The
"Administrative Presidency"
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While he was President, John F. Kennedy reportedly once told a caller, "I agree with you, but I don't know if the government will." Whether true or not, Kennedy's remark illustrates a difficulty that has challenged modern Presidents: Should the President control the bureaucracy? And if so, how?

Clinton Rossiter speculated 20 years ago in The American Presidency that many a President would consider his hardest job was "...not to persuade Congress to support a policy dear to his political heart, but to persuade the pertinent bureau or agency—even when headed by men of his own choosing—to follow his direction faithfully and transform the shadow of the policy into the substance of the program." A number of modern Presidents have wrestled with this problem with varied motives, diverse strategies, and mixed results. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Brownlow Committee of 1936-37, and a succession of Presidential committees and task forces on executive management have all been part of their effort to give specific meaning to the general statement in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution that "the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
Among recent Presidents, Richard M. Nixon stands out for the typically intense and—for a President—reasonably systematic attention that he gave to this problem. Before the fall, Nixon had devised an elaborate plan for Presidential control over the domestic bureaucracy for his second term—a strategy that can be called the "Administrative Presidency."

**From operations to policy**

The idea that the President should manage the bureaucracy has long been favored by public administration experts. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Brownlow Committee emphasized the strong executive—in the Hamiltonian model—as the unique contribution of the Founding Fathers. "Those who waver at the sight of needed power," the Committee said, "are false friends of modern democracy. Strong executive leadership is essential to democratic government."

This classical public administration position, now dismissed by some as naive and outdated, has been replaced in the literature for many contemporary students of the Presidency by the more pessimistic interpretation offered by Richard Neustadt. Corresponding with Kennedy's statement quoted above, Neustadt's view downgrades the President's ability to be the chief executive of the bureaucracy: He can persuade and he can dramatize, but he cannot run the show—or at least it is very difficult for him to try to do so.

Another view of the President's relationship to the bureaucracy that has gained momentum since Watergate embodies the concept of "participatory bureaucracy," a sort of "moveable feast" of power rather than the traditional hierarchial model. This is what might be called the "democracy-inside-of-technocracy" theory, or the "blow-the-whistle" code of bureaucratic behavior, in which the President's role is commensurately downgraded. According to this view, the career official should provide not just competent staff work, but also his judgments concerning the right decisions and proper course of action for his agency and program area, about which he presumably has much more expertise than his political superiors.

What is significant about Nixon's idea for an "Administrative Presidency"—an idea shared by his Advisory Council on Executive Organization, headed by Roy L. Ash—is that it was clearly based on the traditional public administration model. Toward the close of his first term, Nixon increasingly came to believe that the President should manage, that as the chief elected official of the nation,
he had every right—indeed, had a responsibility—to adopt measures that would have the federal bureaucracy carry out his policy preferences. To do so, there were essentially two courses of action available to the President: relying upon strong, Presidentially-appointed domestic-program managers assigned to various executive agencies, or working through the White House and Executive Office staffs to see to it that the President’s policy preferences were put into effect. From time to time, the Nixon Administration considered adopting—and, in fact, eventually did adopt—both strategies, only to come to the conclusion at the end of the first term that they could not be pursued together: Strong agency managers, closely tied to the President, are bound to have difficulty functioning effectively if a powerful White House staff is monitoring their every move. The President had to make a choice; Nixon decided to go with strong agency managers as his second term got underway in 1973.

Reduced to its essentials, his plan involved putting his own trusted appointees in positions to manage directly key elements of the bureaucracy without elaborate White House or Executive Office machinery to encumber their efforts. New appointees for the Nixon second term would be arranged so that there would be clear lines of authority. The bureaucracy would report to them; they would be held accountable.

This plan for an “Administrative Presidency” helps to explain Nixon’s entire domestic policy. The roots of this plan were in the experience of the first term. The President and John D. Ehrlichman, his chief domestic advisor, came to the conclusion sometime in late 1971 or early 1972 that, in most areas of domestic affairs, operations constitute policy. Much of the day-to-day management of domestic programs—regulation writing, grant approval, personnel deployment, agency organization and reorganization, program oversight, and budget apportionment—can involve high-level policy-making. Getting control over these processes was the aim of the President’s strategy; and, judged against the lack of legislative success on domestic issues in the first term, there are grounds for concluding that this was a rational objective. Among Nixon’s various domestic proposals, only revenue sharing cleared Congress in his first term, despite the fact that Nixon had advocated from 1969 through 1971 a wide-ranging legislative agenda for domestic affairs—revenue sharing, welfare reform, health insurance, and block grants for manpower, community development, education, and transportation. In this setting of legislative non-achievement, there
are grounds for concluding that a conservative/centrist President facing a considerably more liberal Congress was well-advised to eschew legislative action and concentrate instead on administrative measures.

