Behave
Can Classic Moral Stories Promote Honesty in Children?
Kang Lee et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The classic moral stories have been used extensively to teach children about the consequences of lying and the virtue of honesty. Despite their widespread use, there is no evidence whether these stories actually promote honesty in children. This study compared the effectiveness of four classic moral stories in promoting honesty in 3- to 7-year-olds. Surprisingly, the stories of “Pinocchio” and “The Boy Who Cried Wolf” failed to reduce lying in children. In contrast, the apocryphal story of “George Washington and the Cherry Tree” significantly increased truth telling. Further results suggest that the reason for the difference in honesty-promoting effectiveness between the “George Washington” story and the other stories was that the former emphasizes the positive consequences of honesty, whereas the latter focus on the negative consequences of dishonesty. When the “George Washington” story was altered to focus on the negative consequences of dishonesty, it too failed to promote honesty in children.
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The morality of larks and owls: Unethical behavior depends on chronotype as well as time-of-day
Brian Gunia, Christopher Barnes & Sunita Sah
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The recently-documented “morning morality effect” indicates that people act most ethically in the morning because their energy wanes with the day. An estimated 40% of the population, however, experience increased energy levels later in the day. These “evening people,” we propose, should not show the morning morality effect. Instead, they should show the same or an increasing propensity toward ethicality in the evening, depending on the relative strength of the two processes governing their sleep. Two experiments supported the predicted interaction, showing that people with a morning chronotype tend to behave more ethically in the morning than the evening, while people with an evening chronotype tend to behave more ethically in the evening than the morning. Thus, understanding when people will behave unethically may require an appreciation of both the person (chronotype) and the situation (time-of-day): a chronotype morality effect.
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Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature Reduces Retribution
Azim Shariff et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
If free-will beliefs support attributions of moral responsibility, then reducing these beliefs should make people less retributive in their attitudes about punishment. Four studies tested this prediction using both measured and manipulated free-will beliefs. Study 1 found that people with weaker free-will beliefs endorsed less retributive, but not consequentialist, attitudes regarding punishment of criminals. Subsequent studies showed that learning about the neural bases of human behavior, through either lab-based manipulations or attendance at an undergraduate neuroscience course, reduced people’s support for retributive punishment (Studies 2–4). These results illustrate that exposure to debates about free will and to scientific research on the neural basis of behavior may have consequences for attributions of moral responsibility.
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Three attempts to replicate the moral licensing effect
Irene Blanken et al.
Social Psychology, Summer 2014, Pages 232-238
Abstract:
The present work includes three attempts to replicate the moral licensing effect by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009). The original authors found that writing about positive traits led to lower donations to charity and decreased cooperative behavior. The first two replication attempts (student samples, 95% power based on the initial findings, NStudy1 = 105, NStudy2 = 150), did not confirm the original results. The third replication attempt (MTurk sample, 95% power based on a meta-analysis on self-licensing, N = 940) also did not confirm the moral licensing effect. We conclude that (1) there is as of yet no strong support for the moral self-regulation framework proposed in Sachdeva et al. (2009) (2) the manipulation used is unlikely to induce moral licensing, and (3) studies on moral licensing should use a neutral control condition.
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David Johnson, Felix Cheung & Brent Donnellan
Social Psychology, Summer 2014, Pages 209-215
Abstract:
Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008) hypothesized that physical cleanliness reduces the severity of moral judgments. In support of this idea, they found that individuals make less severe judgments when they are primed with the concept of cleanliness (Exp. 1) and when they wash their hands after experiencing disgust (Exp. 2). We conducted direct replications of both studies using materials supplied by the original authors. We did not find evidence that physical cleanliness reduced the severity of moral judgments using samples sizes that provided over .99 power to detect the original effect sizes. Our estimates of the overall effect size were much smaller than estimates from Experiment 1 (original d = −0.60, 95% CI [−1.23, 0.04], N = 40; replication d = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.28, 0.26], N = 208) and Experiment 2 (original d = −0.85, 95% CI [−1.47, −0.22], N = 43; replication d = 0.01, 95% CI [−.34, 0.36], N = 126). These findings suggest that the population effect sizes are probably substantially smaller than the original estimates. Researchers investigating the connections between cleanliness and morality should therefore use large sample sizes to have the necessary power to detect subtle effects.
