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Of populism and taxes

IRVING KRISTOL

What is populism and why is everyone suddenly saying such nice things about it? The answer to that last question, at least, is easy enough: When a populist spirit is abroad in the land, most Americans are always eager to say nice things about it. After all, populism as a political movement is indisputably based on popular passions and popular resentments, and very few commentators today are willing to adopt a critical posture toward it, lest they stand accused of the awful ideological error of "elitism." During the 1950's, the late Richard Hofstadter (among others) could explore the connections in American history between political populism and political paranoia—the belief that the world is being misdirected by some kind of mischievous conspiracy against the "common man." The perception of such a connection permits one to understand some of the more interesting aspects of American populist movements: their tendency toward xenophobia and racism for one thing, their extraordinary ineptitude at significant institutional reform for another. But, in recent years, Hofstadter's work has been nibbled at by a flock of younger historians who are maddened by his very detachment from populist clichés. In America, intellectuals are now more consistently populist than the populace itself. Political populism is a natural temptation for a democratic people, but the populist
idea seems to have become something like a secular religion for the
democratic intellectual, who is convinced that “the people” represent
a holy congregation and, therefore, that their indignation is the wrath
of God. Indeed, when the American people sensibly resist the populist
temptation—when they exhibit a preference for a politics of calm
deliberation over a politics of passionate resentment—they are likely
to be rebuked by their intellectuals for their disgusting “apathy.”

What is populism? Oddly enough, I believe the classical Marxist
definition is the most accurate: Populism in America is the radical-
ism of the petit-bourgeois sensibility—the radicalism of the tra-
ditional-minded and nostalgia-ridden “common man,” a radicalism
of the sullen, the bewildered, the resentful, the anxious, the
frustrated. It is, Marxism goes on to say, a “false” class conscious-
ness in that it is myth-ridden and essentially “escapist”; it is
therefore a very dangerous form of radicalism because, in the end,
it is more likely to be captured by unscrupulous right-wing dem-
agogues than by proper socialist theoreticians. This interpretation of
populism is doubtless schematic and even melodramatic, as Marxist
interpretations tend to be. But I think it to be more valid than not,
and I would remark that the ease with which so many of yesterday’s
quasi-Marxist radicals have transformed themselves into today’s
self-styled “populists” is a sad commentary on the condition of
American political thinking in the 1970’s.

Still, when all this has been said, considerably less than everything
has been said. Populism may be a natural temptation in a democ-
racy, but large numbers of citizens are not likely to succumb to this
temptation unless circumstances move them to do so. *Vox populi*
is not *vox dei*, but when people feel the times are out of joint, then
they are in fact out of joint—there is no higher court to appeal to.
The rise of a populist temper is a sure sign that something has gone
wrong, and that reforms are very much in order. A populist upsurge
always points to very real problems that ought to be on our political
agenda. But populism itself usually misperceives these problems,
and the solutions it proposes are, more often than not, illusory.

**What kind of tax rebellion?**

It seems generally agreed that a major cause of the present pop-
ulist discontent is taxation. But, typically, the populist temper
seizes hold of this matter and twists it into a familiar paranoid
shape; the tax issue, it proclaims, arises out of the manipulation of
our tax laws by “vested interests” so that the rich are getting away
scot-free while the common man bears the whole tax burden. The answer, obviously, is to soak the rich.

Now there is, as it happens, something to be said for soaking the rich. But that is not really the problem, nor is it really any kind of a solution. The average American, no matter what he may sometimes say or what is said in his name, is not rebelling against tax inequities. He is rebelling against taxes, period. He is rebelling against increased property and sales taxes. He is rebelling against the hidden tax that inflation represents. He is rebelling against all those itemized deductions from his paycheck—against the fact that his "take-home pay" diverges more and more from his formal salary, so that his hard-won wage increases seem to exist only on paper and never find their way into his pocket.

Since most social critics are members of the upper-middle class, for whom the income tax looms so large, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the income tax for the American working man. True, as his wages increase he moves "progressively" up into higher tax brackets. But the actual impact of this process is minimal, since we are talking about relatively small spurts in income. The average American worker is not paying a greater proportion of his salary to Internal Revenue than he was ten years ago; as a result of the Kennedy and Nixon tax reforms, he is more likely to be paying less. He is, however, witnessing a greater proportion of his salary being preempted by inflation—itselt the consequence of increased government spending on such things as welfare, education, medicare, medicaid, etc. He also sees more of his salary being funneled off into social security, supplementary private pensions, early retirement schemes, medical insurance, etc. Between 1965 and 1971, his weekly earnings rose by 12 per cent, but what we now call his "real spendable earnings" did not increase at all. The American worker finds this frustrating. He resents this whole process, which bureaucratically insists on improving his longer-term prospects at the expense of his shorter-term ones—on improving his general welfare at the expense of his specific well-being. In short, he resents the present structure of the welfare state, and his "tax rebellion" is an expression of this resentment. This intense dissatisfaction of the working class and lower-middle class over the issue of "taxes" is not a uniquely American phenomenon. The same resentment is clearly visible in Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden—nations where the question of tax inequities is barely raised at all.

What is occurring is very interesting and very troubling: The middle-class psychology which has created the welfare state is on
a collision course with a working-class psychology which, while not rejecting any of the benefits of the welfare state, nevertheless feels victimized by it. This may be short-sighted on the part of the working-class—but, then, it is in the nature of working-class people to be more short-sighted (to have a shorter "time horizon") than middle-class people; since their lives offer fewer gratifications, working-class people tend to want them more immediately. And there may well be more than short-sightedness involved. After all, it is the middle class that manages our welfare state, whereas our working class is managed by it—and it is a lot more fun to manage than be managed. Many workers who are angry at those deductions from their paycheck would take pride in making those deductions on a voluntary basis. They could then find personal satisfaction in providing for their own and their children’s future. It is pleasing to fulfill such responsibilities in a “manly” way; it is apparently much less pleasing to have a bureaucratic process do this to you and for you.

How to get out of this impasse is not a subject we have given much thought to. Indeed, we have for the most part failed to realize just what kind of impasse we are in. Instead we tend to permit ourselves to be caught up in the populist current, and to believe that a populist reform—a more “progressive” tax system—will provide the answer to populist discontent. Just how illusory such a notion is may be inferred from the following report in the New York Times for May 19, 1972:

For many New Jersey political leaders it didn’t seem to make any sense. Here was a Republican Governor urging a Legislature controlled by Republicans to approve the most progressive, urban-oriented, socially conscious tax-reform program ever proposed in the state’s history. Appearing before a joint legislative session in the crowded Assembly chamber this afternoon, Gov. William T. Cahill recommended a $2-billion tax program that included a graduated state income tax and a statewide property tax of $1 on every $100 of true value.

He promised that the new taxes would cut local property taxes in New Jersey by an average of 40 per cent and enable the state to assume the entire financial responsibility of operating the public schools. . . .

Stripped to its essentials, it is a controversial program that would bear down hardest on the wealthy, predominantly Republican communities in the suburbs and offers sizable tax relief and new urban aid to the predominantly Democratic poor people in the cities and the working-class communities immediately surrounding them. . . .

It would follow, then, that the Governor should be able to count heavily on the cities and the Democrats in his effort to reform what he calls “an unjust, regressive tax system which places the greatest burden on those least able to pay.”
OF POPULISM AND TAXES

In reality, some of the most strident opposition to any reforms will come from blue-collar neighborhoods who stand to benefit the most from them.

For example, a number of legislators from the cities, such as Anthony Imperiale of Newark, contend—probably rightly—that virtually all their constituents are opposed to any kind of new taxes, regardless of the higher benefits involved and regardless of any accompanying reduction in local taxes.

"I can’t put my finger on it," Mr. Imperiale said today, but it was apparent that the same sense of political, economic and social alienation that is encouraging thousands of working-class Democrats in New Jersey to support Gov. George Wallace of Alabama would also be a major factor in determining their opposition to any reforms.

One can fairly predict that many middle-class reformers will find, to their surprise, that the populace is going to be quick to bite the hand that aims to feed it. The populace doesn’t want to be fed; it wants more freedom to graze on its own.

**Taxing the rich**

I am not suggesting that there are no inequities in our tax system. On the contrary, there are many and their elimination or reformation is highly desirable. But one has to have a clear idea of what this will accomplish. It will not have any significant effect on the distribution of income in the United States, and it will not have any significant effect on the tax burden of the average American. It will not of itself finance the prospective growth of existing social programs, and it will most emphatically not finance any major new social programs (e.g., national health insurance, day-care centers, etc.). Its purpose will be primarily symbolic: to reassure the American people that the tax system is "fair." Such reassurance is clearly needed today, and therefore the importance of such symbolic reforms cannot be overestimated.

One such reform, in my opinion, would affect the present way in which corporate executives can acquire and exercise stock options. The problem here is that corporate executives still think of themselves as businessmen—i.e., entrepreneurs—who ought to get rich if they are successful. This is a dangerous misconception. Executives ought to get tempting salaries, and these salaries ought not to be taxed with exceptional severity— but no corporate executive ought to feel entitled to get rich on the job. He is not a risk-taking entre-

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1The present 50 per cent maximum tax on earned income seems to me to strike just about the right balance.
preneur, since his risks are no greater than that of any other employee of the corporation, and he is entitled to the kinds of benefits other employees get—nothing more. I would say he is not even entitled to a special bonus system—unless, in those years when the corporation does badly, he is willing to accept an equivalent negative bonus (i.e., pay cut).

Another useful reform would be to abolish the tax advantage which the purchase of tax-free municipal and state bonds now offers to those in the higher tax brackets. This advantage is not nearly so scandalous as various newspaper reports would have one believe. It is perfectly true that a wealthy citizen can avoid all taxes by putting his capital into tax-exempts. But it is also true that, since the yield on tax-exempts is only about two-thirds of the yield on taxable bonds, he is in effect paying a 33 per cent tax for the privilege of not having to bother filing a return. This is a lot more than zero; on the other hand, it is substantially less than he would otherwise pay, if this option were not open to him. Various plans have been developed for abolishing tax-exempt bonds while not damaging the ability of localities to borrow money. It is time that some such plan were put into effect.

There are still other possible reforms one could mention, but there is no need to list them here. The point I wish to emphasize—and it is not really controversial in itself—is the mainly symbolic character of such reforms. They will not raise much in the way of new revenue; they will not affect the ordinary person's tax burden; they will leave no trace on the distribution of income. They are desirable on grounds of equity and their impact will be almost totally psychological. Obviously, these are not the kinds of results that those who take populist rhetoric seriously have been led to expect. Such results, if they are to be obtained, will involve far more drastic reforms—and, for better or worse, each of these reforms would have serious costs, economic and political.

It would be easy, for instance, to raise quite a few billions by increasing the corporate income tax and decreasing the depreciation.

2One such plan was described by Charles M. Haar & Peter A. Lewis in *The Public Interest*. See “Where Shall the Money Come From?” (Winter 1970), pp. 101-112.

3I am not even thinking of those famous depletion allowances for firms that produce oil, gas, and minerals. If such allowances were completely eliminated, the Treasury would get an extra $1.5 billion in revenue. And no one is even advocating their complete elimination! Rarely can so much publicity have been generated by the prospect of so little tax revenue. In a way, the fuss over depletion allowances is a perfect illustration of how the populist vision distorts economic reality.
allowances offered to corporations who invest in new capital equipment. But the effect of this would be to slow economic growth in the private sector, to decrease the number of jobs created therein, and ultimately to diminish the tax revenues generated by it. One can fairly predict that, after a few months of such a "sluggish economy," the political pressure for restoring depreciation allowances and cutting corporate taxes would be irresistible.

The abolition of the capital gains tax, and the taxation of all income at normal rates, would raise perhaps an extra $8 billion—on paper. In actuality, it would probably raise only a tiny fraction of that, since people with substantial capital gains would simply refuse to sell their stocks or properties, preferring to borrow against them if they should need cash. Why, they will ask, is it "fair" to treat capital gains as income when capital losses cannot be written off against income? This would seem to be one of those cases when a tax sets itself into direct opposition to elementary self-interest and to the taxpayer's own sense of justice—and when this happens, it is the tax which usually loses out. The same thing would doubtless be true for a cumulative lifetime inheritance tax, which, putting a tax bill of $200,000 on an estate of $500,000 and going up from there (e.g., a tax of over $500,000 on a million dollar estate), would yield $4 billion dollars—on paper. In real life, the incentive for avoidance of such a tax, seen as "confiscatory," would be so great that the only ones to benefit would be the tax lawyers who would figure out ways to soften that tax-bite. Anyone who is skeptical of his ability to succeed in this should himself immediately consult a tax lawyer: He will discover that he has needed one all along.

There are some reforms that would unquestionably bring in the money—only no one is ever going to enact them. If you abolish tax benefits for those over 65, you would pick up some $9 billion a year. And if you abolished the tax-deductibility of interest payments on home mortgages, you would pick up over $20 billion a year. But who is going to pass such legislation? It is all very well to argue, as some academics do, that if we got rid of all of these tax preferences for various groups in the population, we could have, not only a simpler tax system, but a much lower general tax level for everyone. Were we in a position to design our tax system afresh, that would be an eminently sensible procedure. But we are in no such position, and it is quite futile to try to persuade large numbers of people to surrender substantial and tangible tax benefits in favor of a prospective tax reform that might leave them slightly better off. That is just not going to happen.
The rich—too few, and too many

The trouble with the idea of lightening the average man's tax burden through soaking the rich is that there are both too few and too many rich—depending on how you define that category. The top one per cent of our income distribution—families with over $50,000 a year income—number only 700,000, and they already pay out 46 per cent of their income in taxes. The top five per cent consists of 3.5 million families with income of $30,000 or over; these pay out about 33 per cent of their income in taxes. There is unquestionably more tax revenue to be got here—but not easily: These people don't think of themselves as being "rich," the rest of the population doesn't think of them in this way, either, and the millions of people in this bracket will therefore fight hard and effectively against any kind of discriminatory increase in their taxes. The same is even truer for those 14 million families in the top 20 per cent, who make over $18,000 in income. As for the tens of millions of people in the $10,000-$18,000 bracket—well, these are the very people who are already populist rebels against our prevailing tax rates! The idea of taxing them more harshly for the benefit of those with below-median incomes is not to be taken seriously.

It is precisely because of the fact that income distribution in a modern industrial society takes the shape of a diamond, rather than a pyramid, that income re-distribution turns out to be so hellishly difficult. It can hardly be an accident that countries with such different economic and social policies as the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden should have an almost identical pre-tax distribution of income, and a still roughly comparable post-tax distribution. In all of these countries there are both too few "rich," and too many, for taxes to be a powerful instrument of economic equality.

Such a recognition of the limits of tax policy will depress those who believe that the distribution of income is a major problem for American society today. But is it, really? My own guess is that, left-wing intellectuals and academics apart, no one is terribly exercised by this issue. It is in the nature of democratic politics that practically any discontent expresses itself in terms of a demand for greater "equality," when what is actually being demanded is fairness or efficiency—or even special privilege! I have suggested that much of our working-class discontent is over the structure of the welfare state: I would add that this discontent is exacerbated by the ways in which the welfare state is spending its tax revenues—for ever-growing welfare rolls, for an educational system that seems to be falling apart,
for a police force that cannot cope with increased criminality, for low-income housing that converts itself into instant slums, for medicaid to the poor which inflates medical costs for the non-poor, etc. It would not be an exaggeration to say that much of the present discontent with taxation is provoked by the fact that the welfare state, which these taxes support, is too committed to equality—to expenditures that benefit primarily the minority who are poor.

The populist demand for "equality," back in the 1890's, was in reality a protest against the emerging new shape of American society, in which the large corporation was to be a central institution. What the Populists basically wanted, and what in the end they got, was for government to take effective action to curb the economic power and political influence of the corporations. That end achieved, the populist spirit gradually melted away. Today, populist dissent, as I see it, is once again concerned with the emerging new shape of American society. It is a society in which bureaucracies—governmental, judicial, professional, educational, corporate—make the crucial decisions which affect the common man's life (e.g., busing his children away from their neighborhood school, appropriating part of his salary to support people he thinks unworthy of support, etc.). Most of these decisions involve specific costs to him, while promising only future benefits, some of which are vaguely "social." It is no wonder that his anxiety becomes touched with paranoia, and that he should smell foul conspiracy.

There is no conspiracy—but there is a problem. It is not a problem of income distribution or of inequities of taxation. The problem is the bureaucratization of American society—and the fact that this bureaucratization has failed to accomplish the only thing no bureaucracy dare fail at: the efficient delivery on its promises. Populist dissent today is directed against liberal politics—even when it votes for an "anti-establishment" liberal politician. Liberals may find this incredible: How can the people possibly be against liberal politics, when liberal politics so sincerely has the larger interests of the people at heart? So long as this question can be asked so ingenuously, we shall not have got very far in coping with the upsurge of populist dissent in the 1970's.
IN THE BUREAUCRATIC LABYRINTH

The Educational Entrepreneur—a Portrait

HON. EDITH GREEN

During the past decade, the federal government has made many new attempts to aid in the solution of the country's major problems. Great hopes and high ideals underlay these attempts. For the most part, the motives of those who championed new programs were good, and the people supporting these programs were truly representative of a national will to do something about many of the larger problems that plague our times.

As plans turned to realities, in attempting to provide solutions to our country's pressing ills, we have set up a monstrous apparatus that can no longer be supervised or controlled by even the best of men. This tremendous proliferation of programs and activities is leading to a major collapse of rational management. We are becoming ever more aware of the pitfalls we were warned about by former President Lyndon Johnson, when he said that "legislation should not be examined in the light of benefits it will convey if properly administered—but by wrongs it would cause if improperly administered."

What is true of government in general is true as well of the federal presence in education. The Office of Education will supervise the expenditure of over five billion dollars in fiscal 1972, through programs that take over seven printed pages to list. Other federal agencies and departments will pour additional billions from federal coffers into educational enterprises. The duplication, complexity, and sheer weight of these efforts is becoming unbearable to taxpayers and officials alike. Thus, the first major problem we have to face today is how to restore a rational form to our government, and keep it in a manageable form.

Closely related to this problem is a second one, namely, the extent to which education is becoming allied with business and industry. It might be useful to place this problem in the perspective of history. Educators have always wanted to have a decent income; in this respect, they have never been different from the rest of humanity. But it has been customary to realize that financial benefits were simply means to greater ends, and the ends were clear: the pursuit of knowledge, the discovery of truth, and the transmission of our cultural heritage. Only recently have the means become ends in themselves. It is a very modern phenomenon to find educators busily at work accumulating wealth as an academic pursuit in its own right.
We have entered the era of the large-scale education industry, complete with all the excesses that so often appear in a burgeoning big business.

It is sad to say that a well-meaning governmental policy has probably been largely responsible for this development. During the past decade, Congress has supported education more generously and vigorously than ever before. Very large sums of money, funding innumerable new programs, have been made available at every level of the educational ladder, from preschool to post-doctoral. Whether the result has been an improvement in education is not entirely clear; only time will tell, and only serious evaluations will help us find out. But one thing has become evident: The result of all this federal funding has been, directly and indirectly, the personal enrichment of some, and the runaway growth of a great many educational institutions and private corporations.

For several years now I have been particularly interested in what I have come to call the "education-poverty-industrial complex"—people and companies devoted to reaping profit from the nation's legitimate interest in education and welfare. What I have learned has not been encouraging. Studies made at my request by my staff and by the General Accounting Office have revealed serious irregularities in numerous areas. Over and over again, we have found educators enriching themselves at public expense through sizable consulting fees, often for work of which there is no record at all. Over and over again, we have found educational organizations taking money for work not done, for studies not performed, for analyses not prepared, for results not produced. Over and over again, we have found educators using public funds for research projects that have turned out to be esoteric, irrelevant, and often not even research.

Perhaps the precise nature of the problems we face today will be illuminated by a specific example of a case study from my office files. The example I have chosen is neither the best nor the worst of those studied to date; rather, it is quite average in many respects, and for this reason it serves quite well to help underline the deep systemic problems, not the unusual and extraordinary failures.

The case study outlined in the next section represents a total governmental outlay of some $60,000. This may seem a trivial amount by comparison with the billions spent by the Office of Education (OE), but in fact contracts of this size are typical of OE's operation. Consider the projects being funded by OE's National Center for Educational Research and Development (NCERD, formerly the Bureau of Research) in 1970. There was a total of 1,151 projects, as recorded in NCERD's massive directory for July 1970. This total broke down as follows: 368 projects in the under $10,000 range; 404 projects in the $10,000-$100,000 range; 318 projects in the $100,000-$1,000,000 range; and 61 projects in the over $1,000,000 range. From this it can be seen that a contract in the amount of $60,000 typifies a category of OE activity that is representative of OE-funded projects—a category that is, when added up, quite significant fiscally in the overall picture. Although the names of all parties concerned in the
case have been protected, all the details of the following story are true, and are based on data preserved in the NCERD files.

In the spring of 1968, what appears to have been an unsolicited project proposal was received by OE. It was submitted by Professor A. of New York through S.R., a private firm based in Washington, where the work was to be done. The idea was to study in a thorough and extensive manner the sociological aspects of one particular facet of higher education policy. The project was to extend from July 1968 to September 1969.

The basic point of the proposed study is explained in the opening paragraph of the proposal. Immediately thereafter, the basic weakness of the proposal is candidly exposed—to wit, the absence of a concrete plan:

We would like to stress at this point that many of the details of the following outline are necessarily tentative. They illustrate what we are after and the ways we shall proceed; many additional details, though, will have to be developed and others revised as our study progresses.

The proposal contains no background information at all, no context, no reference to other work, no methodology or plan, no curriculum vitae of the principal investigator (or anyone else). At the end, A. writes:

Our ultimate purpose is to provide information and analysis to serve the needs of policy makers...

Products:
1. A report... including background data and reasons for conclusions reached.
2. The training of a sociologist in educational research...

The aim is to give the government advice, via a report. The exact meaning of product 2, "the training of a sociologist in educational research," is nowhere explained or even referred to in the body of the proposal.

The total funds requested for the study come to about $70,000. (All figures are approximate.) Of this, $21,000 is for overhead, $3,000 for a fee. Salaries and benefits are to total $42,000, according to the following breakdown of effort: half time for the director (at a rate of $30,000/yr. for full time) and half time for a research associate (at a rate of $17,000/yr. for full time) for the period September 1968—September 1969, and consultant status for these two (sic!) for July and August 1968; half time for a secretary; full time for a junior research assistant. A., the director, is the only person identified by name.

The first reaction to this proposal must be one of puzzlement. There is a lot of broadly descriptive (and fairly simple-minded and obvious) material, but virtually no specifics; yet there is quite a price tag. What is it all about? The first reaction on file came from B.N. of OE, in a hastily written memorandum to D.O. It reads in
full: “B. and P. feel that the A. proposal is too expensive and see it in the $40-$50,000 range and not $70,000. Will you look it over to see how we can pare it down.” B. and P. are OE officials. They clearly have no problem at all with the product being bought, just a bit of a complaint about the price.

On that day, requests for evaluation were sent to two outside readers. The evaluations were returned within a few days. One recommended flat disapproval. The summary stated the case plainly:

I do not feel that this is a good study; nor is it a good proposal. Reason: The proposal does not specify the methodology, other than a broad and unbounded discussion of the several levels that may be influenced by a specific type of policy to assist higher education. . . . At best it is wordy, not focused, unspecific, and carries no measure of effectiveness as to how policy makers may choose. I can not approve a research proposal on the basis of hope. . . . I am not sure that the author is fully acquainted with the world of education. . . .

Under “Educational Significance,” the evaluator writes “Negative” and goes on to complain that “the proposal does not suggest any real familiarity with educational literature or recent experience with ESEA or HEA.” The comment on “Personnel and Facilities” reads: “No resume of personnel resources was attached. I have no way of knowing if the author is capable except on the basis of the proposal—which is very weak.” He finds the research design “very poor,” and the economic efficiency “extremely poor.”

The second evaluation came back with a recommendation for provisional approval. The summary is not too encouraging:

The applicant has identified an area of great importance to the future of American higher education, and is a highly creative investigator who can be expected to generate valuable insights. However, there are several areas of vagueness in the proposal—possibly due to necessary shortness of time in its preparation—which ought to be remedied before a formal award is made. I would propose the following modifications to be negotiated:

1. The applicant should satisfy the OE staff of his knowledge of existing materials in the area of inquiry. . . .
2. The caliber of the “Research Associate” should be specified to the satisfaction of the USOE staff. (Note, on p. 11, that one “product” is to be the “training of a sociologist in educational research.” At a salary of $17,000/yr., one would expect to hire someone who was already well trained!)
3. The “Fee” . . . should be eliminated from the budget or justified to the satisfaction of OE staff. . . .

The evaluator goes on to note that “the work envisioned here parallels recent developments within the Bureau of the Budget and the planning offices of the several federal agencies.” He finds the proposal “very vague on methodology.” He is concerned that “duplication of effort is to be avoided,” and notes that the proposal is silent
on this question, since “the applicant fails to relate his proposed study to similar work, in any explicit manner.” And again, he comments that the research design is “the weakest part of the proposal,” and that “the budget total strikes me as somewhat high.”

In light of all these criticisms, how could he recommend provisional approval? The answer lies in his comments under “Personnel and Facilities.” So great is the evaluator’s regard for A. that this outweighs his concern about the rest of the background support:

A. is an outstanding sociologist, highly imaginative, and a prolific worker. There should be some specification of the qualifications of the proposed Research Associate. The S.R. probably lacks library resources which would be required to relate the proposed work to relevant literature in the field. I would hope that creative computer people would be available within the S.R., to experiment with system simulation, but this hope isn’t directly justified by the contents of the proposal.

In mid-June, D.O. provided his opinion of the proposal, in an “in-house review.” As we learn from the various official forms, D.O. had been designated project officer for this study. On the question of educational significance, he had this to say:

The problem of policies for federal support of higher education is of top priority (see President’s Education Message); but I am not sure how much hard data this project would furnish on the problem as distinguished from intuitive and informed guesses.

He notes candidly that there is “no clear research design . . . no hypothesis, no experimental procedures, no reference to related research, no procedures described.” Also, he writes, under “Economic Efficiency”:

Cost higher than necessary. Do we need to “train a sociologist in educational research” at $17,000 a year? The “fee” . . . is unjustified when indirect costs . . . are incurred.

But despite these faults, he recommended approval. His reasoning is presented at the outset of the review:

This is not really a research proposal but a proposal to engage the services of a competent and inventive sociologist to forecast the “futures” of American higher education and patterns of federal support. It should be coordinated with the Secretary’s task force on strategies of support (e.g., Bob Berk) and Clark Kerr’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education.

And again, later. “This is a proposal essentially to fund a well-known sociologist to think about higher education.”

The sequence of events leading to the actual contract award bordered on comic opera. The Funding Approval Request originated by D.O. in mid-June—just two weeks before the end of the fiscal year deadline—obtained its final signature within a week; it
called for Fiscal Year 1968 funding in the total of $45,000 for this project. Where did the figure $45,000 come from? We shall never know. It certainly is not the amount requested by A., and there is no other document presenting a budget in that amount. The only plausible explanation relates to the memo from B.N. quoted above, calling for something "in the $40-$50,000 range"—$45,000 being right in the middle of the range. At any rate, for the time being, $45,000 was the magic figure. The Procurement Action Request executed in the last week of June also carried that figure, as did D.O.'s Schedule of Negotiable Items, which was entirely blank except for the total project cost, listed as $45,000, without any indication of how OE wanted S.R. to cut their proposal to that figure.

Apparently, despite all the effort, Fiscal 1968 was missed, so the procedure had to start all over again in July. A new Procurement Action Request was issued in early July, calling again for $45,000, but this time in Fiscal 1969 funds. Meanwhile, mid-July saw some negotiations between OE and S.R. We have some handwritten memos from that period discussing several issues, among which were the following: (1) The size of S.R.'s overhead rate; (2) the propriety of a fee (which, in the end, S.R. received); (3) the propriety of hiring a $17,000-a-year man for "training," an objection raised, as we saw, during the evaluations; (4) the propriety of paying the director in a consultant status during the summer; and (5) the "need for clerk and sec'y for 1 person."

Whatever the mechanism that finally did the trick, S.R. got the message, and produced a slightly reduced budget—a "revised cost estimate"—at the end of July. The covering letter explains that two reductions were involved: (1) the provisional overhead rate was dropped to 50 percent; (2) the junior research assistant's time was cut back drastically, from full time for the whole 15 months, to approximately one-fourth time. In this way, the budget was brought down to $55,000. Actually, the first reduction was a pure fiction, because a final overhead rate was to be established later, quite apart from the provisional rate, and the government would end up paying in full whatever the final overhead rate would turn out to be.

