolution wrought by this prohibition of homosexuality, and the demand that all sexual interaction be male-female, it is first necessary to appreciate just how universally accepted and practiced homosexuality has been throughout the world.

It is biblical sexual values, not homosexuality, that have been deviant. In order to make this point clear, I will cite but a handful of historical examples. Without these examples, this claim would seem unbelievable.

Ancient Near East

Egyptian culture believed that "homosexual intercourse with a god was auspicious," writes New York University sociology professor David Greenberg in *The Construction of Homosexuality*. Having anal intercourse with a god was the sign of a man's mastery over fear of the god. Thus one Egyptian coffin text reads, "Atum [a god] has no power over me, for I copulate between his buttocks."2 In another coffin text, the deceased person vows, "I will swallow for myself the phallus of [the god] Re."3 In Mesopotamia, Hammurabi, the author of the famous legal code bearing his name, had male lovers.4

Greece

Homosexuality was not only a conspicuous feature of life in ancient Greece, it was exalted. The seduction of young boys by older men was expected and honored. Those who could afford, in time and money, to seduce young boys, did so. Graphic depictions of man-boy sex adorn countless Greek vases.

"Sexual intimacy between men was widespread throughout ancient Greek civilization.... What was accepted and practiced
among the leading citizens was bisexuality; a man was expected to sire a large number of offspring and to head a family while engaging a male lover.\textsuperscript{5}

As Greenberg writes, "The Greeks assumed that ordinarily sexual choices were not mutually exclusive, but rather that people were generally capable of responding erotically to beauty in both sexes. Often they could and did."

"Sparta, too, institutionalized homosexual relations between mature men and adolescent boys." In Sparta, homosexuality "seems to have been universal among male citizens."

\textit{Rome}

Homosexuality was so common in Rome that Edward Gibbon, in his \textit{History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire}, wrote that "of the first fifteen emperors Claudius was the only one whose taste in love was entirely correct" (i.e., not homosexual).\textsuperscript{6}

According to psychiatrist and social historian Norman Sussman, "In contrast to the self-conscious and elaborate efforts of the Greeks to glorify and idealize homosexuality, the Romans simply accepted it as a matter of fact and as an inevitable part of human sexual life. Pederasty was just another sexual activity. Many of the most prominent men in Roman society were bisexual if not homosexual. Julius Caesar was called by his contemporaries every woman's man and every man's woman."\textsuperscript{7}

\textit{The Arab World}

Greenberg notes that "a de facto acceptance of male homosexuality has prevailed in Arab lands down to the modern era." As early as the tenth century, German historians depicted Christian men as preferring martyrdom to submitting to Arab sexual demands.

In the words of one of the world's great scholars of Islam, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, "The sexual relations of a mature man with a subordinate youth were so readily accepted in upper-class circles that there was often little or no effort to conceal their existence."\textsuperscript{8}

Edward Westermak observed that "it is a common belief among the Arabic-speaking mountaineers of Northern Morocco
that a boy cannot learn the Koran well unless a scribe commits pederasty with him. So also an apprentice is supposed to learn his trade by having intercourse with his master."9

Greenberg writes: "In Morocco ... pederasty has been an 'established custom,' with boys readily available in the town.... "In nineteenth-century Algeria, 'the streets and public places swarmed with boys of remarkable beauty who more than shared with the women the favor of the wealthier natives.'"10

As for non-Arab Islam, "the situation," Greenberg concludes, "has been little different."

And this is only a cursory review. Homosexuality was also prevalent among pre-Columbian Americans; the Celts, Gauls, and pre-Norman English; the Chinese, Japanese, and Thai; and dozens of other nationalities and cultures. Greenberg summarizes the ubiquitous nature of homosexuality in these words: "With only a few exceptions, male homosexuality was not stigmatized or repressed so long as it conformed to norms regarding gender and the relative ages and statuses of the partners.... The major exceptions to this acceptance seem to have arisen in two circumstances."

Both of these circumstances were Jewish.

**Judaism and homosexuality**

The Hebrew Bible, in particular the Torah (the first five books of the Bible), has done more to civilize the world than any other book or idea in history. It is the Hebrew Bible that gave humanity such ideas as a universal, moral, loving God; ethical obligations to this God; the need for history to move forward to moral and spiritual redemption; the belief that history has meaning; and the notion that human freedom and social justice are the divinely desired states for all people. It gave the world the Ten Commandments and ethical monotheism.

Therefore, when this Bible makes strong moral proclamations, I listen with great respect. And regarding male homosexuality—female homosexuality is not mentioned—this Bible speaks in such clear and direct language that one does not have to be a religious fundamentalist in order to be influenced by its views. All that is necessary is to consider oneself a serious Jew or Christian.

Jews or Christians who take the Bible's views on homosexuality seriously are not obligated to prove that they are not fundamentalists or literalists, let alone bigots (though people have
used the Bible to defend bigotry). The onus is on those who view homosexuality as compatible with Judaism or Christianity to reconcile this view with their Bible.

Given the unambiguous nature of the biblical attitude toward homosexuality, however, such a reconciliation is not possible. All that is possible is to declare: “I am aware that the Bible condemns homosexuality, and I consider the Bible wrong.” That would be an intellectually honest approach.

But this approach leads to another problem. If one chooses which of the Bible’s moral values to take seriously (and the Bible states its prohibition of homosexuality not only as a law, but as a value—“it is an abomination”), of what moral use is the Bible?

Advocates of religious acceptance of homosexuality respond that while the Bible is morally advanced in some areas, it is morally regressive in others. Its condemnation of homosexuality is cited as one example, and the Torah’s acceptance of slavery as another.

Far from being immoral, however, the Torah’s prohibition of homosexuality was a major part of its liberation of the human being from the bonds of unrestrained sexuality and of women from being peripheral to men’s lives.

As for slavery, while the Bible declares homosexuality wrong, it never declares slavery good. If it did, I would have to reject the Bible as a document with moral relevance to our times. With its notion of every human being created in God’s image and with its central event being liberation from slavery, it was the Torah which first taught humanity that slavery is wrong. The Torah’s laws regarding slavery exist not to perpetuate it, but to humanize it. And within Jewish life, these laws worked. Furthermore, the slavery that is discussed in the Torah bears no resemblance to black slavery or other instances with which we are familiar. Such slavery, which includes the kidnapping of utterly innocent people, was prohibited by the Torah.

Another argument advanced by advocates of religious acceptance of homosexuality is that the Bible prescribes the death penalty for a multitude of sins, including such seemingly inconsequential acts as gathering wood on the Sabbath. Since we no longer condemn people who violate the Sabbath, why continue to condemn people who engage in homosexual acts?

The answer is that we do not derive our approach toward homosexuality only from the fact that the Torah made it a capi-
tal offense. We learn it from the fact that the Bible makes a moral statement about homosexuality. It makes no such statement about gathering wood on the Sabbath. The Torah uses its strongest term of disapprobation, “abomination,” to describe homosexuality. It is the Bible’s moral evaluation of homosexuality that distinguishes homosexuality from other offenses, capital or otherwise. As Professor Greenberg, who betrays no inclination toward religious belief, writes, “When the word toevah (“abomination”) does appear in the Hebrew Bible, it is sometimes applied to idolatry, cult prostitution, magic, or divination, and is sometimes used more generally. It always conveys great repugnance” [emphasis added].

Moreover, it lists homosexuality together with child sacrifice among the “abominations” practiced by the peoples living in the land about to be conquered by the Jews. The two are certainly not morally equatable, but they both characterized the morally primitive world that Judaism opposed. They both characterized a way of life opposite to the one that God demanded of Jews (and even of non-Jews—homosexuality is among the sexual offenses that is covered by one of the “seven laws of the children of Noah” which Judaism holds all people must observe).

Finally, the Bible adds a unique threat to the Jews if they engage in homosexuality and the other offenses of the Canaanites: “You will be vomited out of the land” just as the non-Jews who practice these things were vomited out of the land. Again, as Greenberg notes, this threat “suggests that the offenses were considered serious indeed.”

Why Judaism opposes homosexuality

It is impossible for Judaism to make peace with homosexuality, because homosexuality denies many of Judaism’s most fundamental values. It denies life; it denies God’s expressed desire that men and women cohabit; and it denies the root structure that the Bible prescribes for all mankind, the family.

“Choose life”

If one can speak of Judaism’s essence, it is contained in the Torah statement, “I have set before you life and death, the blessing and the curse, and you shall choose life.” Judaism af-
firms whatever enhances life, and it opposes or separates whatever represents death. Thus, meat (death) is separated from milk (life); menstruation (death) is separated from sexual intercourse (life); carnivorous animals (death) are separated from vegetarian, kosher animals (life). This is probably why the Torah juxtaposes child sacrifice with male homosexuality. Though they are not morally analogous, both represent death: One deprives children of life, the other prevents their having life.

Men need women

God's first declaration about man (the human being generally, and the male specifically) is, "It is not good for man to be alone." Now, presumably, in order to solve the problem of man's aloneness, God could have made another man, or even a community of men. However, God solved man's aloneness by creating one other person, a woman—not a man, not a few women, not a community of men and women. Man's solitude was not a function of his not being with other people; it was a function of his being without a woman.

Of course, Judaism also holds that women need men. But both the Torah statement and Jewish law have been more adamant about men marrying than about women marrying. Judaism is worried about what happens to men and to society when men do not channel their drives into marriage. In this regard, the Torah and Judaism were highly prescient: The overwhelming majority of violent crimes are committed by unmarried men.

In order to become fully human, male and female must join. In the words of Genesis, "God created the human ... male and female He created them." The union of male and female is not merely some lovely ideal; it is the essence of the biblical outlook on becoming human. To deny it is tantamount to denying a primary purpose of life.

The family

Throughout their history, one of the Jews' most distinguishing characteristics has been their commitment to family life. To Judaism, the family—not the nation, and not the individual—is to be the fundamental unit, the building block of society. Thus, when God blesses Abraham, He says, "Through you all the families of the earth will be blessed."
Homosexuality's effect on women

Yet another reason for Judaism's opposition to homosexuality is homosexuality's negative effect on women. There appears to be a direct correlation between the prevalence of male homosexuality and the relegation of women to a low societal role. At the same time, the emancipation of women has been a function of Western civilization, the civilization least tolerant of homosexuality.

In societies where men sought out men for love and sex, women were relegated to society's periphery. Thus, for example, ancient Greece, which elevated homosexuality to an ideal, was characterized, in Sussman's words, by "a misogynistic attitude." Homosexuality in ancient Greece, he writes, "was closely linked to an idealized concept of the man as the focus of intellectual and physical activities."

Classicist Eva Keuls describes Athens at its height of philosophical and artistic greatness as "a society dominated by men who sequester their wives and daughters, denigrate the female role in reproduction, erect monuments to the male genitalia, have sex with the sons of their peers...."

In medieval France, when men stressed male-male love, it "implied a corresponding lack of interest in women. In the Song of Roland, a French mini-epic given its final form in the late eleventh or twelfth century, women appear only as shadowy, marginal figures: 'The deepest signs of affection in the poem, as well as in similar ones, appear in the love of man for man....'"11

The women of Arab society, wherein male homosexuality has been widespread, have a notably low status. In traditional Chinese culture, as well, the low state of women has been linked to widespread homosexuality.12

While traditional Judaism is not as egalitarian as many late twentieth century Jews would like, it was Judaism, very much through its insistence on marriage and family and its rejection of infidelity and homosexuality, that initiated the process of elevating the status of women. While other cultures were writing homoerotic poetry, the Jews wrote the Song of Songs, one of the most beautiful poems depicting male-female sensual love ever written.

The male homosexual lifestyle

A final reason for opposition to homosexuality is the homosexual lifestyle. While it is possible for male homosexuals to live
lives of fidelity comparable to those of heterosexual males, it is usually not the case. While the typical lesbian has had fewer than ten sexual partners, the typical male homosexual in America has had over 500. In general, neither homosexuals nor heterosexuals confront the fact that it is this male homosexual lifestyle, more than the specific homosexual act, that disturbs most people.

This is probably why less attention is paid to female homosexuality. When male sexuality is not controlled, the consequences are considerably more destructive than when female sexuality is not controlled. Men rape. Women do not. Men, not women, engage in fetishes. Men are more frequently consumed by their sex drive, and wander from sex partner to sex partner. Men, not women, are sexually sadistic.

