People's republics
Delivering Stability — Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000–1800
Andrej Kokkonen & Anders Sundell
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Building a strong autocratic state requires stability in ruler-elite relations. From this perspective the absence of a successor is problematic, as the elite have few incentives to remain loyal if the autocrat cannot reward them for their loyalty after his death. However, an appointed successor has both the capacity and the motive to challenge the autocrat. We argue that a succession based on primogeniture solves the dilemma, by providing the regime with a successor who can afford to wait to inherit the throne peacefully. We test our hypothesis on a dataset covering 961 monarchs ruling 42 European states between 1000 and 1800, and show that fewer monarchs were deposed in states practicing primogeniture than in states practicing alternative succession orders. A similar pattern persists in the world's remaining absolute monarchies. Primogeniture also contributed to building strong states: In 1801 all European monarchies had adopted primogeniture or succumbed to foreign enemies.
----------------------
Democracy Does Not Promote Well-Being Except in Rich Countries With Demanding Climates
Evert Van de Vliert & Tom Postmes
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Is democracy really a good thing because it improves well-being? Everywhere? Here we use multiple regression analysis to examine continuous associations between democracy and well-being across 137 countries. The results are clarified by breaking them down for 20 poor countries with demanding winters or summers (threatening habitats), 48 poor countries with undemanding temperate climates (unthreatening habitats), 23 rich countries with undemanding temperate climates (unchallenging habitats), and 46 rich countries with demanding winters or summers (challenging habitats). We show that democratic governance is negatively related to satisfaction with freedom of choice and overall happiness in threatening habitats and unrelated in unthreatening and unchallenging habitats. Only in challenging habitats of rich countries with demanding climates is democracy positively related to satisfaction with freedom of choice and overall happiness. This pattern of findings, which persists when controlling for a variety of societal risks, might suggest that the link between democracy and well-being can be particularly strengthened by empowering poorer populations in more demanding climates to generate more income.
----------------------
Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence
Alex Rutherford et al.
PLoS ONE, May 2014
Abstract:
We consider the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, testing a theory designed to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace. Characterizing the model's success in predicting peace requires examples where peace prevails despite diversity. Switzerland is recognized as a country of peace, stability and prosperity. This is surprising because of its linguistic and religious diversity that in other parts of the world lead to conflict and violence. Here we analyze how peaceful stability is maintained. Our analysis shows that peace does not depend on integrated coexistence, but rather on well defined topographical and political boundaries separating groups, allowing for partial autonomy within a single country. In Switzerland, mountains and lakes are an important part of the boundaries between sharply defined linguistic areas. Political canton and circle (sub-canton) boundaries often separate religious groups. Where such boundaries do not appear to be sufficient, we find that specific aspects of the population distribution guarantee either sufficient separation or sufficient mixing to inhibit intergroup violence according to the quantitative theory of conflict. In exactly one region, a porous mountain range does not adequately separate linguistic groups and that region has experienced significant violent conflict, leading to the recent creation of the canton of Jura. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that violence between groups can be inhibited by physical and political boundaries. A similar analysis of the area of the former Yugoslavia shows that during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where they did coincide. The success of peace in Switzerland may serve as a model to resolve conflict in other ethnically diverse countries and regions of the world.
----------------------
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability
Christopher Fariss
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
According to indicators of political repression currently used by scholars, human rights practices have not improved over the past 35 years, despite the spread of human rights norms, better monitoring, and the increasing prevalence of electoral democracy. I argue that this empirical pattern is not an indication of stagnating human rights practices. Instead, it reflects a systematic change in the way monitors, like Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, encounter and interpret information about abuses. The standard of accountability used to assess state behaviors becomes more stringent as monitors look harder for abuse, look in more places for abuse, and classify more acts as abuse. In this article, I present a new, theoretically informed measurement model, which generates unbiased estimates of repression using existing data. I then show that respect for human rights has improved over time and that the relationship between human rights respect and ratification of the UN Convention Against Torture is positive, which contradicts findings from existing research.
----------------------
“The People Want the Fall of the Regime”: Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy
Filipe Campante & Davin Chor
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link between education, “grievance”, and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.
----------------------
Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz & Joseph Wright
Annual Review of Political Science, 2014, Pages 147-162
Abstract:
Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes.
----------------------
Andrew Beath et al.