Existing domestic legislation, typically leaving many decisions to administrative discretion, offers an experienced President wide-ranging opportunities for managerial initiatives as an alternative to seeking Congressional action. But again, a President cannot have it both ways. If he does opt for an energetic managerial strategy, there are sure to be instances where the Congress will dig in and resist legislative initiatives he puts forward; as a result, prospects for his legislative program will be reduced.

**President versus bureaucrat**

The strong management strategy, set in motion in 1973, was to be implemented by a new set of Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials, along with a corresponding deemphasis of major domestic legislative initiatives. Nixon and Ehrlichman were no doubt aware of the problems they faced in carrying out this plan. At the same time that the experience of the first term indicated the pitfalls of legislative initiatives, White House aides frequently warned of an uncooperative—even unfriendly—domestic bureaucracy. According to Hugh Heclo, writing in *The Public Interest*, No. 38 (Winter 1975), the Nixon Administration’s view was that it “faced not only an opposition Congress but also an opposition executive, a collection of agencies and departments with a vested interest in the ways of the past.” A study forthcoming in *The American Political Science Review* bears out this interpretation. In 1970, Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman interviewed 126 supergrade-level administrators of federal domestic programs and found them “ideologically hostile” to the domestic policies of the Nixon Administration:

> Our findings document a career bureaucracy with very little Republican representation but most pointedly picture a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions of the Nixon Administration in the realm of social policy.

Concern about bureaucratic subterfuge, widespread among White House aides at this time, was often expressed in situations where less partial observers would have judged the Administration’s intentions to be so unclear that agency officials could not have been
expected even to know what the President wanted. It was common, nevertheless, for Nixon staffers at White House meetings to discuss at length cases where program managers, without authorization, went to the Congress to plead for help in reversing Administration decisions or attended meetings of interest groups around the country to drum up support for their subversive activities. Close ties between executive branch agencies and Members of the Congress often made it possible for agencies to resist White House policies.

A remark by a White House aide, quoted in *The Wall Street Journal* (June 21, 1971), summed up the attitude of the Nixon staff members toward the bureaucracy:

President Nixon doesn’t run the bureaucracy; the civil service and the unions do. It took him three years to find out what was going on in the bureaucracy. And God forbid if any President is defeated after the first term, because then the bureaucracy has another three years to play games with the next President.

Even Nixon’s own Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials were portrayed by Nixon’s aides in White House strategy sessions as too easily tempted by the lures and snares of the permanent bureaucracy. Late in 1972, Ehrlichman remarked in his often acerbic way that after Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials were appointed, they were only seen at Christmas parties: “They go off and marry the natives.”

Observing this tendency for Nixon appointees to “go native,” one agency official, a political appointee and former Republican Congressional staffer, developed in this period his own law of bureaucratic decision making. He noted: “No decision in government is made only once”—if at first you don’t get your way, keep trying, reopen the question, try another channel, use a different approach. In large agencies, there are sure to be many opportunities for locating a political—that is, appointed—official whose vantage point (Congressional relations, public relations, the budget, substantive concerns, or policy analysis) is such that he will be willing to go back to the Secretary, to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or to the White House in an effort to overturn or change a given policy decision.

On occasion, Nixon officials would visit the office of a Congressional committee to explain an Administration legislative proposal, only to be told that the committee had already been briefed by career agency officials known to have reservations about the Administration’s plans. This led to the establishment in the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) of a system of chaperones to accompany career officials on visits to Capitol Hill, along with a clearance system for all such outings. (An indignant response from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell B. Long, however, resulted in the demise of HEW's chaperonage plan.)