The indiscriminate sex that characterizes much of male homosexual life represents the antithesis of Judaism’s goal of elevating human life from the animal-like to the God-like.

**The Jewish sexual ideal**

Judaism has a sexual ideal—marital sex. All other forms of sexual behavior, though not equally wrong, deviate from that ideal. The further they deviate, the stronger Judaism’s antipathy. Thus there are varying degrees of sexual wrongs. There is, one could say, a continuum of wrong which goes from premarital sex, to adultery, and on to homosexuality, incest, and bestiality.

We can better understand why Judaism rejects homosexuality by understanding its attitudes toward these other unacceptable practices. For example, if a Jew were to argue that never marrying is as equally valid a lifestyle as marrying, normative Judaism would forcefully reject this claim. Judaism states that a life without marrying is a less holy, less complete, and a less Jewish life. Thus, only married men were allowed to be high priests, and only men who had children could sit as judges on the Jewish supreme court, the Sanhedrin.

To put it in modern terms, while an unmarried rabbi can be the spiritual leader of a congregation, he would be dismissed by almost any congregation if he publicly argued that remaining single is as Jewishly valid a way of life as married life.

Despite all this, no Jew could argue that single Jews must be ostracized from Jewish communal life. Single Jews are to be loved and included in Jewish family, social, and religious life.
These attitudes toward not marrying should help clarify Judaism’s attitude toward homosexuality. First, it contradicts the Jewish ideal. Second, it cannot be held to be equally valid. Third, those publicly committed to it may not serve as public Jewish role models. But fourth, homosexuals must be included in Jewish communal life and loved as fellow human beings and as Jews.

We cannot open the Jewish door to non-marital sex. For once one argues that any non-marital form of sexual behavior is as valid as marital sex, the door is opened to all other forms of sexual expression. If consensual homosexual activity is valid, why not consensual incest between adults? Why is sex between an adult brother and sister more objectionable than sex between two adult men? If a couple agrees, why not allow consensual adultery? Once non-marital sex is validated, how can we draw any line? Why shouldn’t gay liberation be followed by incest liberation?

Accepting homosexuality as the social, moral, or religious equivalent of heterosexuality would constitute the first modern assault on the extremely hard-won, millenia-old battle for a family-based, sexually monogamous society. While it is labeled as progress, the acceptance of homosexuality would not be new at all.

**Is homosexuality wrong (even if homosexuals have no choice)?**

To all the previous arguments offered against homosexuality, the most frequent response is: But homosexuals have no choice. To many people this claim is so emotionally powerful that no further reflection seems necessary. How can we oppose actions that people have not chosen?

But upon a moment’s reflection, the answer becomes very clear: “Homosexuals have no choice,” when true, is a defense of the homosexual, not of his conduct.

It may be necessary to oppose actions even if they are not performed voluntarily. We do it all the time, and in all spheres of life. It is what keeps psychiatrists and the courts so busy.

The issue of whether homosexuals have any choice may be terribly important, but even if we were to conclude that they do not, that conclusion would in no way invalidate any of the objec-
tions Judaism raises against homosexuality. Whether or not homosexuals choose homosexuality is entirely unrelated to the question of whether society ought to regard it as an equally valid way of life.

If Judaism's arguments against homosexuality are valid, then even if we hold that homosexuals have no choice, we will have to conclude that nature or early nurture has foisted upon some people a tragic burden. But how to deal with a tragic burden is a very different question from whether Judaism, Christianity, and Western civilization should drop their heterosexual marital ideal.

In fact, to society at large, gays do not generally argue that a homosexual life is entirely as valid as a heterosexual life. Even if they believe this, few heterosexuals would agree with it. So, gays offer the argument that garners the most heterosexual sympathy—that homosexuals have no choice.

And to those homosexuals who truly have no choice, we do owe sympathy. But sympathy is one thing, and the denial of our value system is quite another. Chosen or not, homosexuality remains opposable. If chosen, we argue against the choice; if not chosen, we offer compassion while retaining our heterosexual marital ideals.

**Is homosexuality chosen?**

The question of choice, then, is unrelated to the question of homosexuality's rightness or wrongness. But we must still try to resolve the question of whether homosexuality is chosen.

The question is always posed as, "Do homosexuals choose homosexuality?" When phrased this way, the answer usually seems obvious. One hardly imagines an adult sitting down and debating whether to become a homosexual or a heterosexual. But the question is much more instructive when posed in a more specific way: Is homosexuality biologically programmed from birth, or is it socially and psychologically induced?

There is clearly no one answer that accounts for all homosexuals. What can be said for certain is that some homosexuals were started along that path in early childhood, and that most homosexuals, having had sex with both sexes, prefer homosexual sex to heterosexual sex.

We can say "prefer" because the vast majority of gay men have had intercourse with women. As a four-year study of 128
gay men by a UCLA professor of psychology revealed, "More than 92 percent of the gay men had dated a woman at some time, two-thirds had sexual intercourse with a woman."\(^{14}\)

Moreover, if homosexuality is biologically determined, how are we to account for the vastly differing numbers of homosexuals in different societies? As far as we know, most upper-class men practiced homosexuality in ancient Greece, yet we know that there has been very little homosexuality, for example, among Orthodox Jews.

Wherever homosexuality has been encouraged, far more people have engaged in it. And wherever heterosexuality has been discouraged, homosexuality has similarly flourished, as, for example, in prisons and elsewhere: As Greenberg has written, "High levels of homoeroticism develop in boarding schools, monasteries, isolated rural regions, and on ships with all-male crews."\(^{15}\)

As for female homosexuality, many lesbian spokeswomen argue passionately that lesbianism is indeed a choice to be made, not a biological inevitability. To cite but two of many such examples, Charlotte Bunch, an editor of *Lesbians and the Women's Movement* (1975), wrote: "Lesbianism is the key to liberation and only women who cut their ties to male privilege can be trusted to remain serious in the struggle against male dominance." And Jill Johnson, in her book, *Lesbian Nation: The Feminist Solution* (1973), wrote: "The continued collusion of any woman with any man is an event that retards the progress of women's supremacy."

Of course, one could argue that homosexuality is biologically determined, but that society, if it suppresses it enough, causes most homosexuals to suppress their homosexuality. Yet, if this argument is true, if society can successfully repress homosexual inclinations, it can lead to either of two conclusions—that society should do so (socially, not legally) for its own sake, or that society should not do so for the individual's sake. Once again we come back to the question of values.

Or, one could argue that people are naturally (i.e., biologically) bisexual (and given the data on human sexuality, this may be true). Ironically, however, if this is true, the argument that homosexuality is chosen is strengthened, not weakened. For if we all have bisexual tendencies, and most of us successfully suppress our homosexual impulses, then obviously homosexuality
is frequently both surmountable and chosen. And once again we are brought back to our original question of what sexual ideal society ought to foster—heterosexual marital or homosexual sex.

To sum up:

1) Homosexuality may be biologically induced, but is certainly psychologically ingrained (perhaps indelibly) at a very early age in some cases. Presumably, these individuals always have had sexual desires only for their own sex. Historically, they appear to constitute a minority among homosexuals.

2) In some cases, homosexuality appears not to be indelibly ingrained. These individuals have gravitated toward homosexuality from heterosexual experiences, or have always been bisexual, or live in a society that encourages homosexuality. As Greenberg, who is very sympathetic to gay liberation, writes, “Biologists who view most traits as inherited, and psychologists who think sexual preferences are largely determined in early childhood, may pay little attention to the finding that many gay people have had extensive heterosexual experience.”

3) Therefore, the evidence overwhelmingly leads to this conclusion: By and large, it is society, not the individual, that chooses whether homosexuality will be widely practiced. A society’s values, much more than individuals’ tendencies, determine the extent of homosexuality in that society.

Thus we can have great sympathy for the exclusively homosexual individual while strongly opposing social acceptance of homosexuality. In this way we retain both our hearts and our values.

What are we to do?

We could conceivably hold that while heterosexual sex ought to be society’s ideal, society should not discriminate against homosexuals. This solution, however, while tempting, is not as tidy as it sounds. For the moment one holds that homosexuality is less socially or morally desirable than heterosexuality, discrimination, in some form, becomes inevitable. For example, it is very difficult to hold that marriage and family must be society’s ideal and at the same time advocate homosexual marriage.

More than other issues, homosexuality seems to force one into an extreme position. Either you accept homosexuality completely or you end up supporting some form of discrimination.
The moment you hesitate to sanction homosexual marriage, or homosexual men as Big Brothers to young boys, or the ordaining of avowed homosexuals, you have agreed to discrimination against homosexuals. And then the ACLU, gay activists, and others will lump you with the religious right wing.

This is why many liberals find it difficult not to side with all the demands of gay activists. They terribly fear being lumped with right-wingers. And they loathe the thought of discriminating against minorities. Gay activists have been quite successful at depicting themselves as another persecuted minority, and this label tugs at the conscience of moral individuals, both liberal and conservative. Of course, in some ways this label is deserved, since gays are a minority, and they certainly have been persecuted. But they are not a persecuted minority in the same way that, let us say, blacks have been. Sexual lifestyle is qualitatively different from skin color.

Since blacks have been discriminated against for what they are and homosexuals have been discriminated against for what they do, a moral distinction between the two types of discrimination can be made in a handful of areas. This in no way exonerates gay-bashing or gay-baiting, let alone such evils as the Nazi or communist incarcerations of gays. But it does mean that a moral distinction between discrimination against behavior and discrimination against color is possible. For example, there is no moral basis to objecting to blacks marrying whites, but there is a moral basis for objecting to homosexual marriage.

That is why gay activists fight against every single vestige of discrimination against homosexuality. They intuit that even one form of discrimination—prohibiting homosexual marriages, for example—means that society differs only in degree from those who declare homosexuality "an abomination."

This is a problem with which I continue to wrestle. I want gays to have the rights that I have. But not everything I am allowed to do is a right. Marriage, for example, is not a universal right (see below), nor, even more so, is religious ordination.

**Decriminalizing homosexuality**

Before dealing with areas where discriminating on behalf of marital heterosexuality may be proper, let us deal with the areas where discrimination is not morally defensible.
Twenty-three states in the United States continue to have laws against private homosexual relations. I am opposed to these laws. Whatever my misgivings about homosexuality may be, they do not undo my opposition to the state’s interference in private consensual relations between adults. Those who wish to retain such laws need to explain where, if ever, they will draw their line. Should we criminalize adultery? After all, adultery is prohibited by the Ten Commandments.

What should be permitted in private, however, does not have to be permitted in all areas of society. Thus, for example, while I am for decriminalizing prostitution, I would not allow the transactions to take place in public or permit prostitutes to advertise on billboards, radio, or television.

To decriminalize an act is not to deem it as socially acceptable as any other act. But social acceptance is precisely what gay liberation aims for—and also where the majority of society disagrees with gay liberation.

I suspect that in this regard most people feel as I do—antipathy to gay-baiting, gay-bashing, and to the criminalizing of private gay behavior, while simultaneously holding that homosexuality is not an equally viable alternative. Given these admittedly somewhat contradictory positions, what are we to do?

I believe that we ought to conduct public policy along two guidelines:

1) We may distinguish between that which grants homosexuals basic rights and that which honors homosexuality as a societally desirable way to live.

2) Therefore, we may discriminate on behalf of the heterosexual marital ideal, but not against the individual homosexual in the private arena—for example, where and how a homosexual lives.

**Homosexual ordination**

The most obvious area wherein the distinction between civil rights and public acceptance of homosexuality manifests itself is religion. It is, after all, Western religion that most fought for confining sexual activity to marriage.

It is therefore not surprising that few Christian or Jewish mainstream denominations, even liberal ones, ordain individuals who publicly declare themselves homosexual.
The issue is only secondarily the individual's sex life. It is primarily one of values. If a candidate for ordination at any of the Jewish seminaries engaged in cross-dressing, a clear violation of a Torah law, or took a personal vow of celibacy, another violation of Jewish law (at least for men), but in neither instance announced it, it would not be the admissions committee's task to inquire about such things. But if a rabbinic student were to announce that he is a transvestite or that remaining single is as desirable to Judaism as being married, he should not be ordained.