NBER Working Paper, May 2014
Abstract:
We examine the effect of electoral rules on the quality of elected officials using a unique field experiment which induced randomized variation in the method of council elections in 250 villages in Afghanistan. In particular, we compare at-large elections, with a single multi-member district, to district elections, with multiple single member districts. We propose a theoretical model where the difference in the quality of elected officials between the two electoral systems occurs because elected legislators have to bargain over policy, which induces citizens in district elections to vote strategically for candidates with more polarized policy positions even at the expense of candidates' competence. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that elected officials in at-large elections are more educated than those in district elections and that this effect is stronger in more heterogeneous villages. We also find evidence that elected officials in district elections have more biased preferences.
----------------------
Taxation and democracy: An instrumental variable approach
Nurullah Gur
Applied Economics Letters, Summer 2014, Pages 763-766
Abstract:
Our article investigates the effect of taxation on democracy. We exploit exogenous variation in taxation driven by wars from the pre-modern era and document a positive and highly significant first-stage relationship between pre-modern war casualties and taxation. Using this instrumental variable strategy, we find that taxation has a positive effect on democracy.
----------------------
Coup d’état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008
Clayton Thyne & Jonathan Powell
Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a threat to consolidated and fledgling democracies. Policymakers have adapted to this viewpoint by treating coups as unjustifiable maneuvers that must be curtailed, with states frequently terminating aid and IOs suspending membership following a coup. While coups clearly confound democratic consolidation, it is notable that the vast majority of coups do not happen in democracies. Therefore, we focus on authoritarian regimes in seeking to discover how coups might open paths toward democratization. We first argue that successful coups should promote democratization because leaders have incentives to democratize quickly in order to establish political legitimacy and economic growth. Second, we view failed coups as credible signals that leaders must enact meaningful reforms to remain in power. Empirical analyses strongly support the argument that coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least likely to democratize otherwise.
----------------------
Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War
Jakana Thomas
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.
----------------------
Resource Concentration and Civil Wars
Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner
NBER Working Paper, May 2014
Abstract:
This paper highlights the importance of natural resource concentration and ethnic group regional concentration for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts war to be more likely when resource and group concentration are high, and the empirical analysis, both at the country level and at the ethnic group level, confirms the essential role of geographic concentration variables for civil war.
----------------------
Income Growth, Ethnic Polarization, and Political Risk: Evidence from International Oil Price Shocks
Markus Brückner & Mark Gradstein
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of growth in countries’ national incomes on political risk. To address causality, we use the annual growth rate of the international oil price weighted with countries’ average oil net-export GDP shares as an instrument for national income growth. Our instrumental variables analysis yields two main results: (i) income growth has on average a significant negative effect on countries’ political risk; (ii) the marginal effect of income growth on political risk is significantly decreasing in cross-country differences in ethnic polarization, so much so that at high levels of ethnic polarization income growth increases political risk while at low levels of ethnic polarization income growth reduces political risk.
----------------------
Intergroup Violence and Political Attitudes: Evidence from a Dividing Sudan
Bernd Beber, Philip Roessler & Alexandra Scacco
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do episodes of intergroup violence affect political opinions toward outgroup members? Recent studies offer divergent answers. Some suggest violence deepens antagonism and reduces support for compromise, while others contend it encourages moderation and concessions to prevent further conflict. We argue that violence can fuel both hostility toward the outgroup and acceptance of outgroup objectives and provide evidence from a unique survey of 1,380 respondents implemented by the authors in greater Khartoum in Sudan in 2010 and 2011. We find that Northerners who experienced rioting by Southerners in Khartoum in 2005 were more likely to support Southern independence but less likely to support citizenship for Southerners remaining in the North. In combination, these results suggest that political violence hardens negative intergroup attitudes and makes individuals willing to concede separation to avoid living alongside outgroup members.