The end of July thus saw a $10,000 discrepancy between the $45,000 asked for in OE's Procurement Action Request and the revision downward to $55,000 offered by S.R. What was OE to do? It apparently never occurred to anybody to say to S.R., "Take the $45,000 or leave it." Instead, with no justification, the $10,000 was added, with the aid of a subterfuge. D.O. sent a memo to the Chief of the Contracts Division asking for the additional funds, with the following explanation:

Reason for the increase over amount authorized in original Procurement Action Request is that the overhead rate was inadvertently left out in the proposed budget when [NCERD] approved the proposal.

The absurdity of this explanation could have been revealed at a glance, since the sum requested had no relation at all to any overhead shown on any version of the proposal.
But no matter; it was an unimportant detail. A new request for the additional amount went out, and by the beginning of September, a contract was ready. Five days later, A. wrote OE the happy news that he was now in Washington at S.R., although the letter had to be signed by someone else “in Dr. A.’s absence”!

A disturbing note disrupts the peaceful progress of A.’s cogitation at OE expense. In September, one Dr. J. B. wrote OE asking for help and information regarding a study he had begun with OE funds on the same subject! There was obviously considerable overlap with A.’s work, although not one person involved with either project—in or out of OE—knew that the other was taking place! When the two projects had been funded, no one had checked to see whether there might be others doing the same thing! D.O.’s reply asked J.B. for a copy of his proposal and the names of his OE project officers. Apparently D.O. knew that he could get the information from J.B. more rapidly than he could extract it from the OE bureaucracy of which he himself was a part.

Such duplication, unfortunately, is far from unusual. Part of the problem is OE’s abysmal record system, which is virtually useless. Thus, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate information—or even sketchy information, for that matter—on such questions as what projects are currently being funded, what projects have recently been completed, what contractors or grantees hold which contracts or grants, etc. Part of the problem is OE’s incredibly complex—and ever-changing!—internal organization, which allows for numerous overlaps in authority and which seems to encourage random duplication in various fields.

To return to our narrative: The first progress report was submitted around the beginning of the new year and was quickly accepted by D.O. The report covered the first four months of work, about one third the total length of the project. The first paragraph told it all:

In line with our study design the first period of our research has largely involved 1) a preliminary survey of the literature, especially works which attempt to give an overall view of the higher education system, 2) acquaintance with the data base, and 3) refinement of the research design.

The word “preliminary” in (1) really meant just that, as we are told that “in the months that have elapsed . . . we have only been able to cover a small fraction of the literature on higher education . . . . We are increasingly focusing on literature that reports specific empirical findings relevant to our problem.”

Thus, very little had been accomplished, and most of the time had been spent in highly eclectic reading. What the staff was doing was not clear. Since there had been no research design in the first place, no one at OE could complain. But by the time a few months had passed, it had already become clear that A. was not necessarily a good choice even as a consultant, since he was barely acquainted
with the field—something that the proposal evaluators had warned about. It appears that the sociologist who was being "trained" in education research was A. himself!

The end of March 1969 brought the second progress report; the half-way point had already been reached. The three-page report repeatedly stressed how complex the problems are. The first paragraph again tells the essential story of what was going on:

Since the last progress report we have focused primarily on two tasks:

1) A relatively detailed survey of the current programs of federal assistance to higher education and the proposals for additional assistance, and the development of conceptual tools to facilitate their analysis.

2) Determining the probable consequences of "ideal-type" forms of aid for educational opportunity, and more generally social stratification.

It must have heartened OE personnel to learn that A. was at last becoming acquainted with the existing federal programs. But we do not find out very much about the kinds of "conceptual tools" that were being developed, or the "probable consequences" that were being looked at.

This report was so loose and chatty that it obviously got on D.O.'s nerves. By the end of April he had worked up the determination to do something; not, of course, anything substantive, because A. was being paid to do exactly what he was doing, as D.O. himself had pointed out in his evaluation of the proposal; but rather, something formal, to make things look better. D.O. sent A. a letter asking, in effect, that the format be cleaned up and formalized!

A. was, of course, happy to comply, and a week later the "new look" report was mailed back, prettier than the old one but containing the same information. A few new touches were added, as for example the assurance that "no special difficulties have been encountered. The project is well on its way, as planned." We also learn the following good news:

Professor A. will visit with Professor K., world renowned authority on higher education, [in Great Britain] to consult about our findings. No consulting fee is being charged by Professor K. and Professor A. will pay his own travel expenses.

This is an incredible paragraph: "Findings" that have never been revealed are alluded to; and we are assured that K. will not charge a fee for chatting with A., and that A. will not charge OE for this junket—as if this had been considered a possibility!

In mid-June of 1969, A. wrote a letter to OE containing two requests. The first of these was for an additional $6,000—"a small amount of supplementary funds"—to analyze data in the American Council on Education's newly operational data bank. Basically, the money was to pay for five weeks of a research analyst's time and two weeks of a programmer's time; for data processing; and for overhead and fee. There is no hint as to what kind of analysis is to be per-
formed, nor is there any research plan at all. The second request is for more time:

Secondly, it seems advisable to extend the period of analysis for three months. This would mean that the final report would be submitted December 31, 1969. This additional time is required primarily because of two factors. First of all the relevant empirical relationships already encountered are more complex than originally anticipated. Secondly, researchers have been much more active in this field in the last year than it was possible to anticipate when the proposal was submitted. To cite only two examples, both the Carnegie Commission (under Clark Kerr) and HEW (under Alice Rivlin) have conducted extensive studies in this area and presented far-ranging policy proposals. It has been necessary to spend a considerable amount of time analyzing and evaluating these and other efforts, and relating them to our own work. Finally the analysis of the additional data from the ACE discussed in point one will require some extra time, though the additional three months of analysis seems required, however, even if supplemental funds are not available for analysis of the ACE data.

The reasoning is ingenious. As we had already found out in the progress reports, A. was discovering the problems to be rather complex, something he just might have been expected to have known in advance. Also, as OE had been forewarned from the outset, A.'s study was not the only one in the field, to put it delicately, and his acquaintance with other work was minimal; so OE was paying him to find out what other people were doing, and now OE was being asked to extend the contract because A. had discovered that other people were doing a lot.

The June 30 progress report—mailed on June 27 (but in a project like this it could have been written almost any time)—repeated the substance of the above-cited letter, and reported a few developments. First, A. was slowly becoming more confident in his "tentative finding" that "federal aid—regardless of the form—aimed at enabling more lower-class high school graduates to attend college would generally have less impact on the societal stratification structure (in terms of social mobility roles) than is generally assumed." This hazy and almost meaningless platitude could hardly have left OE gasping with amazement at A.'s powers of analysis and insight.

Second, the report tells what A. had been doing with most of his time: He had, during the April 1-June 30 period, "focused primarily on estimating the effects of federal aid on stimulating racial equality." When one compares A.'s sweeping plans, as outlined in his proposal, with this rather limited perspective, it becomes very evident that he was not doing anything near what he had originally said he would do. By now, OE would probably have had no trouble cutting off further support of this abortive project, even given OE's loose management of it up to this point. But this was not to be.

A.'s request for more money and time must have rattled OE.
D.O. took his time and asked for more explanation of the proposed "analysis" of ACE's data, as well as for a breakdown of two budget items: the salary item of $1600 and the "data processing" item of $2800. A. replied to this inquiry in a letter giving no details at all about the analysis, but carrying on at some length about how important the analysis is. As for the budget items, which cover $4400 of the $6000 asked for, A. broke them down into line form without explaining why each item was actually necessary.

Apparantly it never occurred to anyone at OE to turn down A.'s request, so the extension and additional funds were granted. Another opéra-bouffe-style series of errors ensued in the course of this "small" additional award, which, by the time it was over, must have cost a few thousand dollars in wasted man-hours. We will omit the minute details, which are spelled out in the documents.

Even this was not yet the end. In December, A. wrote for another extension, to March 31, 1970. The delay was entirely due to the slowness of receiving the ACE data, according to A.; he expected everything to be done by February at "the latest," but he was "asking for a delay until the end of March just to be on the safe side." The request was duly processed and granted by OE "at no additional cost to the government."

The report finally arrived in March 1970. It is authored by A. and his associate M. The Office of Education is nowhere mentioned; a reader would not know that OE funds had supported the project. The "Acknowledgments" page does not mention OE or a single person associated with OE or with the government.

What OE got was a very, very long (and wordy) essay, very, very short on hard data. At first sight, it looks as if OE got what it paid for: the thoughts of A. on the subject at hand. A closer look, however, reveals something very different. To begin with, we find out that Part I was written by M., not A. (though we are assured that A. "freely exchanged ideas" with M., whatever that means). Now, Part I of the report is 191 pages long, more than half of the whole. It is to be questioned whether OE would have spent the money had it known that half the product was to be, after all, M.'s thoughts on the subject.

But at least M.'s thoughts are on the subject of the study! A.'s thoughts, on the other hand, as presented in the last 146 pages—some of which happened to be written by other people—are not on the subject of the contract at all. As it turned out, OE was subsidizing A., and a regal support staff, to do whatever A. pleased during—and quite a bit after—the year 1968-1969. There is no record of any evaluation of the final report. A form letter from D.O., sent in June, accepted the report and approved final payment.

This relatively modest case points up many of the specific problems we have earlier mentioned in general terms. On the government side, no one was really clear where the proposed study belonged, whether it should be made, or what program it properly fitted into. Over a dozen OE officials were involved at one point or
another, but they were not in contact with each other on a regular basis and could not coordinate their activities. Errors and oversights were frequent. There were no clear guidelines concerning proper budgetary supervision or technical supervision, nor were there policies governing use of whatever findings might be produced. All in all, one gets the feeling that the Office of Education was hopelessly unaware of what the project was really all about, and had no mechanisms for keeping abreast of what was going on.

On the contractor's side, all the dilemmas are in evidence, albeit in miniature. What overhead and fee, if any, are appropriate? How is the value of thinking power to be measured? What is the line between flexibility and misrepresentation? When is a company performing a service, and when is it taking the government for a ride?

The problems encountered in the case I have just presented are by no means unusual. One company we have studied, a well-known private educational consulting firm, received over a million dollars' worth of contracts from the Office of Education and other federal agencies in about two years' time. What makes this statistic so significant is the fact that at the outset of this period, the company was doing business at a total rate of only $250,000 a year from all sources and had only one full-time professional employee! Naturally, this firm expanded rapidly and was helped in the process by an ingenious device; several proposals would be filed simultaneously, and the same names would appear on the various proposals as the investigators and researchers. As the proposals were funded, money became available to hire new staff with the excess over 100 per cent of any given person's time when the contributions from the various projects were added up.

Another firm we have looked into made a practice of submitting proposals with virtually no research design. This would make it difficult for OE personnel to know exactly what was to be expected in the project, and hence impossible for the government to monitor what was going on. Another regular practice of this firm was to promise mountains of data and accompanying analyses, and then to submit only the raw data, in the form of thousands and thousands of sheets of computer printouts. Since data in this form are virtually useless, the firm was then in a position to ask for additional funds for the analyses, and these funds would invariably be granted by a helpless and gullible OE. Although this happened repeatedly, no one at OE caught on to the pattern, and the firm enjoyed, and still enjoys, an excellent reputation.

Time and time again, firms have displayed a total disregard of deadlines and complete indifference to the importance of delivering results on time. In instance after instance, firms have asked for, and received, fees in addition to overhead charges, on the pretext that these fees were necessary to stimulate corporate stability and growth—as if these considerations are relevant to OE contracts and grants. Over and over, a project would be escalated into a far bigger activity than originally proposed or planned, with vast additional funds being allocated by OE through a non-competitive, non-reviewed
amendment procedure rather than through the normal process of funding approval. In one case we have studied, a project that OE thought might cost $75,000 was funded at $140,135 and was escalated through a series of amendments to $416,743—and it is still alive!

All the problems are by no means concentrated on the side of the contractor or grantee. The Office of Education, as provider of the funds and as the public agent responsible for their proper use, has plenty of its own problems. Our case studies are beginning to uncover a broad pattern of defective management throughout all phases of OE's activities—a dismal pattern that has been glimpsed in part by other study panels, but is only now being revealed in its full impact. Consider, for example, the following partial list of defects that we have uncovered in OE's handling of contracts and grants during the pre-award period alone:

(1) Pre-arrangement seems to be the rule rather than the exception, in consideration of potential contractors and grantees. However an idea originates, it is apparently common practice for OE to discuss a project extensively with a favored award recipient, and to work out some sort of plan for proceeding. When this is done, the formalities are then instituted as an afterthought.

(2) The intent of Congress is often disregarded by OE. Awards are often made with hardly a glance at the legislative intent of the program that has been authorized by Congress. It sometimes seems as if OE considers the total funds appropriated by Congress in any fiscal year as a big pool on which OE can draw at will for whatever programs it sees fit to fund.

(3) Another failing prevalent in the early states of OE projects is the absence of carefully conceived specifications, work plans, or research designs. This failing is evident both in OE-originated projects, where it is a critical flaw, and in outside-originated projects which have been discussed in advance with OE personnel.

(4) Yet another virtually universal problem in proposals is the unavailability of solid budget information, a lack which OE does nothing to remedy. It is as if the very concept of budget justification is entirely alien to OE. The budgets are almost always descriptive line-item affairs presenting totals, with hardly a thought given to explaining why the particular item is necessary or how the money will be used to further the project. Indeed, we have seen many instances where the line-item description does not even correspond to the verbal description given in the text of the proposal! OE virtually never attempts to clarify the budget or force an adequate explanation prior to the award.

(5) Evaluation procedures are slipshod and erratic. Sometimes there is no evaluation at all. Sometimes there are a few in-house evaluations. Sometimes there are a few outside evaluations. There seems to be no rhyme or reason to the process, no pattern at all. But worst of all, OE has no discernible policy concerning what ought to be done with an evaluation once they get it. There seems to be
no connection at all between the content of evaluations and further subsequent actions by OE.

(6) A particularly disturbing feature of the award procedure is the seeming determination of OE to spend all the money that has been appropriated. In the few cases where contracts are put out for bids, it is a foregone conclusion that someone will get the award, even if no one has submitted a really satisfactory proposal. Similarly, when pre-arranged proposals come in, there is an almost inexorable drive to fund them, regardless of their defects. All this becomes even more evident as the end of the fiscal year approaches, when more and more projects are frenetically rushed through in order to commit all available funds. No one at OE seems to feel that Congressional appropriations are (except where otherwise indicated, in explicit language) upper ceilings on permissible expenditures, and that public moneys should not be spent on unworthy projects.

The defects listed above form but a small part of the whole picture. Many additional problems arise during the award period and after the project is completed. What we are finding is the simple absence of good management, or virtually any management at all, at OE. The implications of this situation are truly staggering when one contemplates the important, indeed central, role that OE plays in the educational affairs of virtually every community in the nation.

The first major set of questions must relate to the structure of the federal government. We must ask candidly and repeatedly: What form of agency and departmental organization can best serve the needs of our government today? What overlapping jurisdictions need to be separated, what conflicting authorities have to be resolved? What principles of management must be introduced to ensure that public funds are being spent in a reasonable manner? These questions are only beginning to be asked now, and they are scarcely being posed with the sense of urgency that the situation calls for. Unless they are asked and answered soon, we will be engulfed and overburdened with a runaway federal program—a diverse, overlapping, unplanned, confusing array of governmental efforts whose faults are beyond remedy and whose abuses are beyond belief.

The second major set of questions centers upon the rampant commercialism that threatens to dominate the educational scene. Will the lucrative contract or grant become the new mark of academic success, to replace the traditional measures of teaching skill, scholarship, and humanity? Will the high fee be tomorrow’s school prize? Will the wisdom of educators be turned to outfoxing government agencies and finding ways to make short deliveries on long promises, instead of being turned to shortening the path to truth? Will the educator devote his energies to luring the government into surrendering funds, instead of pursuing his scholarly and pedagogical interests? The whole question of the relation of profits to social betterment must be examined. It is not simply, “Are profits in this area bad?” but, “What should profits in this area look
like? Which are acceptable and which are not acceptable? What are we getting for our money?"

There is no doubt that much value can be realized by the efforts of private companies and individual investigators. The private sector is richly populated with those who honestly offer the service of their companies in the solution of social problems feeling that they can do it better because they know better, and feeling also that they can make a legitimate profit and feel comfortable about it because the results really have produced a better society in some respect, no matter how small.

We should not allow ourselves to be deluded by the categorization of companies into "profit-making" and "non-profit." Sometimes we act as if "non-profit" organizations are morally superior because somehow they are doing the job out of some high moral ideal—as if somehow it were immoral to make a profit. In fact, any organization has to receive enough income to cover its outgo, or it goes out of business. The only real difference between corporations usually classified as "profit-making" and those classified as "non-profit" is that the former require a profit as a return on equity advanced by stockholders in the form of money, while the latter require a "profit" as return on equity advanced by members in the form of skills. In a corporation a profit is distributed as dividends to the stockholders; in a non-profit association a profit is distributed to the controlling members as increased salaries, or in the form of other fringe benefits and improvements.

To summarize, then, there are two central concepts involved here: (1) the inefficiency, confusion, waste, breakdown, and corruption (active or passive) of the federal bureaucracy; (2) the inefficiency, confusion, waste, breakdown, and corruption (active or passive) of the private technocratic bureaucracy. And the big questions before us are the following:

1. What can Congress and the people honestly expect from big business, or from the federal agencies, in answering social needs?
2. What price are we willing to pay private industry for its expertise?
3. How richly are we willing to subsidize the development of expertise? How do we gauge what is fair here?
4. How do we identify industrial parasites when they surface and how might we control their growth?
5. What are some parallels in the development of the "rampant rise in commercialism" on the part of professional educators and the rise of the profiteers in the poverty-education arena who are in private industry? Is there a connection between the two?

These questions cry for answers. Soon. Before education is taken irreversibly out of the hands of educators and placed in the hands of managers and entrepreneurs.
American Catholics—making it or losing it?

ANDREW M. GREELEY

In years to come, it seems very likely that historians will shake their heads in disbelief over many of the events that occurred between 1960 and 1975. Among the things which will dismay them is the fact that during the era when Americans became concerned to the point of obsession about minority groups—Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, blacks, American Indians, Appalachian whites, homosexuals, prisoners, old people—there was virtually no interest shown in our largest minority group, Roman Catholics.

Defense attorneys pleading the case for our era before the tribunal of history will argue that there was no reason to be concerned about Catholics, because “the Catholic problem” was solved in 1960 when John Kennedy was elected to the presidency. The prosecuting attorneys will respond—after noting that Kennedy won by only a little over a hundred thousand votes—that there was, after all, not much real evidence that the Catholic problem was solved in the 1960’s; and even if it had been, the acculturation of the Catholic immigrants, or at least the acceptance of the immigrants and their offspring by the larger society, ought to have been a phenomenon of major importance to those who sought to understand the strengths and the weaknesses, the mechanisms and the processes of the American republic.

The only answering plea available is that in the 1960’s and the early
1970's nobody was really much interested in understanding how the American republic worked. Indicting, denouncing, and raging were thought to be suitable alternatives to understanding. To admit that the acculturation of Catholics was something worth investigating would have been to admit that something good could have happened in American society. It would also, perhaps, have been to admit that from the past successes of American society something might be learned about dealing with present problems. But this latter admission would have required a pragmatic stance in an era when only an apocalyptic stance was thought to be legitimate.

Yet the facts of the case are striking. Roman Catholics form slightly over one quarter of the American population. They are concentrated to a considerable extent in cities in the northeast and north central parts of the country, where they are frequently close to, if not in excess of, one half the population. Most Catholics came to America as rather unwelcome immigrants—poor, uneducated, and ignorant of the language, customs, and styles of the new country. They were originally viewed by the larger society as superstitious, inferior, and, frequently, uneducable, and they have long been the objects of intensive nativist prejudice, which denied Al Smith the presidency, almost denied it to John Kennedy, and, as I will argue in this paper, has not yet dissipated altogether. Yet notwithstanding substantial pressure and a not inconsiderable social disadvantage, most Catholics have maintained an intense loyalty to the Church of Rome (even though at this point in time it is less clear exactly what the Church of Rome stands for than it was a decade ago).

The facts stated above are common knowledge. What is less well known is that Catholics, despite the barriers of history, culture, and religion, have now “made it” in American society. Catholics under 40 are as likely to be college graduates and to be economically successful as are comparable American Protestants. In addition, as the recent

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1It is generally thought that the Irish were an exception to this because they at least knew the language. However, as Professor Emmet Larkin has pointed out to me, large numbers, quite possibly a majority, of the Famine Irish were Irish-speaking rather than English-speaking. The Irish language died out as the first language in the west of Ireland—whence came most of the Famine immigrants—only after 1850. There is little doubt that by 1870 most of the Irish immigrants spoke English as their first language, but the earliest immigrants were not only uneducated, contentious, terribly impoverished people; many of them probably could not speak English with any degree of fluency.

2That is to say, Protestants whose geographic distribution is similar to that of Catholics. It is inappropriate to compare Catholics with the general Protestant population because so many American Protestants are southern and rural that the general “score” of Protestants on socio-economic indicators is substantially lower than that of the largely urban Catholics.
research of Lipset and Ladd has demonstrated, Catholics have even begun to “make it” in the sheltered groves of the academy: Approximately one fifth of the faculty members under 30 at elite colleges and universities are Catholic. Another interesting bit of evidence is that in 1960 one quarter of the nation’s college students were Catholics; today one third are—a fantastic shift in a brief period of time.

Although there are such unmistakable indications that a dramatic change has occurred in the social status of the Catholic population in the last 20 years, virtually nothing is known about the dynamics of this change and even less is known about its differential impact on the various components of the Catholic population. In other words, an extraordinary phenomenon has taken place in American society in the last two decades, having a major effect on one quarter of the population, and yet few people are even aware of its occurrence, only a handful have tentative explanations for why it happened, and the overwhelming majority of the American intelligentsia are not even remotely interested.

In the shadow of the Church

There is, of course, great interest in the Roman Catholic Church. While the Church has not been very impressive in its spiritual capacity, it has been splendid theater and, as such, has managed to get front page coverage in the New York Times and most of the other papers in the country with greater frequency than any other religious body. In fact, one can encounter at any major university social science professors who consider themselves experts on Catholicism because they regularly follow Church politics in the popular press. Yet, when one gently suggests that most of the change in the Church’s organization is not so much the result of the Vatican Council as its cause, and that in the last 20 years there have been profound, pervasive, and dramatic changes in the Catholic population which have had nothing to do with Daniel Berrigan, John XXIII, or John Kennedy, these learned social scientists look mystified.

Their mystification is understandable, for the image of Catholicism has been, and to a considerable extent still is, that of a massive monolith. Word comes down from Rome through the Vatican Council that now is the time to be flexible, and we become flexible as all hell. That changes could go on in the Catholic population which influence the Church as an organization far more than the Church influences the population is contrary to what most social scientists, deep down in their consciousness, know to be true about Catholicism.
These kinds of preconceptions for the most part are allowed to go unchallenged. There is little serious research being done on American Catholics, either by Catholic scholars or by others. If one approaches government or private funding agencies with the suggestion that something fascinating and perhaps very important has happened in American society in the acculturation of the Catholic population and that major research projects are in order, one is greeted with an expression that suggests one ought to consult a competent therapist or perhaps retire to a monastery for prolonged prayer and contemplation. More recently, it has become possible to do research on “ethnics,” but the implication of most of the research on ethnicity is that ethnics are a “problem.” When one discovers that the ethnics are not really discontented at all and are still the backbone of the American liberal coalition, the reaction in many quarters is a mixture of disbelief and the feeling that, well, after all, there’s not much left to study about them.

Yet the relative contentment of the Catholic population is in itself a noteworthy phenomenon which reveals a great deal about our nation. For the success of American Catholics is less a credit to Catholics themselves (though it obviously does them some credit, one supposes) than to American society. Even though native Americans did not like Catholics and were not especially pleased at their arrival, they let them into the country and permitted them to become part of it. This is a fact which most Americans, intellectuals or not, take for granted, but one realizes how astonishing it is when one looks beyond the borders of our republic.

The success of pluralism in America

The plight of the Italian and Yugoslav “guest workers” in countries like Austria, Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden, of the Algerians in France, and of the Indians and Pakistanis in England makes it quite clear that none of these allegedly enlightened and progressive European societies are at all willing to tolerate ethnic diversity. The guest workers are not permitted to become citizens, or if they are, it is only after many serious obstacles are overcome. More important, the opposition to their becoming part of the culture of the society where they are working is such that in many cases they are not even permit-

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2In its views on most items of current political and social interest, the Catholic population is substantially to the left of the comparable American population as a whole. Irish Catholics are second only to Jews in their scores on indicators of political and social “liberalism.”
tied to bring their families with them. The guest worker is the European equivalent of the *bracero*, who comes for a year or two to work in the host country and then returns to his own family and culture. His labor is wanted, but he and his family are not. They are considered a threat to the purity of the host culture.

Perhaps the enlightened and progressive European social democracies should not be criticized too strongly for such behavior. After all, such exclusiveness has been typical of most societies throughout human history. Suspicion of the foreigner—even if he lives just across the river—is much more typical than an enlightened pluralism which not only permits the foreigner to cross the river but welcomes him. But the most striking point about comparisons of the American attitude towards cultural pluralism and, let us say, the German or the Swedish is that they are rarely if ever made. I am unaware of a single American scholar who has pointed out, perhaps with some modest pride, that the United States did, after all, let the immigrants in and, however grudgingly, did permit them to become full-fledged Americans. As the record of the human race in dealing with diversity goes, this is no small achievement.

The Catholic immigrants (Jewish immigrants too, for that matter) were accepted as potential Americans and were given the opportunity to practice their faith and maintain their own identity—at least up to a point. All the pressures on them were, of course, assimilationist, despite occasional nods to the ideal of cultural pluralism. But the assimilationist pressures were relatively gentle and did not prevent the persistency of unofficial cultural pluralism. You could, after all, "make it" in the United States and remain a Catholic. You could not make it everywhere (and you still can't), but you could in most places and, indeed, you might be rather strongly urged to try.

The easy Marxist explanation for this is that the United States desperately needed unskilled workers as the economy expanded. But Sweden and Germany need unskilled workers today, too, which is precisely why they bring in Italian and Yugoslav immigrants. A more sophisticated Marxism would contend that the rapid economic, technical, and territorial expansion of American society made it economically profitable for American capitalism to try to absorb the immigrant groups. But all this argument proves is that it was economically profitable to let the immigrants in. There were no particular *economic* reasons to let them move to the suburbs, much less to let one of them become president of the United States.

The truth of the matter is that we don't really know why a country
whose citizens until 1820 were so predominantly white Protestant was able in a relatively short span of time to become one of the most pluralistic societies the world has ever known—so pluralistic that one may suppose that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison would have feared for the country's survival if they had known it was going to happen. Nor do we have any clear idea why there has been relatively so little violence as the tremendously diverse groups in American life adjusted to one another. There has been only one Civil War, and that was fought essentially between two Anglo-Saxon groups. In other words, if one wishes to understand the relative success of American pluralism, the acculturation of the Catholic population ought to be a fascinating and informative test case. Alas, no one seems interested.

My own hunch is that the native Americans became pluralists in spite of themselves, because they were caught in an ideology which legitimated pluralism. Much of the writing about the founding of the American republic stresses the geographic and economic diversity of the various states. But if one reads the documents of the time, one becomes aware that the states were also denominationally diverse and that the founding fathers had to cope with a Congregationalist New England, a Quaker Pennsylvania, an Episcopalian Virginia, and a Free Church Georgia. Indeed, the country was denominationally pluralistic before it became politically pluralistic. The republic had to establish structures flexible enough to include Boston Congregationalists and Unitarians, Virginia Anglicans, Georgia Methodists, and backwoods Baptists; hence it was ill-equipped both ideologically and structurally to say "no" when Irish Catholics arrived on the scene. And once it had let in Irish Catholics, it was too late to refuse the Poles and

4Professor Arthur Mann has pointed out to me that at the time of the Constitutional Convention one half of the non-Indian population of the United States was Anglo-Saxon, one fourth was non-Anglo-Saxon white—mostly the so-called Scotch Irish (they did not call themselves this at the time) and Palatinate Germans—and one fourth was black.