In sexual matters, the issue is what is advocated and what is lived publicly far more than what is privately practiced. An organization should be able to choose spokesmen who publicly support its ideals; that sort of "discrimination" is perfectly legitimate.

**Homosexual marriage**

Gay activists and some liberal groups such as the ACLU argue for the right of homosexuals to marry. Generally, two arguments are advanced—that society should not deny anyone the right to marry, and that if male homosexuals were given the right to marry, they would be considerably less likely to cruise.

The first argument is specious because there is no "right to marry." There is no right to marry more than one partner at a time, or to marry an immediate member of one's family. Society does not allow either practice. Though the ACLU and others believe that society has no rights, only individuals do, most Americans feel otherwise. Whether this will continue to be so, as Judaism and Christianity lose their influence, remains to be seen.

The second argument may have some merit, and insofar as homosexual marriages would decrease promiscuity among gay men, it would be a very positive development for both gays and society. But homosexual marriage would be unlikely to have such an effect. The male propensity to promiscuity would simply overwhelm most homosexual males' marriage vows. It is women who keep most heterosexual men monogamous, or at least far less likely to cruise, but gay men have no such brake on their cruising natures. Male nature, not the inability to marry, compels gay men to wander from man to man. This is proven by the behavior of lesbians, who, though also prevented from marrying each other, are not promiscuous.
Homosexual employment

In general, not hiring a person because he or she is gay is morally indefensible. There are, however, at least two exceptions which necessitate the use of the qualifier, “in general.”

In some rare cases in which sexual attraction, or non-attraction, is an absolutely relevant aspect of a job, a case can be made for discrimination against gays in hiring. The armed forces are one possible example. One reason for not admitting gays into combat units is the same reason for not allowing women and men to share army barracks. The sexual tension caused by individuals who may be sexually interested in one another could undermine effectiveness.

Big Brothers provides a second example. Just as heterosexual men are not allowed to serve as Big Brothers to girls, gay men should not be allowed to serve as Big Brothers to boys. The reason is not anti-homosexual any more than not allowing heterosexual men to be Big Brothers to girls is anti-heterosexual; it is common sense. We do not want Big Brothers to be potentially sexually attracted to the young people with whom they are entrusted. It is not because we trust homosexual men less; it is because we do not trust male sexual nature with any minor to whom a male may be sexually attracted.

My own view is that, in general, if employees work responsibly, their off-duty hours are their own business. This is not the view of many liberals and conservatives today, however. Off-hours “womanizing” ended the career of the leading contender for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination of 1988. And it was a major reason for not approving a secretary of defense-designate. Ironically, the voting public often seems far more tolerant of “manizing” than of womanizing. Rep. Barney Frank’s male lover ran a male prostitution ring from the congressman’s apartment, yet Frank seems to be as popular with his constituency as ever. Such behavior on the part of a heterosexual would doubtless have led to his resignation from Congress.

Behavior toward homosexuals

Violence against homosexuals has claimed numerous lives over the past decade, and too often the law seems to regard it as less of a crime than the murder of heterosexuals. In 1976, when a gay college student was beaten to death by teenagers
in front of a Tucson bar, the judge imposed no penalty. In 1984, a Bangor, Maine, judge released to custody of their parents three teenage boys who had beaten and thrown a young gay man into a stream. In 1988, a Texas judge eased the sentence of a man who murdered two homosexuals because, in the judge's words, "I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level, and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute."\(^{16}\)

According to a National Gay Task Force study, one-fourth to one-third of gay men have been assaulted or threatened with violence. Even if the figures are exaggerated by a factor of two, they are terrible. And they may actually be understated, since many homosexuals do not wish to report such crimes for fear of embarrassment.

Unfortunately, religious opponents of homosexuality can abet this type of behavior. It should go without saying, but, unfortunately, it needs to be said that the homosexual is created in God's image as much as every other person, and that a homosexual can be as decent a human being as anyone else.

It should also go without saying but, again, it needs to be said that to hurt a homosexual, to be insensitive to a homosexual because of the person's homosexuality, is despicable. Likewise, I believe that when a parent severs relations with a child because of the child's homosexuality, it is a terrible and mutually destructive act.

Gay-bashing, gay-baiting, and jokes that mock (as opposed to poking good-natured fun at) homosexuals have no place in a decent society.

I can confirm from personal experience the truth of the gay activist claim that nearly all of us know or come into regular contact with gay people. From childhood, I was aware that a member of our family circle, one of my mother's cousins, was a gay man; my closest friend during my college year in England was a homosexual; and a proofreader of my journal for two years, one of my closest co-workers, was a lesbian.

I have regarded these people as no less worthy of friendship than my priest friends whose celibacy I do not agree with, or my bachelor friends whose decisions not to marry I disagree with.
"Homophobia"

Just as we owe homosexuals humane, decent, and respectful conduct, homosexuals owe the same to the rest of us. Homosexuals' use of the term "homophobic," however, violates this rule as much as heterosexuals' use of the term "faggot" does.

When the term "homophobic" is used to describe anyone who believes that heterosexuality should remain Western society's ideal, it is quite simply a contemporary form of McCarthyism. In fact, it is more insidious than the late senator's use of "communist." For one thing, there was and is such a thing as a communist. But "homophobia" masquerades as a scientific description of a phobia that does not exist in any medical list of phobias.

Yet the insidiousness of the term really lies elsewhere. It abuses psychology in order to dismiss a human being whose values the name-caller does not like. It dismisses a person's views as being the product of unconscious pathological fears. It is not only demeaning, it is unanswerable. Indeed, the more one denies it, the more the label sticks.

Whenever I hear the term, unless it is used to describe thugs who beat innocent homosexuals, I know that the user of the term has no argument, only McCarthy-like demagoguery, with which to rebut others. To hold that heterosexual marital sex is preferable to all other expressions of sexuality is no more "homophobic" than it is "incest-phobic" to oppose incest, or "beast-phobic" to want humans to make love only to their own species.

Finally, those who throw around the term "homophobic" ought to recognize the principle of "that which goes around comes around." We can easily descend into name-calling. Shall we start by labeling male homosexuals "women-phobic" and "vagina-phobic," and lesbians "men-phobic" and "penis-phobic"? It makes as much sense, and it is just as filthy a tactic.

Good people can differ about the desirability of alternate modes of sexual expression. There are many good people who care for homosexuals, and yet fear the chiseling away of the West's family-centered sex-in-marriage ideal. They merit debate, not the label "homophobic." And there are good homosexuals who argue otherwise. They, too, merit debate, not the label "faggot."
What is at stake

The creation of Western civilization has been a terribly difficult and unique thing. It took a constant delaying of gratification, and a rechanneling of natural instincts; and these disciplines have not always been well received. There have been numerous attempts to undo Judeo-Christian civilization, not infrequently by Jews (through radical politics) and Christians (through antisemitism).

And the bedrock of this civilization, and of Jewish life, of course, has been the centrality and purity of family life. But the family is not a natural unit so much as it is a value that must be cultivated and protected. The Greeks assaulted the family in the name of beauty and Eros. The Marxists assaulted the family in the name of progress. And, today, gay liberation assaults it in the name of compassion and equality. I understand why gays would do this. Life has been miserable for many of them. What I have not understood is why Jews and Christians would join the assault.

I do now. They do not know what is at stake. At stake is our civilization. It is very easy to forget what Judaism has wrought and what Christians have created in the West. But those who loathe this civilization never forget. The radical Stanford University faculty and students who chanted, "Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western civ has got to go," were referring to much more than their university's syllabus.

And no one is chanting that song more forcefully than those who believe and advocate that sexual behavior doesn't play a role in building or eroding a civilization.

Notes


7Sussman.


10Greenberg.

11Greenberg.


15Greenberg.

Are drug prices too high?

MURRAY WEIDENBAUM

THE AMERICAN pharmaceutical industry is under assault. Patients are upset about the high prices of medicines. Congressional committees and consumer groups are aroused by reports of high profits. And the president of the United States has repeatedly promised to “crack down” on pharmaceutical companies, presumably through some form of price control.

Pharmaceutical companies have responded that drug costs make up only a small share of health-care costs, and that drug prices have risen no faster than other health-care prices. The companies also argue that the public’s concern arises largely from the way health-care costs are financed: Many insurance and benefit programs, notably Medicare, do not cover prescriptions. As a result, prescriptions are paid largely out of pocket, and so come in for a disproportionate share of criticism.

These arguments, however valid, have failed to satisfy the public or its representatives. In the memorable words of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), “It is hard to believe that a company could
charge so much for such a tiny pill.” Such sentiments, when taken with the congressional tendency to legislate first and investigate later, make a closer look at medicine prices imperative.

**Why it takes so long**

It should be acknowledged at the outset that new drugs are sometimes very profitable. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does grant manufacturers patent protection (albeit for a limited time). But the other side of the coin is that the odds of coming up with a financial blockbuster are extremely low. A Duke University study of one hundred new drugs, for example, revealed that a majority did not even cover the companies’ investment in research and development.

Why is profitability so elusive? The answer lies in the extended process of drug development and approval. On average, 5,000 different compounds must be tested for each drug ultimately approved by the FDA. Drugs must be tested in the laboratory, on animals, and on humans. A study at Tufts University reports that it takes an average of twelve years to get from initial research through FDA approval.

FDA approval is particularly slow. While no one wants unsafe drugs on the market, the FDA has often been guilty of unconscionable delays. A study of drugs introduced in the U.S. and Great Britain between 1977 and 1987 found that far more were first available in Great Britain (114) than in the United States (41). The U.S. lag ranged from one year for endocrine medicines to three years for cardiovascular medicines to five years for respiratory medicines.

When faced with difficult approval decisions, FDA reviewers often ask for costly, elaborate new studies. If anyone is hurt by a new drug, after all, it will be front-page news. But if 10,000 people die because approval is delayed, the public will never know. That figure of 10,000 is not pulled out of the air. It is an estimate of how many people died needlessly each year from 1967 to 1976, when the FDA was slow in approving beta blockers, which reduce the risk of heart attack.

In 1992, Congress did pass a law to speed up and streamline the drug approval process. But the Clinton administration has indicated that revenues from the Prescription Drug User Fee Act will instead be used to reduce the budget deficit.
Development costs

Drug development is not only very time-consuming; it is also very costly. Studies at the University of Rochester, Texas A&M, and Tufts University show that the average cost of developing a new drug rose from $54 million in the 1970s to $125 million in the 1980s, and to $231 million in 1990.

A 1993 study by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) reports that "a reasonable upper bound" on the full cost of R&D for a successful drug is $359 million (no "lower bound" was reported).

The basic incentive to make such investments is the possibility of high profits. As University of Chicago economist Sam Peltzman has pointed out: "Drug companies undertake these massive searches knowing there will be a big pay-off if they hit a winner. We can have lower drug prices if we accept less of that searching [for new chemical compounds]. That's the choice we face."

The consequences of that choice are on vivid display in Canada, where stringent price controls were imposed in 1969. In the two-and-a-half decades since, Canadian pharmaceutical companies have developed virtually no innovative medicines.

Similarly, Lacy Glenn Thomas of Emory University has found that countries like France and Austria, which have the toughest price restrictions on pharmaceuticals, also do the least research.

Not so expensive

Critics of the pharmaceutical industry invariably ignore such points, and instead focus on the fact that prices have risen. Between 1985 and 1990, they point out, spending on pharmaceuticals rose from $20 billion to $32 billion. Yet what's not mentioned is that during this same period (and on through 1992), the cost of outpatient medicines held steady at 4.8 percent of total medical expenditures. In other words, the cost of drugs has risen at about the same rate as other health-care costs.

The price record prior to 1985 is also revealing. From 1966 to 1982, outpatient drugs were a steadily declining share of U.S. health care expenditures—from a high point of 8.8 percent in 1966 to a low of 4.7 percent in 1982. We can only speculate as to why the improvement in the relative cost of drugs halted in the early 1980s. Perhaps the rapid rise in the cost of developing
new drugs has played a part. We would expect that scientists would first discover and companies first market the medicines that are easiest to develop. Over time, the more difficult and expensive medicines would be brought to market.

Researchers have also pointed to some other reasons for price increases: the use of more patients in clinical trials, increasingly complex testing, and the growing interest in developing treatments for chronic and degenerative diseases like cancer and Alzheimer's.