New team, new strategy

Nixon unveiled his strategy for an "Administrative Presidency" on the morning after his reelection. At a hastily called meeting, he told Cabinet members and their chief subordinates that they should submit their resignations immediately. The instruction was given in a spirit very different from the pro forma manner of the past; it was clear that a new team would be named for the second term. One of their essential tasks would be to take charge of the domestic bureaucracies. Key members of Nixon's new team were James T. Lynn at Housing and Urban Development, Caspar W. Weinberger at HEW, Earl L. Butz at Agriculture, along with a second line of sub-Cabinet officials, primarily made up of former White House aides with close ties to Ehrlichman. The new team was to take on the Congress and take over the bureaucracy. New legislation would be eschewed in deference to this administrative strategy. A system of "Super-Secretaries" was established—Lynn for Community Development, Weinberger for Human Resources, Butz for Natural Resources, and George P. Shultz (then Secretary of the Treasury), for Economic Affairs. The White House staff, which Nixon complained had grown "like Topsy" in his first term, was to be pared down. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Henry Kissinger, Ash (the new Director of the Budget), and Shultz (doubling as a White House aide for economic affairs) were to be the "starting five" among White House assistants. Other Executive Office personnel would be cut so that the trusted lieutenants appointed as agency heads could have frequent and direct access to the President and these chief aides.

It is ironic that, in the midst of Watergate, this decision in favor of strong, loyalist Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials appeared to involve a deliberate attempt to reduce the power and importance of the White House staff. It may be that there was such a connection in the President's mind. However, there was not even a clue at the time that this was so. To the contrary, it was Haldeman and Ehrlichman who emerged at the top of the new structure, and it
was quite clear, as noted earlier, that Ehrlichman was the principal architect of the new plan, which had four principal facets.

1. Personnel shifts: The balanced Cabinet, customary in American politics, which Nixon himself had relied on in his first term, was dropped. A new Cabinet and sub-Cabinet of lesser luminaries was largely in place when the tide of Watergate crested and the “Administrative Presidency” strategy, together with other plans for the second term, had to be put aside. Commenting on Nixon’s decision to retool the Cabinet and put trusted lieutenants in the top agency posts, New York Times reporter John Herbers contrasted the independent, national political figures in Nixon’s first-term Cabinet with the new breed of the second: “But now high posts, with rare exceptions, are held by little-known Nixon loyalists who can be dismissed or transferred at will without creating a ripple in public opinion” (March 6, 1973). The personnel shifts involved not only Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials and appointed agency heads, but many other top policy posts as well. Within their new agency homes, it was expected that Nixon’s new team would also redeploy career program managers, selecting the most cooperative, sympathetic, and talented officials for top posts.

2. Budget impoundments and reductions: President Nixon’s budget for fiscal year 1974 (submitted in January 1973) involved the strong use of fiscal powers as an essential part of his new management strategy. Few more direct ways could be imagined to take on the bureaucracy. Whole programs were to be stopped by impoundment. Important constitutional issues were raised by these decisions: Can a President use his executive authority to curtail or nullify programs that the Congress had previously enacted? The courts eventually had something to say about these executive actions, but in the early months of 1973 these and other such aggressive uses of fiscal tactics appeared to be immensely powerful.

3. Reorganization: The third element of the “Administrative Presidency” was the use of reorganization powers to give the President’s trusted lieutenants authority and leverage to act. In some cases, whole activities were reorganized out of existence, and in others, there were significant changes in reporting relationships. An example of the former was the attempt to abolish the Office

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1 From Nixon’s original Cabinet, all had exited but Shultz. Among the more prominent and outspoken members of the original group for the domestic agencies were George Romney at HUD, John Volpe at Transportation, Walter Hickel at Interior, and Robert Finch at HEW (whose outspokenness was somewhat of a surprise to his mentor).
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in early 1973. Although OEO was established in the Executive Office under Lyndon Johnson, it was not anticipated at the time that a future President would have greater authority over OEO than over other agencies. But instead of following the procedure of the formal Reorganization Act (whereby the Congress has 60 days to disapprove an organizational change), President Nixon's lawyers argued that since OEO was within the Executive Office, the President alone controlled its fate. With this rationale, in 1973 Nixon assigned as the new director of OEO a young conservative, Howard Phillips, an assistant director of OEO and formerly president of the Young Americans for Freedom. The President stipulated that when Phillips had completed his task of dismantling OEO, in part by devolving its functions to other agencies, he would be assigned some other post. Phillip's exuberance in his new task appeared to exceed even White House expectations: In one statement, he was quoted as saying he would do his job so rapidly, before Congress had a chance to react, that no one would be able to put "Humpty-Dumpty" together again. In a more restrained fashion, the special offices in the White House for Consumer Affairs and Science and Technology were devolved to new agency homes and eliminated as Executive Office units. The establishment of the "Super-Secretaries" also constituted an important use of reorganization as a tool for the President to get a firmer hold over the machinery of domestic government.