According to Professors Ronald Greene and Albert Outler, there were really four different groups of Irish migrations to the United States—the Ulster Irish, mostly before 1800; the Celtic Protestants (mostly townsfolk who had converted to Protestantism during the penal times in Ireland), most of whom came through Philadelphia to the South; the German Irish (Palatinate Germans who had dwelled in Ulster for a time before migrating to the Colonies), who also settled mostly in the South and were active in the beginnings of Methodism; and finally the "mere Irish," who began to come in considerable numbers after 1820 and in very great numbers at the time of the Famine. It was to distinguish themselves from the "mere Irish" that the Ulster Irish (who had previously called themselves "Irish" and had founded St. Patrick societies) began to use the term "Scotch-Irish" which others had attached to them. It is interesting to note that in national sample surveys more American Protestants than Catholics claim Irish national backgrounds.
the Italians. The "American dilemma" that Gunner Myrdal saw in white attitudes towards blacks was merely one instance of a larger American dilemma: Native Americans did not particularly like diversity, but their ideology gave them little option in the matter.

"The Americanization process"

One can make some educated guesses as to why the Catholic immigrants were tolerated and even encouraged to become full-fledged Americans. One can say much less, however, about the dynamics of "the Americanization process." The official model has assumed that the individual immigrant and his children and grandchildren learned the language, went to school, worked hard, and eventually became "as American as anyone else." But this official model ignores the fact that the mobility of the Catholic populations has been a group mobility: The Germans, the Irish, and now the Italians and the Poles have made it into the upper-middle class as collectivities, and ethnic and cultural diversity continues to flourish in the upper-middle-class suburbs. The Irish are still Irish, Italians still Italians, Poles still Poles.

Unquestionably, there was a good deal of individual effort at education and achievement, but it now seems probable that this effort went on within a context of important group processes that we only dimly understand. First of all, there was the "internal mobility pyramid": One can become a success in American society, as Peter Rossi has observed, by serving the members of one's own constituency—not merely as a politician but as a doctor, lawyer, dentist, psychiatrist, undertaker, construction contractor, or clergyman. While it is possible to fall into a mobility trap—the Italian surgeon who makes it as the number one surgeon in the Italian community has little prestige in the non-Italian medical profession—even those who are caught there enjoy considerable economic success with all the material accoutrements that come with it. The Mafia don or the corrupt Irish politician may not be able to get his daughters into the elite debutante ball, but his home, automobile, and clothes will compare favorably with those of the native American elite. And from his point of view, that may be all that matters.

Second, in the large cities there are networks of intra-group client-professional relationships. The Italian doctor sees an Italian lawyer when he wants legal advice, both of them have their expensive suburban homes built by an Italian contractor, and all of them vote for an Italian political leader to represent the interests of their community at city hall or the state house. Thus an exchange of goods and serv-
ices goes on within the religio-ethnic collectivity which may well have a multiplier effect in contributing to the economic well-being of this community as a whole.

Finally, there is the process of group conflict, a process symbolized by the balanced political ticket but which also includes much broader areas of contention over homes, neighborhoods, schools, churches, and jobs. Again, what is astonishing is not that this group conflict persists, but that it so rarely turns into violence. A whole series of rituals and protocols have been devised which enable American groups to keep their disputes at the level of rhetoric while working out adjustments and accommodations more or less responsive to their respective power in the particular context. I sometimes wonder if the ritualized conflict of collective bargaining isn't merely a formalization of a much more general process that goes on in many different types of group conflict situations in American society.

Obviously, my comments on these three modalities of "group mobility" can only be the sheerest sort of speculation, for no one has bothered to devote the time or energy or research resources necessary to move beyond speculation. The conventional wisdom suggests that if Catholics have made it in American society (the conventional wisdom is still somewhat dubious about the fact), it is because they have worked hard and because native Americans have been gracious enough to reward them for it. Catholics have indeed worked hard, and the native Americans have grudgingly been willing to accept them; but no one who thinks seriously about American cities for very long will believe that this is the whole story.

Nor should it be assumed that the price the immigrants and their children and grandchildren have had to pay has been a small one. There is much that the ordinary American Catholic has given up. As one of my students commented recently in a discussion of the splendor, ingenuity, precision, and wit of political rhetoric in the Republic of Ireland, "It is a long way from West Clare to Bridgeport." The poetry, music, wit, mysticism, and passion of Celtic culture at its best has been lost by most of the American Irish, and that is a considerable loss for them and for the rest of American society too. Similarly, the cultural riches of the other ethnic communities are still locked up within the ethnic neighborhoods and are not shared with the rest of society, in part because the nativist American doesn't

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5The Bridgeport in question is not the city in Connecticut but that district on the south side of Chicago whence came Chicago's last several mayors. Mr. Daley's malapropisms would be terribly embarrassing in the Dail in Dublin. His political skills, however, might be appreciated in that worthy parliamentary body.
think there are any such riches and in part because the ethnic communities are afraid to share them for fear of being ridiculed. The example of the American Jews, who have made immense contributions to the common culture, has not been successfully imitated by other groups (with the possible exception of the blacks). The Irish, and probably the Germans, have abandoned their folk heritage; the Italians, the Poles, and the other Eastern European groups keep theirs carefully hidden. This is a misfortune, it seems to me, for all concerned.

The acceptance—indeed the encouragement—by elite Americans of cultural pluralism for blacks has probably legitimated cultural pride for the white ethnic groups; but it is too late for the Irish⁶, and it is not clear whether the elite groups in the society are willing to take seriously the possibility that Poles and Italians have something important and valuable to contribute to the rest of American culture.

The Catholic ethnics have not stopped being Catholic ethnics. Our research data would indicate, though, that to a considerable extent they are ethnic only in an implicit and frequently unconscious way. Behavior characteristics, attitudinal constellations, relational styles persist without awareness on the part of many Catholic ethnics that their behavior is different from that of others in the society. This forced repression of diversity, while perhaps a small enough price to pay for admission into American society, is nonetheless unfortunate both for the people involved and for the rest of the country. The present writer can hardly be optimistic about any dramatic changes in this area. When the New York Review of Books becomes as enthusiastic about Polish-American writers as about black-American writers, then the new fashion of cultural pluralism ought to be taken seriously indeed—but not until then.

The Catholic intellectuals

The problem for the Catholic intelligentsia is much more serious, because intellectuals by their very nature cannot, like most of the rest of the Catholic population, spend most of their time with their fellow Catholics. They must interact with the mainstream intelligentsia if they are to achieve any prestige at all. And if they are to be accepted by the mainstream intelligentsia, they must, if anything, overacculturate. Just as rank-and-file American Catholics had to be-

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⁶I personally don't believe that it is too late for the Irish, but the only way to make an Irishman do anything is to tell him that it's already too late.
come super-patriots (and assist Mr. Moynihan's Fordham man in his investigation of Harvard men), so Catholic intellectuals who wish to make it must become almost caricatures of the ideal types of American intelligentsia. Being a Catholic is no longer, I think, an obstacle to acceptance among intellectual elites, so long as you are the "right kind" of Catholic—not too pushy, not too militant, in other words, not too Catholic. I recently remarked to a colleague concerning some implacable enemies of mine on the university campus, "When I first came here they were very friendly."

"Sure," he replied, "they were friendly then because they thought of you as a possible deserter. When they found out that you weren't, you could hardly expect them to keep on being friendly."

It is all right, then, to be a Catholic priest at the University of Chicago, though it is probably more acceptable if you are an ex-priest; but to be a priest who has no intention of turning away from his own heritage, who, on the contrary, rather enjoys being a part of that heritage, is to make yourself very unpopular. As one social scientist remarked about me during a recent unsuccessful campaign by some of my colleagues to get me a certain position, "He's nothing but a loudmouthed Irish priest." I hope that phrase ends up on my gravestone, but the man who spoke it certainly did not intend it as a compliment.

No one who has spent any time in the upper echelons of the American academy and is sensitive to the nuances of acceptance and rejection can doubt that to be an active, committed Roman Catholic is to be thought a very queer fish indeed. The anti-Catholicism of the upper academy is subtle and frequently unconscious, but it is pervasive nonetheless. It cannot be explained away simply by denying that it exists, for, of course, if there is one thing we have learned recently about prejudice, it is that the unconscious kinds of sexism and racism are the worst. And the same is true of unconscious or barely conscious anti-Catholicism.

I recently heard it seriously argued at a national symposium that although the absence of blacks and women from upper-level faculty positions at the great universities was a sign of discrimination, the absence of Catholics was merely a sign of their intellectual inferiority. Nobody in the audience stirred in the slightest at such an incredible assertion. If there is any concern in American universities about the absence of Catholic presidents, deans, department chairmen, and full professors, it is one that has been very well hidden; and if the elite universities are concerned about the absence of Polish and Italian students in their undergraduate and graduate programs, they
have not let it get too far out of their presidential offices or faculty clubs. If there is anyone who wonders whether graduates of Catholic liberal arts colleges are given fair treatment by graduate school admissions committees (and in my experience they are not), this wonder has been spoken only in whispers. Finally, in the whole lengthy debate about the absence of Catholics in intellectual life, I am unaware of a single writer (myself included, incidentally) who ever questioned whether one of the reasons for this absence might be a subtle anti-Catholic bias in the academy. Strange behavior indeed for a profession that prides itself on questioning all assumptions.

Younger Catholic scholars, almost by sheer weight of numbers, have now made it into the academy, and, as data from the recent Carnegie research on college faculty indicate, they are publishing articles and obtaining tenure in the same proportion as Protestants. The academy can heave a sigh of relief: Catholics have finally become bright enough and intellectual enough to merit entrance—but of course they are not yet bright enough or intellectual enough to merit prestige appointments, deanships, chairmanships, and university presidencies. What disturbs me about all this is not that the exclusion of Catholics from such positions is necessarily the result of bigotry (for it may very well be that a later phase of the acculturation process will be required before there will be enough Catholics to occupy such positions), it is the complacent assumption that bigotry couldn't possibly play a part in the situation. Anyone who knows anything about the human condition knows that a Ph.D., a full professorship, or a deanship does not necessarily contribute anything at all to the development of toleration or the enjoyment of diversity. I begin to believe that any group of human beings may not be biased on that day when they begin to examine seriously the possibility that they are biased.

The limits of cultural pluralism

But the Catholic intellectual is not only required to be something less than committed to his Catholicism if he wants full acceptance; he also should not become too concerned about the explicit study of Catholic matters. He will probably be disinclined to do this, in any case, because it involved considerable emotional stress for him to break out of the Catholic subculture and move into the larger society. When someone suggests to him that something in that subculture might be worth analyzing and interpreting for the rest of society, he is not particularly disposed to take such advice seriously.
Thus, among the official American Catholic intelligentsia, only Michael Novak has shown much concern about the new interest in ethnicity and cultural pluralism. When you have just left the ghetto behind, it is difficult to believe that you ought to go back into it to administer a questionnaire or to write a novel that implies something good might be going on there.

There is, then, not the slightest chance of the emergence of a Catholic militancy or pride. Such attitudes will occur in any group only when the larger society legitimates it. The larger society is not about to say to Poles (as it has said to blacks), “Why aren’t you militant and proud?” Until the day comes when the American elites begin to demand pride and militancy from Polish and Italian and, yes, even Irish intellectuals, the Catholic intelligentsia will remain a very tame and docile crew, taking out its frustrations by flailing away at the hapless and incompetent ecclesiastical authority structure, which hasn’t been able to mobilize its resources to do a great deal of harm to anybody for most of the last decade.

One of my Jewish colleagues put his finger on the whole problem when he said, “The difference between the Jews and you Irish is that we know that we have a self-hatred problem, take it into account, and even occasionally turn it to profit in our literature.” The problem may be aggravated by the fact that, while it’s pretty hard for Jewish novelists and intellectuals to become very angry at their rabbis, the Irish intelligentsia, for reasons far beyond the scope of this essay, find it difficult to control their ambivalent feelings towards priests.

The larger American elite culture is at present willing to tolerate a Catholic intelligentsia as long as its Catholicism is quiet, restrained, and devoid of all militancy and enthusiasm. One may, of course, wonder whether such an intelligentsia is really Catholic at all.

In this respect, the treatment accorded Catholics by the American intellectual community is in no way unique. Jews, for example, have undoubtedly achieved a central role in American intellectual life. But where among our leading intellectual figures is there an Orthodox Jew? The situation of blacks merely represents the opposite side of this same coin. Black pride has been granted the intellectuals’ seal of approval—so black militants are immediately welcomed, but black moderates are ignored. The “diversity” of American intellectual life extends no farther than the prevailing ideological climate will allow. Pluralism seems to be much less successful in our universities than in our politics. So while the Catholic ethnics may have “made it” in socio-economic terms, their intellectual and cultural traditions continue to be despised or ignored by most of the American intelligentsia.
Up and down with ecology—
the “issue-attention cycle”

ANTHONY DOWNS

A
erican public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon any one domestic issue for very long—even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to society. Instead, a systematic “issue-attention cycle” seems strongly to influence public attitudes and behavior concerning most key domestic problems. Each of these problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then—though still largely unresolved—gradually fades from the center of public attention. A study of the way this cycle operates provides insights into how long public attention is likely to remain sufficiently focused upon any given issue to generate enough political pressure to cause effective change.

The shaping of American attitudes toward improving the quality of our environment provides both an example and a potential test of this “issue-attention cycle.” In the past few years, there has been a remarkably widespread upsurge of interest in the quality of our environment. This change in public attitudes has been much faster than any changes in the environment itself. What has caused this shift in public attention? Why did this issue suddenly assume so high a priority among our domestic concerns? And how long will the American public sustain high-intensity interest in ecological mat-
The dynamics of the "issue-attention cycle"

Public perception of most "crises" in American domestic life does not reflect changes in real conditions as much as it reflects the operation of a systematic cycle of heightening public interest and then increasing boredom with major issues. This "issue-attention cycle" is rooted both in the nature of certain domestic problems and in the way major communications media interact with the public. The cycle itself has five stages, which may vary in duration depending upon the particular issue involved, but which almost always occur in the following sequence:

1. **The pre-problem stage.** This prevails when some highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet captured much public attention, even though some experts or interest groups may already be alarmed by it. *Usually, objective conditions regarding the problem are far worse during the pre-problem stage than they are by the time the public becomes interested in it.* For example, this was true of racism, poverty, and malnutrition in the United States.

2. **Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm.** As a result of some dramatic series of events (like the ghetto riots in 1965 to 1967), or for other reasons, the public suddenly becomes both aware of and alarmed about the evils of a particular problem. This alarmed discovery is invariably accompanied by euphoric enthusiasm about society's ability to "solve this problem" or "do something effective" within a relatively short time. The combination of alarm and confidence results in part from the strong public pressure in America for political leaders to claim that every problem can be "solved." This outlook is rooted in the great American tradition of optimistically viewing most obstacles to social progress as external to the structure of society itself. The implication is that every obstacle can be eliminated and every problem solved *without any fundamental reordering of society itself,* if only we devote sufficient effort to it. In older and perhaps wiser cultures, there is an underlying sense of irony or even pessimism which springs from a widespread and often confirmed belief that many problems cannot be "solved" *at all* in any complete sense. Only recently has this more pessimistic view begun to develop in our culture.

3. **Realizing the cost of significant progress.** The third stage consists of a gradually spreading realization that the cost of "solving" the
problem is very high indeed. Really doing so would not only take a great deal of money but would also require major sacrifices by large groups in the population. The public thus begins to realize that part of the problem results from arrangements that are providing significant benefits to someone—often to millions. For example, traffic congestion and a great deal of smog are caused by increasing automobile usage. Yet this also enhances the mobility of millions of Americans who continue to purchase more vehicles to obtain these advantages.

In certain cases, technological progress can eliminate some of the undesirable results of a problem without causing any major restructuring of society or any loss of present benefits by others (except for higher money costs). In the optimistic American tradition, such a technological solution is initially assumed to be possible in the case of nearly every problem. Our most pressing social problems, however, usually involve either deliberate or unconscious exploitation of one group in society by another, or the prevention of one group from enjoying something that others want to keep for themselves. For example, most upper-middle-class whites value geographic separation from poor people and blacks. Hence any equality of access to the advantages of suburban living for the poor and for blacks cannot be achieved without some sacrifice by middle-class whites of the "benefits" of separation. The increasing recognition that there is this type of relationship between the problem and its "solution" constitutes a key part of the third stage.

4. Gradual decline of intense public interest. The previous stage becomes almost imperceptibly transformed into the fourth stage: a gradual decline in the intensity of public interest in the problem. As more and more people realize how difficult, and how costly to themselves, a solution to the problem would be, three reactions set in. Some people just get discouraged. Others feel positively threatened by thinking about the problem; so they suppress such thoughts. Still others become bored by the issue. Most people experience some combination of these feelings. Consequently, public desire to keep attention focused on the issue wanes. And by this time, some other issue is usually entering Stage Two; so it exerts a more novel and thus more powerful claim upon public attention.

5. The post-problem stage. In the final stage, an issue that has been replaced at the center of public concern moves into a prolonged limbo—a twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest. However, the issue now has a different relation to public attention than that which prevailed in the "pre-problem" stage. For
one thing, during the time that interest was sharply focused on this problem, new institutions, programs, and policies may have been created to help solve it. These entities almost always persist and often have some impact even after public attention has shifted elsewhere. For example, during the early stages of the “War on Poverty,” the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) was established, and it initiated many new programs. Although poverty has now faded as a central public issue, OEO still exists. Moreover, many of its programs have experienced significant success, even though funded at a far lower level than would be necessary to reduce poverty decisively.

Any major problem that once was elevated to national prominence may sporadically recapture public interest; or important aspects of it may become attached to some other problem that subsequently dominates center stage. Therefore, problems that have gone through the cycle almost always receive a higher average level of attention, public effort, and general concern than those still in the pre-discovery stage.

Which problems are likely to go through the cycle?

Not all major social problems go through this “issue-attention cycle.” Those which do generally possess to some degree three specific characteristics. First, the majority of persons in society are not suffering from the problem nearly as much as some minority (a numerical minority, not necessarily an ethnic one). This is true of many pressing social problems in America today—poverty, racism, poor public transportation, low-quality education, crime, drug addiction, and unemployment, among others. The number of persons suffering from each of these ills is very large absolutely—in the millions. But the numbers are small relatively—usually less than 15 per cent of the entire population. Therefore, most people do not suffer directly enough from such problems to keep their attention riveted on them.

Second, the sufferings caused by the problem are generated by social arrangements that provide significant benefits to a majority or a powerful minority of the population. For example, Americans who own cars—plus the powerful automobile and highway lobbies—receive short-run benefits from the prohibition of using motor-fuel tax revenues for financing public transportation systems, even though such systems are desperately needed by the urban poor.

Third, the problem has no intrinsically exciting qualities—or no longer has them. When big-city racial riots were being shown nightly on the nation’s television screens, public attention naturally focused
upon their causes and consequences. But when they ceased (or at least the media stopped reporting them so intensively), public interest in the problems related to them declined sharply. Similarly, as long as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was able to stage a series of ever more thrilling space shots, culminating in the worldwide television spectacular of Americans walking on the moon, it generated sufficient public support to sustain high-level Congressional appropriations. But NASA had nothing half so dramatic for an encore, and repetition of the same feat proved less and less exciting (though a near disaster on the third try did revive audience interest). So NASA’s Congressional appropriations plummeted.

A problem must be dramatic and exciting to maintain public interest because news is “consumed” by much of the American public (and by publics everywhere) largely as a form of entertainment. As such, it competes with other types of entertainment for a share of each person’s time. Every day, there is a fierce struggle for space in the highly limited universe of newsprint and television viewing time. Each issue vies not only with all other social problems and public events, but also with a multitude of “non-news” items that are often far more pleasant to contemplate. These include sporting news, weather reports, crossword puzzles, fashion accounts, comics, and daily horoscopes. In fact, the amount of television time and newspaper space devoted to sports coverage, as compared to international events, is a striking commentary on the relative value that the public places on knowing about these two subjects.

When all three of the above conditions exist concerning a given problem that has somehow captured public attention, the odds are great that it will soon move through the entire “issue-attention cycle” —and therefore will gradually fade from the center of the stage. The first condition means that most people will not be continually reminded of the problem by their own suffering from it. The second condition means that solving the problem requires sustained attention and effort, plus fundamental changes in social institutions or behavior. This in turn means that significant attempts to solve it are threatening to important groups in society. The third condition means that the media’s sustained focus on this problem soon bores a majority of the public. As soon as the media realize that their emphasis on this problem is threatening many people and boring even more, they will shift their focus to some “new” problem. This is particularly likely in America because nearly all the media are run for profit, and they make the most money by appealing to the largest
possible audiences. Thus, as Marshall McLuhan has pointed out, it is largely the audience itself—the American public—that "manages the news" by maintaining or losing interest in a given subject. As long as this pattern persists, we will continue to be confronted by a stream of "crises" involving particular social problems. Each will rise into public view, capture center stage for a while, and then gradually fade away as it is replaced by more fashionable issues moving into their "crisis" phases.

The rise of environmental concern

Public interest in the quality of the environment now appears to be about midway through the "issue-attention cycle." Gradually, more and more people are beginning to realize the immensity of the social and financial costs of cleaning up our air and water and of preserving and restoring open spaces. Hence much of the enthusiasm about prompt, dramatic improvement in the environment is fading. There is still a great deal of public interest, however, so it cannot be said that the "post-problem stage" has been reached. In fact, as will be discussed later, the environmental issue may well retain more attention than social problems that affect smaller proportions of the population. Before evaluating the prospects of long-term interest in the environment, though, it is helpful to analyze how environmental concern passed through the earlier stages in the "issue-attention cycle."

The most obvious reason for the initial rise in concern about the environment is the recent deterioration of certain easily perceived environmental conditions. A whole catalogue of symptoms can be arrayed, including ubiquitous urban smog, greater proliferation of solid waste, oceanic oil spills, greater pollution of water supplies by DDT and other poisons, the threatened disappearance of many wildlife species, and the overcrowding of a variety of facilities from commuter expressways to National Parks. Millions of citizens observing these worsening conditions became convinced that someone ought to "do something" about them. But "doing something" to reduce environmental deterioration is not easy. For many of our environmental problems have been caused by developments which are highly valued by most Americans.

The very abundance of our production and consumption of material goods is responsible for an immense amount of environmental pollution. For example, electric power generation, if based on fossil fuels, creates smoke and air pollution or, if based on nuclear fuels, causes
rising water temperatures. Yet a key foundation for rising living standards in the United States during this century has been the doubling of electric power consumption every 10 years. So more pollution is the price we have paid for the tremendous advantages of being able to use more and more electricity. Similarly, much of the litter blighting even our remotest landscapes stems from the convenience of using "throw-away packages." Thus, to regard environmental pollution as a purely external negative factor would be to ignore its direct linkage with material advantages most citizens enjoy.

Another otherwise favorable development that has led to rising environmental pollution is what I would call the democratization of privilege. Many more Americans are now able to participate in certain activities that were formerly available only to a small, wealthy minority. Some members of that minority are incensed by the consequences of having their formerly esoteric advantages spread to "the common man." The most frequent irritant caused by the democratization of privilege is congestion. Rising highway congestion, for example, is denounced almost everywhere. Yet its main cause is the rapid spread of automobile ownership and usage. In 1950, about 59 per cent of all families had at least one automobile, and seven per cent owned two or more. By 1968, the proportion of families owning at least one automobile had climbed to 79 per cent, and 26 per cent had two or more cars. In the 10 years from 1960 to 1970, the total number of registered automotive vehicles rose by 35 million (or 47 per cent), as compared to a rise in human population of 23 million (or only 13 per cent). Moreover, it has been estimated that motor vehicles cause approximately 60 per cent of all air pollution. So the tremendous increase in smog does not result primarily from larger population, but rather from the democratization of automobile ownership.

The democratization of privilege also causes crowding in National Parks, rising suburban housing density, the expansion of new subdivisions into formerly picturesque farms and orchards, and the transformation of once tranquil resort areas like Waikiki Beach into forests of high-rise buildings. It is now difficult for the wealthy to flee from busy urban areas to places of quiet seclusion, because so many more people can afford to go with them. The elite's environmental deterioration is often the common man's improved standard of living.

Our soaring aspirations

A somewhat different factor which has contributed to greater concern with environmental quality is a marked increase in our aspira-
tions and standards concerning what our environment ought to be like. In my opinion, rising dissatisfaction with the "system" in the United States does not result primarily from poorer performance by that system. Rather, it stems mainly from a rapid escalation of our aspirations as to what the system's performance ought to be. Nowhere is this phenomenon more striking than in regard to the quality of the environment. One hundred years ago, white Americans were eliminating whole Indian tribes without a qualm. Today, many serious-minded citizens seek to make important issues out of the potential disappearance of the whooping crane, the timber wolf, and other exotic creatures. Meanwhile, thousands of Indians in Brazil are still being murdered each year—but American conservationists are not focusing on that human massacre. Similarly, some aesthetes decry "galloping sprawl" in metropolitan fringe areas, while they ignore acres of rat-infested housing a few miles away. Hence the escalation of our environmental aspirations is more selective than might at first appear.

Yet regarding many forms of pollution, we are now rightly upset over practices and conditions that have largely been ignored for decades. An example is our alarm about the dumping of industrial wastes and sewage into rivers and lakes. This increase in our environmental aspirations is part of a general cultural phenomenon stimulated both by our success in raising living standards and by the recent emphases of the communications media. Another cause of the rapid rise in interest in environmental pollution is the "explosion" of alarmist rhetoric on this subject. According to some well-publicized experts, all life on earth is threatened by an "environmental crisis." Some claim human life will end within three decades or less if we do not do something drastic about current behavior patterns.

Are things really that bad? Frankly, I am not enough of an ecological expert to know. But I am skeptical concerning all highly alarmist views because so many previous prophets of doom and disaster have been so wrong concerning many other so-called "crises" in our society.

There are two reasonable definitions of "crisis." One kind of crisis consists of a rapidly deteriorating situation moving towards a single disastrous event at some future moment. The second kind consists of a more gradually deteriorating situation that will eventually pass some subtle "point of no return." At present, I do not believe either of these definitions applies to most American domestic problems. Although many social critics hate to admit it, the American "system" actually serves the majority of citizens rather well in terms of most indicators of well-being. Concerning such things as real income, per-
sonal mobility, variety and choice of consumption patterns, longevity, health, leisure time, and quality of housing, most Americans are better off today than they have ever been and extraordinarily better off than most of mankind. What is not improving is the gap between society's performance and what most people—or at least highly vocal minorities—believe society ought to be doing to solve these problems. Our aspirations and standards have risen far faster than the beneficial outputs of our social system. Therefore, although most Americans, including most of the poor, are receiving more now, they are enjoying it less.

This conclusion should not be confused with the complacency of some super-patriots. It would be unrealistic to deny certain important negative trends in American life. Some conditions are indeed getting worse for nearly everyone. Examples are air quality and freedom from thievery. Moreover, congestion and environmental deterioration might forever destroy certain valuable national amenities if they are not checked. Finally, there has probably been a general rise in personal and social anxiety in recent years. I believe this is due to increased tensions caused by our rapid rate of technical and social change, plus the increase in worldwide communication through the media. These developments rightly cause serious and genuine concern among millions of Americans.

The future of the environmental issue

Concern about the environment has passed through the first two stages of the “issue-attention cycle” and is by now well into the third. In fact, we have already begun to move toward the fourth stage, in which the intensity of public interest in environmental improvement must inexorably decline. And this raises an interesting question: Will the issue of environmental quality then move on into the “post-problem” stage of the cycle?

My answer to this question is: Yes, but not soon, because certain characteristics of this issue will protect it from the rapid decline in public interest typical of many other recent issues. First of all, many kinds of environmental pollution are much more visible and more clearly threatening than most other social problems. This is particularly true of air pollution. The greater the apparent threat from visible forms of pollution and the more vividly this can be dramatized, the more public support environmental improvement will receive and the longer it will sustain public interest. Ironically, the cause of ecologists would therefore benefit from an environmental disaster like a “killer
smog” that would choke thousands to death in a few days. Actually, this is nothing new; every cause from early Christianity to the Black Panthers has benefited from martyrs. Yet even the most powerful symbols lose their impact if they are constantly repeated. The piteous sight of an oil-soaked seagull or a dead soldier pales after it has been viewed even a dozen times. Moreover, some of the worst environmental threats come from forms of pollution that are invisible. Thus, our propensity to focus attention on what is most visible may cause us to clean up the pollution we can easily perceive while ignoring even more dangerous but hidden threats.

Pollution is also likely to be kept in the public eye because it is an issue that threatens almost everyone, not just a small percentage of the population. Since it is not politically divisive, politicians can safely pursue it without fearing adverse repercussions. Attacking environmental pollution is therefore much safer than attacking racism or poverty. For an attack upon the latter antagonizes important blocs of voters who benefit from the sufferings of others or at least are not threatened enough by such suffering to favor spending substantial amounts of their money to reduce it.