Drug prices must also be seen in perspective. While many new drugs are expensive, they often enable patients to avoid painful and even more costly surgery. The cost of treating ulcers with H-2 antagonist drug therapy runs about $900 a year. The cost of ulcer surgery, by contrast, averages $28,900.

Finally, it's unclear how much drug prices have actually risen. The federal government's price statistics, issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), do not account for increases in medicine quality. In other words, a portion of the reported increase in prices is due to the fact that Americans are buying newer and better medicines.

In the case of automobiles, by contrast, the BLS does account for quality improvements. If the price of a car rose only by the cost of new safety and anti-pollution equipment, the BLS would not report that the price of the car had gone up.

In a 1992 study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, researchers made an effort to account for quality increases in blood pressure medicines. The researchers found that from 1986 to 1991, the period of the study, more than half of the reported price increase (54 percent) was due to improvements in quality. A study of anti-ulcer drugs at the University of Michigan reached similar conclusions.

Price controls...

Despite these facts, many people continue to believe that drug prices are far too high. The obvious way to lower them, it seems, is with price controls. Of course, the U.S. has had a great deal of experience with controls. There were general price controls during World War II, the Korean War, and the 1971 to 1973 period. Many municipalities continue controlling rents to this day.
The experience has been uniformly adverse. When faced with price controls, investors shift their funds to sectors of the economy without controls (as New York City’s deteriorating housing stock reminds us). Consumers also suffer, because price controls create shortages. These shortages may be quantitative, as occurred in many markets from 1971 to 1973, or qualitative, as the Canadian drug market is suffering now. (In Canada, the availability of drugs developed in the U.S. has helped alleviate the problem. But American consumers would not have such a ready alternative.)

The U.S. price control experience from 1971 to 1973 should serve as a warning. A “temporary” ninety-day freeze was transformed into formal controls that lasted nearly three years. Evasions and distortions were widespread. Foreign trade was exempt, so companies sold products overseas, creating domestic shortages. Items were then imported back into the U.S. merely to avoid the controls. And product quality deteriorated as producers attempted to maintain profit margins in the face of price ceilings (“caps” is the current euphemism).

A recent Washington Post roundup of expert opinion on price controls in health care reported:

The reaction to price controls now, as in the past, is likely to be evasion, inflation, and confusion, experts say. The resulting distortions could include everything from unnecessary surgery to longer waiting lines, from poorer quality care to strikes over the wages of nurses, technicians, and other health care workers.

...or more competition

Fortunately, there is an alternative to price controls. That alternative is more competition. Of course, some careful consideration is necessary. Simply eliminating the patent protection enjoyed by developers of new drugs would not work.

What’s needed instead is broader price competition. It could be encouraged in a number of ways. Many states, for example, now prohibit the advertising of prescription drug prices. These prohibitions make it difficult for consumers to shop for the best price. Such restrictions should be repealed. Even Sen. David Pryor (D-AR), a pharmaceutical industry critic, has urged that “any reform effort should make sure that both doctors and patients are more aware of prices.”
At the federal level, the FDA should lower its advertising barriers. There need be little concern about deceptive advertising. Because consumers must first obtain prescriptions from physicians, there is less reason to fear deception in this market than in any other. The evidence, moreover, clearly shows that advertising can lower prices. Such evidence was cited by the Supreme Court in its decision overturning state bans on the advertising of eyeglasses.

The FDA's rules governing advertising are also needlessly bureaucratic. The agency should reconsider its requirement that a "brief summary" accompany any ad mentioning both a health condition and a drug treatment. The notorious "brief summary" is actually a lengthy statement listing side-effects and contraindications. Such information is essential for physicians, but incomprehensible to the average patient. More importantly, the "brief summary" requirement works to discourage advertising by making it needlessly cumbersome and expensive.

In sum

There are several lessons here. The first is that while some drugs are very profitable, many more are not. The second is that price controls would be a mistake. The third is that what's needed is more competition. Warts and all, the competitive marketplace is the best protector of consumers.
The environmentalist assault on agriculture

KARL ZINSMEISTER

RECENTLY, environmentalists have "discovered" agriculture. Sleepy old farm issues like land use, soil conservation, and animal husbandry are attracting fresh attention, and farmers increasingly find themselves faced off against a horde of regulators.

This puts economic pressure on farmers. But that's not all. Some of the demands of agro-environmentalists are also, ironically, hurting the environment.

Fortunately, there are many opportunities to make U.S. agriculture environmentally gentler, without sacrificing our farmers or our economy. I want to suggest three steps.

The first is that we phase out or sharply reduce farm subsidies. Our current subsidies encourage narrow, overly intensive styles of production. Market agriculture would be more varied, and environmentally gentler. It would also serve the long-range interests of farmers.
Second, environmental regulators should begin paying for their land-use takings, as well as some of their mandates. That would encourage the (badly needed) cooperation of farmers.

Third, we should encourage further advances in agricultural technology, which have enormous potential for improving the environment. While federal research remains important, private companies are now doing much of the most useful work. What these biological scientists need most is protection from over-regulation and politicized fretfulness.

Traditionally, environmental improvement has been thought to come at the expense of economic efficiency. But today in agriculture we have a rare opportunity to improve the environment and economy at the same time. If the government will allow the dramatic new technologies on the horizon to come to full fruit, and cut subsidies and production controls so that farmers have incentives to pursue new styles of agriculture, many of farming's environmental problems will literally solve themselves.

**Why subsidies are anti-environmental**

The federal government's farm programs have two main components. One is price supports, which encourage farmers to produce. The other is land-idling requirements, which force farmers to leave a portion of their acreage unused. Together, these policies are supposed to guarantee farmers high prices while preventing overproduction.

But puffing up prices and then forcing farmers to hold land out of circulation has one other effect: It encourages over-intensive cultivation of the acreage that remains in use. Farmers are induced to maximize chemical inputs, tractor time, and fuel, because increasing yield per acre is the only way they can increase their income. The strange result—in this country where we have more rich earth than we know what to do with—is that much land sits idle, while some of the rest is tilled as frantically and harshly as if we were some soil-shy rocky island.

If farm subsidies were phased out, American agriculture would shift to a lower-input style of production. Farmers would till only the most appropriate and productive lands. Needless to say, this less-souped-up agriculture would be milder on the environment.
Subsidized farm prices have other negative environmental effects. They discourage crop rotation, leading to unhealthy monocropping. They discourage experimentation with alternative crops not covered by subsidy programs. And they overpower incentives to conserve irrigation water.

Another farm program with adverse environmental effects is U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) “disaster aid.” Begun in 1973, disaster programs now disburse tens of billions of dollars each decade. This aid amounts to free crop insurance, and it encourages riskier planting decisions, less care in management, and more exploitation of marginal land.

Corn, for example, is more vulnerable to lack of water than grain sorghum, but if all goes well, corn is more profitable. With disaster aid guarantees behind them (and tempting corn subsidies dangling in front of them), dryland farmers often gamble on the bigger payoff instead of planting the crop that makes the most sense for their area. The sensible old arid-region practice of leaving land fallow every few years—in order to let subsoil moisture build up—has fallen off for the same reason. In this way, disaster aid works as an anti-conservation policy.

Another multi-billion-dollar program with anti-conservation effects is one that, ironically, was promoted as an environmental measure when it was established in 1985. The Conservation Reserve makes payments to farmers who take marginal land out of production for an extended time. Yet this program has encouraged some farmers to sod-bust unproductive, highly erodible grasslands, farm them for a few years until they give out, and then retire them into the Reserve to collect ten years of government rent checks. Such perverse incentives would be eliminated by a move to market agriculture.

Take and give

While we are putting agriculture on a more market footing, we also ought to start treating farmers’ assets with more respect. Uncompensated appropriation of the use of private land is one of the most contentious issues dividing farmers and environmentalists.

USDA strictures sharply limit the authority farmers have over things like field boundaries and crop rotation. Wetlands
regulations dictate land use, drainage patterns, and ditch maintenance. At the state and local level, land-use restrictions increasingly forbid changes in farm patterns, limit the use of land that fronts a water body, prohibit conversion of farm land to other purposes, and otherwise prevent farmers from exercising control over their property.

In a number of areas, the Endangered Species Act forbids farmers from using enormous tracts of land. A couple of years ago, in Fort Bend County, Texas, area farmers were stunned to discover that the sighting of six to eight specimens of the Attwater's Greater Prairie Chicken was going to result in the prohibition of most farm activity on an incredible 250,000 acres of private land. That amounts to one-quarter of the heavily agricultural county.

The issue here is not whether specific land-use takings are justified, but rather whether it is fair to lay the full cost on the unlucky farmer who happens to own the land. Land is the major asset, in many cases the only significant asset, a farmer has. The land is his capital, his kid's college fund, his savings account, his pension and retirement plan. If society wants to, for instance, prevent a soggy patch from being tilled, that may be legitimate. But the rightful landowner ought to be compensated for his loss of value.

Such compensation is not only fair, it is efficient. The rate of environmental compliance is going to be much higher when farmers have an economic incentive to comply than when the environmentally desirable course carries a serious personal cost.

There are already precedents for compensation to landowners in two USDA programs: the Wetlands Reserve Program and the Water Bank Program—which buy ten-year, thirty-year, or permanent easement on selected lands. Unfortunately, Congress has failed to fund these programs adequately. A new wetlands bill before Congress, H.R. 1330, would take the compensation principle further. The bill stipulates that when private land is classified as a wetland in which no activity will be allowed, this will be recognized as a "taking" for which compensation must be made. The U.S. Court of Claims would adjudicate settlements as it currently handles other takings; for roadbuilding, for instance. The bill had 176 co-sponsors in the previous Congress, and it
now seems quite likely that its main provisions will be incorporated into U.S. clean water law.

There is also a growing body of court precedent asserting that certain regulatory measures are " takings " as defined in the Constitution ' s Fifth Amendment. The recent Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission indicates that compensation will be legally required in many future instances in which land use is strictly limited.

**Don't stop the revolution**

A third way to make agriculture more environmentally benign is to encourage the research revolution now underway. A biotechnology cornucopia is about to open in this country, offering breathtaking improvements in the quality and variety of agricultural products, as well as lower costs, while at the same time solving environmental problems.

High-yield corn that grows without fertilizer, plants that eat toxics out of contaminated soil, vegetables that resist spoiling, plants that can withstand drought—all are on the way.

Not all the innovations will be of the gee-whiz variety. Many will be rather homely: for instance, membranes that encapsulate fertilizers so they 're absorbed slowly into the soil, electrostatic spray rigs that target chemicals more accurately, and so forth. But collectively, innovations such as these will produce big ecological and economic gains.

Many of the most dramatic successes in agriculture come from an accumulation of small improvements. Take the poultry industry: In 1950 it took eighty-four days to raise a four-pound broiler chicken, and 3.25 pounds of feed for every pound of meat produced. Today—thanks to poultry inoculation, scientific breeding, controlled diets and other improvements—it takes just forty-two days, and the feed-conversion ratio is 1.9:1. A combination of good management and scientific development has produced the same amount of product, of higher quality, in half the time, using less barn space, less land, less electricity, less propane heat, and close to half as much food.

Even more revolutionary changes are on the way. There will be plants that draw their own nitrogen from the atmosphere (reducing the need for artificial fertilizers), meat genetically engineered to contain less cholesterol, and plants that produce
their own pesticides. There is nothing new or unproven about the basic techniques. The first microbial pesticide, a bacterium that infects Japanese beetles, was initially distributed back in 1939. It can be bought in any good hardware store under the name Milky Spore Disease.

But as scientists have worked more actively on biotechnological products, they've often been attacked by environmentalists. Organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Audubon Society have tried to prevent field-testing of important bioengineered products. Indeed, the environmental group Friends of the Earth has labeled bioengineering "Russian roulette."

Such scientific obstructionism is shortsighted and dramatically anti-ecological. All of the biological pesticides now being developed are variants of naturally occurring organisms. Before they can be approved for use, their manufacturers must demonstrate that they won't kill beneficial insects or transfer to other plants. When the National Academy of Science looked closely at bioengineering of field crops in 1989, it concluded that the process presents no unusual or unmanageable risks.

Plant disease research is at a threshold, similar to when the new process of vaccination began to be used to protect humans. But rather than treating this as an exciting scientific moment that requires normal laboratory precautions, many environmentalists insist biotechnology is a dangerous leap into wholly new territory. It is not.