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For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment
Charles Millar, John Turri & Ori Friedman
Cognition, October 2014, Pages 79–84
Abstract:
People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.
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The social and ethical consequences of a calculative mindset
Long Wang, Chen-Bo Zhong & Keith Murnighan
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, forthcoming
Abstract:
Rational choice models suggest that decisions should be both deliberate and calculative. In contrast, the current research suggests that calculations may lead to unintended social and moral consequences. We tested whether engaging in a calculative task would lead decision makers to overlook the social and moral consequences of their subsequent decisions and act selfishly and unethically. In each of the first four experiments, participants first completed either a calculative or a comparable, non-calculative task followed by an ostensibly unrelated decision task (either a Dictator or a modified Ultimatum Game). Compared to the non-calculative tasks, completing the calculative tasks led people to be consistently more selfish in the Dictator Game and more unethical in the modified Ultimatum Game. A final experiment tested whether the calculative task led to more self-interested behavior through increased utilitarian judgments and dampened emotional reactions; it also examined whether a subtle, social intervention might mitigate these effects.
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Isaac Smith et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Throughout history, principles such as obedience, loyalty, and purity have been instrumental in binding people together and helping them thrive as groups, tribes, and nations. However, these same principles have also led to in-group favoritism, war, and even genocide. Does adhering to the binding moral foundations that underlie such principles unavoidably lead to the derogation of out-group members? We demonstrated that for people with a strong moral identity, the answer is “no,” because they are more likely than those with a weak moral identity to extend moral concern to people belonging to a perceived out-group. Across three studies, strongly endorsing the binding moral foundations indeed predicted support for the torture of out-group members (Studies 1a and 1b) and withholding of necessary help from out-group members (Study 2), but this relationship was attenuated among participants who also had a strong moral identity.
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Florian van Leeuwen et al.
Evolution and Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study evaluated the extent to which predictions derived from several theories could account for variability in human moral values across US states. We investigated moral values as conceptualized by Moral Foundations Theory, which argues that morality evolved in response to adaptive challenges in at least five domains: Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, Purity/sanctity ("binding" foundations) and Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity ("individualizing" foundations). We report correlations for measures of cognitive ability, social class, urbanization, pathogen prevalence, life expectancy, and teenage birth rates. Social class and educational attainment had fairly consistent but small effects across moral foundations (social class: positively associated with Ingroup/loyalty, negatively with individualizing foundations and Purity/sanctity; education: positively associated with individualizing foundations, negatively with binding foundations). We conducted multilevel regressions that were stratified for ethnicity. The most consistent state-level predictor of moral values was teenage birth rates (negatively associated with individualizing foundations, positively with binding foundations). This suggests that life-history theory may provide an explanation for individual differences in moral values, although the directions of effects for teenage birth rates diverged from predictions of life-history theory. We conclude that none of the tested theories provides a good explanation for the observed variability in moral values in the USA. We discuss how a life-history approach might account for the findings, and note the need for improved measurement of pathogen stress to better distinguish its effects from those of life-history variables.
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Moral hypocrisy: Impression Management or Self-Deception?
Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Bernd Irlenbusch & Gari Walkowitz
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, November 2014, Pages 53–62
Abstract:
In three studies (S1-S3; N = 256) we investigated whether moral hypocrisy (MH) is motivated by conscious impression management concerns or whether it is self-deceptive. In a dictator game, MH occurred both within participants (saying one thing, doing another; S1) and between participants (doing one thing when it is inconsequential, doing another thing when it affects payoffs; S2). People were willing to let an ostensibly fair coin determine payoffs only if they could fudge the results of the coin flip, suggesting that hypocrites do not deceive themselves (S3). Also supporting this view, MH was associated with adherence to Conformity values (S1-S2), indicative of a desire to appear moral in the eyes of others but not indicative of self-deception. Universalism values were predictive of moral integrity (S1, S3).