----------------------
Sexual violence in armed conflict: Introducing the SVAC dataset, 1989–2009
Dara Kay Cohen & Ragnhild Nordås
Journal of Peace Research, May 2014, Pages 418-428
Abstract:
Which armed groups have perpetrated sexual violence in recent conflicts? This article presents patterns from the new Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset. The dataset, coded from the three most widely used sources in the quantitative human rights literature, covers 129 active conflicts, and the 625 armed actors involved in these conflicts, during the period 1989–2009. The unit of observation is the conflict-actor-year, allowing for detailed analysis of the patterns of perpetration of sexual violence for each conflict actor. The dataset captures six dimensions of sexual violence: prevalence, perpetrators, victims, forms, location, and timing. In addition to active conflict-years, the dataset also includes reports of sexual violence committed by conflict actors in the five years post-conflict. We use the data to trace variation in reported conflict-related sexual violence over time, space, and actor type, and outline the dataset's potential utility for scholars. Among the insights offered are that the prevalence of sexual violence varies dramatically by perpetrator group, suggesting that sexual violations are common – but not ubiquitous. In addition, we find that state militaries are more likely to be reported as perpetrators of sexual violence than either rebel groups or militias. Finally, reports of sexual violence continue into the post-conflict period, sometimes at very high levels. The data may be helpful both to scholars and policymakers for better understanding the patterns of sexual violence, its causes, and its consequences.
----------------------
The Distributive Politics of Enforcement
Alisha Holland
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: Enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Using an original data set on unlicensed street vending and enforcement operations at the subcity district level in three Latin American capital cities, I show that the combination of voter demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement. Supported by qualitative interviews, these findings suggest how the intentional nonenforcement of law, or forbearance, can be an electoral strategy. Dominant theories based on state capacity poorly explain the results.
----------------------
Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China
Melanie Manion
China Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article draws on evidence from loosely structured interviews and data from original surveys of 5,130 delegates in township, county and municipal congresses to argue that congressional representation unfolds as authoritarian parochialism in China. It makes three new arguments. First, popularly elected local congresses that once only mechanically stood in for the Chinese mass public, through demographically descriptive and politically symbolic representation, now work as substantively representative institutions. Chinese local congressmen and women view themselves and act as “delegates,” not Burkean trustees or Leninist party agents. Second, this congressional representation is not commonly expressed in the quintessentially legislative activities familiar in other regime types. Rather, it is an extra-legislative variant of pork-barrel politics: parochial activity by delegates to deliver targeted public goods to the geographic constituency. Third, this authoritarian parochialism is due to institutional arrangements and regime priorities, some common to single-party dictatorships and some distinct to Chinese authoritarianism.
----------------------
Regime Spoiler or Regime Pawn: The Military and Distributional Conflict in Non-Democracies
Atsu Amegashie
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or a revolution by the citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play a passive role. The autocrat determines the distribution of the country’s wealth among himself, the military, and the citizens. I find that, under certain conditions, there exists a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in which there are no coups, the citizens revolt in each period, and the military fights on behalf of the autocrat. Under a different set of conditions, there is another equilibrium in which there are no coups, the citizens always revolt, but the military does not fight the revolt. However, peace (no revolts) is also an equilibrium of the model. The model is consistent with the persistence of social unrest or civil wars in certain countries and the different roles played by the military in different countries. Surprisingly, I find that if the citizens’ outside option (i.e., payoff in a democracy) improves, this is likely to make them worse off. Furthermore, an increase in natural resources is likely to make the citizens worse off because it reduces the probability of a transition to democracy or the prospect of good governance in autocracy. I discuss other implications of the model and relate it to real-world events.
----------------------
Yesterday’s heroes, today’s villains: Ideology, corruption, and democratic performance
Daniel Gingerich
Journal of Theoretical Politics, April 2014, Pages 249-282
Abstract:
This paper develops a game-theoretic model for assessing the relationship between ideological divisions in a society and prospects for good governance. Synthesizing the insights of the literature on political career concerns with those from the literature on issue framing, the model emphasizes that ideological balance — rough equality in the ideological component of utility the median voter derives from government and opposition — is the key to good governance. Polities which are ideologically balanced are ruled by elites who attempt to impress their merit upon the electorate through the provision of public goods. Ideologically imbalanced polities are ruled by elites who use public resources for their own consumption and who court voters through socially unproductive issue framing. The cases of pre-revolutionary Cuba, post-apartheid South Africa, and post-Pinochet Chile are used to illustrate the crucial importance of ideological balance for good governance.