In opposing the new products and processes that are agriculture's best hope for a cleaner future, environmentalists are their own worst enemies. If farming is to be steered toward more healthful output with fewer unwanted byproducts and ecological side-effects, then the environmental movement is going to have to overcome its allergy to technical and scientific advance.

**X-rays for food**

A good place to start would be food irradiation. Irradiation is an efficient, scientifically uncontroversial method of preserving and sterilizing food without chemicals. In a process that might be thought of as somewhere between microwave cooking and an airport luggage x-ray, low-dosage energy is used to kill
harmful organisms without leaving any radioactive residue. With irradiation, all meat, poultry and fish products could immediately be freed of trichina, toxoplasmosis, salmonella, and other dangerous microorganisms. (The food poisoning outbreak that killed several restaurant customers in the state of Washington in 1992 was only one high-profile example of a problem that causes hundreds of deaths every year.)

Food irradiation has been fully approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The head of food safety for WHO, Dr. Fritz Kaferstein, states unambiguously:

> Scientific research shows this is a perfectly sound food preservation technology, badly needed in a world where food-borne diseases are on the increase and where between one-quarter and one-third of the global food supply is lost post-harvest.

Irradiation is already used to sterilize meals for hospital patients and astronauts, and to make consumer products like cosmetics and medical supplies.

Hardly any retail food is treated, however, because a small band of consumer and environmental groups have succeeded in scaring the public. When the USDA called in 1992 for irradiation of poultry as a means of making it safer for consumers, activists responded with horrible, frightening claims. An advance that is both healthful and economic, and that could replace inferior sterilization processes which have known environmental drawbacks, is thus being wasted.

**Everyone is hurt**

As a final example of Luddite environmentalism, and the way it can combine with government farm programs to hurt consumers, farmers, and the environment, consider dairy production. In 1945, there were 25 million dairy cows in the United States, and they each produced 4,600 pounds of milk a year, on average. Today, we have just 10 million animals, but they put out 14,000 pounds each. It's a remarkable success story: We're making 22 percent more milk with only two-fifths as many animals.

That progressive trendline could take another sharp jolt upward in the next few years. The next big improvement on the
milk horizon will come from the use of bovine somatotropin (BST), a natural growth hormone that could boost milk production per cow by another 15 percent. The FDA has already given the go-ahead to sales of milk from cows getting BST (it is indistinguishable from other milk), and the drug itself is likely to be approved soon for commercial use. But environmentalist opponents are now organizing a scare and boycott campaign, and in this case they have allies among dairy farmers, who have their own reasons for opposing BST.

The dairy program is one of the most rigidly controlled farm programs. (The rules and equations used by regulators to set the price of milk take up three full volumes in the Code of Federal Regulations.) The government supports milk prices by buying up tons of surplus dairy products. If BST suddenly boosted milk output, it could cost a couple of billion dollars a year more to keep prices where they are now.

The obvious solution is to let milk prices fall, but dairy farmers used to their cartel would fight that strongly. By cartel logic it’s better to continue using yesterday’s production methods. So, in this instance, an efficient, bounty-inducing new technology is being resisted on trumped-up environmental grounds, largely because the U.S. farm program makes it impossible for prices to adjust to changes in supply. Not only BST but also any other breakthrough that would sharply increase productivity becomes anathema under this warped set of incentives.

The position of environmentalists is particularly perverse. In addition to the large amounts of energy-intensive grain and forage that cows consume, and the solid wastes that must be disposed of, cows also produce significant amounts of methane. About 12 percent of all methane released into the atmosphere comes from cattle. Methane, of course, is one of the major so-called “greenhouse” gases.

Indeed, full-page ads were purchased in the New York Times in the spring of 1992 by a group of environmentalists who want to stop the raising of cattle altogether because of their alleged contributions to global warming. What was most interesting about this effort was that Jeremy Rifkin was its head. Rifkin, of course, has distinguished himself by his ferocious opposition to all forms of biological engineering, prominently including BST. It seems not to have occurred to Mr. Rifkin and his allies that if BST
could make one dairy cow in six superfluous, that would be an environmentally useful thing.

**Politics or progress**

Knowledgeable observers have suggested that we are at the beginning of a new agricultural era, one which will see the increasing substitution of biological for mineral resources: plants engineered to produce new pharmaceuticals, botanically derived plastics, animal "factories" that synthesize valuable chemicals, and cultivated energy sources. Undue fretfulness and stifling control will only mean lost opportunities and a surrender of U.S. leadership on this crucial new frontier.

With the future in mind, a distinguished group of 218 scientists and economists, including twenty-seven Nobel laureates, issued a warning at the recent "Earth Summit" in Rio:

We are ... worried, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, at the emergence of an irrational ideology which is opposed to scientific and industrial progress and impedes economic and social development.... The greatest evils which stalk our earth are ignorance and oppression, not science, technology, and industry.

If we allow technophobes to block the door to scientific progress, and subsidizers to block the door to economic reason, there is no telling how many agricultural innovations we will forego. And those foregone opportunities will hurt farmers, consumers, and the environment alike.
SHORTLY AFTER taking office, President Clinton began pushing for a stimulus program to end the country’s recession. But according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession was already over. It began in July 1990 and ended in March 1991. Since that time the U.S. economy has expanded continuously. By the end of 1992, in fact, the economy was growing at an annual rate of 4.7 percent—almost twice the postwar average.

Fortunately, Congress was less persuaded of the need for stimulus than Clinton. His proposal was withdrawn. But months later the administration was still pushing for a scaled-down stimulus bill, even as the unemployment rate continued to decline.

Probably the best defense of Clinton’s action is that he was simply doing what our last ten presidents all did. All these presidents, regardless of party or ideology, ultimately endorsed public works programs to combat recessions that were already over.
This article will review the results of this curious phenomenon. Without exception, stimulus programs have failed to moderate the recessions at which they were aimed, and have often sowed the seeds of the next recession. These programs have not been simply worthless, but harmful. It would have been better to do nothing.

**Keynesian economics**

The idea of using public works to jump-start the economy is not a new one. Since at least the late nineteenth century, governments have attempted to use public works in a countercyclical manner. But until John Maynard Keynes, governments felt constrained by the need to keep their budgets in balance. Since recessions invariably shrink tax revenues, few governments could afford to increase spending on public works as a countercyclical measure. Keynes, by preaching the efficacy of deficit spending, relieved governments of this constraint.

Keynes also freed governments of the need to fund public works projects that were useful. In *The General Theory*, he wrote that pyramid-building, earthquakes, and even wars "may serve to increase wealth." He suggested that people be paid to dig holes in the ground, and even proposed burying bank notes in mine shafts to encourage the digging.

Although it is widely believed that the public works projects of the New Deal played a major role in ending—or at least mitigating—the Great Depression, such programs actually played a very limited role. It was World War II and monetary policy, not the New Deal, that ended the Depression. Unfortunately, policymakers have convinced themselves otherwise. And so, whenever another slowdown has occurred, they have turned to the same programs they believe ended the Great Depression.

This over-reliance on fiscal policy has given the U.S. massive deficits and debt, which require ever greater payments for interest. Large deficits also crowd out private borrowers, raising interest rates, and reducing investment, growth, and productivity. Finally, deficits put pressure on the Federal Reserve to increase the money supply, which leads to inflation.

For an illustration of these points, let us take a brief look at the postwar economic experience.
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations

The first recession of the postwar era began in November 1948. Initially the Truman administration was oblivious, as were most private economists. In mid-December, for example, Treasury Secretary John Snyder said the economy “is at present in a basically sound condition, and shows encouraging signs of stability in the vicinity of the present high levels.” A survey of private economists found similar optimism: 59 percent expected business to expand; only 41 percent expected a decline. And this was after the recession had already begun!

It was not until eight months later that President Truman asked Congress to pass an antirecession program. Congress did eventually pass the Advance Planning for Public Works Act, and it took effect in October 1949—the very month the recession ended.

The first of three recessions under President Eisenhower began in July 1953, shortly after he took office. There is no evidence Eisenhower was even aware a recession had begun. Later, when signs of a slowdown became unmistakable, Eisenhower supported a small increase in highway spending. But no significant action was taken to counteract the recession, which ended three months later.

Eisenhower confronted a second recession in August 1957. Again, there is no evidence he saw it coming. In July, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey told the Senate Finance Committee, “I don’t see any significant recession or depression in the offing.”

Although the Eisenhower administration did not put forward any antirecession legislation, it did acquiesce in congressional efforts. Congress passed and Eisenhower signed bills to increase grants to states for highway construction, and to increase federal spending on rivers and harbors. The highway bill became law in April 1958, and the rivers and harbors bill was signed in July. The recession had ended in April.

The Kennedy administration

The third recession under Eisenhower began in April 1960, and it contributed to the election of John F. Kennedy. Upon
taking office in January 1961, Kennedy moved quickly to enact antirecession legislation. A key element of his program was the Area Redevelopment Act (ARA), which sent federal aid to areas with high unemployment. It was signed into law on May 1, although the recession had ended in February.

An early assessment of the ARA by Sar Levitan, a professor of economics at George Washington University, found that 40 percent of its funds went simply to reimburse other government agencies. Moreover, almost any project undertaken in a depressed area was eligible for ARA funding, even if it would have been undertaken anyway. Thus while 7,100 miles of ARA-funded roads were built in depressed areas, Levitan notes, the Federal Highway Administration "could not point to a single mile of road which was constructed as a result of priorities accorded to depressed areas."

In 1962, Congress passed more antirecession legislation—the Accelerated Public Works (APW) program. Subsequent analysis shows that the peak employment created by this program did not come until June 1964—thirty-nine months after the end of the recession. Spending was so drawn-out that expenditures were still being made nine years later.

A follow-up report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the number of jobs created by the ARA and the APW had been overstated by 128 percent. Another GAO study found the overstatement to be 94 percent. The GAO also found that only 55 percent of the jobs created by the APW went to workers living in the areas where the projects were located, and that most of the jobs went to contractors' regular employees rather than unemployed local persons. Partially as a result of such criticism, Congress abolished the Area Redevelopment Administration (which administered the ARA and APW) in 1965.

The Nixon and Ford administrations

The country's next recession began in December 1969 and ended in November 1970. Antirecession legislation, however, was not enacted until August 1971. That legislation—the Public Works Acceleration Act—funded public works in designated areas of high unemployment. It was predicted by the Economic Development Administration that the program would create 62,000 man-months of employment in the first two years, with 75 percent of
the jobs going to the previously unemployed. A Commerce Department study, however, found that only 39,000 man-months of employment were created, and that only 22 percent of the jobs went to the unemployed. The average job lasted just four weeks, and well over half those employed worked less than two weeks.

The next recession was the worst of the postwar era. It began in November 1973, following the OPEC oil embargo. Yet antirecession legislation, in the form of a tax rebate, was not enacted until March 1975, the month the recession ended. The $22.8 billion legislation gave taxpayers a 10 percent rebate on their 1974 tax payments (with a maximum rebate of $200). The bill also extended unemployment benefits, increased the investment tax credit from 7 to 10 percent, and made various other tax changes. All this was intended to pump up demand by putting dollars into people’s pockets. Subsequent analysis, however, shows that most of the money was initially saved, not spent. The bill had no significant stimulative effect.

During the following year, Congress determined that the lingering effects of the recession justified further antirecessionary action. Over the veto of President Ford, Congress established the Antirecession Fiscal Assistance Program (ARFA), and the Local Public Works Program (LPW). The LPW increased funding for public works by $2 billion. The ARFA program increased revenue-sharing by $1.25 billion.

As late as 1977, in fact, Congress was still enacting legislation to deal with the aftermath of the 1973-75 recession. The Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 added another $4 billion to the LPW program. The ARFA program was also extended for another year and its funding increased by another $1.75 billion.

Subsequent analysis shows that these programs were failures. A Treasury Department study of the ARFA program found that because the funds were not disbursed until well after the end of the recession, they failed to provide assistance when it was most needed and probably contributed to inflationary pressures during the economic expansion. The study also found that, rather than spend federal money immediately, state and local governments tended to save it. Thus state and local government budget surpluses increased, mitigating the stimulative effect of the federal programs. Another study, by the GAO, found that ARFA grants
often went to areas unaffected by the recession, and concluded that the program was not particularly effective as a countercyclical tool.