According to the new "game plan," the reorganization approach was not to be limited to the Executive Office and the Cabinet: Within their respective agencies, Nixon's new appointees were expected to take advantage of opportunities to rearrange their agencies in ways that would enable them to obtain stronger managerial control.

4. Regulation: The fourth component of the "Administrative Presidency" was regulation-writing—another exercise of federal authority that had not been thought of in the past as a method by which a President could achieve major policy goals. Two illustrations of how this authority could be used were revealed in conjunction with the federal budget for fiscal year 1974. In the field of social services (where this tactic eventually floundered because of strong Congressional opposition) new rules were issued early in 1973 that restricted the way in which funds to aid the poor through social services could be expended. The new rules, among other steps, required that these funds be used only for persons with specifically defined conditions of need, and then only under a system of de-
tailed accounting for the services provided. Here the aim was to reduce the options available to social-work professionals, long subject to Administration disdain, and strongly entrenched in the welfare bureaucracy of HEW. On the other hand, in the manpower field, the regulatory power was to be used not to introduce federal government controls, but to reduce them. The aim in this case was to decentralize by implementing Nixon's plan for manpower special revenue sharing through administrative action in the form of changed regulations under existing statutory authority.

Although in retrospect these four elements of the "Administrative Presidency" fit together in a fairly neat package, it is not likely that anyone in the White House systematically identified and defined this framework in preparing for the second term. In any event, it was all for naught: On April 30, 1973, John Ehrlichman, the driving force behind these various measures, was gone. Soon, too, the designations of the "Super-Secretaries" were removed. As the new White House staff was assembled in the late spring and summer of 1973, it came into being in a far different setting. The mandate of 1972 had dissipated, and decisive action, including unnecessary fights with program bureaucracies and Congressional committees, could not now be undertaken. General Alexander Haig, Jr., as Haldeman's successor, called for "an open Presidency" with activist, independent roles for Cabinet officers. The wheel had turned a full revolution.

Management as policy

It must be emphasized that the abortive "Administrative Presidency" strategy for Nixon's second term was much more than a managerial plan: It was closely tailored to the President's policy ideas. The two main elements of the "New Federalism" agenda, which Nixon had advanced in August 1969, were welfare reform and revenue sharing. Both moved away from the "Great Society" approach of attempting to solve a wide range of social problems by establishing new programs and agencies of the federal government. Instead, the aim was to rely on the community through revenue-sharing programs, and on individuals through a welfare-reform strategy that provided welfare recipients with adequate resources so they could make their own decisions. In his White House Food Conference address, on December 2, 1969, Nixon said:

The task for Government is not to make decisions for you or for anyone. The task of Government is to enable you to make decisions
for yourselves. Not to see the truth of that statement is fundamen-
tally to mistake the genius of democracy. We have made too many
mistakes of this type—but no more. Our job is to get resources to
people in need and then to let them run their own lives.

Both of these themes—localism and individualism—were closely in
line with the anti-big-government, anti-bureaucracy mood of the
1970's.

Just as in physics, if the aim is to shift power, it is necessary to
take it away from somewhere else. Nixon's advisors realized that
they would have their hands full in attempting to assign more
responsibility to state and local governments and individual citizens
under his "New Federalism" domestic program, because these
policy changes involved reducing the power of strongly entrenched
bureaucracies of the national government. In short, having had only
limited success with the legislative route to the "New Federalism"
in his first term, Nixon decided in his second term to take on the
bureaucracy directly, using the "Administrative Presidency" ap-
proach.

Although decentralization remained a major aim, it should be
noted that Nixon's "New Federalism" domestic program frequently
shifted in tone and content. In particular, the President's ardor for
welfare reform cooled as the time for reelection neared. It dropped
off completely following the controversy over George McGovern's
"demogrant" plan in 1972. After the election, there was in addition
an across-the-board shift to the right in the President's budget and

The post-Watergate notion of the "Imperial Presidency" and
similar views warning of the dangers of a strong Presidency cau-
tion against any attempt, such as Nixon's, to have the President
be a strong manager. Yet Franklin D. Roosevelt sought similar
goals, and many students of the Presidency credit him for doing
so. In the present day, there are good arguments to the effect that
we need a force to counter strongly entrenched bureaucracies and
interest groups. In The End of Liberalism, Theodore J. Lowi warns
against just such a concentration of power in centers of technical
expertise that are not subject to the give-and-take of democratic
political processes.