A third strength of the environmental issue is that much of the “blame” for pollution can be attributed to a small group of “villains” whose wealth and power make them excellent scapegoats. Environmental defenders can therefore “courageously” attack these scapegoats without antagonizing most citizens. Moreover, at least in regard to air pollution, that small group actually has enough power greatly to reduce pollution if it really tries. If leaders of the nation’s top auto-producing, power-generating, and fuel-supplying firms would change their behavior significantly, a drastic decline in air pollution could be achieved very quickly. This has been demonstrated at many locations already.

Gathering support for attacking any problem is always easier if its ills can be blamed on a small number of “public enemies”—as is shown by the success of Ralph Nader. This tactic is especially effective if the “enemies” exhibit extreme wealth and power, eccentric dress and manners, obscene language, or some other uncommon traits. Then society can aim its outrage at a small, alien group without having to face up to the need to alter its own behavior. It is easier to find such scapegoats for almost all forms of pollution than for other major problems like poverty, poor housing, or racism. Solutions to those problems would require millions of Americans to change their own behavior patterns, to accept higher taxes, or both.

The possibility that technological solutions can be devised for most
pollution problems may also lengthen the public prominence of this issue. To the extent that pollution can be reduced through technological change, most people's basic attitudes, expectations, and behavior patterns will not have to be altered. The traumatic difficulties of achieving major institutional change could thus be escaped through the "magic" of purely technical improvements in automobile engines, water purification devices, fuel composition, and sewage treatment facilities.

**Financing the fight against pollution**

Another aspect of anti-pollution efforts that will strengthen their political support is that most of the costs can be passed on to the public through higher product prices rather than higher taxes. Therefore, politicians can demand enforcement of costly environmental quality standards without paying the high political price of raising the required funds through taxes. True, water pollution is caused mainly by the actions of public bodies, especially municipal sewer systems, and effective remedies for this form of pollution require higher taxes or at least higher prices for public services. But the major costs of reducing most kinds of pollution can be added to product prices and thereby quietly shifted to the ultimate consumers of the outputs concerned. This is a politically painless way to pay for attacking a major social problem. In contrast, effectively combating most social problems requires large-scale income redistribution attainable only through both higher taxes and higher transfer payments or subsidies. Examples of such politically costly problems are poverty, slum housing, low-quality health care for the poor, and inadequate public transportation.

Many ecologists oppose paying for a cleaner environment through higher product prices. They would rather force the polluting firms to bear the required costs through lower profits. In a few oligopolistic industries, like petroleum and automobile production, this might work. But in the long run, not much of the total cost could be paid this way without driving capital out of the industries concerned and thereby eventually forcing product prices upwards. Furthermore, it is just that those who use any given product should pay the full cost of making it—including the cost of avoiding excessive pollution in its production. Such payment is best made through higher product prices. In my opinion, it would be unwise in most cases to try to pay these costs by means of government subsidies in order to avoid shifting the load onto consumers. We need to conserve our politically
limited taxing capabilities to attack those problems that cannot be dealt with in any other way.

Still another reason why the cleaner-environment issue may last a long time is that it could generate a large private industry with strong vested interests in continued spending against pollution. Already dozens of firms with "eco-" or "environ-" in their names have sprung up to exploit supposedly burgeoning anti-pollution markets. In time, we might even generate an "environmental-industrial complex" about which some future President could vainly warn us in his retirement speech! Any issue gains longevity if its sources of political support and the programs related to it can be institutionalized in large bureaucracies. Such organizations have a powerful desire to keep public attention focused on the problems that support them. However, it is doubtful that the anti-pollution industry will ever come close to the defense industry in size and power. Effective anti-pollution activities cannot be carried out separately from society as a whole because they require changes in behavior by millions of people. In contrast, weapons are produced by an industry that imposes no behavioral changes (other than higher taxes) on the average citizen.

Finally, environmental issues may remain at center stage longer than most domestic issues because of their very ambiguity. "Improving the environment" is a tremendously broad and all-encompassing objective. Almost everyone can plausibly claim that his or her particular cause is another way to upgrade the quality of our life. This ambiguity will make it easier to form a majority-sized coalition favoring a variety of social changes associated with improving the environment. The inability to form such a coalition regarding problems that adversely affect only minority-sized groups usually hastens the exit of such problems from the center of public attention.

All the factors set forth above indicate that circumstances are unusually favorable for launching and sustaining major efforts to improve the quality of our environment. Yet we should not underestimate the American public's capacity to become bored—especially with something that does not immediately threaten them, or promise huge benefits for a majority, or strongly appeal to their sense of injustice. In the present mood of the nation, I believe most citizens do not want to confront the need for major social changes on any issues except those that seem directly to threaten them—such as crime and other urban violence. And even in regard to crime, the public does not yet wish to support really effective changes in our basic system of justice. The present Administration has apparently concluded that a relatively "low-profile" government—one that does not try to lead the
public into accepting truly significant institutional changes—will most please the majority of Americans at this point. Regardless of the accuracy of this view, if it remains dominant within the federal government, then no major environmental programs are likely to receive long-sustained public attention or support.

Some proponents of improving the environment are relying on the support of students and other young people to keep this issue at the center of public attention. Such support, however, is not adequate as a long-term foundation. Young people form a highly unstable base for the support of any policy because they have such short-lived “staying power.” For one thing, they do not long enjoy the large amount of free time they possess while in college. Also, as new individuals enter the category of “young people” and older ones leave it, different issues are stressed and accumulated skills in marshaling opinion are dissipated. Moreover, the radicalism of the young has been immensely exaggerated by the media’s tendency to focus attention upon those with extremist views. In their attitudes toward political issues, most young people are not very different from their parents.

There is good reason, then, to believe that the bundle of issues called “improving the environment” will also suffer the gradual loss of public attention characteristic of the later stages of the “issue-attention cycle.” However, it will be eclipsed at a much slower rate than other recent domestic issues. So it may be possible to accomplish some significant improvements in environmental quality—if those seeking them work fast.
For nearly two decades now, the United States has been passing new legislation to improve the quality of the environment. Numerous laws with environmental implications have been passed, and rivers of rhetoric have flowed from members of Congress and executive agencies. We have seen the Water Pollution Control Act of 1956, the Water Quality Act of 1965, the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, and the Environment Quality Improvement Act of 1970, among others. In 1965, we heard President Johnson say, as he signed the Water Quality Act, “Today, we begin to be master of our environment”; and in 1971, President Nixon stated, “The battle for a better environment can be won and we are winning it.”

Unfortunately, the facts of environmental quality do not jibe with the rhetoric. Indices of environmental quality show that the waste loads imposed on environmental resources have been growing continuously, and rising waste loads mean deteriorating environmental quality. The recent report of the Council on Environmental Quality, for example, indicates that emissions of all the major air pollutants have increased at an overall rate of over three per cent per year and that, in recent years, “the overall quality of the nation’s waters probably has deteriorated because of accelerated eutrophication, in-
creased discharges of toxic materials, greater loads of sediment, and other factors.” The legislation of the past decades has, in fact, failed to deliver on its promises.

Existing legislation is based essentially on a regulatory strategy, with an added carrot of federal subsidy enabling the budget to reflect “environmental priorities.” This rule-making, enforcement strategy pits the power of public agencies against polluters in a context in which the rules of the struggle and the information available to each party are biased against the government. Not surprisingly, this effort at regulation has failed to induce private sector behavior leading to achievement of the objectives of the legislation. Even more serious, this strategy fails to recognize the basic economic nature of the problem. Use of the services of scarce environmental resources continues to be free, and as a result there is no cost to a person who overuses, misuses, or abuses them. Moreover, no effective institutional mechanisms, with clearly spelled out functions and operating procedures, have been established to manage the utilization of environmental resources or to guide them into their most productive uses.

**Existing legislation**

Present federal water pollution control policy has two main elements. The first is a program of federal subsidies to cities for the construction of waste treatment plants. The second is a procedure for establishing regulations to limit discharges and for enforcing these rules through the police power of the state and, ultimately, the courts.

The Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 established the first federal subsidy for treatment plant construction. This subsidy takes the form of federal grants to municipalities which cover up to 55 per cent of the cost of plant construction. As an added incentive, some states have augmented the grants to the point where cities are responsible for only 15 per cent of total construction costs. Since 1956, this program has grown rapidly, and today nearly $1 billion per year is being spent by the federal government for such construction. This money is allocated among states on the basis of a formula which assigns the first $100 million according to population and inversely according to per capita income, and the rest according to population alone. To be eligible for such grants, a state must have adopted a plan for achieving water quality standards acceptable to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Present regulations
stipulate that such plans must require a minimum of secondary treatment (85 per cent removal of organic wastes) or its equivalent.

This program encourages cities to provide at least secondary treatment to the wastes of all dischargers who use municipal sewer systems. These dischargers include the bulk of the nation's households and commercial enterprises, but the majority of the nation's industrial wastes are discharged directly into rivers and streams. To encourage waste treatment activities by these dischargers, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 allows accelerated depreciation of waste treatment plant investments for tax purposes. The objective of this $120 million annual "tax expenditure" is to stimulate more spending on pollution control by reducing the after-tax cost of such investments.

In addition to these subsidy programs, federal policy provides for regulations governing the disposal of wastes into rivers and mechanisms to enforce these rules. The first provision for federal enforcement actions against water polluters was contained in the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act, which relied primarily on voluntary compliance stemming from abatement conferences attended by polluters and government officials. Under this provision it usually proved impossible to get beyond the conference stage, and only one case ever got to court.

The Water Quality Act of 1965 assigns primary responsibility for implementing pollution control plans to the states. It requires states to establish water quality standards and to develop a program for attaining them. This program was envisioned as a benchmark for judging the progress of a state in attaining its water quality standards and for assisting federal officials in determining when and where to undertake federal enforcement actions. In implementing this program, state agencies must first determine the maximum amount of discharges consistent with their water quality standards. Then they issue licenses limiting dischargers in aggregate to this maximum. To enforce these license provisions, states must monitor dischargers and initiate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings when violations occur.

The 1965 law also authorizes federal enforcement actions whenever it is found that state water quality standards are being violated. (A governor or state agency can also request EPA to initiate enforcement efforts to deal with an interstate pollution problem.) EPA can initiate court actions 180 days after notifying violators. This provision of federal law was not used at all until August 1969, and as of the end of 1971, EPA had issued only 27 notices.

The decision to proceed to litigation ultimately rests with the
administered by the EPA. Because of the lack of guidelines for deciding when a pollution problem is sufficiently serious to warrant legal action, this decision becomes a political matter. Thus enforcement at the federal level is, in practice, far from comprehensive or uniform. While the large municipality or firm may confront a probability of ultimate legal action, the small polluter is virtually immune.

In practice, federal and state pollution control efforts have been limited in scope and coverage in two respects. First, they have been aimed primarily at organic pollutants and have given relatively little attention to nonorganic pollutants such as plant nutrients, heavy metals (e.g., mercury), toxic materials, and heat. This is less the result of any limitations in either federal or state law than of the fact that organic pollution is the most noticeable in its effects and is relatively easy to deal with, given present technology. In the second place, pollution control efforts to date have been limited to discharges from point sources (i.e., factories and sewer pipes) and have ignored pollution arising from erosion and siltation, agricultural fertilizer, irrigation water, pesticide run-offs, and other non-point sources. This is an area where neither technology nor policy is well developed. Yet as point sources are brought under better control, pollution from non-point sources will loom as a larger problem—both relatively and absolutely.

The record of failure

If its objective is the improvement of the quality of the nation's rivers, as it surely must be, then existing federal water pollution policy has been a dismal failure. In 1969, a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of several rivers concluded that even though $5.4 billion had been spent at all levels of government for waste treatment plant construction during the previous 12 years, the nation's rivers were in worse shape than ever before.

This record of failure is attributable to both the subsidy and the enforcement aspects of current policy. Consider, for example, the waste treatment grant program. Because of the structure and administration of that program, much was spent but little achieved. Five of the chief reasons for this result are:

1. By subsidizing only conventional "end-of-the-pipe" treatment systems, the grant program induces planners to overlook what in some cases may be less costly or more effective alternatives, such as the storage (ponding) of wastes during critical periods of low-
stream flow and the augmentation of the assimilative capacity of
the stream through instream aeration and other devices.

2. Current regulations require secondary waste treatment for all
municipalities along a watercourse. An optimal basin-wide plan
would relate the degree of desired municipal treatment to streamflow
conditions and downstream uses (among other variables). In this
optimal plan, some municipalities may require tertiary treatment
while others may require only primary treatment. The drive for
uniform secondary treatment results in excessive treatment costs at
some outfalls and insufficient treatment costs at others.

3. States have failed to target federal funds on the municipalities
with the most harmful discharges. More than one town situated
downstream from major industrial locations has used federal funds
to build treatment plants with the result that its treated effluent is
of higher quality than the river into which it is discharged. Also,
federal funds have been concentrated on smaller, largely suburban
communities rather than the larger cities with the most pollution.
For example, nearly 40 per cent of the federal grant money has gone
to towns with populations of less than 10,000, which contain less
than 16 per cent of the U. S. urban population. The largest cities,
containing 25 per cent of the total urban population, have received
only 6 per cent of the total federal grant money.

4. Construction of treatment facilities does not guarantee their
effective operation. In fact, the structure of the recent program
creates incentives which work in the opposite direction. A second
study by the GAO has confirmed the widely held belief that munic-
ipal plants are often operated inefficiently. Over one half of the
plants surveyed were providing inadequate treatment, due to over-
zealous efforts to reduce plant operating costs, the difficulty and
expense of hiring trained personnel to operate the plants, and the
failure of cities to maintain and repair equipment. By subsidizing
only one part of the cost of effective waste treatment—plant con-
struction costs—the federal government has induced resources into
construction activity but has provided no similar inducement for
efficient plant operation.

5. Federal grants for municipal waste treatment plant construc-
tion provide an indirect subsidy to industrial and commercial waste
dischargers. By subsidizing the capital costs of municipal treatment
facilities, the existing policy tends to reduce the sewer charges im-
posed on industrial, commercial, and domestic waste dischargers
connected to the sewerage system. Because approximately 50 per cent of the wastes handled by municipal treatment plants are from industrial sources, the size of the subsidy to business is substantial. The effect of this subsidy is to weaken the incentives for waste dischargers to seek such alternatives to the public treatment of their waste flows as production process changes, recycling, and materials recovery. There are many such alternatives, and these are often less costly. Yet because they do not receive federal subsidies, firms overlook them. The tax subsidies have a similar distorting effect on the decisions made by firms as to the techniques they choose to reduce their discharges.

Thus, through federal grants for municipal waste treatment facilities, as well as through tax subsidies for industrial pollution-control equipment, current policy is, in effect, allowing polluters to generate and dispose large quantities of wastes without bearing the full cost of their discharges—and then using taxpayers' money to clean up after them. With little effective constraint on the generation of industrial wastes and with rapid economic growth, the burden on the environment will skyrocket in the coming decades. One recent study showed that the annual costs of applying secondary treatment to an unconstrained flow of wastes would be $18 billion in 1973, $27 billion in 1980, and $55 billion by the year 2000. The continued spending of taxpayers' money to clean up after polluters—along the lines of the current strategy—is going to be an enormously expensive and relatively fruitless venture.

Why “enforcement” doesn't work

In regard to the regulatory/enforcement aspects of present policy, it is widely agreed that enforcement has not been effective so far, both at the federal level and at the state level, where the primary responsibility now lies. The question is whether the regulatory/enforcement strategy can be made to work by tightening up the laws and increasing our efforts, or whether failure is inherent in the enforcement process. We incline to the latter view and believe that both history and a clear understanding of the nature of the regulatory process support our position.

It is in the American tradition to create regulatory agencies to deal with problems caused by malfunctions in the economic system. The existence of agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the Federal Drug Ad-
ministration is sufficient to convince most people that the problems for which these agencies were created are being dealt with successfully. But a careful analysis of the evidence shows that this is rarely the case.

The naive view of the regulatory process is that the agency establishes rules and regulations to govern the behavior of the regulated and to further the public interest. The threat of sanctions is thought to be sufficient to deter violations; but if any occur, it is assumed that violators are quickly brought to justice. The reality is quite different. Regulatory agencies have substantial discretionary power concerning the interpretation and application of their rule-making and enforcement powers. As a consequence, regulation/enforcement becomes essentially a political process entailing bargaining between parties of unequal power. In this process the real issues are camouflaged in technical jargon, and the regulators are largely isolated from political accountability for their actions. The regulatory agency and the interests they regulate bargain over the regulations to be set. They bargain over whether violations have occurred and, if so, who was responsible. They bargain over what steps shall be taken to correct infractions. And in the rare instances where the bargaining process breaks down and the conflict moves to the courts for resolution, the judicial system seeks an "acceptable solution" or a "reasonable compromise." Only rarely is it forced by the flow of events into making either/or choices. At every stage of this multi-level bargaining process those being regulated have a lot at stake, while the public interest is diffuse, poorly organized, and poorly represented. Predictably, the bargains struck favor those being regulated.

The regulatory/enforcement strategy pits the power of pollution-control authorities against the power of the polluter in an unending sequence of skirmishes and battles over licensing and the enforcement of regulations. As a consequence, the enforcement process is long and drawn out and often inconclusive. Industrial polluters get higher returns from hiring lawyers to fight enforcement than from money spent on pollution control.

The inherent difficulties with the regulation/enforcement process are nowhere more apparent than in the recent attempts to make the 1899 Refuse Act work. This law prohibits the discharge of "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever" into any waters unless the discharger has obtained a permit from the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Virtually none of the present estimated 40,000 industrial dischargers hold a valid permit. This all but forgotten law made headlines beginning in 1969 when charges were brought
against several firms as a consequence of individuals’ initiatives. Some convictions were obtained, fines levied, and rewards paid to vigilant citizens, as the law provides. But in June 1970, as the number of cases began to increase, the Justice Department issued guidelines to its attorneys instructing them not to bring charges against firms for which residuals discharge was a part of normal plant operations, or against firms holding a permit issued by a state or local government. With this action, the Justice Department, in effect, established a policy of selective non-enforcement of one of the nation’s laws. This policy was reinforced in December 1970, when the Administration announced that, while permits were required of all dischargers (including those “exempted” by the earlier Justice Department policy), no prosecutions would take place so long as an application had been filed by July 1, 1971 and not subsequently rejected by the government. The effect of this is to grant firms an immunity from prosecution which is likely to last for several years while the government works its way through the backlog of unprocessed permit applications. And since all permit applications are forwarded to the relevant state for certification that the discharge is consistent with the state’s pollution control plan, the new policy has contributed nothing to the establishment of a more effective pollution control effort. It has, however, generated a flood of new permit applications to burden the work load of federal and state officials while, in effect, repealing the one potentially effective federal law against pollution.

**The Muskie bill**

Although there is growing disenchantment with federal water pollution control policies, the recent legislative response has been more of the same. Both the Senate and the House have passed bills in 1971-72 which are based on a legislative finding that past efforts have failed. Quantum jumps in regulatory controls and subsidies are contained in both bills. But if past experience is any guide, these efforts will at best be patch jobs on an already sieve-like structure.

The clearest example of the “let’s hitch our belts one notch tighter and forge ahead” philosophy implicit in these efforts is the so-called Muskie bill, which passed the Senate by an 86-0 vote late in 1971. That bill essentially ends the use of water quality standards as the measuring rod for performance and substitutes standards or regulations regarding effluent control and treatment. The bill requires that industry apply the “best practicable” waste treatment
technology available by 1976 and completely eliminate discharges of pollutants by 1981 if it can be done at "reasonable cost." If zero discharge cannot be attained at reasonable cost, industry must install the "best available treatment" facilities, "taking into account the cost." A date of 1985 is set as a target for zero discharge.

The basic weakness of the bill is its reliance on precisely that sort of discretion which has vitiated numerous other rule enforcement efforts. Who is going to define "reasonable," "best available," and "best practicable," and who is going to "take into account the cost"? All of these terms are open to widely divergent interpretations, and none has a precise legal meaning. Perhaps more important, this bill implicitly requires federal surveillance and enforcement action on a case-by-case basis on each of 40,000 industrial pollution sources to police the ill-defined discharge standards.

Aside from these enormous administrative difficulties, there is the further consideration that, should the rules actually be enforced, the cost would be enormous. Given existing technology and its foreseeable developments, attainment of either the best available technology or the zero-discharge goals will be prohibitively expensive. Because costs rise swiftly at very high treatment levels, the total cost of meeting these objectives could be several times that required to meet current quality standards and far in excess of any benefits resulting from elimination of the last few units of residual discharge. As the Report of a Panel of Experts to the Director of the Office of Science and Technology stated:

The . . . costs in achieving or even approaching such a goal would be very great and would almost certainly in every instance constitute a misallocation of the nation's resources. Removing the last few per cent of the common pollutants from water is usually extremely costly, yet the added benefits due to the extra treatment in that regard are extremely questionable in all cases.

The subsidy component of the present strategy is also reaffirmed and extended in this bill. Appropriations of $20 billion are authorized through fiscal year 1975, and a minimum of secondary waste treatment is required for all municipalities by 1976. The share of municipal waste treatment construction costs to be covered by federal grants is also enlarged.

Paying by the pound

If our appraisal of the effectiveness of both the current strategy and recent legislation is correct, a major restructuring of water
pollution control policy is required if we are to improve water quality. This restructuring, to be successful, must recognize the basic economic nature of the pollution problem and the economic incentives governing the behavior of polluters. It must force waste dischargers to bear the costs which their actions generate. If these costs can be imposed on dischargers, incentives will be present to constrain the waste generation proclivities of industrial and municipal polluters and to keep valuable environmental resources from being diverted to low-valued uses. The necessary incentives can be created by imposing user or effluent charges on waste dischargers such that the size of the charge is related to the volume of harmful substances which is released into the environment. In effect, waste dischargers should be required to “pay by the pound.”

Numerous arguments can be offered in support of this user-charge strategy. The most cogent argument is that it will succeed in reducing waste discharges—not just retarding their growth. The recorded response of waste dischargers to the imposition of municipal sewerage charges provides strong evidence. For example, after putting a relatively small user charge into effect, the city of Cincinnati reported that industrial waste was reduced nearly 40 per cent in one year. Another city found discharges cut to one third of the former level.

That user charges have induced such dramatic reductions in waste discharges is not surprising. When a price is placed on wastes discharged into watercourses, a number of actions that previously looked unattractive to dischargers become appealing alternatives. These include changes in production procedures within the plant to reduce waste generation, as well as the installation of waste treatment facilities at the plant site. Moreover, such charges would stimulate research and development efforts aimed at developing new technologies for reducing waste generation or recycling wastes. Finally, if environmental services are priced, those commodities whose production imposes large environmental damages will experience price increases relative to commodities whose production imposes minor environmental costs. Because higher prices mean smaller demand, production and consumption would tend to be shifted away from those commodities with the most damaging environmental effects.

In addition to providing incentives for reductions in waste generation, a comprehensive national effluent-charge policy would have a second important effect. It would end the system of bargaining and negotiating between agencies and individual producers—a sys-
tem which rewards delaying tactics—and replace it with a system which rewards compliance and effective and continuing controls on waste discharges.

Finally, while the current strategy has placed substantial demands on a tight federal budget, a user-charge strategy would actually *generate* revenues. These revenues could be used to finance environmental measures that municipalities and firms cannot be expected to undertake, such as basic research and development, establishment of regional or river basin authorities to manage the use of regional environmental resources, and construction of installations to artificially reaerate streams or to increase stream flows during low-flow periods.

In evaluating the merits of an economic—i.e., user-charge—approach to environmental policy, it must be emphasized that an effluent charge will, by itself, be inadequate to insure the efficient use of environmental resources. For one thing, it cannot cope with non-point sources of pollution such as agricultural fertilizer and pesticide run-off. But this is also true of the subsidy/enforcement strategy. Comprehensive environmental management requires the establishment of regional authorities whose responsibilities would include planning for the optimal use and augmentation of environmental resources; undertaking collective investments; setting water and air quality standards and charge levels designed to meet these standards; monitoring discharge levels into both water and air resources; and regulating patterns of regional land use. To be effective in managing the environment consistently with regional preferences, these authorities should be governed by directly elected rather than appointed officials. The sad history of the appointive regulatory commissions and their capture by those interests which they were supposed to regulate should be a powerful lesson.

**The conventional objections**

Proposals for an economic-incentives approach to pollution control have not been enthusiastically received by waste dischargers—especially industrial polluters. Indeed, powerful corporate interests have objected strenuously to the effluent-charge strategy. Industry, it is claimed, is already spending as much as possible on pollution-control efforts. As H. C. Lumb, vice-president of Republic Steel Corporation, stated before a Congressional committee: “Taking money away from industrial companies in the name of a tax on pollution . . . would harm the cause of pollution control.” The
vacuousness of this position should be apparent. By implication, it
denies that economic incentives—prices and costs—influence busi-
ness decisions and behavior, a contention that is contradicted by
daily observation. For example, when firms purchase labor-saving
capital equipment in response to rising wages, they are demon-
strating not only their responsiveness to economic incentives but
their ability to finance cost-saving investment. The purpose of an
effluent-charge policy is to provide a similar economic incentive.
The financial resources for responding can be found. Industry ex-
pects to spend $4.9 billion on pollution control in 1972. But this
figure is only 5.3 per cent of all planned capital expenditures. A
doubling in the level of spending for pollution control could be
accommodated with only a 5.6 per cent reduction in other capital
spending. It is not financial resources that are lacking but the in-
centive to use more of these resources for pollution control.

A second objection which has been raised to an effluent-charge
policy is that it will be too complex to administer and that, as a
consequence, its effectiveness will be eroded by powerful interests.
This objection, we would argue, sees the real situation in reverse.
In our view, the effluent-charge strategy will be more straightfor-
ward to administer and far more effective than the current regula-
tory strategy.

Once environmental quality standards have been set, a single
charge would be levied on each unit of the prominent harmful
substances found in effluents or emissions. Each discharger would
be responsible for monitoring his discharge, reporting its composi-
tion and quantity to the public authority, and making the appropri-
ate payments. There is an obvious comparison with the system of
reporting and paying income taxes. As in the case of the income
tax, rules and standards of accuracy for measurement would have
to be specified, and audits for compliance would have to be under-
taken. Dischargers would be required to install and maintain the
required monitoring equipment, subject to audit and calibration
for accuracy by the authorities. Information on discharges and
payments would be recorded and made available for public
scrutiny.

With such a system there is little room for administrative dis-
cretion and bargaining. The primary decision is the level of the
charge to be imposed, and this decision is a significant and highly
visible one. There is also a clear performance criterion by which to
judge the correctness of the decision on the level of the charge. If
water quality standards are being met, the rate is high enough—if
CLEAN RHETORIC AND DIRTY WATER

not, the rate should be raised. Moreover, while the zeal and effectiveness of regulatory agencies diminish over time, the effect of an effluent charge is durable. It remains in place unless there is an explicit political decision to remove it.

It is clear, then, that an effluent-charge system poses no unique or particularly difficult administrative problems. In fact, it is an administratively simple strategy which avoids many of the pitfalls of the regulatory/enforcement approach, and which leaves little room for powerful interests to gain special advantages through low-visibility negotiations with the regulatory agency.

A problem of pluralism

When one compares the failure of existing policy with the widely-acknowledged potency of an economic-incentives strategy, a natural question arises: If improved water quality is a national objective, then why the reluctance to modify policy and incorporate the advantages of a promising alternative strategy? The answer is to be found in the nature and dynamics of a pluralistic representative democracy.

The political system is in large part a mechanism for reconciling conflicting interests. With respect to the pollution issue, the conflict is over how much cleaning up of pollution is actually going to be done and who is going to pay for it.

Now, policy makers, like other decision makers, act in their own self-interest. Elected officials behave so as to assure their own re-election; bureaucrats behave so as to be promoted, not to alienate the legislature, or to assure themselves of a lucrative position in private industry at a later date. If a policy maker supports a policy which takes something away from a part of his constituency, he alienates that group. As a consequence, he would tend to support any policy only if the losers were small in number or without influence and if the beneficiaries were large in number or influential. Thus, policy makers search for policies whose costs are hidden or can be shifted to less influential or less organized elements of their constituencies. Policy makers also try to postpone decisions (since every decision has a cost) and to avoid the costs of a decision by shifting the responsibility for making it to another place in the political system.