The LPW program was also ineffective. Although the recession ended in March 1975, 20 percent of the program's funds were spent in 1977, 61 percent in 1978, 18 percent in 1979, and 1 percent in 1980. In a study commissioned by the Commerce Department, Chase Econometrics estimated that the cost per direct job created was $95,000.

Chase and the Commerce Department found other problems. Between 25 and 30 percent of LPW funds paid for projects that would have been funded by state and local governments anyway, and another 9 percent of LPW funds crowded out private expenditures that would otherwise have occurred. In addition, only 12 percent of workers on LPW projects were previously unemployed, and half of those had been unemployed less than five weeks. The average job lasted just 2.6 months. Finally, due to the Davis-Bacon Act, workers on LPW projects were paid more than before—for the same work.

The LPW program has also been severely criticized by University of Michigan economist Edward Gramlich. He argues that because the program had no allocation formula, required no matching funds, and funded only projects that could be started within 90 days, it virtually guaranteed that the only projects funded would be those that would have been built anyway. He has also noted that since the Commerce Department received some $22 billion worth of project applications for just $2 billion in federal funds, the LPW program apparently postponed $22 billion worth of construction spending, thus reducing GNP by $30 billion. Instead of stimulating the economy, the LPW program was actually contractionary.

**The Carter and Reagan administrations**

Despite the many problems of the LPW program, one of Jimmy Carter's first acts upon taking office was to push for its expansion. The Congressional Budget Office argued that an expansion would have no impact on the economy for at least a year, but Carter proceeded anyway. He signed the expansion legislation on May 13, twenty-six months after the end of the
Another recession developed in 1980, as a result of Carter's ill-considered imposition of credit controls. Although the recession was over by mid-year—after the lifting of controls—Carter continued to press for money for antirecessionary public works. It was then revealed that some $100 billion was already available from previous programs—fifty times more than Carter was asking for. According to analyst Pat Choate, these funds were held up by a combination of incompetence at the state and local level, and federal regulations that made it difficult to get money released.

Even the Reagan administration, despite its general aversion to such policies, adopted two antirecessionary programs. They were designed to attack a recession that began in July 1981 and ended in November 1982. The first of the programs was the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, which raised the gasoline tax by five cents a gallon, and increased spending for highways and mass transit by $33.5 billion over five years.

With some exceptions, the provisions of the act that created jobs did not go into effect until after the tax increases to pay for them. Thus, in the short run, the legislation was contractionary rather than stimulative.

Table 1. Surface Transportation Act Receipts and Outlays

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Receipts (billions of dollars)</th>
<th>Outlays (billions of dollars)</th>
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<td>1986</td>
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There is also evidence that the act led state and local governments to pull back on their own public works spending in anticipation of new federal funds. Furthermore, many state and local governments "piggy-backed" gasoline tax increases on the federal increase. Between 1982 and 1984, twenty-nine states increased their gasoline taxes. The result was a large increase in state and
local government budget surpluses, which offset much of the stimulative impact of the federal spending.

President Reagan predicted the transportation bill would create 320,000 jobs, but subsequent analysis shows otherwise. In the year following passage of the legislation, employment in highway construction actually grew at a lower rate than did total employment (although wages for highway construction workers did rise sharply).

Interestingly, at the very time that President Reagan was pressing hard for passage of the transportation bill as a jobs program, his Office of Management and Budget produced a study which showed that increases in federal aid for public works actually reduce overall public works spending, because state and local governments respond by cutting back their own spending. Of course, this and other studies had little effect. Both Congress and the administration were under irresistible political pressure to appear to be doing something about the recession, even though it had ended four months earlier.

The ink was barely dry on the transportation bill, in fact, when Congress pressed ahead with another antirecession bill, the Emergency Jobs Act of 1983. This act was little more than a grab-bag of pork-barrel projects, most of which just happened to be in the congressional districts of Appropriations Committee members.

A GAO study of the act in 1986 noted that it was not passed until twenty-one months after the beginning of the recession. A year and a half after passage, only one-third of the bill’s funds had been spent; two and a half years after passage, half of the funds still had not been spent.

Job creation peaked in June 1984, but the number of jobs created at that point totalled just 1 percent of the private jobs created since passage of the bill.

The Bush and Clinton administrations

Like its predecessors, the Bush administration adopted an antirecession program after a recession. The $151 billion Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act was signed by the president in November 1991—eight months after recession’s end. Congressional supporters of the bill estimated it would create 2 million jobs. The Bush administration, “eager to embrace
the bill as a job creator on the eve of an election year," according to *Congressional Quarterly*, doubled the estimate to 4 million. More than a year later, however, transportation planners told the *New York Times* that "the law has neither stimulated the economy nor created many jobs." One of the major reasons was the slow pace of construction, which has been attributed to an increase in federal standards for air quality, access for the disabled, and public participation. In the end, the bill did nothing to alleviate the recession or to aid Bush's reelection hopes.

As noted earlier, the Clinton administration quickly came forward with a $16 billion stimulus program, despite data showing the economy to be strengthening. Although the program was promoted as an insurance policy to keep the economy going, the evidence indicates that few, if any, jobs would have been created in the short run. Instead, the main effect of the legislation would have been simply to fund traditional Democratic programs. As *Newsweek* observed:

Administration officials concede privately that much of the money will go into highway and transportation projects that won't actually get underway until 1994 or 1995. A good chunk of the rest will raise spending on programs Clinton proposes to expand permanently, like Head Start and infant nutrition. By boosting outlays right away instead of waiting until the next fiscal year starts in October, Clinton can label those initiatives "stimulative."

A Republican analysis of the cost per job of the Clinton stimulus program found that the average cost was over $89,000, with the cost of some jobs reaching into the millions.

**Doing harm**

In 1980, Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, now secretary of the Treasury, held a hearing before the Joint Economic Committee on the effectiveness of countercyclical public works programs. At that hearing, President Carter's Office of Management and Budget presented a study that reviewed the postwar experience with such programs. Its conclusions:

- Public works programs cannot be triggered and targeted in a sufficiently timely manner to compensate for cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and economic activity.
Even if it were possible to properly time a countercyclical program, the time it takes to construct public works would lead to a significant overlap of job generation and economic stimulus with periods of economic recovery.

Public works programs have had minimal impact on the unemployed. This is partly because the programs are not labor-intensive, and partly because many of the jobs created require skills the unemployed do not have.

The duration of employment for individual workers is too short to provide meaningful economic relief, to maintain skills and work habits, or to provide on-the-job training.

Public works are extremely costly. The cost of generating a construction job for one year ranges from $70,000 to $198,000.

Later Bentsen issued a unanimous report from the Joint Economic Committee which concluded that by the time a recession is recognized, it is too late to be treated. Efforts to do so are destabilizing. The committee recommended avoiding short-term countercyclical actions, and instead focusing on factors that contribute to long-run growth. This was good advice then, and good advice now.

Even Lord Keynes, the father of countercyclical policy, eventually recognized its limitations. Toward the end of his life he wrote:

Organized public works ... may be the right cure for a chronic tendency to a deficiency of effective demand. But they are not capable of sufficiently rapid organization (and above all cannot be reversed or undone at a later date), to be the most serviceable instrument for the prevention of the trade cycle.

The U.S. economic experience provides ample confirmation.
### Table 2. Dates of Recessions and Anti-Recession Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beginning</th>
<th>End</th>
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<sup>a</sup>Advance Planning for Public Works Act, P.L. 81-352 (October 13, 1949).


<sup>c</sup>Area Redevelopment Act, P.L. 87-27 (May 1, 1961).

<sup>d</sup>Public Works Acceleration Act, P.L. 87-658 (September 14, 1962).


<sup>k</sup>Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1993.
The end of taxation?

JAMES L. PAYNE

FOR A PEOPLE so ready to cast off ancient customs, Americans have been strangely reluctant to question the practice of taxation. Begun millennia ago, taxation developed as a method of exploitation. Instead of massacring defeated peoples, or taking them as slaves, conquerors realized that they could make a regular income by demanding wealth—with the threat of massacre as a prod. Of course the methods of taxation have been refined since those early days, but they still rest on the ugly foundation of force and the threat of force.

Yet philosophers and idealists, so eager to liberate the human race in other ways, have all but ignored taxation. Our culture's two outstanding thoughts on the subject are Benjamin Franklin's aphorism that "nothing is certain but death and taxes," and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's dictum that "taxes are what we pay for civilization." In other words, either you simply can't do away with taxes, or if you did, civilization would collapse. In the thrall of this received wisdom, generations of earnest reformers have accepted taxation, the legacy of Roman
tyrants, as the only workable way to raise money for public purposes.

**Growing strains**

There are signs that this intellectual free ride is coming to an end. Sophisticated new research has begun to document what common sense long suggested, namely that taxation, far from being an efficient money machine, is an extremely wasteful way to raise money.

Since Adam Smith, scholars have known that taxation hurts the economy: It denies workers, entrepreneurs, and investors some of the fruits of their creativity and thus discourages their contributions. Only recently, however, have economists gotten around to measuring this disincentive effect. The first serious attempt appears to have been made by Michael Boskin in 1975. Since then, quite a number of studies have been done, both on specific taxes and for the tax system as a whole, and they show in all cases a significant depressing effect of taxation. One estimate for the entire tax system by Charles L. Ballard of Michigan State and his colleagues, published in the *American Economic Review* in 1985, found the disincentive effect to be 33.2 percent. That is, to raise $100 in taxes causes the waste of $33.20 in lost production. Another study, reported in 1990 by Harvard economists Dale W. Jorgenson and Kun-Young Yun, put the disincentive effect for the tax system even higher, at 38.3 percent of tax revenues.

Another area where research has revealed hitherto unmeasured burdens is compliance costs: recordkeeping, studying tax regulations and instructions, making calculations, and filling out forms and supplementary documents. It was not until the 1980s that systematic surveys were conducted to discover how much time taxpayers spent on these compliance activities. The most comprehensive of these surveys, which included both individual and business taxpayers, was released by the Arthur D. Little company in 1985. It found that the nation was wasting 5.4 billion man-hours a year in federal tax compliance work. This is the equivalent of having 2,900,000 people working all year long just to figure out and comply with federal tax regulations. In monetary terms, this burden amounted to $159 billion in 1985, or over 24 percent of tax revenues collected.
Further burdens of the tax system include the time and energy citizens spend grappling with IRS enforcement actions. There are some 20 million of these every year, including levies, liens, seizures, underreporter notices, non-filing notices, audits, and penalty assessments. Then there is the cost of tax litigation (190,000 cases in 1990), as well as the waste of resources devoted to tax avoidance and evasion devices (which range from investment tax shelters to offshore tax havens and money laundering schemes). When estimates of these costs are combined with the findings about compliance and disincentive costs, the conclusion emerges that, all told, the overhead cost of running the federal tax system appears to be about $65 for each $100 in tax collected (see table).

### Costs of operating the U.S. federal tax system†

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<th>Cost to raise $100</th>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance costs</td>
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<td>Disincentive costs</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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What's worse, these costs are heading upward. Tax systems in the modern era have a natural tendency to become more complex. This is partly because economic life becomes more complex, with more nooks and crannies to be defined, reported, and controlled. Another cause of complexity is the politician's desire to undo the hardship of taxation and tax enforcement. In the good old days, tax collectors came to your farm and took which cows they wanted and maybe even your daughter—and burned down your barn if you didn't give them a drink of whiskey.

Today, the trend is away from the arbitrary application of force, but toward an ever-growing mass of rules, regulations, and opportunities to protest. This may make taxation less cruel, but at the same time it makes it more complicated and more costly.

Take just one small illustration of this process. In 1976, Congress gave taxpayers the right to be informed when witnesses were being summoned to testify against them, thus ending the IRS's medieval power to coerce testimony secretly. However, the flip side of this new right was higher costs, as taxpayers used the court system to challenge IRS summonses. The number of cases of summons-enforcement litigation doubled after passage of the 1976 provision, going from 1,900 in 1975 to 3,700 in 1977—and has since climbed to over 8,000 cases.