----------------------
A Checkpoint Effect? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Travel Restrictions in the West Bank
Matthew Longo, Daphna Canetti & Nancy Hite-Rubin
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does nonviolent repression prompt subject groups to obey or rebel? By what mechanism does it do so? To address these questions, we exploit a natural experiment based on a 2009 policy toward the “easement” of checkpoints — nonviolent impediments to movement — in the West Bank. We sample populations across 17 villages (n = 599), beside one checkpoint slated for easement (treatment) and one that will undergo no change (control), before and after the intervention. We then pursue difference-in-difference estimation. This design is experimental, as easement was orthogonal to Palestinian attitudes; for robustness, we test our findings against an independent panel (n = 1,200). We find that easement makes subject populations less likely to support violence; we suggest humiliation as the mechanism bridging nonviolent repression with militancy. This warrants rethinking Israeli security policy, as short-term concerns over Palestinian mobility may be compromising Israel's long-term interests. By extension, checkpoint easement may positively affect peace negotiations.
----------------------
On the Wrong Side of the Law – Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary
Stefan Voigt & Jerg Gutmann
International Review of Law and Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Empirical research on the determinants of corruption has made substantial progress over the last decade. To date, the consequences of different structures of the legal enforcement institutions have, however, only played a marginal role. This contribution deals with both the determinants of corruption in the judiciary and the consequences of judicial organization for corruption at large. Regarding the latter, it is shown that the actual independence of the judiciary as well as that of prosecution agencies is correlated with lower levels of corruption. This is also true for a third indicator that measures the degree to which judges are held accountable for their decisions (“judicial accountability”). Furthermore, independence and accountability function as complements in preventing corruption – judicial accountability without independence appears to be ineffective, whereas judicial or prosecutorial independence alone can even have adverse effects.
----------------------
The Returns to Office in a “Rubber Stamp” Parliament
Rory Truex
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are there returns to office in an authoritarian parliament? A new dataset shows that over 500 deputies to China’s National People’s Congress are CEOs of various companies. Entropy balancing is used to construct a weighted portfolio of Chinese companies that matches companies with NPC representation on relevant financial characteristics prior to the 11th Congress (2008–2012). The weighted fixed effect analysis suggests that a seat in the NPC is worth an additional 1.5 percentage points in returns and a 3 to 4 percentage point boost in operating profit margin in a given year. Additional evidence reveals that these rents stem primarily from the “reputation boost” of the position, and not necessarily formal policy influence. These findings confirm the assumptions of several prominent theories of authoritarian politics but suggest the need to further probe the nature of these institutions.
----------------------
Capitalism and (versus?) democracy: Stock markets and democratization in transition
Christopher Hartwell
Applied Economics Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article takes a look at the determinants of democracy in transition economies, with reference to the role of financial markets. Using three different proxies for financial market development, I find that stock exchanges appear to correlate with lower levels of democracy on average, although the most successful democracies also have the largest stock markets. Nonlinearities thus appear to exist in the relationship between financial markets and political institutions in transition.
----------------------
Davide Cantoni et al.
NBER Working Paper, May 2014
Abstract:
We study the causal effect of school curricula on students’ stated beliefs and attitudes. We exploit a major textbook reform in China that was rolled out between 2004 and 2010 with the explicit intention of shaping youths’ ideology. To measure its effect, we present evidence from a novel survey we conducted among 2000 students at Peking University. The sharp, staggered introduction of the new curriculum across provinces allows us to identify the effects of the new educational content in a generalized difference in differences framework. We examine government documents articulating desired consequences of the reform, and identify changes in textbook content and college entrance exams that reflect the government’s aims. These changes were often effective: study under the new curriculum is robustly associated with changed views on political participation and democracy in China, increased trust in government officials, and a more skeptical view of free markets.
----------------------
Konstantin Ash
Democratization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent work on competitive authoritarianism has not explored the full consequences of electoral participation for opposition movements. While prominent work argues that the government must employ a mix of side-payments and repression to fragment opposition to its rule, Belarus’ history since the ascension of President Alexander Lukashenko in 1994 shows that the opposition has been repressed after most parliamentary and presidential elections without any substantial co-optation. I argue that electoral contestation and subsequent post-electoral repression have led to the Belarusian opposition's fragmented state. This state is grounded in competition for foreign aid, which creates a need among Belarusian opposition leaders to demonstrate their ability to mobilize support through campaigns. Invariably, successful opposition leaders emerge as the principal challengers to the regime, leading to their arrest or exile. Repression then fosters division within anti-government movements and restarts the cycle for new aid-seeking parties and leaders. A quantitative test establishes that repression concentrates in post-electoral periods and a qualitative assessment shows that opposition fragmentation stems from the arrest or exile of opposition leaders. The empirical findings provide contrasting evidence to work on co-optation in autocracies while suggesting an adverse effect of foreign democracy assistance around the world.