In a system with full information on the part of both policy makers and voters and with no basic structural imperfections, a decision maker would be accountable to all groups affected by his decisions,
and all of these groups would have access to him. Such perfection, however, does not characterize our political system. Certain institutional arrangements, such as the Congressional seniority system and loose campaign-finance regulations (which enable economic power to be readily transformed into political power), undermine both accountability and accessibility. And when such structural imperfections persist, policy makers gain the leeway which they desire to avoid those decisions likely to alienate major sources of their support. They have the latitude to choose those strategies which shift costs to unwary sectors of their constituencies, which shift responsibility for unpopular decisions to other parts of the political system, and which postpone those decisions likely to generate adverse political repercussions.

These few rough propositions about pluralistic democracies provide some insight into why the type of pollution-control policy that has emerged from our political process is not surprising. Let us review some of the characteristics of existing policy:

- Through existing and pending legislation, federal legislators have consistently shifted the burden for making difficult decisions to the states (e.g., the setting of standards) or to decision makers within the federal bureaucracy. Federal legislation typically passes the Congress with large majorities, sometimes—as with the Muskie bill—unanimously. One can only conclude that if all legislators are for the policy, they must have found some way to duck the real issues.

- Policy makers have been willing to subsidize industrial dischargers wherever this could be hidden in tax depreciation formulas or municipal cost-sharing programs.

- Federal law fails to require states to hold public hearings on the setting of water quality standards. Obviously, there can be considerable public controversy surrounding the choice of standards. The failure to stipulate public hearings serves the interests of dischargers at the expense of the public, whose accessibility to the decision making process is greatly diminished.

- Setting environmental quality standards is a meaningless exercise unless effective mechanisms are developed for achieving the standards. Without exception, states have placed primary reliance on some form of licensing of discharges (including discharge limits) accompanied by judicial enforcement of the license terms. As we have seen, this leads to multi-stage bargaining with minimal accessibility and accountability, and the consequence is delay or non-enforcement of the standard.
In short, the political response to the water pollution problem has been to shift the real decisions from the federal to the state level and from the legislature to the bureaucracy; to make decisions in arenas where there is less accountability and accessibility; and to avoid once-and-for-all resolutions of the political conflicts in favor of the piecemeal, fragmented decisions characterizing the enforcement process. These tendencies work against the public interest in pollution control and in favor of polluters.

The economic-incentives approach which we (along with many other economists) have suggested has heretofore had little political appeal. This is in part because it runs directly counter to the tendencies cited above. Establishment of a pollution-charge system in conjunction with environmental quality standards would resolve most of the political conflict over the environment. And it would do so in a highly visible way, so that those who would be hurt by such a policy could see what was happening. It is the openness and explicitness of such choices that policy makers seek to avoid.

It is not entirely facetious to suggest that the reason an economic-incentives approach has not been tried in this country is that it would work. In the absence of effective pollution-control policies, polluters are able to expropriate the environment for their own use by the act of discharging wastes. A system of pollution charges, on the other hand, would establish the principle that the environment is owned by the people as a whole and that the polluters must pay for the privilege of using part of the environment for waste disposal. Such massive transfers of "property rights" and the wealth they represent seldom occur without political upheaval. Viewed in this light, the most formidable barrier to controlling pollution is probably not technology, population, or public attitudes, but rather the politics of power in our pluralistic democracy.
Education and economic equality

LESTER C. THUROW

However much they may differ on other matters, the left, the center, and the right all affirm the central importance of education as a means of solving our social problems, especially poverty. To be sure, they see the education system in starkly contrasting terms. The left argues that the inferior education of the poor and of the minorities reflects a discriminatory effort to prevent them from competing with better-educated groups, to force them into menial, low-income jobs. The right argues that the poor are poor because they have failed to work hard and get the education which is open to them. Moderates usually subscribe to some mixture of these arguments: The poor are poor because they have gotten bad educations, partly as a result of inadequately funded and therefore inferior school systems, but partly also as a result of sociological factors (e.g., disrupted families) that prevent poor children from absorbing the education that is available. Yet despite these differences, people at all points of the political spectrum agree that, if they were running the country, education policy would be the cornerstone of their effort to improve the condition of the poor and the minorities: If the poor or the minorities were better educated, they could get better jobs and higher income. This idea has had a profound influence on public policy in the last decade.
This acceptance of the efficacy of education is itself derived from a belief in the standard economic theory of the labor market. According to this theory, the labor market exists to match labor demand with labor supply. At any given time, the pattern of matching and mismatching gives off various signals: Businesses are “told” to raise wages or redesign jobs in skill-shortage sectors, or to lower wages in skill-surplus sectors; individuals are “told” to acquire skills in high-wage sectors and are discouraged from seeking skills and jobs in sectors where wages are low and skills are in surplus. Each skill market is “cleared,” in the short run, by increases or reductions in wages, and by a combination of wage changes, skill changes, and production-technique changes over the long run. The result, according to the theory, is that each person in the labor market is paid at the level of his marginal productivity. If he adds $3,000 to total economic output, he is paid $3,000; if he adds $8,000, he is paid $8,000.

This theory posits wage competition as the driving force of the labor market. It assumes that people come into the labor market with a definite, pre-existing set of skills (or lack of skills), and that they then compete against one another on the basis of wages. According to this theory, education is crucial because it creates the skills which people bring into the market. This implies that any increase in the educational level of low-income workers will have three powerful—and beneficial—effects. First, an educational program that transforms a low-skill person into a high-skill person raises his productivity and therefore his earnings. Second, it reduces the total supply of low-skill workers, which leads in turn to an increase in their wages. Third, it increases the supply of high-skill workers, and this lowers their wages. The net result is that total output rises (because of the increase in productivity among formerly uneducated workers), the distribution of earnings becomes more equal, and each individual is still rewarded according to merit. What could be more ideal?

Empirical studies seemingly have confirmed this theory. The economic literature on “human capital” is full of articles that estimate the economic rate of return for different levels of education; while the results differ slightly depending on the data and methods used, most studies find a rate of return on higher education slightly above 10 per cent per year for white males. This rate of return, as it happens, is approximately the same as that of investments in “physical capital” (e.g., new machines). From these findings, two conclusions seem to follow. First, educational investment produces just as much
additional output as physical investments in plant and capital; and
second, education is a powerful tool for altering the distribution of
income in society. Such calculations are in common use in discus-
sions of public education policy, and they form a major justification
for heavy public investment in education.

Yet, despite this seeming confirmation, there is reason to doubt the
validity of this view of the labor market and the importance of the
economic role it assigns to education. As we shall see, a large body
of evidence indicates that the American labor market is character-
ized less by wage competition than by job competition. That is to
say, instead of people looking for jobs, there are jobs looking for
people—for "suitable" people. In a labor market based on job com-
petition, the function of education is not to confer skill and therefore
increased productivity and higher wages on the worker; it is rather
to certify his "trainability" and to confer upon him a certain status
by virtue of this certification. Jobs and higher incomes are then dis-
tributed on the basis of this certified status. To the extent that job
competition rather than wage competition prevails in the American
economy, our long-standing beliefs about both the economic benefits
of education and the efficacy of education as a social policy which
makes for greater equality may have to be altered.

Defects of the "wage competition" theory

While it is possible to raise a number of theoretical objections
against the "human capital" calculations which seem to confirm the
wage competition theory, it is more instructive to see if in our ac-
tual post-war experience, existing educational programs have had the
effects that the wage competition theory would predict. In fact,
there are a number of important discrepancies. The first arises from
the fact that, in the real world, the distributions of education and
IQ are more equal than the distribution of income, as Figure I in-
dicates. The usual explanation for this disparity is that income is
disproportionately affected by the combination of education and in-
telligence. This would explain the wider dispersion of income than
of education or intelligence—but it cannot explain the markedly dif-
ferent shapes of the distributions. Clearly, other factors are at work.

A second discrepancy is revealed by the fact that, while the dis-
tribution of education has moved in the direction of greater equality
over the post-war period, the distribution of income has not. In 1950,
the bottom fifth of the white male population had 8.6 per cent of the
total number of years of education, while the top fifth had 31.1 per
Figure I. Distribution of Income, Education, and Intelligence (IQ) of Males Twenty-five Years of Age and Over in 1965.


By 1970, the share of the bottom fifth had risen to 10.7 per cent and that of the top fifth had dropped to 29.3 per cent. According to the wage competition theory, this should have led to a more equal distribution of earnings, whereas in fact the distribution of income among white males has become more unequal, as Table 2 indicates. From 1949 to 1969, the share of total income going to the lowest fifth has dropped from 3.2 per cent to 2.6 per cent while the share going to the highest fifth rose from 44.8 per cent to 46.3 per cent. Empirically, education has not been having the equalizing impact that the rate-of-return calculations would have led one to expect.

Black/white income gaps reveal the same discrepancies. From 1952 to 1968, the mean education of black male workers rose from 67 per cent to 87 per cent of that of white male workers—yet median
wage and salary incomes rose only from 58 per cent to 66 per cent. Most of this increase, moreover, can be traced to black emigration from the South, with its lower relative incomes for blacks. As a result, education does not seem to have equalized black and white incomes in the manner that the rate-of-return calculations would indicate.

Similarly, a more rapid rate of growth of education should have led to a more rapid growth of the economy. In the early 1950's, the college-educated labor force was growing at a rate of 3 per cent per year. In the late 1960's, it was growing at a 6 per cent rate. Yet there does not seem to be any evidence that the rate of growth of productivity of the economy as a whole has accelerated correspondingly. If anything, the opposite has happened. Productivity today may be increasing more slowly than its historic rate of growth of 2.9 per cent per year.

Moreover, the entire theory assumes a labor market where wage competition is the most important short-run method for equilibrating the supplies and demands for different types of labor. Yet the real world reveals very sluggish wage adjustments in most sectors of the economy. Not only is there considerable variance in wages for different individuals with the same skills; there is also little tendency for the existence of unemployment to lower wages. There may be many unemployed airline pilots or engineers today, but their joblessness does not lead to lower wages for those lucky enough to remain employed. In fact, wage competition simply is not the all-pervasive force that economic theory supposes it to be.
Perhaps the most devastating problem with the simple wage competition view is that it cannot explain the existence of unemployment. When the demand for labor falls, wages are supposed to fall until enough jobs have been generated to keep everyone fully employed at the new lower wages. Yet the real world is full of unemployed workers whose presence does not seem to have led to falling wages for those who are employed.

The absence of wage competition is also indicated by employers' lack of interest in relative wage differentials when designing new plants. In the several cases investigated by Piore and Doeringer, plant designers typically did not take account of (or even know) the relative prices of different types of labor when designing new plants. They could not economize on expensive skills since they did not know which skills were expensive and which cheap. They simply used an average wage rate in making their calculations.

Now there are plausible *ad hoc* explanations for all of these aberrant observations—but the necessity for so many *ad hoc* explanations is itself suspicious. Our experience with large investments in higher education entitles us to have doubts about the value of education as a means of altering the distribution of income. In the post-war years, this experience has not been encouraging. Large investments have been made. What little has happened to the post-war distribution of adult white male incomes has been contrary to expectation. Before further investments are made for such purposes, we should first get clear on why past investments have not had the expected and desired results.

**The “job competition” model**

Governmental education and training policies have not had the predicted impact because they have ignored the “job competition” elements in the labor market. In a labor market based on job competition, an individual's income is determined by (a) his relative position in the labor queue and (b) the distribution of job opportunities in the economy. Wages are based on the characteristics of the job, and workers are distributed across job opportunities on the basis of their relative position in the labor queue. The most preferred workers get the best (highest-income) jobs. According to this model, labor skills do not exist in the labor market; on the contrary, most actual job skills are acquired informally through on-the-job training after a worker finds an entry job and a position on the associated promotional ladder.
As a matter of fact, such a training process is clearly observable in the American economy. A survey of how American workers acquired their actual job skills found that only 40 per cent were using skills that they had acquired in formal training programs or in specialized education—and, of these, most reported that some of the skills they were currently using had been acquired through informal on-the-job training. The remaining 60 per cent acquired all of their job skills through such informal on-the-job training. More than two thirds of the college graduates reported that they had acquired job skills through such informal processes. When asked to list the form of training that had been most helpful in acquiring their current job skills, only 12 per cent listed formal training and specialized education.

Thus the labor market is primarily a market, not for matching the demands for and supplies of different job skills, but for matching trainable individuals with training ladders. *Because most skills are acquired on the job, it is the demand for job skills which creates the supply of job skills.* The operative problem in a job competition economy is to pick and train workers to generate the desired productivity with the least investment in training costs. For new workers and for entry-level jobs, it is the “background characteristics” of the workers that form the basis of selection. Those workers whose backgrounds promise the lowest training costs will be hired. For workers with previous job experience, existing job skills (including skills like reliability and punctuality) are relevant to the selection process to the extent that they might lead to lower training costs.

In such a system, depending as it does on informal on-the-job transmission of knowledge and skills, the absence of direct wage competition and the restriction of any job competition to entry-level jobs are absolutely necessary. If workers feel that they are training a potential wage or job competitor every time they show another worker how to do their job, they have every incentive to stop giving such informal training. Each man, under the circumstances, would try to build his own little monopoly by hoarding skills and information and by resisting any technical improvements that would reduce the number of job opportunities in his occupation. But in a training system where no one is trained unless a job is available (which is what on-the-job training means), where strong seniority provisions exist, and where there is no danger of some competitor bidding down your wages, employees can freely transmit information to new workers and more readily accept new techniques. If anyone is made
redundant by such techniques, it will be a clearly defined minority—new workers.

In a labor market governed by job competition, employers rank workers on a continuum from the best potential worker (trainee) to the worst potential worker (trainee) on the basis of estimated potential training costs. (Such costs certainly include the costs of inculcating norms of industrial discipline and good work habits.) But because employers rarely have direct and unambiguous evidence of the specific training costs for specific workers, they end up ranking workers according to their background characteristics—age, sex, educational attainment, previous skills, performance on psychological tests, etc. Each of these is used as an indirect measure of the costs necessary to produce some standard of work performance.

Entirely subjective and arbitrary elements may also affect the labor queue. If employers discriminate against blacks, blacks will find themselves lower in the labor market queue than their training costs would warrant. To some extent, the smaller the actual differences in training costs, the more such subjective preferences can determine the final ordering. If every individual had identical training costs, blacks could be placed at the bottom of the labor queue with no loss in efficiency.

The national labor queue depends upon the distribution of these background characteristics and upon employers' ranking of different background characteristics. While no two workers may be exactly alike, the costs of discovering small differences are so large that individuals are ranked on a finite number of background characteristics. This means that there are a finite number of rankings in the labor queue and that many individuals have identical rankings.

Jobs and their corresponding training ladders are distributed to individuals in order of their rank, working from those at the top of the queue down to those at the bottom. The best jobs go to the best workers and the worst jobs to the worst workers. Given a need for untrained labor, some workers at the bottom of the queue will receive little or no training on their jobs. In periods of labor scarcity, training will extend farther and farther down the queue as employers are forced to train more costly workers to fill job vacancies. In periods of labor surplus, it is those at the bottom of the labor queue who will be unemployed.

To the extent that education and formal training are an important background characteristic used for screening individuals, alterations in the distribution of education can have an important impact on the shape of the labor queue. This queue can be skinnier at the top,
at the bottom, or in the middle. The relevant empirical question is
the weight that is attached to education in screening, relative to the
weight that is attached to other factors. Although this obviously
differs from job to job, educational screening tests are in fact ubiqui-
tous. But although education can affect the shape of the labor queue,
this does not necessarily mean that it can change the actual distribu-
tion of income. This is a function, not only of the labor queue, but
also of the distribution of job opportunities. An equal group of la-
borers (with respect to potential training costs) might be distributed
across a relatively unequal distribution of job opportunities. After
receiving the resultant on-the-job training, the initially equal work-
ers would have unequal productivities since they would now have
unequal skills. As a result, the distribution of incomes is determined
by the distribution of job opportunities and not by the distribution
of the labor queue, which only determines the order of access—and
the distribution of access—to job opportunities.

The distribution of job opportunities

The shape of the job distribution (and hence of the income dis-
tribution) across which individual laborers will be spread is gov-
erned by three sets of factors: (1) the character of technical pro-
gress, which generates certain kinds of jobs in certain proportions;
(2) the sociology of wage determination—trade unions, traditions of
wage differentials, etc.; and (3) the distribution of training costs
between employees and employers, which will influence the wage
that is associated with each job. The interaction among these fac-
tors is exceedingly complicated—and little studied. The outcome of
such studies would tell us with some assurance where exactly the
American economy is to be located on a continuum between a wage
competition economy and a job competition economy. Let me point
out, however, that observed changes over the post-war period are
in accordance with a job competition model.

If, at the beginning of the post-war period, an observer had been
told that the composition of the adult white male labor force was
going to change from 47 per cent with a grade school education, 38
per cent with a high school education, and 15 per cent with a col-
lege education, to 20 per cent with a grade school education, 51
per cent with a high school education, and 28 per cent with a college

1Further discussion of this matter may be found in Lester C. Thurow, "The
American Distribution of Income: A Structural Problem," Committee Print, U.S.
Congress Joint Economic Committee, 1972.
education (the actual 1949 to 1969 changes), expectations about the distribution of income would have been very different depending upon whether the observer subscribed to a job competition model or a wage competition model. Assuming there were no offsetting changes on the demand side of the market, the observer subscribing to a wage competition model of the economy would have predicted a substantial equalization of earnings. But the observer subscribing to the job competition model would have predicted something quite different. He would have expected an equalization of income within the most preferred group (college-educated workers), a rise in its incomes relative to other groups, and a decrease relative to the national average. He would have reasoned as follows: As the most preferred group expanded, it would filter down the job distribution into lower-paying jobs. This would lead to a fall in wages relative to the national average. As it moved into a denser portion of the national job (income) distribution, it would, however, experience within-group equalization of income. By taking what had previously been the best high school jobs, college incomes would rise relative to high school incomes.

Such a prediction would have been correct. The proportion of college incomes going to the poorest 25 per cent of white male college-educated workers rose from 6.3 to 9.0 per cent from 1949 to 1969, while the proportion going to the richest 25 per cent fell from 53.9 per cent to 46.0 per cent. While the median income of college-educated workers was rising from 198 per cent to 254 per cent of the median for grade-school-educated workers and from 124 per cent to 137 per cent of the median for high-school-educated workers, it was falling from 148 per cent to 144 per cent of the national median.

As the least preferred group (those with a grade school education) contracted in size, a job competition observer would have expected it to be moving out of the denser regions of the income distribution and becoming more and more concentrated on the lower tail of the income distribution. Given the shape of the lower tail of the American income distribution, such a movement would have led to falling relative incomes and increasing income equality. In fact, the incomes of grade school laborers have fallen from 50 per cent to 39 per cent of college incomes and from 63 per cent to 54 per cent of high school incomes. The income going to the poorest 25 per cent of all grade school laborers has risen from 2.9 per cent to 6.6 per cent of the group’s total, and the income going to the richest 25 per cent has fallen from 53.5 per cent to 49.4 per cent.

Predictions of the position of the middle group (the high-school-
educated) would have depended upon an analysis of the relative densities of the income distribution at its margin with the college-educated and the grade-school-educated. Since the American income distribution is denser on the margin with the grade-school-educated than on the margin with the college-educated, an expansion in the size of the middle group should have led to more within-group equality, an income rise relative to the grade-school-educated, and an income fall relative to the college-educated. In fact, the proportion of income going to the poorest 25 per cent of all the high-school-educated has risen from 8.2 per cent to 10.2 per cent, while the proportion going to the highest 25 per cent has fallen from 46.0 per cent to 41.6 per cent. High school incomes have risen relative to grade school incomes (from 160 per cent to 185 per cent) and fallen relative to college incomes (from 81 per cent to 73 per cent).

An alternative method for viewing the same changes is to look at the probability each of these educational groups has of holding a job at different levels in the American job hierarchy. The increasing economic segregation based on education can be seen in Table 3, where each cell has been adjusted for changes in the proportions of those with college, high school, and grade school educations. (The table is constructed so that each cell would have the number 1.000 if incomes were randomly drawn with respect to education.) In 1949, a college graduate was six times as likely to hold a job in the top tenth of jobs as a grade school graduate, but by 1969 he was 15 times as likely to hold a job in the top tenth. Conversely, the probability of a grade school graduate holding a job in the lowest tenth has risen from three to six times that of a college graduate. Similarly, probabilities of holding the best job have risen for college graduates relative to high school graduates (from 2.5 to 4 times those of high school graduates), while there has been a rise in relative probabilities of holding the worst jobs for high school graduates (from 1.2 to 1.5 times those of college graduates). Extrapolation of these trends for another 20 years would lead to a world where income was almost perfectly segregated according to education.

Although the job competition model seems to "post-cast" accurately what happened to the American distribution of income in the post-war period, post-casting is not a definitive test, and there are other possible explanations for what happened in the post-war period. One explanation would be that increasing technical progress has simply made education more necessary for acquiring income-producing skills. Training costs differentials have risen, and this could explain the increasing economic segregation based on educa-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Jobs (Determined By Income of Total Males with Income, 25 Yrs. &amp; Older)</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Males in Each Job Class, in 1950 &amp; 1970, by Educational Attainment (Divided by Per Cent of Total Males with that Educational Attainment that Year)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary</td>
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<tr>
<td>10% Best Jobs—1950: $5,239.3 &amp; up 1970: $15,000 &amp; up</td>
<td>.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Best 10%—1950: $4,028.84-$5,239.2 1970: $12,506.26-$14,999</td>
<td>.599</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd 10%—1950: $3,519.7-$4,028.83 1970: $10,012.9-$12,506.25</td>
<td>.772</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th 10%—1950: $2,553.6-$3,025.1 1970: $7,573.9-$8,751</td>
<td>.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th 10%—1950: $2,101-$2,553.5 1970: $6,449.6-$7,573.8</td>
<td>1.079</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th 10%—1950: $1,530-$2,100 1970: $5,148.3-$6,449.5</td>
<td>1.193</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th 10%—1950: $706-$1,529 1970: $3,576.8-$5,148.2</td>
<td>1.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th 10%—1950: $270.6-$705 1970: $2,008.2-$3,576.5</td>
<td>1.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% Worst Jobs—1950: $0-$270.5 1970: $0-$2008.1</td>
<td>1.458</td>
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tion. Another explanation would be that higher education has become more meritocratic in the post-war period (i.e., it is becoming more perfectly correlated with other income-producing factors), which would create the appearance of more economic segregation based on education. Still another explanation would be that the American economy has become more of a “credential society,” in which education is used as a cheap (or defensible) screening device even though it is not very closely related to training costs.

**Economic implications**

While education has many non-economic benefits, its strictly economic benefits may be of three types: First, education directly increases the productivity of a country’s labor force and indirectly increases the productivity of its physical capital. The result is more output and a higher real living standard. Second, by altering the distribution of individual productivities, education can lead to changes in the distribution of earned income between rich and poor. It can help the poor to catch up with the rich. Third, education can lead to economic mobility. Black earnings may catch up with white earnings, and the children of low-productivity parents need not themselves be low-productivity individuals. It is important to recognize, however, that each of these three impacts is merely possible. They may or may not occur. Whether they do or do not is an empirical question.

Even on the wage competition view of the labor market, education can be expanded to the point where it no longer increases a country’s productivity. Nevertheless, large observed earnings differentials between the high-school-educated and the college-educated (after standardization for other factors such as IQ) have been taken as evidence to substantiate the fact that there are actual gains to be made. But if there is a substantial element of job competition in the economy, education’s impact on individual productivity cannot be determined simply with rate-of-return calculations based on normalized income differentials. The exact impact on productivity of an alteration in the distribution of education depends upon a set of factors beyond the scope of this essay, but large observed income differentials could persist after the productivity impact of education was exhausted. An increasing supply of the college-educated would lead them to accept jobs farther down the job opportunities distribution. In the process, they would take the best high school jobs and thus bring down average high school incomes. This would preserve the observed wage differential between college and high school la-
There is, then, a need to be much more agnostic about the productivity impacts of education than public rhetoric would indicate to be our present inclination. In the wage competition view of education, additional education for someone with more education than I can never hurt my prospects. If anything, it must raise my potential earnings. From the job competition point of view, however, education may become a defensive necessity. As the supply of educated labor increases, individuals find that they must improve their educational level simply to defend their current income positions. If they don't, others will, and they will find their current job no longer open to them. Education becomes a good investment, not because it would raise people's incomes above what they would have been if no one had increased his education, but rather because it raises their income above what it will be if others acquire an education and they do not. In effect, education becomes a defensive expenditure necessary to protect one's "market share." The larger the class of educated labor and the more rapidly it grows, the more such defensive expenditures become imperative. Interestingly, many students currently object to the defensive aspects of acquiring a college education. This complaint makes no sense from a wage competition point of view, but it makes good sense from a job competition point of view.

While the current public policy emphasis on on-the-job training programs seems to fit in with the job competition view of the world, on-the-job training programs can have an impact only if they really lead to the training of a different class of workers than would ordinarily have been trained through the job market. Unfortunately, many government training programs have simply led to the training of the groups that would have been trained in any case; the only operative difference is that government foots the training bills.

Based on a wage competition view of the labor market, government programs to equalize incomes and to raise the productivity of low-income individuals have been almost entirely devoted to changing the labor characteristics that an individual brings into the labor market. This is done in spite of the fact that individual labor characteristics typically do not explain more than half of the observed income differences between black and white, rich and poor, or male and female. Thus the emphasis has been entirely on changing the supplies of different types of workers rather than the demands for different types of workers.

In addition to being uncalled for by economic theory, this empha-
sis on altering labor supplies is at variance with our own history. To find a period of increasing income equality it is necessary to go back to the Great Depression and World War II. From 1929 to 1941 the share of total income going to the bottom 40 per cent of the population rose from 12.5 per cent to 13.6 per cent, while the share of income going to the top 5 per cent fell from 30.0 per cent to 24.0 per cent and the share of income going to the top 20 per cent fell from 54.4 per cent to 48.8 per cent. From 1941 to 1947 the share going to the bottom 40 per cent rose to 16.0 per cent, while the share going to the top 5 per cent fell to 20.9 per cent and the share going to the top 20 per cent fell to 46.0 per cent. In both cases alterations in the demand side, rather than the supply side, of the market seem to have provided the mechanism for equalizing incomes.

In the Great Depression an economic collapse was the mechanism for changes. Individual fortunes were lost, firms collapsed, and a wage structure emerged that was noticeably more equal than before the collapse. While interesting, the deliberate collapsing of an economy in order to equalize the distribution of income is not a policy that commends itself.

The World War II period is more interesting from this vantage point. As a result of an overwhelming consensus that the economic burdens of the war should be shared equally, the federal government undertook two major actions. First, it instituted a very progressive income tax (more progressive than the current federal income tax) that converted a regressive tax system into a mildly progressive tax system. Second, it used a combination of wage controls and labor controls to equalize market wages. This was accompanied by a conscious policy of restructuring jobs to reduce skill requirements and to make use of the existing skills of the labor force. To some extent, old skill differences were simply cloaked with a new set of relative wages and, to some extent, skill differentials were actually collapsed. Together the two factors led to an equalization of market incomes that was not dissipated after the war ended.

To some extent the wage policies of World War II were a deliberate—and successful—attempt to change the sociology of what constitutes "fair" wage differentials. As a result of the war, our judgments as to what constituted fair differentials changed, and this was reflected in wage patterns. As a consequence of the widespread consensus that wage differentials should be reduced, it was possible to make a deliberate attempt to reduce wage differentials. After they had been embedded in the labor market for a number
of years, these new differentials came to be regarded as the "just" differentials and stuck after the egalitarian pressures of World War II disappeared.

From this experience, I would suggest that any time a consensus emerges on the need for more equality, it can be at least partly achieved by making a frontal attack on wage differentials. Elaborate educational programs are not necessary. Without such a consensus, I would suggest, massive educational investments are apt to be wasted. They simply will not bring about the desired equalization.

In addition to a frontal attack on wage differentials, programs to alter the demands for different types of employees would include research and development efforts to alter the skill-mix generated by technical progress; guaranteed government jobs; fiscal and monetary policies designed to create labor shortages; public wage scales designed to pressure low-wage employers; and incentives to encourage private employers to compress their wage differentials. If quick results are desired, quotas must seriously be considered since they are the only technique for quickly altering the types of laborers demanded.

In any case, I would argue that our reliance on education as the ultimate public policy for curing all problems, economic and social, is unwarranted at best and in all probability ineffective.
The Street Gangs and Ethnic Enterprise

NATHAN GLAZER

It has long been felt by those who struggle with the acute problems of living in the low-income areas of our cities that some answers could be found in the informal structures of social life among the low-income groups. If the child-care authorities, the courts, the police were ineffective in controlling the fantastic level of juvenile delinquency, was it possible that the street gangs themselves could in some way do so? If the schools could not teach or control the children, in competition with the glamor of street life, could street life—and those who dominated it—take over some of the functions of education? If the public housing authorities could not maintain the buildings at some decent level, could some social form that emerged among the tenants do so? And if neither individual initiative nor government aid seemed to be effective in getting new groups into small business enterprise, could some ethnic or racial organization do so?

In Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, Daniel P. Moynihan described how such thinking entered into the making of the poverty program. For in the poverty program one important line of thought was that those groups which opposed existing, legitimate authority—and, indeed, even engaged in illegal activity—might be used to raise the condition of new ethnic and racial groups in the city. If the political machine had raised the Irish, and the Mafia the Italians, why could not the gang raise the Negroes and Puerto Ricans? The thought was an intriguing one and solidly based on good sociological tradition, coming from Durkheim and Mayo through Robert K. Merton and Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin to reach fruition in the work of an army of social workers and government officials.

Richard W. Poston's The Gang and the Establishment (Harper & Row, $7.95) and Harry Brill's Why Organizers Fail (University of California Press, $6.95) describe two efforts, both supported by poverty program funds to one degree or another, both based on the informal social structures of people in low-income areas, and both failures. They also suggest to me—and perhaps it is only my disciplinary loyalties as a sociologist that prompt such a conclusion—that what was wrong in this case was not sociological theory, but only the efforts of social workers and government officials to create such informal groups when they did not exist, and to respond to their own paper creations as if they were real.
Richard Poston tells, in fantastic and rich detail, the story of an enterprise improbably named the "Real Great Society." A few years ago, those of us who read the newspapers and mass magazines might have believed the Real Great Society to be a growing complex of business establishments and formal and informal organizations for recreation, education, vocational training, and culture, all organized by Puerto Rican gang leaders on the Lower East Side. Poston, who had worked in community development in poor areas in this country and abroad, and who is now a research professor at Southern Illinois University, was intrigued: Here was the street gang being turned to positive pursuits instead of petty crime, the harassment of local merchants, and apprenticeship for adult crime or self-destruction through drugs. He reconstructed the history of the beginnings of the Real Great Society, and himself played a role in its maturity and decline.

The story Poston tells is one of a great triumph of public relations, organized almost entirely by a few young men of middle-class background, some of whom lived on the Lower East Side, some of whom had connections with the poverty program and other government agencies, and some of whom were professionally involved in working with youth. Poston's account makes it clear that, even with a good idea (in this case, the utilization of youths with street and gang skills to organize programs that would teach, train, and involve other slum youths), it was not easy to get money from the government. But it was possible, if one were ingenious enough, persistent enough, and skillful enough to get the mass media to tell a story that was still only a gleam in the eye of a few people as if it existed and involved hundreds.

There were street people and gang leaders involved—indeed, without them the entire enterprise was impossible. But their major roles, it appears from Poston's account, were, first, to describe in glowing terms and with a confusion of tenses the achievements of the Real Great Society to college and university audiences around the country; and second, to meet with the media people and the foundation officials, while the earnest and dedicated young professionals in the background wrote up the proposals for foundation and government grants and arranged the meetings.

At one point, a Washington lawyer who had worked in developing countries was intrigued by the vision of a nationwide network of street-gang-supported organizations, carrying on the work of the Real Great Society everywhere (the work had only barely started as yet on the Lower East Side). A national meeting of street-gang leaders was organized at Carbondale, Illinois. As Poston writes: "What was actually happening was that the street leaders [whom the Washington lawyer] had caused to be enlisted . . . were being wooed, solicited, and eulogized, not only by him, but by everyone else from outside the ghetto who had become a part to the promotion—especially

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1The name was a takeoff on President Johnson's "Great Society": This was to be the real "Great Society."
Eventually, the street leaders, in alliance with the OEO officials, circumvented both those who had written up the proposals and designed the promotion and those dedicated people, from various backgrounds, who back on the Lower East Side really carried on the programs that for brief periods made the Real Great Society an exciting reality. But since the street leaders, according to Poston’s account, were skilled only at self-projection—they did no real work and had no clear idea what the building of organizations involved—the positive programs of the Real Great Society collapsed as the street leaders took over the control of funds from both their original promoters and the people who actually could and did carry on effective youth programs.

There is one other aspect to the story: The gang leaders were Puerto Rican. The professionals who backed them or promoted them were white. The gifted individuals who were really able to work with Lower East Side youth and who had functioning programs were black, white, and Mongolian! But as Puerto Rican nationalism rose, an entirely Puerto Rican East Harlem offshoot of the Real Great Society was able to challenge the Lower East Side street leaders who worked so comfortably with non-Puerto Rican blacks and whites. The Lower East Side leaders, to maintain their position in an increasingly separatist and militant atmosphere, were forced to move against their non-Puerto Rican backers and youth workers, and in doing so wrecked the nascent program. “The only possibility for a neutral third party to help resolve the struggle and clear the path for productive work was the federal agency that had made the . . . grant and which was responsible for its supervision. But that didn’t happen. Instead, OEO . . . encouraged the Real Great Society in its hostility to the effective workers, aided and abetted its attack against the staff, and threw the official weight of the United States government into the vendetta.”

Poston thinks work with street gang leaders is possible but difficult. “The only relationship between grantee and grantor that will work in the streets is that which is based on complete understanding, absolute honesty. . . . If the gang leaders lie about their intentions or behavior, the grant-maker is obliged to be aware of that fact and candidly tell them they were lying. . . . The gang leaders must know . . . the grantor is not a set-up for a hustle, and that they cannot depend on him to shield them from illegal or criminal acts. . . .” Poston goes into a detailed analysis of the relationship that is necessary to funnel the energy of street-gang leaders into positive directions. Each grant must have a counselor who is “a respected friend and helper, not a crutch. Yet he must also exercise an element of control that will extend far beyond the puny efforts of any contract specification or auditing procedures. . . . He must carry enough authority to be persuasive . . . [but must not be] authoritarian. The job will obviously be extremely delicate and exceedingly difficult, perhaps even hazardous. . . . These requirements . . . are merely the practical minimum.”
But if the requirements are so demanding, can any bureaucratic government agency or foundation possibly administer such a grant? And does this not make the hope of utilizing the informal structure of the streets rather illusory? So it would appear to me, and perhaps it is only American optimism, with its conviction that government can do anything, that leads us to think that this task, too, is possible.

Harry Brill, at the other end of the country, studied a rent strike in a public housing project. His is another tale of a fantasy that was taken seriously, at least for a while. The story begins with the local organization of the poverty program. In one area of the city, with a largely Spanish-speaking population, a Mexican-American leader was selected to run the program, with an elected board and staff. But in one housing project a black militant organizer and a few associates insisted on taking over full control of their sub-area, in opposition to the Mexican leader and largely Mexican board. Brill describes the two political styles in conflict: The black style is loud and aggressive and threatening, the Mexican style is mild and acquiescent—though the Mexicans are also armed. An example: “When Curtis [the black organizer] appeared before the board, the delegates questioned him in great detail about his background and experience . . . but Curtis believed they were treating him offensively and walked out of the interview . . . The area board delegates responded without indignation and approved him for the community organizer position.”

The black organizers refused to follow rules as to elections to their own local board: “. . . they submitted a list of nominees to the main office, but they refused to say when the elections would be held. . . . [A Mexican official insists on knowing the election date, so he can see how it is conducted] Curtis . . . accused him of racism, and said, ‘Blacks are not children. They can supervise their own elections.’ They secretly elected delegates. . . . [One black organizer] claimed, ‘Mexicans are all cowards.’” Brill believes that, in fact, the Mexicans had considerably more power and organization than the blacks, but they used it differently and for different purposes, and preferred to avoid certain conflicts.

The black leaders decided to organize a rent strike to force the housing authority to spend more in maintenance and meet other demands, and the main part of the book describes the tactics and strategy of the strike. The organizers made statements and threats; they confronted the housing authority, the housing manager, the mayor and other officials—but the strike itself barely ever existed. There were 18 women (the project apparently held mostly welfare mothers) who withheld their rent. Only one of the four organizers (“Jerry”) was assigned the task of encouraging non-payment of rent and keeping the strikers in line; the others considered this a rather inferior and low-status job compared with planning the higher strategy of the strike and making speeches. Of the relatively few women who actually participated in the strike, some stayed on because of a sexual relationship with the organizer. They were lonely and isolated, and Jerry at least would show up now and then. But he refused to
call the strikers together, because he feared what one woman would find out from another:

**Me:** Jerry, wouldn’t it be a good idea to meet with the tenants?

**Jerry:** I meet with them all the time. I meet with them every day, in their homes.

**Me:** But what about bringing them together at the office?

**Jerry:** Do you think I’m crazy? They’d be after my scalp.

The organizers claimed many were withholding rent, assuring themselves that the authority had no way of knowing who was striking and who was simply in arrears. They were quite wrong. The authority knew it was dealing with an enterprise whose main source of strength was the fact that it could disrupt housing authority meetings and get news coverage, but which really had very little behind it. Brill believes there were real possibilities for organization—at another housing project, there had been a successful rent strike—but that the organizers lived for their brief moments of glory in telling off the authorities.

Their relations with the white lawyers from the government-funded agency that tried to assist them were no more effective. They distrusted them on racial grounds and could not see that, though their lawyers did not bluster and chatted with the opposing lawyers, they could nevertheless be effective allies. In effect, the hard work of organization was as uncongenial to these black rent-strike organizers as to the Puerto Rican street leaders of *The Gang and The Establishment*. Their politics was expressive rather than effective. Brill describes them as engaged in “an almost continuous search for stimulation, which generated behavior that was highly impulsive and frantic, [and which] often seemed to others to reflect their ultra-militancy.” But to Brill this simply reflected ghetto and lower-class styles, which, while dramatic, sometimes frightening, and occasionally effective, were in the end a failure. His own account—the backside of the poverty program, as it were—is often hilarious but all too believable. Brill is deeply committed to the organization of the poor, and it would appear his favored model is the trade-union one; but he is aware, as so many are not, of the incredibly hard work organization requires.

**Pondering** these accounts, one wonders how much of the failures they describe should be attributed to ethnic or to lower-class styles (Brill’s account is reminiscent of Herbert Gans’s description of the lower-class style of life, in which one lives for stimulation and “highs,” in contrast to the sober working-class style), and how much to the fatuity of expecting government to create a suitable substitute for the ties of organization, formal and informal, that so often effectively knit together low-income groups. In *Ethnic Enterprise in America* (University of California Press, $7.95), a sophisticated and subtle analysis of the business and welfare experience of Chinese, Japanese, and Blacks in the United States, Ivan H. Light deals with a different area of social experience than does Poston or Brill. Yet as one sees the living social texture of a group emerging from his statistics
and analysis, one reflects sadly that there is much that cannot be
done by publicity, bluster, and government grants—and when this
social texture is not there to do the job, it is very hard to see what
can take its place.

The facts of the case are well known: Chinese, Japanese, and Blacks
have all suffered from a fierce prejudice and persecution in this
country. The first two groups have been effective—even when this
prejudice and persecution were at their worst—in establishing small
businesses and in taking care of their own poor and unfortunates.
The Blacks have not.

What is the explanation? Certain explanations will no do: for ex-
ample, differential access to bank credit. Few small businessmen (of
the size we are talking about) had access to bank credit. Most small
businesses get their capital from either personal and family savings
or loans from family and kin. A more sophisticated explanation is
that of special consumer demands. It is clear that a group speaking a
foreign language and sharing an exotic culture has demands which
only members of its own group, as small businessmen, can satisfy.
This explains more. Yet the fact is—and Light ingeniously demon-
strates this from the statistics—that from an early period the Chinese
and Japanese served far more than their own groups. The Chinese
restaurant and laundry served mostly non-Orientals, as did the Jap-
namese growers and marketers of vegetables in California.

Light focuses on quite another explanation: the prevalence of ro-
tating credit associations both in the areas from which the Chinese
and Japanese came, and in the Chinese and Japanese communities in
this country. These take many forms, and are found widely in tradi-
tional societies. Basically, they consist of a group of participants “who
agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole
or in part, to each contributor in rotation.” There are many variants
on this basic form, but it is found in China, Japan, and West Africa,
and it played a major role in establishing Chinese and Japanese busi-
nesses in this country. Why did it not work for blacks? Because while
it survived the trip from Africa to the West Indies, it did not survive
the further trip to this country.

But this is only the beginning of the story. The mere existence of a
social form is scarcely sufficient to explain such substantial differences.
The social form is itself based on an underlying social reality, the
ethnic group, of which all feel themselves a part, and in which each
feels responsible for the other (or, to put it perhaps less positively, in
which all are subject to one another). Which is why the first man to
get the pot does not abscond with it. “Rotating credit associations did
not possess any magical means of eliminating the risks of lending,
which in Western practice are offset by collateral assignments. The
ability of the hui and the ko [the Oriental forms] routinely to provide
credit without requiring collateral depended, in the last analysis, on

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2Light’s analysis is now supplemented by what is probably the most scholarly
and searching book on the Japanese in America, William Petersen’s Japanese
Americans (Random House, $2.95). In his discussion of Japanese success, Peter-
sen comes to conclusions similar to Light's.
the strong, informal, and moralistic social relations of lenders and borrowers. Should a member default, die, or prove unable to pay his debts, his kin were expected to make good the obligation.

Immigrant ethnic groups could run such rotating credit associations; Light argues they could not run banks. It is well known that most black banks have failed in this country; Light points out that Chinese and Japanese banks (we speak of those set up by the immigrants, not the branches of banks in China and Japan) have failed too. They had to bear the costs of management and overhead—which the rotating credit associations avoided—and, more significantly, they were led inevitably into less personal relations, in which default and dishonesty were more likely.

Light describes other forms of association among the Oriental groups—prefectural and area associations, name associations, guilds of tradesmen, organizations of businessmen. Each Chinese or Japanese immigrant was automatically part of an "ascriptively" determined group that served a variety of functions—and for immigrants who did not need big capital or go into big business, it served these functions effectively. Its welfare role, too, was managed effectively, principally by the sanction of shame, which meant that very few came to the group for aid. But when they did, what could be simpler than this:

Some family associations [in Chinatown] kept a barrel of rice in the foyer from which a "cousin" might remove without charge as much as needed to feed himself or his family. The borrower was ... expected to return the rice ... whenever he found himself in more fortunate circumstances. The family associations did not experience a problem of 'relief chiselers' who took more rice than they needed, sold free association rice, or failed to return what they had received. The associations did not closely administer the dispensation of the rice, nor did they find it necessary to investigate the authenticity of the need of persons ... securing aid ... the system ... [permitted] the needy to secure victuals unobtrusively, without a humiliating display of dependency. ...

The ascriptive form of social organization found among the Chinese and Japanese, one which embraced all the immigrants—and which, it might be pointed out, could only be escaped by a determined effort—did not exist among the blacks. Color discrimination and international migration forced the Orientals together. Color discrimination also forced the blacks together—but there was nothing in their Southern past which encouraged locality organization. "Southern-born blacks lacked a highly evaluated past which would stimulate the establishment of organizations based on regional loyalties... urban Negro communities had to depend on voluntary organizations ... the members of which did not share migrant solidarity."

Black businessmen were destroyed by, among other things, the need to extend credit. The Chinese and Japanese conducted strictly cash business with outsiders; "on the other hand, in trade among themselves, both the Chinese and Japanese were extremely liberal in
extending credit. Liberal and informal credit policies worked smoothly in the Chinatowns and Japantowns because of institutionalized social trust."

Where Blacks formed into "moral communities" (for example, sects such as that of Father Divine), remarkable business success became possible. In effect, these sects created the kind of social organization that the Chinese and Japanese brought with them. But this kind of achievement was only rarely possible, and reached only a small percentage of the black population.

Light ends with a rather subtle analysis and revision of Max Weber's notion of "ethnic honor." As against honor based on status, or on membership in a voluntary group, or on achievement, "the sense of ethnic honor," Weber wrote, "is the specific honor of the masses, for it is accessible to anyone who belongs to the subjectively believed community of descent." Weber thought that this type of honor led to a double standard, in which faith was kept with the members of the group but outsiders could legitimately be cheated. As a matter of fact, though, the Chinese and Japanese had a reputation for honesty in dealing with whites, as well as with their own countrymen. "Ethnic honor" could also mean that the reputation and the prestige of the group in outside eyes must be built up and maintained; this was the motivation for high achievement by schoolchildren. "Unlike Orientals, black migrants could not be disciplined by reference to ethnic honor, since Southern-born migrants did not conceive of themselves as having any honor. Especially among the lowest stratum of urban Negroes, peers could rarely induce a fellow to actually refrain from some line of personally advantageous activity lest it discredit or shame blacks in general. . . Blacks were free to act as individuals quite apart from group approval of the impact of their actions on black honor. The rampant individualism contributed to the social disorganization of social life in the slums."

Light has a penchant for sociological language in its most prickly variants, but in the end he makes a powerful case. One looks back at the experience of the gang leaders and the rent-strike organizers, and one wonders to what extent a weakly developed sense of "ethnic honor" contributed to failure. And one wonders—a much more difficult question—what is to be done in its absence, and to what extent the new forms of militancy are a means of achieving a basis for ethnic honor. The signs are not encouraging—at least if we interpret ethnic honor to mean the kinds of norms and behavior patterns characteristic of Chinese and Japanese immigrants. In their absence, we try to fill up the void with government. But where ethnic honor operated efficiently, economically, and smoothly to establish businesses and to minimize the need for outside assistance, government operates inefficiently, clumsily, and at cross purposes. Still, in the absence of the natural forms of informal social organization, what alternatives do we have?
The Evidence on Busing

DAVID J. ARMOR

The legal basis of the national policy of integration—and of the school busing issue today—is the declaration of the Supreme Court in 1954 that

to separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.

Few decisions of the Court have provoked so much controversy for so long, or have had so much impact on the way of life of so many persons, as the case of Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, where this doctrine is stated. Policy makers have used it to restructure political, economic, and social institutions. Groups have rioted and states

Rarely can an unpublished academic article have attracted as much attention and publicity as has this analysis of busing. Professor Armor, a sociologist who specializes in research methods and social statistics, played a leading role in research on the Boston METCO study, which was one of the earliest evaluations of the effects of busing on black students. In this article he reports the detailed findings of that study plus those of several other comparable studies. While his manuscript was being copy-edited in our office, its findings were being "reported" in the national press (e.g., New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe), and they have even been denounced publicly by critics who have never seen the results of the studies themselves. We are publishing the full text of this academic article—all the graphs, footnotes, and references are included at the end—because we think that, in so controversial a matter as busing, it is important to be as precise as possible, even at the risk of pedantry. Inevitably, findings such as those of Professor Armor give rise not only to public but also to scholarly controversy. In our next issue we shall print comments on Professor Armor's article by other scholars.

—Editors
have divided over actions, direct and indirect, that have flowed from this ruling. And social scientists have proudly let it stand as a premier axiom of their field—one of the few examples of a social theory that found its way into formal law.

Few persons, perhaps, know of the role played by the social sciences in helping to sustain the forces behind desegregation. It would be an exaggeration to say they are responsible for the busing dilemmas facing so many communities today, yet without the legitimacy provided by the hundreds of sociological and psychological studies it would be hard to imagine how the changes we are witnessing could have happened so quickly. At every step—from the 1954 Supreme Court ruling, to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the federal busing orders of 1970—social science research findings have been inextricably interwoven with policy decisions.

And yet, the relation between social science and public policy contains a paradox in that the conditions for adequate research are often not met until a policy is in effect, while the policy itself often cannot be justified until supported by the findings of science. In consequence, the desire of scientists to affect society and the desire of policy makers to be supported by science often lead to a relation between the two that may be more political than scientific. Further, this can mean that the later evaluation research of a social action program may undo the very premises on which the action is based—as is the case somewhat in the Coleman Report on the effect of schools on achievement. There are obvious dangers for both social science and public policy in this paradox. There is the danger that important and significant programs—which may be desirable on moral grounds—may be halted when scientific support is lacking or reveals unexpected consequences; conversely, there is the danger that important research may be stopped when the desired results are not forthcoming. The current controversy over the busing of schoolchildren to promote integration affords a prime example of this situation.

The policy model behind the Supreme Court’s 1954 reasoning—and behind the beliefs of the liberal public today—was based in part on social science research. But that research did not derive from the conditions of induced racial integration as it is being carried out today. These earlier research designs were “ex post facto”—i.e., comparisons were made between persons already integrated and individuals in segregated environments. Since the integration experience occurred before the studies, any inferences about the effects of induced integration, based on such evidence, have been speculative at best. With the development of a variety of school integration programs across the country there arose the opportunity to conduct realistic tests of the integration policy model that did not suffer this limitation. While it may have other shortcomings, this research suffers neither the artificial constraints of the laboratory nor the causal ambiguity of the cross-sectional survey. The intent of this essay is to explore some of this new research and to interpret the findings. What we will do, first, is to sketch the evolution of the social science model which became the basis of public policy, and then review a number of tests of this model.
as revealed in recent social science studies of induced school integration and busing.

The Integration Policy Model: Stage I

The integration model which is behind current public policy is rooted in social science results dating back to before World War II. The connections between segregation and inequality were portrayed by John Dollard (1937) and Gunnar Myrdal (1944) in the first prestigious social science studies to show how prejudice, discrimination, segregation, and inequality operated to keep the black man in a subordinate status. Myrdal summarized this process in his famous “vicious circle” postulate: White prejudice, in the form of beliefs about the inferior status of the black race, leads to discrimination and segregation in work, housing, and social relationships; discrimination reinforces social and economic inequality; the resulting inferiority circles back to solidify the white prejudice that started it all. The vicious circle theory was the integration policy model in embryonic form.

Along with these broad sociological studies there also appeared a number of psychological experiments which were to play a crucial role in the policy decisions. The most notable were the doll studies of Kenneth and Mamie Clark (1947). They found that preschool black children were much less likely than white children to prefer dolls of their own race. Though this tendency tapered off among older children, the Clarks concluded that racial awareness and identification occurred at an early age and that the doll choices suggested harmful and lasting effects on black self-esteem and performance. Other studies confirmed these early findings (Proshansky and Newton, 1968; Porter, 1971). These studies added a psychological dynamic to explain the operation of the vicious circle: Prejudice and segregation lead to feelings of inferiority and an inability to succeed among the blacks; these sustain inequality and further reinforce the initial white prejudice. In other words, segregation leads to serious psychological damage to the black child; that damage is sufficient to inhibit the kind of adult behavior which might enable the black man to break the circle.

How could the circle be broken? This question plagued a generation of social scientists in quest of a solution to America’s race problems. Of a number of studies appearing after the war, two which focussed upon the effects of segregation and integration upon white racial attitudes had especial impact. The first was a section of Samuel Stouffer’s massive research on the American soldier during World War II (1949). Stouffer found that white soldiers in combat companies with a black platoon were far more likely to accept the idea of fighting side by side with black soldiers than were white soldiers in non-integrated companies. The second was the study by Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins (1951) of interracial housing. Comparing residents of similar backgrounds in segregated and integrated public housing projects, they found that whites in integrated housing were
more likely to be friendly with blacks, to endorse interracial living, and to have positive attitudes towards blacks in general than were whites living in the segregated projects. Though neither of these studies could ascertain the beliefs of these individuals prior to integration, neither author had reason to believe that the integrated whites differed from the segregated whites before the former's experience with blacks. They concluded, therefore, that the positive results were due to the effect of interracial contact and not to prior positive belief.

The culmination of this research was Gordon Allport's influential work, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1953). Using the work of Stouffer, Deutsch and Collins, and others, he formulated what has come to be known as the "contact theory":

Contacts that bring knowledge and acquaintance are likely to engender sounder beliefs about minority groups. . . . Prejudice . . . may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom, or local atmosphere), and if it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.

The clear key to breaking the vicious circle, then, was contact. By establishing integrated environments for black and white, white prejudice would be reduced, discrimination would decline, and damaging effects upon the black child's feelings and behavior would be reduced.

While the Supreme Court based its 1954 decision upon the narrower relationship between legally sanctioned segregation and psychological harm, it is clear that the *modus operandi* by which the damage would stop is implied by the contact theory. With the 1954 decision, then, contact theory became an officially sanctioned policy model, and the Southern public school systems became prime targets for its implementation.

The Integration Policy Model: Stage II

In the eyes of the Northerner, segregation had always been a Southern problem. The Supreme Court's action at first reinforced this belief, since state-sanctioned school segregation was rare outside the South. But events in the 1960's changed this for good. While the modern civil rights movement began in the South, its zenith was reached in the March on Washington in the late summer of 1963. Organized to dramatize the failure of court action to end segregation in the South, the March brought together 250,000 persons in the most impressive organized protest meeting in the history of the United States, and showed President Kennedy and the Congress the deep and massive support for anti-discrimination legislation.

The Congress answered this appeal by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the strongest such act since the Reconstruction period. The Act included strong sanctions against discrimination in education, employment, housing, and voting (the last supplemented by the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965), and while its thrust was still aimed at the South, it also set standards that could be used against de facto segregation in the North (for example, the Title VI provisions directed the withholding of federal funds from localities which intentionally maintain segregated schools—and this has recently been applied to the city of Boston). Equally important, it set in motion a social science study that was to have an immense impact upon public policy in the North as well as the South. As part of the Act, the Congress commissioned the United States Office of Education to conduct a survey "concerning the lack of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions at all levels in the United States...." Sociologist James Coleman was selected to head a team to design and conduct the survey.

The Coleman Report (1966), as it has come to be known, contained striking evidence of the extent of school segregation not only in the South but in all parts of the country. While the South was more segregated than the North, fully 72 per cent of black first graders in the urban North attended predominantly black schools. The report also confirmed one of the basic assumptions of the Stage I model: that black students performed poorly compared to white students. Using results from a variety of achievement tests, Coleman reported that throughout all regions and all grade levels, black students ranged from two to six years behind white students in reading, verbal, and mathematics performance. Equally, black students were shown to have lower aspirations, lower self-esteem about academic ability, and a more fatalistic attitude about their ability to change their situation.

The Coleman study, however, also reported some findings that surprisingly were not in accord with the early model. For one thing, black children were already nearly as far behind white children in academic performance in the first grade as they were in later grades. This raised some question about whether school policies alone could eliminate black/white inequalities. Adding to the significance of this finding were the facts that black and white schools could not be shown to differ markedly in facilities or services, and that whatever differences there were could not be used to explain the disparities in black and white student achievement. This led Coleman to conclude that schools bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent of his background and general social context; and this very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities [of their adult life].

While the findings about segregation and black/white differences have been widely publicized and largely accepted, this concluding aspect of Coleman's findings has been ignored by educational policy makers. Part of the reason may derive from the methodological controversies which surrounded these findings (e.g., Bowles and Levin, 1968), but the more likely and important reason is that the implications were devastating to the rationale of the educational establish-
ment in its heavy investment in school rehabilitative programs for the culturally deprived; the connection between public policy and social science does have its limitations.

We must return to the policy makers one more time for an important input into the final policy model. In 1965, President Johnson requested the United States Commission on Civil Rights to conduct an investigation into the effects of de facto segregation in the nation and to make recommendations about how it might be remedied. He expressed hope that the findings "may provide a basis for action not only by the federal government but also by the states and local school boards which bear the direct responsibility for assuring quality education." The Commission recommendations, in its 1967 volume entitled *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, constitute the most comprehensive policy statement to date on the subject of school integration; it is the policy which is, indeed, being followed by many states and local school boards throughout the country.

Using data from the Coleman study and several other original studies prepared for the Commission, the report concluded that Negro children suffer serious harm when their education takes place in public schools which are racially segregated, whatever the source of such segregation may be. Negro children who attend predominantly Negro schools do not achieve as well as other children, Negro and white. Their aspirations are more restricted than those of other children and they do not have as much confidence that they can influence their own futures. When they become adults, they are less likely to participate in the mainstream of American society, and more likely to fear, dislike, and avoid white Americans. The conclusions drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court about the impact upon children of segregation compelled by law—that it "affects their hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be undone"—applies to segregation not compelled by law.

To remedy this situation, the Commission recommended that the federal government establish a uniform standard for racial balance and provide financial assistance to states that develop programs to meet the standard. The Commission did not recommend a precise standard, but it did suggest that the standard be no higher than 50 per cent black in any single school. Likewise, the Commission did not specifically recommend that busing be the method whereby integration is accomplished. But the realities of residential segregation in many cities throughout the nation offered little alternative to the use of busing if these integration standards were to be attained.