The 1980s saw dramatic increases in the complexity and burdens of the U.S. tax system. The number of tax court cases nearly tripled (to 28,000 in 1990); the number of liens placed on property doubled (to 1.1 million); and the number of levies (IRS actions to seize paychecks and bank accounts) quadrupled (to 2.6 million). In an effort to keep with a complexity of economic life that was making the tax system ever more porous, Congress approved a mass of highly complicated measures, including the alternative minimum tax and the passive loss provisions. Grappling with this new burden cost Americans millions more hours of work. A study by University of Michigan economist Joel Slemrod found that the time spent on tax compliance for the average household increased 26 percent between 1982 and 1989; the increase of the compliance burden on businesses and corporations was undoubtedly even larger.

The voluntary alternative

We have reached the point where everyone familiar with the facts—including IRS officials themselves—agrees that the current tax system is an appallingly wasteful arrangement. But most people can't see any alternative. They assume that we must endure the tax system, whatever it costs, sacrificing our prosperity to stave off the end of civilization.

Fortunately, this logic is spurious. There is another way to raise public funds. It has been around for thousands of years, and until the twentieth-century love affair with government, it was the principal way money was raised for social purposes. It's
called voluntarism. Instead of using force, one collects money on a voluntary basis by offering donors a positive satisfaction in return for their contributions. In many cases, the satisfaction is that of fulfilling a high religious ideal or social duty. But voluntary giving can operate with mundane, personal motives as well. Vanity, for example, is a common impulse behind charitable giving. In ancient Greece, the desire to stand out and be well-thought-of undergirded an extensive philanthropic system called “liturgy.” Wealthy, prominent citizens made public gifts of buildings, military equipment, bridges, plays, and festivals. It was, according to tax historian Charles Adams, “the voluntary alternative to progressive taxation.”

The free rider fallacy

Voluntary giving is not only ancient; it is widespread. The FFFROC Trust for Philanthropy, an association that keeps records of charitable giving, reports that in 1991, charitable giving in the United States exceeded $124 billion. Still more remarkable is the fact that charitable giving, in spite of the growing bite of government taxation, is increasing, showing a 2.8 percent yearly increase in real (inflation-adjusted) terms over the past decade.

Despite its importance, and its great potential, voluntary giving is routinely ignored, especially in academia. While the theory of taxation is expounded in thousands of books, articles, and college courses, there are hardly any books, articles, or courses on the theory of voluntary giving.

One reason for this neglect is the academic preoccupation with the “free rider problem.” Whenever people can enjoy something without being made to pay for it, this argument goes, they will do so. Take, for example, a charitably supported library. Since people can take out books without paying, the natural result—say the theorists—is that everyone will attempt to “free-load,” and the library will collapse. Therefore, the only way to have free libraries, or any other public service you don’t want to charge for, is to force everyone to pay using a tax system.

The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that everyone is narrowly selfish, always trying to maximize wealth. This kind of simplifying assumption is widely used as a starting point for social science theories, but it overlooks the complexity of human behavior. Human beings can be generous as well as selfish, and
this generosity makes possible the hundreds of thousands of voluntary giving arrangements that we see all across the country.

Zero-cost fundraising

A serious look at voluntary fundraising reveals that it has some impressive advantages. For one thing, voluntary fundraising can avoid the overhead costs that plague modern tax systems.

First of all, the disincentive effect disappears. Whereas a tax system discourages work, a voluntary system of giving encourages it. The voluntary donor says, “I want to work overtime this week so I can earn extra money to send our scout troop to the jamboree.” In effect, a voluntary contribution is a consumption item. It is no different from a stereo, a ticket to a ball game, or anything else a person earns money for.

Another cost that disappears in a voluntary system is the compliance burden. Since donors are not forced to give any particular amount, there is no need to prove anything to anyone: no recordkeeping, no regulations to study, no forms to fill out. Just whip out a dollar, if you want, or a hundred dollars, if you’d rather. It’s your own business.

Just as compliance costs fall to zero in a voluntary system, so do enforcement costs, litigation costs, and avoidance costs. Since no one is being pinned to the wall, no one has to waste energy resisting or evading the pinning.

The overall result, then, is that in a voluntary system, fundraising costs can fall to zero. This is not just a theoretical prediction. Thousands of voluntary groups in the United States actually achieve virtually zero fundraising costs. Take the First Lutheran Church of Sandpoint, Idaho, of which the author happens to be a member. The church is, in effect, a public service organization, operating a free soup kitchen, a free clothing program, youth activity programs, a sewing circle, a choir, counseling services, prayer groups, as well as worship services and Sunday school. The church also forwards over 19 percent of its income to local, national, and international charities. All church activities are open to members and non-members, to those who contribute and those who do not.

Despite the obvious potential for freeloaders, this system of voluntary giving does not collapse, as the academics say it should. Instead it thrives. In 1991, it raised $153,893, or an average of
over $650 for each of the 230 family members. This voluntary contribution is considerably higher than the average Idaho state income tax payment of these same families.

What was the overhead cost of collecting this $153,893? A close inspection of church accounts and procedures reveals only two fundraising expenditures. In the fall, the church has a potluck stewardship dinner. The supper itself is a social and culinary occasion (the best home cooking in Sandpoint), so it can hardly count as a cost or burden. However, at the dinner, pledge cards are distributed to encourage each family to decide on its yearly contribution. Second, each family gets a box of dated and numbered offering envelopes. Like the pledge cards, the envelopes help motivate and organize giving. The cards and the envelopes cost $419.73, making the total fundraising costs 0.27 percent of the funds collected. In other words, this church has fundraising costs less than one two-hundredth those of the IRS.

This figure is characteristic of most churches and many locally based clubs, like Rotary or Kiwanis. The key to their success is the idea of “stewardship giving”: Donors themselves are convinced of the need to give. Other voluntary groups, which do not have such a committed membership, have to expend resources on advertising and mass mailing. But even organizations that depend on these inferior methods still do better than the IRS. For example, the fundraising costs of the American Cancer Society are 23 percent of income; the United Negro College Fund’s costs are 21 percent; the American Red Cross’s, 7.7 percent.

**Give at the office**

Voluntary payroll deductions provide another approach. A good example of such an arrangement is the Combined Federal Campaign in the Washington, D.C. area. The federal employees who join the plan are given a booklet detailing nearly two thousand charities vetted by the campaign’s organizers. They then fill out a card, stipulating the amount they want deducted from their pay and naming the groups they want their money sent to. The cost of running the entire system—which includes approving the charities, publishing the booklets, collecting the deductions, and disbursing them to the respective charities—is less than 4 percent of the entire sum collected ($35.3 million in 1991).
This system, like all systems of voluntary giving, empowers individuals. Each person gets to choose the charities and public services he wants to support. Governments pay lip service to this ideal, but they never come close to implementing it. In a governmental system, your money is taken away from you whether you want to donate or not, and then spent as decided by a massive, tangled network of administrators and legislators. Unless a citizen is prepared to mount an exhausting and costly lobbying campaign, he is helpless to affect the allocation of his funds. In a voluntary system, on the other hand, the donor can vote agencies up or down with a stroke of his pen. The result is a genuine free market in which consumer choice can reward effective charities and punish those that are unnecessary, wasteful, or corrupt.

In addition to its practical advantages, voluntary giving also has an idealistic advantage. Tax collection is a depressing process. Acting under the gun of coercion, donors can take no satisfaction from their contributions. Instead, they experience anger at having their privacy invaded and their funds "ripped off." Those who operate the system—tax collectors—don't feel good about the arrangement either. Throughout history, they have been resented and friendless. Taxation breeds cynicism, with donors suspecting tax collectors, and tax collectors suspecting donors.

A voluntary system, on the other hand, brings out the best in everyone. It provides inspiration for donors, recipients, and observers. One man who noticed this win-win feature of voluntary fundraising was Booker T. Washington, founder of the Tuskegee Institute, the first black college in Alabama. Washington sought voluntary contributions from everyone, black and white, and often received in-kind donations:

I recall one old coloured woman, who was about seventy years of age, who came to see me when we were raising money to pay for the farm. She hobbled into the room where I was, leaning on a cane. She said, 'Mr. Washin' ton, God knows I spent de bes' days of my life in slavery. God knows I's ignorant an' poor; but I knows what you is trying to do. I know you is tryin' to make better men an' better women for de coloured race. I ain't got no money, but I wants you to put dese six eggs into de eddication of dese boys an' gals.

The moral power of this kind of voluntary transaction can never be achieved with a tax system based on force.
A needed policy debate

As noted earlier, taxation is a deeply embedded social institution, woven into the fabric of modern life by generations of indoctrination and usage. It is the vested interest to end all vested interests, supporting scores of millions of people, from pensioners to professors. As such, it is probably neither possible nor desirable to do away with it in a stroke—no matter what its flaws may be.

But what we can and should debate is our future direction. Do we want to depend ever more heavily on taxation as the fundraising system for addressing public problems, or should we start to de-emphasize it and instead promote voluntarism?

Voluntary giving receives little formal encouragement these days. The public has been imbued with the idea that taxation is the way community services are supposed to be funded. Our school children are taught the mechanics of political finance; they are taught to vote and to form pressure groups to lobby for government grants and benefits. They are not trained in the theory and practice of philanthropy.

Voluntary giving, disparaged in our statist culture as a whimsical distraction, nevertheless yields scores of billions: dramatic evidence of its inherent potential. It is worth speculating how such giving might thrive in a society that decided to emphasize it, in a society where children were taught, from their earliest days, that voluntary giving is needed to sustain civilization.
Toward a new intolerance

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

IT WILL BE fifty years ago this June that I graduated from Benjamin Franklin High School in East Harlem, in the company of State Senator Joe Galiber, and any number of prominent New Yorkers. I find myself at this half-century mark thinking: “How much more difficult a city we have now.” And wondering where so much went wrong. We were a city of the same size, about 150,000 more persons then than now. And the city was wonderfully able to respond to opportunity when it came.

We had had half a million people on relief in 1935. By 1943, this was down to 73,000 persons, of which the city reported only 93 were employable. (We have one million on welfare today, more than attend public schools in the city.) Mayor LaGuardia got FDR to get the Brooklyn Navy Yard going. In an instant we were building Iowa-class battleships and thousands of people were at work. In time, the city began that ascent to the incomparable heights that followed just after the war. We were a city that had a social structure, an infrastructure, the best subway system in the world, the finest housing stock in the world, the best urban school system in the world, and in many ways the best behaved citizens.

Over on the West Side, we made a thing about living in Hell’s Kitchen and belonging to a kind of street warrior caste, but in truth the neighborhood was a peaceable kingdom. Monsignor McCaffrey maintained said peace. In 1943, there were exactly forty-four homicides by gunshot in all of the City of New York. Forty-four. Last year there were 1,499.

Mayor LaGuardia was concerned about the condition of youth. He visited us. I interviewed him for the school paper. His message was simple: “You must take your lessons seriously, but never forget how to have fun.” I suppose he told that to every school newspaper

These remarks were delivered before the Association for a Better New York in New York City.
reporter he ever saw, but he also told it to me. Mind, he didn't mean too much fun. On January 4, 1943, in one of his weekly radio talks, he told of a police officer, a patrolman he described as “a fellow-worker of mine,” who had called in from the Yorkville section of the city and told him about young people who were hanging out in “cider stubes,” drinking soft drinks. The Mayor thought that we had had enough of that. He directed that they be closed down.

There were problems. The number of abandoned children seemed to have sharply increased. A headline in the New York Times reported: “Abandoned Babies Increasing In City—74 Brought Into Foundling Hospital This Year.” Seventy-four. (Visit the maternity ward of any city hospital today. See the boarder babies. Not just abandoned, but often deathly ill.)

The decline in our social institutions is really without equivalent. Most importantly, and absolutely essential is the decline of family. The small platoons without which a society this large just cannot function. In 1943, the illegitimacy rate in New York City was 3 percent. Last year, it was 45 percent. (Former School Chancellor Joseph Fernandez estimates that two school children in three come from single-parent households. As did I in my days at Franklin. It's not fatal, but it's no help.) There are parts of the city today which are overwhelmed by the social chaos that comes in the aftermath of the inability to socialize young males. It grows worse by the year.