In addition to such theoretical concerns about the power of bu-
reaucracies, the memoirs of public officials offer abundant exam-
pies of the frustrations involved in challenging the functional fief-
doms of Washington. There is reason to think that managerial tasks
are harder to perform in Washington than at other levels of our
political system. Political appointees with state and local experience frequently commented during the Nixon years that they found it more difficult to tackle Washington bureaucracies than those at the state level, which tended to be more responsive to policy decisions by political officials.

The essential question is whether we need to have more and stronger checks and balances within the federal executive branch. Nixon's notion that the only way to take on the bureaucracy was to assemble like-minded political appointees strongly committed to his program and policy ideas raises questions of political behavior similar to those raised by Watergate. In the case of Watergate, like-minded associates, strongly devoted to the President, developed a warped and unbalanced perspective where excesses reinforced and fed upon each other. The result was catastrophic for Nixon and for the country. Would this same behavior have occurred in the area of domestic policy if the "Administrative Presidency" had been played out in the absence of Watergate? Would the orientation of Nixon's trusted lieutenants for domestic affairs have caused men to yield to the same temptation to put ends before means? Or would our traditions of public service have been sufficient in these substantive policy areas to assure responsible conduct?

It must be remembered that the key figures of the "Administrative Presidency" were men of character and ability, untainted by Watergate (with one exception, Ehrlichman). George Shultz (economic policy), Caspar Weinberger (human resources), Earl Butz (natural resources), and James Lynn (community development) are all men of centrist or moderately conservative views who, in one capacity or another, have proved themselves to be skillful public-policy managers. It was in the campaign arena, not in the area of domestic policy, that Nixon's choice of unprincipled subordinates produced his ultimate crisis.

The intriguing question whether the "Administrative Presidency" could have succeeded in the absence of Watergate may not be answered for a long time. For Watergate has had a deep impact on political morality in the United States. With a new and heightened concern for political ethics, it is possible that a President with a coherent program could organize his administration to navigate a course similar to Nixon's plan but, at the same time, adhere to high stands of public service and personal conduct. Yet Watergate may have made the "Administrative Presidency" impossible for some time. Its aftertaste will no doubt discourage a future Presi-
dent from soon again attempting this kind of a domestic strategy; such a firm grabbing of the reins with an emphasis on administrative accomplishment may now be unacceptable. If the domestic bureaucracies have acquired too much power, a solution in terms of a Presidential strategy may now be very hard to implement. Clearly, President Ford is not disposed, or does not seem to be disposed, in this direction.

**Ford and the future**

By the time of Nixon's departure, much of the "New Federalism" agenda was in place. It might be argued that President Ford, who appears to hold to a philosophy of domestic policy similar to Nixon's, could have advanced goals closely in line with the "New Federalism" without adopting a management plan specifically designed to do so.

Ford's domestic strategy initially involved a shift back to the traditional concept of a balanced Cabinet. He named to the Cabinet a group of distinguished citizens—some of whom he had not previously known—who apparently were selected without much concern for their political or philosophical orientation. As of this writing, the Ford Cabinet for domestic affairs consists of a Southerner at HEW (a Democrat, considered by many a liberal), a woman at HUD (also with an essentially liberal track record), a black at Transportation, a Harvard man at Labor, a Westerner at Interior. Balanced according to religion, sex, race, and region, the Ford Cabinet in many ways resembles Nixon's first Cabinet. Can such a group be loyal to the Administration's conservative, decentralist domestic policies? The answer in part depends on the importance which the President and his advisers attach to these objectives: Preoccupied with other tasks, the Ford White House has shown little disposition so far to highlight domestic affairs.

Nevertheless, there were signs in late 1975 that the new President, in international affairs at least, was learning the lessons of Nixon's experience—perhaps learning them all too well. Explaining his decision to fire Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in November 1975, Ford said he wanted to avoid "growing tensions" in his Administration. "I need a feeling," said the President, "of

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2 General revenue-sharing, and block grants for manpower and community development. Enactment of the latter two measures, in 1973 and 1974 respectively, came as something of a surprise to most Nixon Administration domestic strategists.
comfort with an organization: no tension, complete cohesion.” Hugh Sidey, writing in *Time* magazine (November 3, 1975), called attention to what he saw as the need for a stronger interest in management in the Ford White House. Although “Ford has repeatedly attacked the bureaucracy,” said Sidey, his aides have made “no reliable assessments of how some of the huge Government programs are working.” Noting that although Ford had promised to cut federal payrolls, they had increased during his 14-month tenure, Sidey urged that the President “come out from behind the microphone and grapple with the problem himself.”