This, then, became the basis for the integration policy model as applied to public schools. While the implementation of racial balance programs has differed from one locality to the next, the underlying rationale of all these programs is similar to that first formulated by the Supreme Court and extended by the Civil Rights Commission. The full policy model may be summarized as follows: The starting point is white prejudice consisting of stereotyped beliefs about black people. These beliefs lead to discriminatory behavior in
employment, housing, schooling, and social relationships in general. Discrimination in turn leads to social and economic inequality on the one hand, and segregation on the other hand. Inequality and segregation are mutually reinforcing conditions, reflecting not only the judicial doctrine that separation is inherently unequal, but also the social reality that segregation of a deprived group can cut off channels and networks that might be used to gain equality. Segregation and inequality combine to cause psychological damage in children resulting in lower achievement, lower aspirations, and less self-esteem. As the child grows older, this damage leads, on the one hand, to further social and economic inequalities in the form of inadequate education and inferior jobs and, on the other hand, to black alienation, prejudice, and hostility towards whites. This in turn leads to increased white prejudice (the vicious circle) and a general polarization of race relations. Given these cause and effect relations, the elimination of segregation in schooling should act as a countervailing force for black students by increasing achievement, raising aspirations, enhancing self-esteem, reducing black/white prejudices and hostility, and enabling black students to find better educational and occupational opportunities. It then follows that social and economic inequalities would be lessened and the vicious circle would be bent if not broken.

It must be stressed that this model is construed from public policy. While many of the causal relationships assumed in the model are, indeed, based on many years of scientific research in psychology and sociology, it is doubtful that any two specialists in the field of race relations would agree on all of the components of the model. Be that as it may, it is more to the point to stress that we are not setting out to test the full model. We are specifically interested in those aspects of the model that postulate positive effects of school integration for black students; namely, that school integration enhances black achievement, aspirations, self-esteem, race relations, and opportunities for higher education. We do not have data on the effects of integration on adults, nor on the effects of other types of integration, such as neighborhood housing, employment, and other forms. More important, the school integration programs we review here have two important characteristics in common that may limit generalizability. First, they are examples of “induced” integration as opposed to “natural” integration. Induced integration is brought about by the decision of a state or local agency to initiate a school integration program (sometimes voluntary, sometimes mandatory), rather than by the “natural” process whereby a black family makes an individual decision to relocate in a predominantly white community. Second, all of these programs have had to use varying amounts of busing to accomplish integration. This makes it difficult to separate out the potential effects of busing, if any, from the integration experience per se. In other words, we will be assessing the effects of induced school integration via busing, and not necessarily the effects of integration brought about by the voluntary actions of individual families that move to integrated neighborhoods. This is a more limited focus,
yet induced integration, usually necessitating some amount of busing, is precisely the policy model that has been followed (or is being considered) in many communities throughout the country.

The Data

Many of the cities which desegregated their schools to achieve a racial balance have conducted research programs to evaluate the outcomes of desegregation. It is from these studies that we can derive data to test the school and busing hypotheses stemming from the integration policy model. Since the evaluations were conducted independently, the variables studied and the research designs differ from one study to the next, and the quality of the research and the reports varies considerably. Accordingly, we have been selective in choosing studies to include in our analysis. Our choices have been guided by two considerations: 1) A study must employ a longitudinal time-span design, with the same tests administered at different times during the integration experience so that actual changes can be assessed; and 2) a study must have a control group for comparison with integrated black students. The ideal control group, of course, would consist of black students who are identical to the integrated students in every way except for the integration experience. Since such studies are rare, an “adequate” control group for our present purposes is either a group of non-bused black students who are reasonably comparable to the bused black students, or a group of white students in the same school as the bused black students. In the latter case, the effects of integration are revealed in the changes in the black/white differential for the measure in question.

The data we will use can be classified into two parts. The first part consists of findings from a study of Boston’s METCO program, for whose research design, execution, and analysis we are partly responsible (Walberg, 1969; Armor and Genova, 1970). The data are more complete and offer a more thoroughgoing test of the policy model than many other studies we have seen. The METCO program buses black students of all age levels from Boston to predominantly white middle-class schools in the suburbs. Approximately 1500 black students and 28 suburban communities have participated since the program began in 1966; the study from which our data will be taken covers the period from October 1968 to May 1970. The study used a longitudinal design that called for achievement testing for all students and a questionnaire for the junior and senior high students in three waves: the first at the beginning of the school year in October 1968; a second in May 1969; and a third in May 1970. (For a variety of reasons, the achievement testing was not done for the third wave.) The questionnaire covered several areas, including academic performance, aspirations and self-concept, relations with and attitudes toward white students, and attitudes toward the program.

The METCO study also included a small control group consisting
of siblings of the bused students matched by sex and grade level. The fact that the siblings were from the same families as the bused students means that there is an automatic control for social class and other tangible and intangible family factors. Since the high application rate usually prevented the busing program from taking more than one applicant per family, we had reason to believe that the control students would not differ substantially from the bused students along the important dimensions of ability, aspirations, and so forth. This belief is confirmed by the findings presented in the next section.

In addition to the data for black students, there are also data from a single cross-sectional study done in the spring of 1969 to assess the impact of the program on white sophomores in eight of the suburban schools (Useem, 1971 and 1972). We will cite some of the findings from the Useem study whenever such comparisons seem relevant.

The second part of the data comes largely from reports on integration programs in four other Northern cities throughout the country. In 1964, White Plains, New York, closed down one racially imbalanced inner-city elementary school and began busing the children to predominantly white inner-city schools; the study we cite covers a two-year period from 1964 to 1966 (White Plains Public Schools, 1967). In Ann Arbor, Michigan, there was a similar pattern: A racially imbalanced elementary school was closed in 1965 and the students were bused to predominantly white schools; the study covers a one-year period with a three-year follow-up (Carrigan, 1969). A program in Riverside, California, followed a graduated program of closing its racially imbalanced elementary schools and integrating its predominantly white schools; the program began in 1965 and the study covers a five-year period (Purl and Dawson, 1970; Gerard and Miller, 1971). The fourth program, Project Concern, is similar to METCO. Elementary school children from two inner cities (Hartford and New Haven, Connecticut) are bused to suburban schools in surrounding towns; this program began in 1966—the studies selected cover two years for Hartford (Mahan, 1968) and one year for New Haven (Clinton, 1969). In addition to these five major studies, we will also refer at certain points to studies of other integration programs that seem relevant. One such study is an evaluation of A Better Chance (ABC), a program which places high-ability black students in white preparatory schools in the Northeast (Perry, 1972). This evaluation research used techniques and instruments similar to those used in the METCO study; therefore comparisons with ABC may be more valid than comparisons with some of the other studies.

To test the integration policy model we can group our findings under five major headings—the effects of busing and integration on: (1) academic achievement; (2) aspirations; (3) self-concept; (4) race relations; and (5) educational opportunities. In addition, we will examine a sixth area, program support. In each case, we shall compare bused students with the control groups to assess those
changes that might be uniquely associated with the effects of induced integration.

The Findings: Achievement

None of the studies were able to demonstrate conclusively that integration has had an effect on academic achievement as measured by standardized tests. Given the results of the Coleman study and other evaluations of remedial programs (e.g., Head Start), many experts may not be surprised at this finding. To date there is no published report of any strictly educational reform which has been proven substantively to affect academic achievement; school integration programs are no exception.

The changes in reading achievement for elementary and secondary students in the METCO program are shown in Figures 1 and 2. For the elementary students, the grade-equivalent gains for bused third and fourth graders after one year are somewhat greater than those for the control group (.4 to .3), but this is not a statistically significant difference. For grades 5 and 6 the situation is reversed; the control group outgained the bused group (.7 and .5), but again the difference is not significant. We can see that the control group is somewhat higher initially for both grade levels, but this difference, too, is not significant.

In the case of high school students, the bused group scores somewhat higher than the control groups initially (but not significantly so). Nonetheless, the gain scores present no particular pattern. While the bused junior high students increased their grade-equivalent score from 7.5 to 7.7, the control group improved from 7.4 to 7.5; the bused gain is not significantly different from that for the control group. For senior high students the effect is reversed; the control students gain more than the bused students (9 percentile points compared to 4 points), but again the gains are not statistically significant for either group.

The results for reading achievement are substantially repeated in a test of arithmetic skills; the bused students showed no significant gains in arithmetic skills compared to the control group, and there were no particular patterns in evidence.

The White Plains, Ann Arbor, and Riverside studies also found no significant changes in achievement level for bused students in the elementary grades when comparisons were made with control groups. Although the White Plains report did show some achievement gains among the bused students, these were not significantly different, statistically, from gain scores of inner-city black students in 1960. Moreover, when comparisons were made with white students in the integrated schools, the black/white achievement gap did not diminish during the period of the study. The Ann Arbor study compared bused black student gains to white gains and to black student gains in a half-black school. The bused students did not gain significantly more than the black control group, nor did their gains diminish the black/white gap in the integrated schools. On the contrary, a follow-

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up done three years later showed that the integrated black students were even further behind the white students than before the integration project began. The Riverside study compared minority students (black and Mexican-American) who had been integrated for differing number of years with the city-wide mean (which consisted of about 85 per cent white students). The minority/white gap had not diminished for fourth graders who had been integrated since kindergarten; the gap in 1970 was as great as it was in 1965 when the program began (Purl and Dawson, 1971). Similar results occurred for minority pupils at other grade levels with differing numbers of years in the integration program.

Studies in the fifth program, Project Concern, showed mixed results. A study of the Hartford students compared bused black students who received special supportive assistance with non-bused inner-city black students (Mahan, 1968). (Although two separate one-year periods were covered, problems with missing data allow valid comparisons for only one full academic year, fall 1967 to spring 1968). The bused students showed significant IQ gains only in grades two and three; the gains in kindergarten and grades one, four, and five were either insignificant or, in two cases, favored the control group. In a study of New Haven students, second and third grade students were randomly assigned to bused and non-bused conditions and were given reading, language, and arithmetic tests in October 1967 (when the busing began) and again in April 1968 (Clinton, 1969). Of the six comparisons possible (three tests and two grades), only two showed significant differences favoring the bused students.

While none of these studies are flawless, their consistency is striking. Moreover, their results are not so different from the results of the massive cross-sectional studies. An extensive reanalysis of the Coleman data showed that even without controlling for social class factors, "naturally" integrated (i.e., non-bused) black sixth-grade groups were still one and one-half standard deviations behind white groups in the same schools, compared to a national gap of two standard deviations (Armor, 1972). This means that, assuming the Coleman data to be correct, the best that integration could do would be to move the average black group from the 2nd percentile to the 7th percentile (on the white scale, where the average white group is at the 50th percentile). But the social class differences of integrated black students in the Coleman study could easily explain a good deal of even this small gain. Other investigators, after examining a number of studies, have come to similar conclusions (St. John, 1970).

While there are no important gains for the METCO group in standardized test scores, there were some important differences in school grades (See Fig. 3). Even though the bused secondary school students have somewhat higher test scores than the control group, the bused group was about half a grade-point behind the control group in 1969, and the bused students dropped even further behind by 1970. The average control student is able to maintain a grade average at above a B—level in the central city, while the average bused student in the suburbs is just above a C average. Although it is
not shown in the Figure, from the Useem study we can estimate the average white student academic grade average (i.e., excluding non-academic courses—an exclusion not made for the black students) at about 2.45, or between a B— and C+ average.

Again, if we take into account the Coleman findings, we should not be too surprised. Since black students of the same age are, on average, behind white students in all parts of the country with respect to academic achievement, we should expect their grades to fall when they are taken from the competition in an all-black school to the competition in a predominantly white school. In addition, the bused students may not be adequately prepared for this competition, at least in terms of the higher standards that may be applied in the suburban schools.

Aspiration and Self-concept

In the METCO study we found that there were no increases in educational or occupational aspiration levels for bused students (see Figs. 4 and 5); on the contrary, there was a significant decline for the bused students, from 74 per cent wanting a college degree in 1968 to 60 per cent by May 1970. The control panel actually increased its college aspirations over the same period, but this is probably not a meaningful finding. (The cross-sectional data show a slight decline for the control group in 1970; this cautions us about our interpretation).

At the very least, we can conclude that the bused students do not improve their aspirations for college. The same is true for occupational aspirations, and in this case both the bused students and the controls show a similar pattern. We should point out, however, that the initial aspiration levels are already very high; Coleman found that only 54 per cent of white twelfth graders in the urban North aspired to college, and 53 per cent expected a professional or technical occupation. Therefore, even the slight decline we have found still leaves the bused students with relatively high aspirations compared to a regional norm. Moreover, when achievement is taken into account, black students actually have higher aspirations than white students at similar levels of achievement (Armor, 1967; Wilson, 1967). In this respect, some educators have hypothesized that integration has a positive effect in lowering aspirations to more realistic levels; of course, others would argue that any lowering of aspirations is undesirable. However, we shall see in a later section that the METCO students were more likely to start college than the control group.

Since the other cities in our review included only elementary students, they do not provide data on regular educational or occupational aspirations. But two of the studies did examine a concept closely related to aspirations—"motivation for achievement." The findings of the Ann Arbor and Riverside studies corroborate the pattern of high aspirations for black children in both the pre- and post-integration periods. In addition, the Ann Arbor researchers concluded
that the overly high aspiration of black boys may have been lowered by the integration experience. The Riverside study, on the other hand, concluded that there were no significant changes in achievement motivation.

In the METCO study we also found some important differences with respect to academic self-concept (Fig. 6). The students were asked to rate how bright they were in comparison to their classmates. While there were some changes in both the bused and control groups, the important differences are the gaps between the bused students and controls at each time period. The smallest difference is 15 percentage points in 1970 (11 points for the full cross-section), with the control students having the higher academic self-concept. Again, this finding makes sense if we recall that the academic performance of the bused students falls considerably when they move from the black community to the white suburbs. In rating their intellectual ability, the bused students may simply be reflecting the harder competition in suburban schools.

Both the Ann Arbor and Riverside studies made much more extensive inquiry into the realm of self-esteem of black children, although there were no directly comparable data for our academic self-concept measure. The Riverside study did report that, in a special test, minority children (black and Mexican-American) tended to choose white students more often than black students as "the [ones] with good grades." While we will not go into detail on the many other measures used in these studies, we can summarize their findings briefly as follows: 1) Minority children do tend to have lower self-esteem before integration, particularly in the later elementary grades; and 2) integration does not seem to affect the self-esteem measures in any clearly consistent or significant way.

Race Relations

One of the central sociological hypotheses in the integration policy model is that integration should reduce racial stereotypes, increase tolerance, and generally improve race relations. Needless to say, we were quite surprised when our data failed to verify this axiom. Our surprise was increased substantially when we discovered that, in fact, the converse appears to be true. The data suggest that, under the circumstances obtaining in these studies, integration heightens racial identity and consciousness, enhances ideologies that promote racial segregation, and reduces opportunities for actual contact between the races.

There are several indicators from the METCO study that point to these conclusions. The question which speaks most directly to the 50 per cent racial balance standard suggested by the Civil Rights Commission asked: "If you could be in any school you wanted, how many students would be white?" Figure 7 reports the percentage which responded in favor of 50 per cent or fewer white students. While both the control and the bused students started out fairly close together in 1968 (47 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively), two
school years later the bused students were 15 percentage points more in favor of attending non-white schools than the controls (81 per cent compared to 66 per cent), although the differential change is not statistically significant. The changes for the controls (both the panel and the full cross-sections) indicate that the black community as a whole may be changing its attitudes toward school integration, but the bused students appear to be changing at a more rapid rate. Ironically, just as white America has finally accepted the idea of school integration (Greeley and Sheatsley, 1971), blacks who begin experiencing it may want to reject it.

That these changes reflect ideological shifts is supported by Figures 8 and 9. The bused students are much more likely to support the idea of black power than the control students, going from a difference of 11 points in 1969 to 36 points in 1970. We were also able to construct a Separatist Ideology Index from responses to a series of statements about black/white relations (e.g., 1. “Most black people should live and work in black areas, and most whites should live and work in white areas.” 2. “Black and white persons should not intermarry.”). The scores range from 0 (anti-separatist) to 4 (pro-separatist). From 1968 to 1970 the control group barely changes, increasing from 1.4 to 1.5. The bused group, however, changed from 1.4 to 1.8—a statistically significant change of about one half a standard deviation. This is the clearest indication in our data that integration heightens black racial consciousness and solidarity.

The changes do not appear to be in ideology alone. From 1969 to 1970 the bused students reported less friendliness from whites, more free time spent with members of their own race, more incidents of prejudice, and less frequent dating with white students (Fig. 10). In other words, the longer the contact with whites, the fewer the kinds of interracial experiences that might lead to a general improvement in racial tolerance.

To what extent might these changes be a result of negative experiences with white students in the schools? We do not doubt that there has been considerable hostility shown by certain groups of white students. Nonetheless, although the evidence is not complete, what we have indicates that the white students themselves were negatively affected by the contact. Support for the busing program was generally high among white sophomores in the eight high schools studied, especially among middle-class students in the college preparatory tracks (Useem, 1972). For example, 46 per cent of all students were “very favorable” to METCO (only 11 per cent were “not favorable”); 73 per cent felt METCO should be continued; and 52 per cent agreed that there should be more METCO students (20 per cent disagreed and 27 per cent were not sure). But those students who had direct classroom contact with bused black students showed less support for the busing program than those without direct contact. In fact, the kind of students who were generally the most supportive—the middle-class, high-achieving students—showed the largest decline in support as a result of contact with bused black students. This finding is based on cross-sectional data and does not indicate
a change over time, but it is suggestive of the possibility that a general polarization has occurred for both racial groups.

The data from the Ann Arbor and Riverside studies give some support to these findings, although again there were no directly comparable measures. Moreover, it is unlikely that the concept of ideology is relevant to elementary students. The Ann Arbor study included a sociometric test, whereby children could indicate how much they liked each classmate. Black students at all grade levels suffered a loss of peer status when they switched from a segregated to an integrated school, although the results were statistically significant only for second and third grade girls and fourth and fifth grade boys. That is, these black children were liked less by their new white peers than by their previously all-black peers. Also, the level of acceptance was considerably lower for black students than for white students. On the other hand, the black students tended to be more positive about their white peers after integration than they were about their black peers before integration, although the changes are not statistically significant.

The Riverside data more clearly support the conclusion that integration heightens racial identity and solidarity. Data from a test in which children rate pictures of faces portraying various ethnic and racial groups showed that fewer cross-racial choices were made after integration than before integration. For example, one rating task required that the children choose the face that they would “most like for a friend.” Both black and white children tended to choose their own race to a greater extent after one year of integration than before integration (Gerard and Miller, 1971). The Riverside study also concluded that these effects were stronger with increasing age; that is, the cross-racial choices declined more in the later grades than in the earlier grades.

To avoid any misinterpretation of these findings, we should caution that the measures discussed here do not necessarily indicate increased overt racial hostility or conflict. This may occur to some extent in many busing programs, but our impression based on the METCO program is that overt racial incidents initiated by black or white students are infrequent. The polarization that we are describing, and that our instruments assess, is characterized by ideological solidarity and behavioral withdrawal. Our inferences pertain to a lack of racial togetherness rather than to explicit racial confrontations or violence. While it is conceivable that a connection may exist between these ideological shifts and open racial conflicts, such a connection is not established by the studies reviewed.

There are two other qualifications we must place on the interpretation of these data. First, as of 1970 the majority of the bused METCO students still supported general integration ideology. Only 40 per cent of the METCO students would ideally prefer schools with a majority of black students (compared to 28 per cent of the controls); 60 per cent of METCO students believe that “once you really get to know a white person, they can be as good a friend as anyone else” (compared to 78 per cent of the controls); and 58 per cent of
METCO students do not agree that "most black people should live and work in black areas, and most whites should live and work in white areas" (compared to 71 per cent of the control students).

The main point we are making is that the integration policy model predicts that integration should cause these sentiments to increase, while the evidence shows they actually decrease, leaving the bused students more opposed to integration than the non-bused students. Only further research can determine whether this trend will continue until the majority of bused students shifts to a general anti-integration ideology.

Second, group averages tend to obscure important differences between individual students. While we do not deny the existence of racial tension and conflict for some students, other students and families (both black and white) have had very meaningful relationships with one another, relationships made possible only through the busing program. It is very difficult, indeed, to weigh objectively the balance of benefit and harm for the group as a whole. The main point to be made is that a change in a group average does not necessarily reflect a change in every individual group member.

Long-term Educational Effects

In view of the fact that most of the short-term measures do not conclusively demonstrate positive effects of busing in the area of achievement, aspirations, self-concept, and race relations, it becomes even more important to consider possible longer-term changes that may relate to eventual socio-economic parity between blacks and whites. Since no busing program has been in operation for more than seven years or so, this area, obviously, has not been studied extensively. There are, however, some preliminary findings on long-term educational effects. Specifically, two studies have investigated the effects of integration on college attendance, and some tentative conclusions have emerged.

Seniors from the 1970 graduating class in the METCO program, as well as the seniors in the 1970 control group, formed samples for a follow-up telephone interview in the spring of 1972. Approximately two thirds of both groups were contacted, resulting in college data for 32 bused students and 16 control group students. The results of the follow-up are striking and they are summarized in Figure 11. The bused students were very much more likely to start college than the control group (84 per cent compared to 56 per cent), but by the end of the second year the bused students resembled the control group (59 per cent compared to 56 per cent). In other words, the METCO program seems to have had a dramatic effect upon the impetus for college, and many more of the bused students actually started some form of higher education. But the bused drop-out rate was also substantially higher, so that towards the end of the sophomore year the bused students were not much more likely to be enrolled full-time in college than the control group.

In spite of this higher drop-out rate, the bused students were still
enrolled in what are generally considered higher-quality institutions. That is, 56 per cent of the bused students were in regular four-year colleges, compared to 38 per cent for the control group. An even greater difference was found for those enrolled in full universities (which include a graduate school). The figures are 47 per cent and 12 per cent for bused and control students, respectively.

Similar findings emerged from a special college follow-up study of the ABC program (Ferry, 1972). A group of ABC students were matched with a control group of high-ability black students not in the ABC program. Since ABC is a highly selective program, the matching was carried out so that the ABC and control groups had very similar family backgrounds, socio-economic status, and achievement levels. Approximately 40 matched pairs were followed until their first year of college (academic year 1971-72). All of the ABC students entered college, whereas only half of the control group did so. While it is too early to assess differential drop-out rates, it is very clear from the data that even if half of the ABC students drop out of college, the quality of colleges attended by the ABC students is considerably higher than those attended by the control group. Of the matched pairs attending college, two thirds of the ABC students attended higher-quality institutions.

Neither of these studies is large enough, of course, to draw any definite conclusions. But there does seem to be some strong evidence that middle-class suburban or prep schools have an important "channeling" effect not found in black schools. The effect is probably due to better counseling and better contacts with college recruiting officers. Whatever the reason, black students attending such schools may have doors opened for them that are closed to students attending predominantly black schools. Given the lack of positive effects in other areas, these findings may have great significance for future busing programs, and further research is urgently needed.

Program Support

Although it is not explicitly part of the integration policy model we are testing, it seems appropriate to consider the extent of the support for the busing program among the students and communities involved. As might be expected from the changes already described, there was a general decline in the enthusiasm for the METCO program over time, with the bused students showing greater changes than the controls: 80 per cent of the bused group said they were "very favorable" to the program in 1968, compared to 50 per cent by 1970. Yet we cannot infer from this alone that there is a decline in support for the program. The drop-out rate in the METCO program is almost non-existent in spite of some of the changes we have reported. The families involved in the program appear to feel that their children will get a better education in the suburbs in spite of the inconvenience and the problems. Our data indicated that the most important reason cited by the bused students for being in the busing program was to receive "a better education." Moreover, this did not
change as much as many of our other indicators from 1969 to 1970; 88 per cent said this was a "very important" reason in 1969, and 81 per cent indicated the same in 1970. Very few reported that "getting out of the city" or "more contact with whites" were important reasons for being in the program.

In other words, the justification of the program in the black community has little to do with the contact-prejudice components of the policy model; instead, busing is seen in the context of enlarging educational opportunities for the black students.

We do not have much systematic data from the white receiving schools other than those cited earlier (i.e., a sample of white sophomore students was generally supportive of the program in 1969). It is our impression, however, that most of the 28 communities that receive METCO students are enthusiastic about the program, and only a few communities have turned down the opportunity to participate. The other programs reviewed receive moderate to strong support from the community and participants. In Project Concern the drop-out rate was only 10 per cent, half of which was due to the program directors’ initiative in withdrawing students. After two years of urban-to-suburban busing, nine additional suburban towns chose to participate and over 1,000 additional elementary school children were bused to suburban schools. In White Plains both black and white parents expressed more positive than negative attitudes about integration, although black parents were more favorable to the program than white parents after two years of desegregation. In Ann Arbor the black parents felt more positive toward the program after one year of desegregated schooling, but the children were slightly less positive than they were prior to the integration experience. In both groups, however, support was high; only 20 per cent of each group expressed negative attitudes toward the program.

We must conclude that the busing programs we have reviewed seem to have considerable support from both the black and white communities. In most cases, black parents were highly supportive of the various busing programs. Like the students in our own study, black parents stressed quality education as the most important benefit of such programs, whereas white parents in receiving schools tended to stress the experience of coming into contact with other races. We must point out, however, that none of the programs reviewed involved mandatory busing of white students into black communities; cities facing this situation might present a very different picture of white support. Moreover, it is unlikely that many in the black community have seen the data on achievement reported here; much black support may be based upon premises regarding academic gain which our findings call into question. Whether or not black support will be affected by such findings remains to be seen.

Social Class and Other Background Factors

Most of the data we have presented so far summarize the effects of busing on all students considered as a single group. A question
might be raised about whether these effects (or lack of same) are consistent for all students regardless of their background. In particular, it might be hypothesized that social class differences between black and white students can explain the changes (or lack of changes) we have reported. We shall briefly indicate the major trends for students of differing social class and other characteristics, such as sex and age level.

It is difficult to separate race and social class, since black families as a group tend to be lower than white families on most socio-economic measures. To the extent that the distinction can be made, however, no uniquely social class factors have been reported that would contradict the findings presented so far. The Riverside study selected a group of white students whose social class scores were less than or equal to the minority students; achievement test scores of the black students were still significantly lower than the low-SES white students (although the original difference was diminished somewhat; Gerard and Miller, 1971). For the METCO data, special analyses were made of the race relations changes among bused students who were children of blue-collar as compared to white-collar workers; no significant differences emerged. What small changes there were usually revealed that the black students from white-collar families changed more (in a negative direction) than those from blue-collar families.

There is also the possibility that, contrary to the assumptions behind many school integration programs, some of the predominantly white schools to which black students are sent are in fact worse than the inner-city black schools. In the METCO study there were no data to examine this issue in detail, but it is our impression that perhaps only one or two suburbs would approximate the inner-city socio-economic level. In any event, while there were some differences from one town to another in the absolute levels of the various measures, there were no important variations in the changes over time that appeared to be related to any socio-economic differences in the communities.

With the exception of achievement test scores, there was some sex and age differential on various measures both before and after integration; but there were no important differences in the relative changes in these groups due to integration. That is, in METCO we found that girls generally had a more difficult time adjusting to the program (reflected in lower program support, stronger separatist ideology, and less contact with white students). There seemed to be some important differences in cross-sex, cross-race relationships, which were better between black boys and white girls than between white boys and black girls. This situation seems to have left some black girls with resentful feelings over white girls “stealing their men.” But the amount of interracial contact was small for both groups, and, more important, the changes in our race relations measures for bused students were about the same for both boys and girls. A similar finding emerged for age levels. Younger students were somewhat more supportive of the program and were more positive
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on the various race relations measures than older students, but the
degree and direction of change were similar for all ages. This was
true for the METCO secondary school data as well as the Riverside
elementary school data.

In sum, while there were some over-all differences according to
the sex and age levels of students in busing programs, the effects of
busing on changes (if any) in achievement and attitudes tended to
be uniform for all groups.

It seems clear from the studies of integration programs we have re-
viewed that four of the five major premises of the integration
policy model are not supported by the data, at least over the one-
to five-year periods covered by various reports. While this does not
deny the possibility of longer-term effects or effects on student char-
acteristics other than those measured, it does mean that the model is
open to serious question.

The integration policy model predicted that achievement should
improve as black students are moved from segregated schools to
integrated schools. This prediction was based in part upon the classi-
cal works of Kenneth Clark and others which argue that, because of
segregation, black students have lower regard for themselves. It was
also based in part upon reanalyses of the Coleman data which
showed that black students achieve less than white students, but
that black students in integrated schools achieve more than black
students in segregated schools. But four of the five studies we re-
viewed (as well as the Berkeley and Evanston data discussed in
footnote 4) showed no significant gains in achievement scores; the
other study had mixed results. Our own analyses of the Coleman data
were consistent with these findings (see Armor, 1972).