I have been having a correspondence with Justice Edwin Torres, who is a Justice of the Supreme Court in New York State, Twelfth Judicial District. He was raised in the barrio, the neighborhood where Benjamin Franklin was first located, on 108th Street. We have reason to believe we might have crossed paths in a pool room called Los Muchachos. I was struck by his account of the court system. Here are his words: “The slaughter of the innocent marches unabated: subway riders, bodega owners, cab drivers, babies; in laundromats, at cash machines, on elevators, in hallways.” He decries a civic acceptance of this, of persons in his courtroom, victims who will say something to the effect that: “I suppose I shouldn’t have been out at that hour of the night.”

Here is a sentence from a letter he sent me a while back:

This numbness, this near narcoleptic state can diminish the human condition to the level of combat infantrymen, who, in protracted campaigns, can eat their battlefield rations seated on the bodies of the fallen, friend and foe alike. A society that loses its sense of outrage is doomed to extinction.

That letter is from a Supreme Court Justice. “A society that loses its sense of outrage....”
Last winter in the American Scholar, I published an article entitled "Defining Deviancy Down." It seems there is always a certain amount of crime in a society. You need to know what is deviant in order to know what is not. But when you get too much, you can always start to say that that's not really so bad. Pretty soon, you are getting used to behavior that's not good for you at all.

This subject came to me the morning after the Democratic National Convention. We were driving upstate; my wife Liz was driving and I was reading. We were up around Morningside Heights and I was at about page B14 of the Times. We learned there had been another drug execution. This was not noteworthy in itself—there's an execution every night. But in this case—the male and the female and the teenager laid down, shot in the back of the head—the woman had a baby that she had shoved under a bed. And when in the course of events the stink of human flesh began to make its way into the hallway and the police arrived, they found the little child dehydrated but alive. A new twist.

I settled down to work on the American Scholar article. I remembered the St. Valentine's Day Massacre. I have a World Book Encyclopedia, a wonderful thing. I looked it up. The St. Valentine's Day Massacre in 1929 in Chicago has two entries in the World Book Encyclopedia. Two. Along with the Battle of Thermopylae and things like that. The country was outraged. Al Capone had sent four of his men dressed as police. They rubbed out seven of Bugs Moran's men. All adults; they knew what they were up to and in for. But it shocked the country. We changed the Constitution. We said this was not acceptable behavior.

This last St. Valentine's Day in our city we too had a St. Valentine's Day Massacre. Six persons were laid down on a floor and shot in the back of the head. But that was only six, not enough to meet the quota, as if we were in a competition. And so the following day, a seventh, a possible witness, was murdered in the Bronx County Courthouse. That is civilization slipping away.

George Will recently observed (not, of course, just about New York): "We are experiencing in America today something without precedent in urban history: broad-scale social regression in the midst of rising prosperity."

OURS WAS a much poorer city fifty years ago, but a much more stable one. One that prepared you for the uses of prosperity when it came. I learned about Pearl Harbor from a man whose shoes I was shining on Central Park West, next to the Planetarium. On Sundays, you shined uptown, around the Museum of Natural History where people were. Saturdays were
downtown. Five years later, I was an officer in the United States Navy. Benjamin Franklin High School did that for me. (With an assist from a year in City College.) They thought it was routine. And it was. Joe Galiber went on to become what he is today. And others. Is that all behind us?

We had the finest urban housing stock in the world. Look what has happened. We could do things in no time at all. We could build the George Washington Bridge in four years and one month. And think far enough ahead to make it structurally capable of carrying a second deck when the traffic grew, with a capacity for yet a third. Things happened quickly, easily.

One day Mayor LaGuardia was flying in from Chicago, where the mayors' headquarters were, and expecting to land at Floyd Bennett Field. It was fogged in so he landed in Newark. He took out his ticket and said: "Mine says Floyd Bennett Field; what am I doing in a place called New Jersey?" Whereupon what we now know as LaGuardia Airport was built. In two years and one month. Today we are the only major city in the world that does not have a rail link to its major airport. Just can't seem to get it done.

But we can still steady ourselves. I was hugely encouraged by an address Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly gave to the Second Annual F.B.I. National Symposium on Addressing Violent Crime through Community Involvement. He called it: "Toward A New Intolerance." An intolerance of violence, an intolerance to the acceptance of violence. An intolerance of what Justice Torres describes as a "narcoleptic state" of acceptance. I'll just quote Commissioner Kelly and this will be the end of my task:

There is an expectation of crime in our lives. We are in danger of becoming captive to that expectation, and to the new tolerance to criminal behavior, not only in regard to violent crime. A number of years ago there began to appear in the windows of automobiles parked on the streets of American cities signs which read: "No Radio." Rather than express outrage, or even annoyance at the possibility of a car break-in, people tried to communicate with the potential thief in conciliatory terms. The translation of "No Radio" is: "Please break into someone else's car, there's nothing in mine." These "No Radio" signs are flags of urban surrender. They are handwritten capitulations. Instead of "No Radio," we need new signs that say "No Surrender."
The other Adam Smith

GEORGE WEIGEL

IN THE PREFACE to his first volume of memoirs, H. L. Mencken offered this fetching defense of his row-house origins in the Baltimore of the 1880s:

I was a larva of the comfortable and complacent bourgeoisie, though I was quite unaware of the fact until I was along in my teens, and had begun to read indignant books. To belong to that great order of mankind is vaguely discreditable today, but I still maintain my dues-paying membership in it, and continue to believe that it was and is authentically human, and therefore worthy of the attention of philosophers, at least to the extent that the Mayans, Hittites, Kallikuks and so on are worthy of it.

Adam Smith, in his proper Caledonian way, would have agreed. For as Jerry Muller observes in Adam Smith in His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society, Smith was one of the first philosophical defenders of the moral worthiness of bourgeois society.

That will come as news, of course, to those whose only acquaintance with one of the great leaders of the Scottish Enlightenment is with his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. But Muller, an intellectual historian on the faculty of the Catholic University of America, insists that the full scope of Smith’s “civilizing project” can only be grasped when the Wealth of Nations is read with Smith’s two other major works: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the posthumously published Lectures on Jurisprudence. When this is done, interesting challenges to the regnant caricature of Smith begin to emerge.

SMITH’S SEMINAL ECONOMIC insights are well enough known. As Muller recounts, Smith refuted three seemingly self-evident propositions: that “economic activity in a market system must occur at the expense of consumers, because it is motivated by the search for private gain”; that “a system based
on self-interest cannot benefit society as a whole”; and that “a rational economic system [should be] based on a comprehensive plan that directs resources to where they are most needed.” Each of these propositions assumes that “altruistic intentions expressed through deliberate planning” are the engine of social progress. But Smith demonstrated how “self-interest may in fact result in public benefits.”

That dimension of Smith’s work is, as I say, well recognized, if not always understood. What is less familiar is Smith’s view that the market is one of the social institutions by which men are schooled in freedom—which, for Smith, meant “not ‘freedom’ from all control,” but the capacity to control their own passions. Indeed, Muller insists that Smith’s economic interests were part and parcel of his more comprehensive concern with the construction of a society in which “decency” would extend far beyond the ranks of the aristocracy.

Smith’s proposals for the ordering of society are also characterized by a striking moral realism, neither utopian nor dourly cynical about the human prospect. Smith did not expect that “commercial society” would make “most men highly virtuous and noble”; but he also understood, from his study of history, that no society could do so. Rather, as Muller puts it, commercial society “held out the potential of a society in which most men would be decent, gentle, prudent, and free” [emphasis added]. Some would say—correctly—that that is no small accomplishment.

Muller is also at pains to show that Smith took positions that would cause considerable heartburn in some quarters where Adam Smith neckties are frequently worn. That is to say, Adam Smith was no libertarian:

Indeed, he was so successful in making the general case against government restraints on trade that his readers all too often ignored the complexity of his conception of commercial society and his frequent qualifications of “natural liberty.” That it was essential for government in a commercial society to provide for the common defense, for a legal system to protect person and property, and for the infrastructure necessary for commerce; that government must encourage and even coerce its citizens to acquire an education; that government should foster non-governmental institutions that develop character in its citizenry; that government must ensure the decency of popular entertainments—all were overlooked.

Muller argues that contemporary libertarianism descends less from Smith than from John Stuart Mill, who attempted to extend Smith’s Whig liberalism “by the incorporation of Romanticism.” The result was a liberalism reduced to a “defense of individual-
ity," an enterprise that bore scant resemblance to Smith’s more comprehensive “civilizing project.”

Smith and Mill also had different views of government. Smith believed in limited government, not because government was intrinsically evil, but because limited government would clear the social space in which non-governmental institutions could “channel the passions in socially beneficial directions,” as Muller puts it. Mill, on the other hand, “advocated limiting government power in order to ensure a free sphere of private life where romantic impulses and expressions of personality could emerge.”

To get down to present tenses: Jerry Muller’s Adam Smith would not find much comfort in the mix of classical economic liberalism and modern lifestyle libertinism found in the low taxes/deregulation/abortion rights/gay rights program of the governor of Massachusetts, William Weld, and his op-ed campaign manager, William Safire. As Muller writes, “an unanticipated consequence of Smith’s rhetoric [has been] his identification with conceptions of the good life he would have found abhorrent if not incomprehensible.”

Muller’s portrait of Smith as a “public policy analyst” also rescues from inattention Smith’s advocacy of what would today be called “mediating structures.” In this “complex web of subpolitical mechanisms,” Muller writes, Smith saw instruments capable of teaching freedom, primarily by giving sensible direction to men’s passions. The market is one such “mediating structure.” But so is the family, which Smith believed to be the most crucial institution of socialization. It is in the family that “children take their first steps toward self-command”—the chief virtue necessary for the “decent society.”

Smith argued for a rather strict (by contemporary standards, at any rate) legal regulation of marriage, aimed at supporting the traditional family. Easy, “no-fault” divorce would have been, for Smith, an idiocy. Those who would “think like Smith” today, Muller suggests, should be asking how “the law, government welfare policies, tax policies, and market institutions could be redesigned to create a structure of incentives that would heighten family stability.”

Similarly, Smith’s “preference ... for public goods to be provided through the market” would not preclude a contemporary Smithian (any more than it prevented Smith himself) from advocating policies in which the “government provides its citizens with the means to purchase such goods in the marketplace.” The obvious example today is choice in education. The public good is
an educated citizenry; and it is in pursuit of that public good that
government raises tax monies to support universal education.
"Thinking like Adam Smith" would not mean eliminating
government’s power to tax in support of education; it would
mean transforming the government’s educational role into one of
funder rather than service-provider.

**Muller’s Study** is a fine introduction to Smith’s thought,
and a most useful corrective to the misinterpretations of
both libertarians and the left. But it would have been an even
more stimulating study had Muller stretched out the implications
of one of his criticisms: namely, Smith’s tendency to “downplay
the role of entrepreneurial innovation in the history of capitalism.” That blind spot was due, Muller argues, to Smith’s interest
in promoting a neo-stoic conception of prudence in which risk-
taking and innovation were not highly valued. One wonders if
that reticence about the powers of human creativity helps explain
why Smith’s “system of natural liberty,” for all its demonstrable
empirical success, proved less compelling than the revolutionary
proposals, largely Marxist in conception, that swept the West in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That question, in turn,
forces us to consider whether Smith’s moral philosophy does in
fact provide a sufficiently strong foundation on which to build
the “decent” (i.e., bourgeois) society.

At the very least, it is intriguing that one of the most powerful
moral arguments on behalf of the “free economy” in recent
years—Pope John Paul II’s 1991 encyclical letter, *Centesimus
Annus*—is based on an analysis that highlights the roles of fore-
sight, risk-taking, innovation, “initiative and entrepreneurial abil-
ity.” John Paul’s analysis also yields a moral philosophy of a
“thicker” sort than is possible on Smith’s ground of “moral senti-
ments,” the pope arguing that objective moral norms are, in
principle, knowable by all men of good will.

But at the level of public policy, there are striking parallels
between Adam Smith’s “civilizing project” and John Paul’s stress
on the crucial role of mediating structures, his insistence that
individual prosperity foster the common good, his critique of the
nanny state, and his defense of free trade.

To note these parallels is neither to turn the pope into a
Smithian nor Smith into a Catholic social ethicist *mangúé*. But it
is to suggest that one of the most important intellectual projects
of the past generation—the moral defense of democratic capital-
ism—is now being pressed along lines of analysis that may prove
more durable than Smith’s own.
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Editor's note: The Anatomy of Thatcherism, reviewed in our Spring 1993 issue, has now been published in the United States by Transaction Publishers.
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