Others have argued that the Congress should give managerial direction to the federal bureaucracy. But even though we may decide that coherent management of the federal bureaucracy is needed, I do not believe that the Congress can fulfill this role. Its oversight role, however, in this area is an essential one.

Aaron Wildavsky has written, “The weakening of the Presidency is about as likely as the withering away of the state” (*The Public Interest*, No. 41, Fall 1975). There was, as might be expected, a strong tendency to think otherwise in the aftermath of Watergate. The long-held belief in the strong Presidency, favored by public-administration groups since the mid-1930’s, was abandoned. In a report prepared in 1974 for the Ervin Committee of the United States Senate, a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration rejected the tactics being developed for the Nixon second term: “The federal executive is necessarily pluralistic.” Although made up of the ideological descendants of the authors of the Brownlow and Hoover reports, the Academy panel, referring to Nixon’s management strategy for his second term, breathed a sigh of relief that Watergate had stemmed the tide of Presidential power:

The United States Government [under Nixon] would be run like a corporation—or at least a popular view of the corporate model—with all powers concentrated at the top and exercised through appointees in the President’s office and loyal followers placed in crucial positions in the various agencies of the Executive Branch. . . . No one can guess how close the American government would be to this closed hierarchical model had not Watergate exposures halted the advance towards it—at least temporarily.

There were many who believed when Nixon resigned in 1974 that his plan for a managerial takeover of domestic government in his second term constituted a threat to our political system. Maybe so; but, as often happens after periods of great emotion, there is likely yet to be a revision of attitudes. When this happens, I predict
that Nixon's strategy for his second term—not necessarily for the "Administrative Presidency," but for a more administrative Presidency in domestic affairs—will be seen to have raised basic questions for our political system. In more immediate terms, whoever is elected President in 1976, and whatever his major objectives for domestic affairs (decentralization, reduction of the bureaucracy, fiscal responsibility, full employment, equal opportunity), he would do well, at the outset of his term, to study carefully, the President's role as Chief Executive.

The managerial agenda

Assuming the next President is so disposed, the key to the establishment of some measure of managerial control over the executive establishment is in one word—appointments. The predominant tradition in American government is for a new administration to name a balanced Cabinet, to use this first step for binding and healing, selecting men and women who represent the various streams of opinion, regions, and races that the new President wishes to have represented on his team. Unfortunately, this honeymoon mood often exceeds real prospects for political harmony. As a result, it can exacerbate the normal adversarial relationship between the President and his Cabinet.

Despite the fact that this adversarial relationship is built into our system, the essential point is that it can be ameliorated by naming sympathetic men and women to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posts, appointees clearly pointed in the same policy direction as the new President in their assigned areas of responsibility. Only with such persons can the President hope to get a handle on running the government. Unless his top appointees share his substantive goals, the normal politics of Washington mitigate strongly against even a semblance of managerial cohesion in government. Managerial experience and interests are additional important qualifications, but basic substantive agreement is the essential ingredient.

If this diagnosis is correct, the next President (unless it is Gerald Ford) will not have time to learn in the caldron of Presidential experience. Once the wrong Cabinet is appointed, the managerial agenda becomes unfeasible. This is the lesson of Nixon's Watergate-aborted "Administrative Presidency."

To conclude, I believe a managerial strategy or emphasis is appropriate for the American Presidency. Even if we assume that the next President is successful in establishing some measure of man-
Agerial cohesion and control over the federal bureaucracy, there still exist an abundance of ways in which his power in this area and in others can be checked and balanced. It can be argued, in fact, that a managerial emphasis on the part of the President enhances popular control, given the tendency of industrialized states to become increasingly controlled from bureaucratic and technocratic power centers. The exercise of a greater measure of civilian control over the Executive branch of the American national government—properly reflective of legal and Constitutional requirements—is fully consistent with democratic values.

CORRECTION

We regret that an error was made in transcribing the table on page 83 of "The Wavering Polls," by Seymour Martin Lipset, which appeared in the Spring 1976 issue of The Public Interest (No. 43), pp. 70-89. Under the column heading "Great Deal of Confidence," the correct figures should be as follows: for "Colleges," 46 per cent rather than two per cent; for "Professors," 29 per cent rather than nine per cent. Under the column heading "Moderate Confidence," the correct figure for "Elected Government Officials" should be 75 per cent rather than 65 per cent. Under the column heading "No Confidence," the correct figures should be as follows: for "Colleges," two per cent rather than 46 per cent; for "Professors," nine per cent rather than 29 per cent.