Although there were no gains in general standardized achievement
scores that we might attribute to integration, neither were there any
losses for black or white students. Unfortunately, we cannot say the
same about academic grades of black students. The grades of the
METCO secondary students in suburban schools dropped consider-
ably. We did not measure the bused students' grades before they
entered the program, but the fact that their test scores are somewhat
higher than the control group's offers substantial evidence that this
difference does represent a change. Along with this change we ob-
served a difference in academic self-concept that seems to indicate
that the bused students are aware that they are experiencing more
difficult competition in the suburbs. While we might expect this
result if we believe the Coleman finding of black/white achievement
differences, it does not mean there is no problem. It is possible that
there are psychological consequences of this increased competition
that may be harmful to black children. Being moved from an en-
vironment where they are above average to one in which they are
average or below may be frustrating and discouraging. It might be
one of the reasons why the bused black students have become less
supportive of the program and more supportive of black separatism.

We tested this latter possibility by examining the relationship
between support for the Black Panthers and academic grades in our 1970 sample from METCO (see Fig. 12). Consistent with our findings, the bused students are more favorable to the Panthers than the control group. But among the bused students we find that the METCO group which has college aspirations but which has a C average or below stands out clearly as more pro-Panther than the other groups. In other words, the increased militancy and anti-integration sentiments among the bused students may arise partly from the fact that their aspirations remain at a very high level even though their performance declines to the point where they may question their ability to compete with whites at the college level. The fact that this group is proportionally a large one (about 25 per cent of the total bused group compared to 13 per cent for the analogous control group) may be an indication of a potentially serious problem.

The integration policy model predicted that integration should raise black aspirations. Again, our studies reveal no evidence for such an effect. Unlike poor achievement, however, low aspirations do not appear to be much of a problem. The black students in our busing program seem to have aspirations as high as or higher than white students. If anything, given their academic records in high school, these aspirations may be unrealistic for some students. The emphasis on equality of educational opportunity may be pushing into college many black students whose interests and abilities do not warrant it. The fact that only half of the 1970 METCO seniors are still enrolled in four-year colleges (after over 80 per cent had started) may attest to this possibility.

The integration policy model predicted that race relations should improve as the result of interracial contact provided by integration programs. In this regard the effect of integration programs seems the opposite of that predicted. It appears that integration increases racial identity and solidarity over the short run and, at least in the case of black students, leads to increasing desires for separatism. These effects are observed for a variety of indicators: attitudes about integration and black power; attitudes towards whites; and contact with whites. The trends are clearest for older students (particularly the METCO high school students), but similar indications are present in the elementary school studies as well. This pattern holds true for whites also, insofar as their support for the integration program decreases and their own-race preferences increase as contact increases.

It is this set of findings that surprised us most. Although many recent studies have questioned the meaning of black/white differences in achievement and aspirations, to our knowledge there have been no research findings which challenged the contact theory. The idea that familiarity lessens contempt has been a major feature of liberal thought in the western world, and its applicability to racial prejudice has been supported for at least two decades of social science research. It may be true that, under certain conditions, greater contact will lead to a reduction of prejudicial feelings among racial or ethnic groups. But the induced integration of black and white
students as it is being carried out in schools today does not fulfill the conditions.

In all fairness to the Allport contact theory, it must be said that he placed many qualifications upon it. One major qualification was that the contact must be made under equal-status conditions. Many behavioral scientists might assume that an integration program presumes equality of status, at least in the formal sense that all races are treated equally and have equal access to educational resources. But there is another way to look at status. Integrating black and white students does very little, in the short term, to eliminate the socio-economic and academic status differentials between black and white students that exist before integration. Therefore, we have to question whether integration programs for black and white children fulfill the equal-status conditions as long as socio-economic and academic inequalities are not eliminated. Allport warned that contact under the wrong conditions can reinforce stereotyped beliefs rather than reduce them; this may be occurring in our current integration programs. In other words, the social class differences between blacks and whites—the differences that integration programs are supposed to eliminate eventually—may heighten the sense of black identity and solidarity, leading to an increasing opposition to integration.

What Allport did not say, but what his emphasis on equal-status conditions may imply, is that contact between two groups with strong initial prejudices may increase prejudice to the extent that stereotypes are reflected by actual group differences. For black students, initial stereotypes about white students as snobbish, intellectual, and "straight" may be partially confirmed by actual experience; the same may be true for white stereotypes of black students as non-intellectual, hostile, and having different values. We might make the same observations about some of the other ethnic and religious conflicts we see in the world today, particularly the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Arab battles in the Middle East. It is certainly true in these cases that the amount of contact has not lessened the hostilities; it seems to have heightened them to dangerous levels in the first place.

Why has the integration policy model failed to be supported by the evidence on four out of five counts? How can a set of almost axiomatic relationships, supported by years of social science research, be so far off the mark? Part of the reason may be that the policy model has failed to taken into account some of the conditions that must be placed upon contact theory; but we believe that there may be other reasons as well having to do with (1) inadequate research designs, (2) induced versus "natural" factors, and (3) changing conditions in the black cultural climate.

Most of the methodological procedures which have been used to develop various components of the integration policy model are not adequate. The single most important limitation is that they have been cross-sectional designs. That is, the studies have measured
aspects of achievement or race relations at a single point in time, with causal inferences being drawn from comparisons of integrated groups with segregated groups. Such inferences are risky at best, since the cross-sectional design cannot control for self-selection factors. For example, the Coleman study showed that integrated black students had slightly higher achievement than segregated students, but it is more than likely that families of higher-achieving students move to integrated neighborhoods in the first place (for reasons of social class or other issues involving opportunity). Thus the cause-and-effect relationship may be the opposite to that suggested by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission report. In the Deutsch and Collins housing study, which found that integrated whites were more tolerant of blacks than segregated whites, it is possible that self-selection factors were operating which led the more tolerant white persons to choose the integrated housing project in the first place. It is fair to say that none of the studies before the ones we have reviewed had an opportunity to study the effects of large-scale induced integration over a reasonable period of time. Yet this is the only way the effects of integration can be sorted out from differences which may originally exist between any two groups of persons.

The second reason for our findings in the race relations realm may have to do with the relatively contrived nature of current school integration programs. In all of the programs reviewed, the integration has been induced by the actions of state or local agencies; it has not occurred in a more natural way through individual voluntary actions. The use of busing, the relatively instantaneous transition from an all-black to an all-white environment, the fact of being part of a readily identifiable group in a new and strange setting, may all combine to enhance racial solidarity and increase separatist tendencies for black students. (We might find a very different picture for black families that move into predominantly white neighborhoods and allow their children some time to adjust to the new environment.) On the other hand, this set of mechanisms would not explain why white student attitudes in the receiving schools also tended to become less favorable to black students, as shown in the Ann Arbor, Riverside, and METCO studies. Moreover, these mechanisms—if they are, in fact, operating—do not invalidate our evaluation of those current policies that focus precisely on induced school integration.

The final major reason why the integration policy model may fail is that the racial climate has changed drastically in the years since the Allport work and the Supreme Court decision. The most noteworthy change, of course, has been in the attitudes of black people. Although the majority of blacks may still endorse the concept of integration, many younger black leaders deemphasize integration as a major goal. Black identity, black control, and black equality are seen as the real issues, and integration is regarded as important only insofar as it advances these primary goals. Some black leaders, albeit the more militant ones, feel that integration might actually defeat attainment of these goals by dispersing the more talented blacks
Throughout the white community and thereby diluting their power potential. Integration is also seen as having white paternalistic overtones and as the means whereby the white man allays his guilty conscience while ignoring reform on the really important issues. Given these sentiments, school integration programs are seen by blacks not as a fulfillment of the goal of joining white society, but only as a means of obtaining better educational opportunities, which would ultimately lead to a more competitive position in the occupational and economic market.

Integrated schools per se are not the real issue; if schools in the black community provided education of the same quality as those in white communities, blacks would not be so interested in busing programs. In fact, when we asked students in the METCO program this question, almost 75 per cent said they would prefer to attend their own community school if it were as good as the suburban schools. Of course, it is by no means clear that the suburban schools actually offer better education. Any improvement in facilities or teacher quality (the ultimate importance of which is called into question by the Coleman report) may be counteracted, as our data show, by stiffer competition and a more hostile and unfriendly student atmosphere. Black leaders who view school integration only as a means to better opportunity must take these other factors into account.

In the context of these new black attitudes, the Allport model may not be applicable, and contact with white students provided by induced school integration may enhance ideological tendencies towards separatism. The reality of contact seems to sensitize black students to the heightened racial identity and separatism that has been growing in the black community since the late 1960's. The explanation may be, in part, that the large socio-economic differences between black and white students are fully recognized only when contact enables them to witness these differences. The difficulty of bridging this gap, coupled with the knowledge that they are viewed by whites as having lower status, leads black students to reject white standards and relationships. They turn inward, as it were, stressing the uniqueness and value of their own race, shutting off contact with whites, and embracing a point of view which endorses separatism as a means toward preserving and elevating their own position. Those black students not in contact with whites may exhibit some of these tendencies due to the over-all contact with white society, but the lack of direct contact postpones the problem or avoids it altogether. This type of “contact-conflict” model may be used to explain the conflicts which occur between two different cultural groups which come into direct contact (e.g., Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; Israelis and Arabs in the Middle East). Whether or not it is applicable on a larger scale, it would fit the data better and would provide a more realistic model for the school integration case.

It would be a mistake, of course, to view the increased racial solidarity of black students as a completely negative finding. The differences between black and white cultures make a certain amount of culture conflict inevitable and even necessary if an integrated
society is to be realized. In fact, it would be reasonable not to expect
collapse—which always accompanies the contact of two cultures—
only if we did not believe that a distinct black culture exists in
America. Although this belief was held at one time by a large number
of social scientists, it is not so popular today. There is now growing
recognition that a black culture does exist, at least in the eyes of
many blacks, and that this culture stresses values, goals, and be-
behavioral patterns that differ considerably from those of the predomi-
nant white culture (Jones, 1972; Metzger, 1971).

Up to this point, we have said little about the one positive finding
of our research, the “channeling” effect whereby black students who
attend white middle-class schools tend to get into higher quality
colleges (even though they may not finish college at a higher rate
than segregated black students). This finding should be heartening
to those who have believed that integration does provide educational
opportunities not found in inner-city black schools, although the
finding must be considered a tentative one since it has been shown in
only two fairly small studies. Also, the positive effects are limited to
the college-bound, so that there still may be a question about the
benefits of integration for the non-college-bound black students. And
it may be that the “channeling” effect works only when the number
is relatively small. Nonetheless, this kind of longer-term effect—and
perhaps others as yet undiscovered—may turn out to provide a basis
for certain types of integration plans.

Policy Implications

It is obvious that the findings of integration research programs
have serious implications for policy. Given the momentum which
has built up over the last few years for the school integration move-
ment, however, it is likely that in some quarters the data we have
presented will be attacked on moral or methodological grounds and
then summarily ignored. In other quarters the data may be met with
rejoicing over the discovery of a club which can be used to beat back
the pro-integration forces. But we hope these extreme reactions will
be avoided and that a more balanced interpretation of our findings
will prevail.

The most serious question is raised for mandatory busing (or in-
duced integration) programs. If the justification for mandatory bus-
ing is based upon an integration policy model like the one we have
tested here, then that justification has to be called into question. The
data do not support the model on most counts. There may be justifi-
cations for school integration other than those in the integration
policy model, but then the burden must fall upon those who support
a given school integration program to demonstrate that it has the
intended effects (with no unintended, negative side-effects). It also
must be demonstrated that any such program is at least supported by
the black community.

We want to stress this last point. Decisions must be based upon
feelings of the black community as well as the white community.
Many liberal educators have been so intent on selling integration to reluctant white communities that they risk the danger of ignoring the opinion of the black community. While many black leaders favor school integration, there are also many black persons who would much prefer an upgrading of schools in their own community. The recent (March 1972) National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana, condemned mandatory busing and school integration, arguing that such plans are racist and preserve a black minority structure. These views may not represent the entire black community, but they are indicative of the complexity and heterogeneity of black political opinion. Whether or not a white community wants integration (and there are obviously many that do not), we must take into account the feelings of the group on whose behalf integration is advocated.

Although the data may fail to support mandatory busing as it is currently justified, these findings should not be used to halt voluntary busing programs. For one thing, we have stressed that the studies of integration so far have been over fairly short periods (one to five years), and there are possibilities of longer-term effects which are not visible until adulthood (not to speak of effects on characteristics not measured by the present research). More important, however, we have tentatively demonstrated one very significant longer-term benefit of integration for college-bound blacks. The “channeling” effect, if substantiated by further research, could form a substantial basis for voluntary programs whose focus is upon the college-bound black student. Even for this subgroup, of course, we have documented the trend towards separatist ideology. But the gain in educational opportunity may well outweigh this consequence in the eyes of the black community, as indeed it does now for programs like METCO. In fact, some persons will view these ideological changes, as well as any conflict that may accompany them, as an inevitable consequence of contact between two different cultures. If blacks and whites are ever to live in an integrated culture, they must begin learning and accepting their differences; and this cannot happen without contact. If contact engenders a certain amount of racial friction, many persons will feel the gains from school integration—both long-term and symbolic—more than make up for it.

To these questions of the symbolic and long-run benefits of induced school integration, the existing studies provide no answer. What they do show is that, over the period of two or three years, busing does not lead to significant measurable gains in student achievement or interracial harmony (although it does lead to the channeling of black students to better colleges). The available evidence thus indicates that busing is not an effective policy instrument for raising the achievement of black students or for increasing interracial harmony. On the other hand, the existing studies do not rule out the possibility that in the longer run, or in other respects, busing may indeed prove to have substantial positive consequences.

The available evidence on busing, then, seems to lead to two clear policy conclusions. One is that massive mandatory busing for pur-
poses of improving student achievement and interracial harmony is not effective and should not be adopted at this time. The other is that voluntary integration programs such as METCO, ABC, or Project Concern should be continued and positively encouraged by substantial federal and state grants. Such voluntary programs should be encouraged so that those parents and communities who believe in the symbolic and potential (but so far unconfirmed) long-run benefits of induced integration will have ample opportunity to send their children to integrated schools. Equally important, these voluntary programs will permit social scientists and others to improve and broaden our understanding of the longer-run and other consequences of induced school integration. With a more complete knowledge than we now possess of this complicated matter, we shall hopefully be in a better position to design effective public education policies that are known in advance to work to the benefit of all Americans, both black and white.

Even in voluntary school integration programs, however, our data indicate that certain steps should be taken which might help alleviate the problems of achievement and race relations. Wholesale integration without regard to achievement levels of white and black students can lead to potentially frustrating experiences. Some selectivity might be desirable so that both groups reflect a similar achievement capacity. Although a certain amount of racial problems may be inevitable, full education of both groups about the possibilities and causes of differences might ameliorate the kind of polarization that would endanger the program.

One must also consider the possibility that other types of integration programs may be more successful. We have said since the outset that our data do not necessarily apply to neighborhood integration brought about by the individual choice of black families. It is possible that such programs would be more successful over the long run, at least in terms of race relations. Being a member of the community might tend to ameliorate black feelings of separateness that are fostered in the relatively contrived busing situation. Whether or not this kind of program could also change standardized achievement levels remains to be seen. Since the differences between black and white achievement are so large and consistent across so many different settings and studies, we must entertain the possibility that no plan of school integration will lessen this gap. Research will have to be continued in this area before the full causal mechanisms are understood and a firm basis is established on which social action can accordingly be planned.

Although we have been critical of some aspects of the connection between social science and public policy in the integration movement, we do not want to imply that their connection should be lessened. On the contrary, the real goals of social science and public policy are not in opposition; the danger is rather that the connection may not be close enough to enable us to make sound decisions. Society can only benefit by those ties which combine the advantage of scientific knowledge with a clear awareness of its limitations.
Figure 1. Reading Achievement—Elementary.

- Metropolitan Achievement Tests; no statistically significant gains when bused compared to controls for either age group.
- N=88 for Third-Fourth graders and 59 for Fifth-Sixth graders.
- N=14 for Third-Fourth graders and 27 for Fifth-Sixth graders.

*Full cross-sections for grades:
  - 3-4: bused 3.4 (N=131); control 3.7 (N=38)—not significant (sd=.96)
  - 5-6: bused 5.5 (N=90); control 5.4 (N=55)—not significant (sd=1.5).

Figure 2. Reading Achievement—Junior and Senior High.

- N=123 for junior high and 72 for senior high (no statistically significant changes).
- N=27 for junior high and 14 for senior high (no statistically significant changes).
- Full cross-section for junior high: bused 7.5 (N=197); control 7.4 (N=74)—n.s. (sd=1.9)
  - Full cross-section for senior high: bused 8.5 (N=160); control 8.4 (N=55)—n.s. (sd=24).
- Full cross-section for junior high: bused 7.7 (N=143); control 7.3 (N=47)—n.s. (sd=1.9)
  - Full cross-section for senior high: bused 44 (N=88); control 34 (N=20)—n.s. (sd=25).
**Figure 3. Grade Point Average—Junior and Senior High.**

- N=165; statistically significant change (.01 level).
- N=23; no significant change.
- Self-reported; a grade of A is 4.0, B is 3.0, etc.
- Full cross-section: bused 2.33 (N=210); control 2.73 (N=59)—significance at .001 level.
- Full cross-section: bused 2.20 (N=467); control 2.59 (N=228)—significance at .001 level.

**Figure 4. Per Cent Wanting a Bachelor's Degree.**

- N=132; bused changes significantly different from control changes (.02 level).
- N=34.
- Full cross-section: bused 71% (N=323); controls 68% (N=87)—not significant.
- Full cross-section: bused 69% (N=211); controls 68% (N=60)—not significant.
- Full cross-section: bused 60% (N=488); controls 56% (N=228)—not significant.
**Figure 5. Per Cent Expecting a Professional or Technical Occupation.**

![Graph showing percentage expecting professional or technical occupations over years 1968 to 1970.](image)

- *N=130; bused changes not significantly different from control changes.*
- *N=31.
- *Full cross-section: bused 63% (N=311); controls 55% (N=91)—not significant.*
- *Full cross-section: bused 62% (N=203); controls 52% (N=58)—not significant.*
- *Full cross-section: bused 66% (N=482); controls 66% (N=228)—not significant.*

**Figure 6. Per Cent Feeling More Intelligent than Classmates.**

![Graph showing percentage feeling more intelligent than classmates over years 1968 to 1970.](image)

- *N=130; bused changes not significantly different from control changes.*
- *N=33.
- *Full cross-section: bused 25% (N=320); controls 47% (N=99)—significance under .01.*
- *Full cross-section: bused 31% (N=211); controls 42% (N=60)—not significant.*
- *Full cross-section: bused 25% (N=483); controls 34% (N=230)—significance under .01.*
**Figure 7.** Per Cent Wanting to be in a School with no More than 50 Per Cent White Students.

- N=133; bused change not significantly different from control change.
- N=36.
- Full cross-section: bused 56% (N=323); controls 58% (N=97).
- Full cross-section: bused 67% (N=209); controls 59% (N=61)—not significant.
- Full cross-section: bused 71% (N=485); controls 62% (N=229)—significance under .001.

**Figure 8.** Per Cent Favoring Black Power.

- N=167; bused change significantly different from control change (.05 level).
- N=21.
- Full cross-section: bused 59% (N=211); controls 52% (N=59)—not significant.
- Full cross-section: bused 76% (N=479); controls 55% (N=220)—significance under .001.
**FIGURE 9. Separatist Ideology Index.**

![Graph showing separatist ideology index over years](image)

*A score of 4 indicates strongest separatist feelings; reliability = .78; sd = .8.*

*bN=135; bused change significantly greater than control change (under .01 level).*

*cN=34.*

*dFull cross-section: bused 1.4 (N=324); control 1.4 (N=97)—not significant.*

*Full cross-section: bused 1.6 (N=213); control 1.5 (N=90)—not significant.*

*Full cross-section: bused 1.8 (N=489); control 1.5 (N=290)—significance under .001.*

**FIGURE 10. Bused Students Relations with White Students.**

![Graph showing bused students relations with white students](image)

*N's range from 146 to 159; all changes significant at or under .02 level.*
**FIGURE 11. Per Cent Attending College Full-time.**

- **N=32** for all time periods.
- **N=16** for all time periods.
- Includes 2-year junior college; bused change significantly greater than control change (.05 level).
- Universities with a graduate program.

**FIGURE 12. Percentage of Bused and Control Students Who Sympathize with the Black Panthers, by College Plans and Academic Performance.**
FOOTNOTES

1 In spite of these precautions, we must still warn that it is difficult to make comparisons and generalizations when data are derived from different studies. Also, all of the studies we review were done in Northern cities, so that our findings may not be generalizable to the South. Nonetheless, the studies do reveal sufficiently clear and consistent findings in certain areas to enable at least a preliminary assessment of the effects of induced integration in de facto segregated cities of the North.

2 The data summarized in the reports cited were subjected to extensive reanalysis for the present study.

3 The number of junior and senior high students participating in the METCO study are as follows: wave one, 357 bused (80 per cent of the total population) and 112 controls (54 per cent of the eligible population); wave two, 229 bused (51 per cent) and 67 controls (32 per cent); wave three, 492 bused (87 per cent) and 232 controls (65 per cent). Because of clerical errors in relating achievement tests to questionnaires, the questionnaire data for waves one and two are based on about 10 per cent fewer respondents in each group. Given the low turnout rates for wave two and other factors (drop-outs, graduates, transfers from control to bused status), our panel of secondary school students with achievement data for both testing periods consists of 195 bused students and 41 control students; for the questionnaire data the panel consists of 135 bused students with data from all 3 waves and 36 control students with data from wave one and wave three. (Only 16 students in the control group had questionnaire data from all three waves. Of the initial sample of control students, over a third had either graduated or transferred into the busing program by the third wave.) In addition, achievement data for elementary grades is available for panels of 147 bused students (66 per cent of the wave one sample) and 41 controls (44 per cent). Given the relatively small proportion of both bused and control students in the panels, there is the chance that the panels are not representative of the full population of bused students and their matched siblings. In the comparisons we make in the next section, therefore, we shall also present data from the complete cross-sections for all waves. The bused panel does not differ significantly from the full cross-section of bused students, and the control panel differs in no way that would affect our main conclusions. In other words, the cross-sectional data can be used as a check on the panel data; the absence of any divergence between the two sets of findings indicates that the attrition of the panels does not invalidate the panel findings.

(Analysis was carried out on the 240 bused students who were in both waves one and three, representing 74 per cent of the wave one sample, and there were no important differences between these results and the results from the smaller three-wave panel.)

4 Research reports for a number of widely-discussed busing programs were not included for various reasons. For example, the Berkeley, California, busing program has not been systematically studied; a report is available, however, which shows that black student achievement is as far behind (or further behind) white achievement after two years of integration as before integration (Dambacher, 1971). A study of the Rochester busing program also lacked a proper pre-test design (Rochester City School District, 1970). The study had pre-test and post-test achievement scores from different tests, and control groups with generally lower pre-test scores; and it used analysis of covariance to make adjustments for post-test scores. Such statistical adjustments do not necessarily eliminate initial differences between the bused and control groups. A third study—of the Evanston integration program—was received too late for inclusion (Hsia, 1971). This report did show, however, that after two to three years of integration, integrated black students were still as far—or farther—behind white students as before integration. This research also confirmed the reduction in black academic self-concept after integration and the tendency for black student grades to decline. We know of no other studies of induced school integration in the North which have the research design necessary for establishing cause and effect relationship—to wit, a longitudinal design with a control group.

5 About half of the elementary students and two thirds of the secondary students...
were new to the program in 1968. However, there were no differences in gain scores for the newly-bused compared to the previously-bused students.

Initial differences between the newly-bused and the previously-bused revealed no particular pattern; for third and fourth graders the previously-bused were higher by .15 points, but for fifth and sixth graders the newly-bused were higher by .5 points; in any event there were no statistically significant differences in gain scores.

The newly-bused students were somewhat higher than the previously-bused initially for both junior and senior high students (.3 and 2.5, respectively), but the differences were not significant.

The control school was a "naturally" integrated school with an increasing proportion of black students; it was scheduled to be closed down the following year.

The pattern of black achievement falling further behind white achievement at later grade levels has been extensively documented (Coleman, 1966; Rosenfeld and Hilton, 1971).

Even these two significant results might not have occurred if the data had been analyzed differently. The author controlled for pre-busing scores using analysis of covariance rather than analyzing gain scores (see footnote 4). Since the author did not present pre-test means, we cannot know if the bused and control groups differed initially.

The grade-point system used here has an A as 4 points, B as 3 points, and so on.

The Ann Arbor study did include a measure of occupational aspiration, but the variation was so great (not to speak of the coding problems presented by such choices as "superman" and "fairy princess") that interpretation was difficult.

A recent Gallup Poll reported that 46 per cent of a national non-white sample are opposed to busing for racial balance; 43 per cent were in favor, and 11 per cent were undecided (August 1971).

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Dear Sirs:

Although I make it a practice to stay away from reporters, some statements of mine were printed in Sunday's (April 9) Times. I want to clarify several things concerning the findings of the so-called "Coleman Report," and the use of those findings by governmental institutions, including the courts:

1. The Report found, as I have testified in various court cases, and as has been confirmed by numerous further analyses of those same data, that the academic achievement of children from lower socio-economic backgrounds (black or white) was benefited by being in schools with children from higher socio-economic backgrounds (black or white).

2. This achievement increment is not nearly sufficient to overcome the educational disadvantage of children from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

3. This effect, however, was greater than those of other school resources of the kind ordinarily added by compensatory programs. The effects of these resources on achievement can hardly be found at all.

My opinion, with which others who have more experience in constitutional law than I may disagree, is that the results stated in 1 and 3 above have been used inappropriately by the courts to support the premise that equal protection for black children is not provided unless racial balance is achieved in schools. I believe it is necessary to recognize that equal protection, in the sense of equal educational opportunity, cannot be provided by the State. Most of the inequality of opportunity originates in the home, through loving care and attention by parents—but differential care and attention, since parents differ—and the State can hope only to add opportunity in such a way that these inequalities are not increased but reduced. This does mean, of course, that actions of the State that have increased racial or socio-economic segregation

CURRENT READING

Coleman on "The Coleman Report"

The following letter, by Professor James Coleman, was sent to the New York Times on April 13th. The Times having failed to find space for it, we are here inserting it into the public record of the debate on busing and school integration:
should be corrected by the courts, but not on the mistaken assumption that they are thereby creating equal educational opportunity.

While the issue of racial integration in schools does not, I believe, involve constitutional questions of equal protection for black children conditional upon increased achievement in integrated schools, it is a matter on which school boards and governmental authorities have a responsibility to take affirmative action—action with a less punitive and blunt quality than some court decisions, but affirmative action nevertheless. In the past 20 years, there has been an increasing self-segregation into homogeneous communities by those families that have greatest freedom to move. The result is an increasing social and economic segregation in the schools, which makes a mockery of the classic American conception of the common school attended by children of all social groups.

Probably the most cogent recent statement on this issue is that made by the New York Board of Regents on March 24, in reaffirming its stand on school integration. The Board of Regents did not mention constitutional equal protection of black students because of greater achievement in integrated schools, but said rather, “This Board cannot foresee any but the most sullen and corrosive scenarios of the future if the multi-colored and multicultured children of this state and nation are not permitted to get to know one another as individuals.”

JAMES S. COLEMAN
Professor of Social Relations

Situation Normal: Paranoia Steady

The Los Angeles Free Press, a so-called “underground newspaper,” runs a regular service to its readers called “Dope Scoreboard,” a kind of consumer’s report on the drug market. In the April 28th issue, there is the following entry on “speed”:

SPEED: Mini-whites are becoming scarcer. No bad reactions reported this week, except usual speed symptoms—paranoia, etc.

The Bewildering Five Per Cent

The Opinion Research Corporation, of Princeton, New Jersey, in the course of a poll on attitudes toward automobile accidents, asked the following question:

I’d like your views on this auto accident case: Suppose you are driving within the speed limit on the right side of the road. A car coming in the opposite direction crosses over into your lane and crashes into your car and you are injured. Who would be at fault, you or the other driver?

One is not surprised that 95 per cent found the other driver at fault. But four per cent answered “don’t know” and one per cent blamed themselves! That makes five per cent of the American population which is guilt-ridden beyond all reason, or utterly irrational, or utterly mischievous in responding to opinion polls, or—what?