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Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest
Anna van’t Veer, Mariëlle Stel & Ilja van Beest
Judgment and Decision Making, May 2014, Pages 199–206
Abstract:
The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high cognitive load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three times and reported their outcomes — of which one of the rolls would be paid out — while either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high cognitive load, reported die rolls that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition, suggesting that participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.
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Does 'Could' Lead to Good? Toward a Theory of Moral Insight
Ting Zhang, Francesca Gino & Joshua Margolis
Harvard Working Paper, June 2014
Abstract:
We introduce the construct of moral insight and study how it can be elicited when people face ethical dilemmas - challenging decisions that feature tradeoffs between competing and seemingly incompatible values. Moral insight consists of discovering solutions that move beyond selecting one conflicting ethical option over another. Moral insight encompasses both a cognitive process and a discernible output: it involves the realization that an ethical dilemma might be addressed other than by conceding one set of moral imperatives to meet another, and it involves the generation of solutions that allow competing objectives to be met. Across four studies, we find that moral insight is generated when individuals are prompted to consider the question “What could I do?” in place of their intuitive approach of considering “What should I do?” Together, these studies point toward a theory of moral insight and important practical implications.
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Repeated Exposure to Narrative Entertainment and the Salience of Moral Intuitions
Allison Eden et al.
Journal of Communication, June 2014, Pages 501–520
Abstract:
R. Tamborini (2011, 2012) recently proposed the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which combines theoretical developments in moral psychology with media theory to predict the influence of media exposure on morality. To test predictions from this model, a quasi-experimental study conducted over 8 weeks exposed selected participants to an online soap opera. Participants' moral intuitions were measured pre-exposure and postexposure. Consistent with predictions, results showed that repeated exposure to morally relevant media content is capable of influencing the salience of moral intuitions. The findings are consistent with the model's description of underlying mechanisms explicating the manner in which entertainment can influence moral judgments, and demonstrate the value of understanding the relationship between exposure to entertainment and moral judgment processes.
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How selfish is memory for cheaters? Evidence for moral and egoistic biases
Raoul Bell, Cécile Schain & Gerald Echterhoff
Cognition, September 2014, Pages 437–442
Abstract:
We remember very well when another person has cheated us, but is this due to the cheating’s immorality or due to its negative consequences? Theories claiming that reputational memory helps retaliate cheating imply that we should be sensitive both to the norm violation and to the personal consequences of another person’s cheating. In the present study, faces were presented with descriptions of immoral and moral behavior. In contrast to previous studies, the morality and the personal consequences of the behaviors were orthogonally manipulated (both cheating and trustworthy behavior could lead to personal benefits or costs). In a surprise memory test, participants were required to remember whether the faces were associated with moral or immoral behaviors, or with personal benefits or costs. Overall, the morality of the behaviors was better remembered than were the personal consequences of the same behaviors. However, the immorality of morally questionable behaviors was well remembered when associated with personal costs, and poorly remembered when associated with personal benefits. Apparently, people’s categorization of the social environment is based on moral judgments, but also reflects self-serving biases.
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Conscience without Cognition: The Effects of Subconscious Priming on Ethical Behavior
David Welsh & Lisa Ordóñez
Academy of Management Journal, June 2014, Pages 723-742
Abstract:
Research in the field of behavioral ethics has traditionally viewed ethical decision making as rational and deliberate. However, some recent research has proposed a dual process model of ethical decision making that has both conscious and subconscious components (Reynolds, 2006). We extend current theory by using subconscious ethical and unethical priming to test the effects of subconscious processes on ethical behavior through an automatic process of schema activation and implicit association. Studies 1 and 2 extend self-concept maintenance theory (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008) by exploring the mediated process through which subconscious ethical and unethical primes trigger the activation of moral standards, thereby influencing categorization and subsequent responses to morally ambiguous situations. Study 3 demonstrates that both subconscious ethical and unethical priming reduce dishonesty even when participants are unmonitored and are given difficult performance goals that previously have been shown to lead to unethical behavior.
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Andrew Monroe, Kyle Dillon & Bertram Malle
Consciousness and Cognition, July 2014, Pages 100–108
Abstract:
Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will — a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused “first mover,” and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people’s judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will.